1 /* ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "statem_locl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
168 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
169 static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s);
170 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
171 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
176 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
182 static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
184 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
185 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
186 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
187 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
194 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
201 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
203 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
206 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
207 * ciphersuite or for SRP
209 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
218 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
219 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
220 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
221 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
224 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
225 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
227 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
229 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
232 switch(st->hand_state) {
233 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
234 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
235 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
239 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
240 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
241 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
247 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
249 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
250 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
251 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
254 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
259 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
260 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
262 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
263 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
264 && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
265 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
267 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
268 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
269 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
270 * the server is resuming.
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
275 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
276 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
277 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
282 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
283 if (ske_expected < 0)
285 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
287 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
288 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
289 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
293 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
294 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
297 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
298 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
306 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
307 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
308 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
315 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
316 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
317 if (ske_expected < 0)
319 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
321 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
322 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
323 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
331 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
332 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
333 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
341 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
342 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
343 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
348 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
349 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
350 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
352 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
353 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
358 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
359 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
360 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
365 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
366 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
367 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
376 /* No valid transition found */
381 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
382 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
384 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
386 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
388 switch(st->hand_state) {
390 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
392 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
393 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
395 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
397 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
400 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
402 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
403 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
407 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
408 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
410 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
411 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
415 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
417 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
419 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
420 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
423 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
424 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
425 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
426 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
428 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
433 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
438 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
442 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
443 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
446 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
447 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
453 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
454 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
459 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
462 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
468 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
473 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
474 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
475 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 /* Shouldn't happen */
480 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
485 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
486 * the client to the server.
488 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
490 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
492 switch(st->hand_state) {
493 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
495 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
496 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
497 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
502 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
504 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
505 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
508 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
509 * messages unless we need to.
513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
514 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
515 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
518 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
521 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
524 /* No pre work to be done */
528 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
532 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
533 * client to the server.
535 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
537 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
541 switch(st->hand_state) {
542 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
543 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->d1->cookie_len > 0 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
546 /* Disable buffering for SCTP */
547 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
550 * turn on buffering for the next lot of output
552 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
553 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
557 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
558 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
563 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
564 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
568 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
569 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
570 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
571 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
573 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
574 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
576 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
578 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
581 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
582 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
585 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
589 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
592 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
597 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
601 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
603 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
605 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
608 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
612 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
617 /* No post work to be done */
621 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
625 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
627 * Valid return values are:
631 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s)
633 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
635 switch(st->hand_state) {
636 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
637 return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
640 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
642 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
643 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
645 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
646 return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
648 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
650 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
652 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
654 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
655 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
656 return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
658 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
659 return tls_construct_finished(s,
661 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
663 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
666 /* Shouldn't happen */
674 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
675 * reading. Excludes the message header.
677 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
679 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
681 switch(st->hand_state) {
682 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
683 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
685 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
686 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
689 return s->max_cert_list;
691 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
692 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
694 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
695 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
697 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
698 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
700 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
701 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
703 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
704 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
706 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
707 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
709 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
710 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
713 /* Shouldn't happen */
721 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
723 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
725 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
727 switch(st->hand_state) {
728 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
729 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
731 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
732 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
735 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
737 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
738 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
740 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
741 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
743 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
744 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
746 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
747 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
749 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
750 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
752 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
753 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
755 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
756 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
759 /* Shouldn't happen */
763 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
767 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
770 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
772 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
774 switch(st->hand_state) {
775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
776 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
777 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
778 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
779 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
780 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
781 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
782 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
783 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
786 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
787 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
794 /* Shouldn't happen */
799 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
800 * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
801 * Returns 1 on success
804 static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s)
806 unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
808 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
810 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
811 * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
812 * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
813 * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
814 * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
815 * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
817 mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
818 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
822 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
823 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) {
824 if ((options & mask) != mask) {
825 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
831 s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
834 if ((options & mask) == mask) {
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
838 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
841 mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
842 if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
843 s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
844 mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
845 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
846 if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
847 s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
850 if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
852 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
856 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
861 } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
862 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
863 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
864 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
865 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
867 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
871 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
873 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
878 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
880 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
881 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
884 * We only support one version: update method
886 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
887 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
888 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
892 s->client_version = s->version;
897 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
900 unsigned char *p, *d;
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
908 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
910 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
912 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
913 if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0)
916 if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
918 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
919 * "ticket" without a session ID.
