2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
66 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
68 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
69 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
73 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
79 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
81 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
82 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
83 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
84 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
91 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
97 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
99 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
102 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
103 * ciphersuite or for SRP
105 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
114 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
115 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
116 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
117 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
119 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
120 * (transition not allowed)
122 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
124 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
127 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
128 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
129 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
132 switch (st->hand_state) {
136 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
138 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
139 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
154 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
172 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
174 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
180 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
186 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
194 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
195 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
198 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
199 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
205 /* No valid transition found */
210 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
211 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
212 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
213 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
215 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
216 * (transition not allowed)
218 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
220 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
224 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
225 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
227 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
228 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
233 switch (st->hand_state) {
237 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
238 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
239 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
243 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
244 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
245 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
256 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
258 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
259 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
262 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
263 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
266 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
267 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
272 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
274 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
275 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
276 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
279 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
280 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
284 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
285 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
287 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
288 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
289 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
290 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
292 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
293 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
294 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
295 * the server is resuming.
298 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
300 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
301 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
302 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
303 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
307 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
308 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
310 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
311 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
312 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
313 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
316 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
317 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
318 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
320 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
321 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
330 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
331 * |ext.status_expected| is set
333 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
339 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
340 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
341 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
342 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
343 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
344 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
345 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
352 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
353 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
354 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
362 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
363 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
369 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
370 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
371 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
372 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
375 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
376 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
381 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
382 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
383 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
388 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
389 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
390 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
396 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
397 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
404 /* No valid transition found */
405 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
406 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
411 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
412 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
415 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
417 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
420 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
421 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
422 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
424 switch (st->hand_state) {
426 /* Shouldn't happen */
427 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
429 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
430 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
431 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
433 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
438 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY)
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
441 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
442 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
443 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
445 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
446 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
447 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
452 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
453 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
460 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
461 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
467 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
468 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
469 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
475 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 /* Try to read from the server instead */
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
485 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
486 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
488 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
490 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
493 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
494 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
498 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
500 switch (st->hand_state) {
502 /* Shouldn't happen */
503 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
506 if (!s->renegotiate) {
508 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
509 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
511 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
513 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
516 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
519 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
521 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
522 * actually selected a version yet.
524 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
525 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
528 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
531 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
533 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
534 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
536 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
538 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
540 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
541 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
542 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
544 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
545 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
548 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
549 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
551 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
553 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
554 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
557 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
558 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
559 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
560 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
562 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
563 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
567 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
570 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
572 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
577 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
579 hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
581 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
586 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
588 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
589 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
594 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
596 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
597 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
599 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
602 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
608 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
611 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
613 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
616 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
617 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
618 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
619 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
624 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
625 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
630 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
631 * the client to the server.
633 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
635 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
637 switch (st->hand_state) {
639 /* No pre work to be done */
642 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
644 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
645 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
646 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
647 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
653 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
654 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
657 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
658 * messages unless we need to.
662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
663 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
664 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
669 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
670 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
672 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
675 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
679 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
680 * client to the server.
682 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
684 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
688 switch (st->hand_state) {
690 /* No post work to be done */
693 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
694 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
697 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
698 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
702 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
703 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
705 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
706 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
707 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
709 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
710 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
715 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
716 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
720 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
721 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
722 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
723 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
725 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
726 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
728 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
730 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
733 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
734 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
737 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
741 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
744 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
749 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
753 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
755 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
757 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
760 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
764 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
767 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
768 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
769 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
774 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
775 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
777 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
782 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
786 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
789 * Valid return values are:
793 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
794 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
796 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
798 switch (st->hand_state) {
800 /* Shouldn't happen */
803 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
805 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
807 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
808 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
811 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
812 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
813 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
817 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
818 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
821 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
822 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
823 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
826 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
827 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
828 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
831 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
832 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
833 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
834 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
837 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
838 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
839 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
842 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
843 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
844 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
852 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
853 * reading. Excludes the message header.
855 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
857 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
859 switch (st->hand_state) {
861 /* Shouldn't happen */
864 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
865 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
867 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
868 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
870 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
871 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
874 return s->max_cert_list;
876 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
877 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
879 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
880 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
882 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
883 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
885 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
887 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
888 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
889 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
891 return s->max_cert_list;
893 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
894 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
896 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
897 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
899 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
901 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
902 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
904 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
905 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
907 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
908 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
910 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
911 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
916 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
918 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
920 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
922 switch (st->hand_state) {
924 /* Shouldn't happen */
925 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
927 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
928 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
930 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
931 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
933 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
934 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
937 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
939 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
940 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
942 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
943 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
945 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
946 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
948 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
949 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
951 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
952 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
954 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
955 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
957 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
958 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
960 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
961 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
963 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
964 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
966 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
967 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
969 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
970 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
975 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
978 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
980 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
982 switch (st->hand_state) {
984 /* Shouldn't happen */
987 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
988 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
991 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
992 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
993 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
994 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
995 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
996 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
997 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
998 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1001 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1002 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1007 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1012 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1016 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1018 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1019 /* Should not happen */
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1024 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1025 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1026 if (protverr != 0) {
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1031 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
1033 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
1034 * "ticket" without a session ID.