921 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
922 (sess->not_resumable)) {
923 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
926 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
928 p = s->s3->client_random;
931 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
932 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
934 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
937 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
946 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
947 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
950 /* Do the message type and length last */
951 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
954 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
955 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
956 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
957 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
958 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
959 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
960 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
961 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
964 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
965 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
966 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
967 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
968 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
969 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
970 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
971 * know that is maximum server supports.
972 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
973 * containing version 1.0.
975 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
976 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
977 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
978 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
979 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
980 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
981 * the negotiated version.
983 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
984 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
987 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
988 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
994 i = s->session->session_id_length;
997 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1001 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
1005 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1006 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1007 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1011 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
1012 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
1013 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
1016 /* Ciphers supported */
1017 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));
1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
1022 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
1024 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
1025 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
1028 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
1029 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
1030 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
1036 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1040 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
1043 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1045 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
1046 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1050 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
1052 /* TLS extensions */
1053 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1058 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1060 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1066 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
1067 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1074 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1078 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1081 unsigned int cookie_len;
1084 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1085 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1086 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1091 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1092 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1093 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1098 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1099 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1103 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1105 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1107 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1108 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1109 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1112 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1114 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1115 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1117 size_t session_id_len;
1118 unsigned char *cipherchars;
1119 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1120 unsigned int compression;
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1126 unsigned int sversion;
1128 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1129 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1134 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
1135 #error Code needs updating for new TLS version
1137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1138 if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1141 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
1142 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1145 s->method = SSLv3_client_method();
1148 if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
1149 s->method = TLSv1_client_method();
1150 } else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) &&
1151 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
1152 s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method();
1153 } else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) &&
1154 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
1155 s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1158 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1161 s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
1163 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
1165 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1168 } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1169 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
1170 unsigned int hversion;
1173 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &hversion)) {
1174 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1179 options = s->options;
1180 if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1181 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
1182 else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1184 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1185 s->version = hversion;
1186 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1188 } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1189 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1192 s->version = hversion;
1193 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1196 s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
1198 unsigned char *vers;
1200 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &vers, 2)) {
1201 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1205 if ((vers[0] != (s->version >> 8))
1206 || (vers[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1208 s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | vers[1];
1209 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1214 /* load the server hello data */
1215 /* load the server random */
1216 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1217 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1224 /* Get the session-id. */
1225 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1226 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1230 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1231 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1232 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1233 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1238 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1240 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1245 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1246 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1247 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1248 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1249 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1250 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1251 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1252 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1253 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1254 * server wants to resume.
1256 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
1257 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
1258 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1259 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1260 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1261 &s->session->master_key_length,
1263 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1264 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1265 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1273 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1274 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1275 session_id_len) == 0) {
1276 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1277 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1278 /* actually a client application bug */
1279 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1281 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1287 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1288 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1289 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1290 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1291 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1293 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1294 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1299 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1300 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1301 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1305 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1307 /* unknown cipher */
1308 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1312 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1313 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1314 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1316 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1317 /* Skip TLS v1.0 ciphersuites if SSLv3 */
1318 if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1) && s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1319 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1321 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1324 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1325 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1330 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1331 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1333 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1334 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1340 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1341 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1342 * set and use it for comparison.
1344 if (s->session->cipher)
1345 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1346 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1347 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1349 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1352 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1353 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1355 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1357 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1360 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1361 if (compression != 0) {
1362 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1363 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1364 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1368 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1369 * using compression.