1036 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
1037 (sess->not_resumable)) {
1038 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1041 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1043 p = s->s3->client_random;
1046 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1047 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1049 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1052 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1061 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
1065 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1066 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1067 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1068 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1069 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1070 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1071 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1072 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1075 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1076 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1077 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1078 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1079 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1080 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1081 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1082 * know that is maximum server supports.
1083 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1084 * containing version 1.0.
1086 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1087 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1088 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1089 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1090 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1091 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1092 * the negotiated version.
1094 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1095 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1097 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1098 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1104 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1107 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1108 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1109 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1110 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1112 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1117 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1118 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1119 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1120 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1121 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1127 /* Ciphers supported */
1128 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1132 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1133 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1135 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1141 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1146 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1147 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1148 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1149 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1150 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1151 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1152 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1159 /* Add the NULL method */
1160 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 /* TLS extensions */
1166 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1167 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1175 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1181 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1182 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1183 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1188 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1189 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1190 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1195 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1196 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1200 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1202 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1204 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1205 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1206 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1209 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1211 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1212 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1213 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1214 size_t session_id_len;
1215 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1216 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1217 unsigned int compression;
1218 unsigned int sversion;
1219 unsigned int context;
1221 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1226 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1227 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1232 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1233 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1234 if (protverr != 0) {
1235 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1240 /* load the server hello data */
1241 /* load the server random */
1242 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1243 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1248 /* Get the session-id. */
1249 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1250 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1251 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1255 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1256 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1257 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1258 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1260 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1264 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1268 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1270 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1274 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1275 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1277 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1284 /* TLS extensions */
1285 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1286 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1287 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1288 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1293 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1294 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1295 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL))
1300 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1301 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1302 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1303 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1304 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1308 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1309 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1310 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1311 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1312 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1313 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1314 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1315 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1316 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1317 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1319 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1320 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1321 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1323 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1324 * backwards compat reasons
1326 int master_key_length;
1327 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1328 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1331 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1332 && master_key_length > 0) {
1333 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1334 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1335 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1343 if (session_id_len != 0
1344 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1345 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1346 session_id_len) == 0)
1351 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1352 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1353 /* actually a client application bug */
1354 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1356 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1361 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1362 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1363 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1364 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1365 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1367 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1369 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1370 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1371 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1372 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1377 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1378 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1379 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1380 if (session_id_len > 0)
1381 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1385 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1386 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1387 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1390 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1394 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1396 /* unknown cipher */
1397 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1402 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1405 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1406 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1408 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1409 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1411 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1412 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1417 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1418 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1420 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1421 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1427 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1428 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1429 * set and use it for comparison.
1431 if (s->session->cipher)
1432 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1433 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1434 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1436 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1439 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1441 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1442 if (compression != 0) {
1443 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1445 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1449 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1450 * using compression.