1371 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1376 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1377 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1379 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1382 if (compression == 0)
1384 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1385 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1389 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1392 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1393 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1395 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1398 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1402 /* TLS extensions */
1403 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1408 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1409 /* wrong packet length */
1410 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1416 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1417 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1418 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1421 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1424 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1425 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1427 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1428 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1430 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
1434 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1435 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1436 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1440 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1442 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1444 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1445 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1448 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1450 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1451 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1453 unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1454 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1455 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1457 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1462 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1463 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1464 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1468 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1469 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1470 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1471 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1473 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1477 certstart = certbytes;
1478 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1480 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1484 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1485 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1487 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1490 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1497 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1498 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1499 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1501 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1504 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1507 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1511 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1513 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1514 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1516 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1519 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1522 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
1524 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1528 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1532 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1537 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1541 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1542 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1543 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1544 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1545 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1547 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1549 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1552 s->session->peer_type = i;
1554 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1556 s->session->peer = x;
1557 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1560 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1564 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1566 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1568 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1570 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1574 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1579 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1580 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1588 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
1589 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1590 EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1593 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1595 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1597 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1599 save_param_start = *pkt;
1601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1602 DH_free(s->s3->peer_dh_tmp);
1603 s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
1605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1606 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp);
1607 s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
1610 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1612 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1615 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1616 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1617 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1618 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1624 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1625 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1626 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1629 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1630 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1635 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1636 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1637 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1638 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1639 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1640 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1645 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1646 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1648 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1650 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1651 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1652 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1653 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1654 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1655 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1656 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1661 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1662 PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1664 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1665 PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1667 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1668 PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1670 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1671 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1676 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1681 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1682 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1683 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1685 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1687 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1688 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1690 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1691 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1692 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1697 if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1702 if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1703 PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1704 || (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1705 PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1707 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1708 PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL)) == NULL) {
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1713 if (BN_is_zero(dh->p) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1718 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1719 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1723 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1724 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1725 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1727 s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
1730 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1733 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1735 const EC_GROUP *group;
1737 unsigned char *ecparams;
1739 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1745 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1746 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1747 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1749 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1754 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1755 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1757 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1762 if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2))) == 0) {
1763 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1765 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1769 ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
1770 if (ngroup == NULL) {
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1774 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1778 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
1780 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
1782 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1783 if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
1784 ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1789 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1794 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1795 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), bn_ctx) == 0) {
1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1801 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1802 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1806 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1807 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1808 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1810 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1811 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1812 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1814 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1815 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
1816 s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
1818 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1820 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1821 srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1823 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1827 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1829 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1833 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1834 * equals the length of the parameters.
1836 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1837 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1838 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1839 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1844 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1845 unsigned char *sigalgs;
1847 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1851 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1858 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1860 } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1861 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1866 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1867 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1871 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1878 * Check signature length
1880 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)j) {
1881 /* wrong packet length */
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1885 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1886 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1887 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1888 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1889 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1890 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1891 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1892 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1896 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1897 PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
1899 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1904 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1905 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1906 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1907 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1908 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1909 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1912 /* still data left over */
1913 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1918 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1919 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1920 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1922 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1924 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1932 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1933 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1936 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1937 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1938 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1941 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1943 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1944 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1945 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1946 unsigned char *data;
1947 unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1948 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1950 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
1951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1955 /* get the certificate types */
1956 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
1957 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
1958 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1962 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
1963 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
1964 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
1965 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1966 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
1967 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1971 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
1972 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
1973 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
1975 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
1976 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
1978 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1979 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1980 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
1981 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1983 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1987 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1988 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1989 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1990 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1992 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
1993 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1995 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
1998 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1999 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2004 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2007 /* get the CA RDNs */
2008 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2009 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2010 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2015 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2016 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2017 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2018 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2020 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2024 namestart = namebytes;
2026 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2027 name_len)) == NULL) {
2028 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2033 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2034 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2036 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2039 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2045 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2046 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2047 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2048 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2049 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2052 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2055 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2057 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2061 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2063 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2066 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2069 unsigned int ticklen;
2070 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
2072 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2073 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2074 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
2075 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2080 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2082 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2084 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2085 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2086 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2088 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2091 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2093 * Remove the old session from the cache
2095 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
2096 if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
2097 s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
2100 /* We carry on if this fails */
2101 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2105 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2106 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2111 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2112 s->session = new_sess;
2115 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2116 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2118 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2119 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
2120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2123 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
2124 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2129 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2130 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2132 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2133 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2134 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2135 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2136 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2137 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2138 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2139 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2140 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2142 EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
2143 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
2144 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2145 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2147 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2149 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2150 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2153 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2156 unsigned long resplen;
2159 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2160 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2161 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2165 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)