1452 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1457 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1458 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1460 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1463 if (compression == 0)
1465 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1466 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1467 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1470 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1473 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1474 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1476 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1479 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1483 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1487 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1488 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1489 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1492 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1495 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1496 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1498 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1499 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1501 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1504 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1505 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1506 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1511 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1512 * we're done with this message
1515 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1516 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1517 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1518 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1523 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1524 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1526 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1527 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1528 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1529 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1532 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1534 unsigned int sversion;
1536 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1540 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1541 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1546 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1548 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1549 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1550 if (errorcode != 0) {
1551 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1556 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1557 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1562 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1563 &extensions, &al, NULL)
1564 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1565 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1568 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1570 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1572 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1573 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1574 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1575 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1578 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1580 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1581 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1583 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1584 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1585 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1587 unsigned int context = 0;
1589 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1594 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1596 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1597 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1598 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1602 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1603 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1604 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1605 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1607 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1611 certstart = certbytes;
1612 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1614 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1618 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1619 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1621 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1625 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1626 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1629 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1630 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1634 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1635 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
1636 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1637 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1638 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1641 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1644 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1651 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1653 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1654 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1655 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1656 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1657 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1658 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1659 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1660 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1661 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1662 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1663 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1664 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1666 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1667 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1669 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1672 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1675 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1679 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1681 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1682 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1684 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1687 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1690 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1692 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1696 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1700 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1705 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1709 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1710 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1713 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1714 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1715 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1716 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1717 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1718 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1720 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1722 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1726 s->session->peer_type = i;
1728 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1730 s->session->peer = x;
1731 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1734 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1736 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1737 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1738 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1739 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1744 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1748 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1750 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1753 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1757 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1760 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1762 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1764 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1765 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1771 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1772 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1773 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1776 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1777 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1782 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1783 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1784 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1785 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1786 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1787 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1794 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1799 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1802 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1804 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1805 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1806 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1807 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1808 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1813 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1815 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1816 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1818 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1819 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1821 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1822 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1824 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1825 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1826 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1827 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1831 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1832 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1833 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1837 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1838 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1839 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1844 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1849 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1852 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1853 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1856 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1860 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1861 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1862 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1863 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1868 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1871 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1872 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1877 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1878 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1879 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1881 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1882 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1883 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1884 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1885 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1889 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1890 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1891 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1896 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1897 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1903 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1904 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1909 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1910 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1916 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1917 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1918 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1922 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1923 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1928 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1931 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1932 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1934 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1935 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1936 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1945 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1950 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1955 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1959 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1961 unsigned int curve_flags;
1962 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1965 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1966 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1967 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1969 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1970 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1975 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1976 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1978 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1979 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1984 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1986 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1987 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1989 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1993 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1994 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1996 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1997 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2002 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2004 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2005 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2007 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2008 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
2009 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2010 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2012 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2015 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2019 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2020 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2025 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2026 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2027 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2028 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2034 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2035 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2038 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2039 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2040 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2041 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2042 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2047 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2052 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2056 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2057 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2058 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2059 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2061 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2063 save_param_start = *pkt;
2065 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2066 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2067 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2070 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2071 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2075 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2076 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2077 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2078 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2080 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2081 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2083 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2084 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2087 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2092 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2096 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2099 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2100 * equals the length of the parameters.
2102 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2103 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2104 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2105 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2110 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2111 unsigned int sigalg;
2114 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2115 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2119 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2121 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2123 } else if (rv == 0) {
2124 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2128 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2130 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2131 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2135 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
2137 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2138 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2139 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2140 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2143 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2145 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2146 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2151 * Check signature length
2153 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2154 /* wrong packet length */
2155 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2157 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2161 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2162 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2163 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2164 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2168 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2169 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2173 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2174 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2175 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2176 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2177 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2182 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2183 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2184 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2185 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2186 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2187 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2188 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2192 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2193 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2195 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2196 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2199 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2202 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2203 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2204 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2205 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2206 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2207 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2208 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2211 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2215 /* still data left over */
2216 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2217 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2223 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2226 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2227 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2228 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2229 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2232 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2234 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2235 unsigned int i, name_len;
2236 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2237 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2238 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2241 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2246 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2249 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2250 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2251 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2252 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2253 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2254 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2256 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2262 /* get the certificate types */
2263 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2264 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2266 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2270 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2276 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2279 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2280 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2282 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2286 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2287 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2288 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2289 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2290 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2292 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2295 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2296 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2302 /* get the CA RDNs */
2303 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2304 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2309 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2310 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2311 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2312 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2313 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2314 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2318 namestart = namebytes;
2320 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2321 name_len)) == NULL) {
2322 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2327 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2328 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2330 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2333 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2339 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to parse and process extensions, for now ignore */
2340 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2343 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &reqexts)) {
2344 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2346 SSL_R_EXT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2351 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2352 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2357 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2358 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2359 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2360 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2363 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2366 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2369 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2373 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2375 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2378 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2380 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2381 unsigned int ticklen;
2382 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2383 unsigned int sess_len;
2384 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2386 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2387 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2388 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2389 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2391 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2397 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2398 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2399 * be 0 here in that instance
2402 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2404 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2405 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2406 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2407 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2409 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2412 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2414 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2416 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2419 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2420 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2425 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2426 s->session = new_sess;
2430 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2431 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2433 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2435 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2436 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2437 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2439 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2440 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2444 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2445 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2446 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2450 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2451 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2452 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2454 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2457 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2458 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2459 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2461 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2462 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2469 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2470 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2471 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2472 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2473 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2474 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2475 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2476 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2477 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2480 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2481 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2483 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2484 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2485 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2486 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2489 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2491 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2492 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2494 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2495 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2498 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2500 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2502 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2504 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2508 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2509 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2510 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2512 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2517 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2518 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2519 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2521 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2524 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2525 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2526 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2530 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2531 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2532 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2536 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2537 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2541 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2547 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2551 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2552 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2553 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2554 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2557 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2561 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2562 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2563 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2566 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2569 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2572 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2573 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2578 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2579 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2580 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2582 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2583 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2584 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2587 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2588 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2589 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2593 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2594 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2595 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2600 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2601 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2602 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2603 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2612 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2614 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2616 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2617 /* should contain no data */
2618 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2623 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2624 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2632 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2634 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2638 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2639 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2640 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2641 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2644 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2647 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2648 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2649 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2652 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2657 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2658 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2661 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2662 size_t identitylen = 0;
2663 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2664 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2665 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2668 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2670 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2674 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2676 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2677 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2680 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2682 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2684 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2686 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2687 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2691 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2692 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2694 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2698 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2699 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2700 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2702 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2706 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2707 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2708 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2710 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2711 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2714 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2716 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2723 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2724 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2725 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2726 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2731 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2736 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2739 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2740 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2741 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2743 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2746 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2748 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2754 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2755 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2760 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2761 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2764 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2768 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2769 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2770 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2771 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2775 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2776 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2780 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2781 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2782 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2786 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2787 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2791 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2794 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2795 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2800 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2801 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2803 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2804 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2809 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2810 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2815 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2820 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2824 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2825 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2826 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2828 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2832 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2836 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2838 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2841 /* send off the data */
2842 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2843 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2846 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2847 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2851 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2854 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2858 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2861 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2862 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2863 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2866 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2872 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2878 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2883 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2884 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2886 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2891 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2898 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2899 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2903 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2908 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2911 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2912 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2915 unsigned int md_len;
2916 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2917 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2918 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2919 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2922 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2923 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2926 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2928 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2930 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2932 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2936 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2937 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2938 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2943 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2944 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2945 * certificate key for key exchange
2948 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2950 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2952 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2957 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2958 /* Generate session key
2959 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2961 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2962 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2967 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2970 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2971 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2972 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2973 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2974 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2975 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2976 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2977 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2978 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2982 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2984 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2985 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2986 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2990 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2992 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2995 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2996 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3001 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3002 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3003 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3004 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3009 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3010 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3011 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3015 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3016 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3017 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3021 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3026 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3029 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3031 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3032 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3037 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3039 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3040 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3041 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3042 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3049 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3054 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3056 unsigned long alg_k;
3059 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3061 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3062 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3065 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3066 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3068 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3069 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3071 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3072 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3074 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3075 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3077 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3078 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3080 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3081 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3082 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3089 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3090 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3091 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3093 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3094 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3099 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3101 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3104 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3105 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3107 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3109 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3110 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3112 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3119 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3120 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3124 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3125 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3127 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3136 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3137 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3138 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3141 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3144 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3145 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3147 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3148 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3149 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3152 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3153 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3159 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3160 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3165 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3166 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3167 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3169 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3171 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3172 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3175 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3176 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3178 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3179 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3184 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3187 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3190 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3191 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3192 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3193 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3195 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3199 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3200 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3203 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3205 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3206 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3208 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3212 /* We need to get a client cert */
3213 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3215 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3216 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3218 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3220 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3223 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3224 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3225 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3227 } else if (i == 1) {
3229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3230 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3234 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3235 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3238 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3239 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3240 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3241 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3243 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3244 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3245 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3246 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3252 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3255 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3259 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3261 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3264 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3267 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3268 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3269 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3277 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3278 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3279 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3281 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3287 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3291 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3293 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3296 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3300 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3301 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3303 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3304 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3306 /* we don't have a certificate */
3307 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3310 /* This is the passed certificate */
3312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3313 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3314 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3315 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3322 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3324 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3328 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3329 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3331 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3332 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3334 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3338 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3340 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3345 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3346 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3348 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3353 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3354 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3362 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3367 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3369 size_t len, padding_len;
3370 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3372 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3373 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3375 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3376 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3381 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3385 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3390 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3392 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3393 /* should contain no data */
3394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3395 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3396 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3397 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3401 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3402 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3403 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3404 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3405 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3410 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3412 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3415 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3417 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3419 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3421 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3422 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3423 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3427 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3428 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
3429 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3430 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3433 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3434 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3437 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3438 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3439 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3440 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3443 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3447 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3448 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3449 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3450 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3455 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3456 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3460 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3463 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3464 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3465 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3466 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3471 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3472 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3473 # error Max cipher length too short
3476 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3477 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3480 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3481 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3484 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3487 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3489 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3492 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3493 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3495 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3496 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3497 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3500 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3514 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3515 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3516 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3518 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3523 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3524 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3525 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3527 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);