2166 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2167 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2171 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2172 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2173 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
2174 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2178 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
2179 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2183 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2184 if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2186 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2188 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2193 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2194 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2198 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2200 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2201 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2202 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2205 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2207 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2208 /* should contain no data */
2209 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2211 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2212 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2216 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2217 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2219 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2220 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2221 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2227 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2230 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2231 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2232 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2233 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2237 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2238 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2239 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2240 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2243 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2246 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2251 size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
2253 unsigned long alg_k;
2254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2256 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2259 EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
2260 const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
2261 EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
2262 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2263 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2264 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2266 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2268 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2270 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2274 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2277 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2278 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2281 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2283 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2286 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2288 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2292 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2294 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2295 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2298 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2300 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2302 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2303 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2304 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2308 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2309 s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
2310 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2312 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2313 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2317 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2319 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2320 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2322 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2325 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2326 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
2327 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2328 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2332 s2n(identitylen, p);
2333 memcpy(p, identity, identitylen);
2334 pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
2338 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2340 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2344 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2349 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2353 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2355 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2356 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2360 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2362 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2365 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2369 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2370 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2371 || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2373 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2374 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2377 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2378 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2380 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2381 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2382 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2386 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2387 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2389 n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2391 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2393 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2398 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2402 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2403 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2410 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2411 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
2412 if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
2413 dh_srvr = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp;
2415 /* we get them from the cert */
2416 EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
2418 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2420 dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
2421 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
2423 if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2425 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2429 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
2430 /* Use client certificate key */
2431 EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2434 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2435 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2437 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2441 /* generate a new random key */
2442 if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2446 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2453 pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt);
2454 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2459 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2460 * clear it out afterwards
2463 n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
2464 if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2474 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
2477 /* send off the data */
2478 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2480 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2489 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2490 const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
2492 int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
2495 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2496 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2497 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2499 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
2501 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2502 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2503 * To add such support, one needs to add
2504 * code that checks for appropriate
2505 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2506 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2507 * key on the same curve as the server's
2508 * and the key should be authorized for
2511 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2512 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2515 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2516 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2517 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2518 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2522 if (s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
2523 tkey = s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp;
2525 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2526 srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2527 if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
2528 || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
2529 || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2531 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2535 tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
2538 srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2539 srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
2541 if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2543 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2547 if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2549 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2553 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2557 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2559 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2560 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2562 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2563 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2564 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2565 if (priv_key == NULL) {
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2567 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2570 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2575 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2576 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2584 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2585 * clear it out afterwards
2588 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
2589 if (field_size <= 0) {
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2593 pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
2594 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2597 n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
2598 if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) {
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2603 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2604 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2608 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2612 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2613 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2614 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2617 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
2618 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
2619 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
2620 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2622 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2626 /* Encode the public key */
2627 n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2628 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2629 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2630 encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
2632 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2633 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2635 /* copy the point */
2636 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
2637 /* increment n to account for length field */
2641 /* Free allocated memory */
2642 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2643 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2644 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2645 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2647 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2649 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2650 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2651 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2654 unsigned int md_len;
2655 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2656 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2658 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2659 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2660 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2664 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2669 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2671 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2673 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2674 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2678 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
2679 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2680 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2682 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2686 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2687 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2688 * certificate key for key exchange
2691 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2693 if (pkey_ctx == NULL
2694 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2695 /* Generate session key */
2696 || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2697 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2699 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2703 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2705 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2706 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2707 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2709 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2716 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2719 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2720 if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2721 EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2722 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2723 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2724 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2725 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2726 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2727 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2732 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2733 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2734 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2740 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2742 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2744 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2746 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2751 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2753 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2756 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2759 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2760 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2761 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2762 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2763 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2764 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2766 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2767 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
2771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2772 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2773 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2774 /* send off the data */
2775 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2777 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2781 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2784 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2785 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2786 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2788 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2794 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2803 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2804 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2809 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2810 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2814 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2817 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2818 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2820 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2821 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2822 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2823 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2826 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2827 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2829 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2833 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2835 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2840 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2841 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2843 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2849 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2850 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2852 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2853 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2857 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2858 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2864 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2865 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2866 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2869 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2872 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2873 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2875 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2876 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2877 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2880 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2881 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2887 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2888 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2892 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
2896 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2899 unsigned long n = 0;
2903 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2905 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2906 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2908 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2909 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2913 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2914 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2922 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2924 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
2925 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2926 || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2927 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(&mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2928 s->session->master_key_length,
2929 s->session->master_key))
2930 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2935 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2936 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2937 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2938 BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);
2944 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2945 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2947 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2952 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
2955 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
2960 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2961 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2962 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2964 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2966 unsigned long alg_k;
2967 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2969 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2970 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2973 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2974 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2976 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2977 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2979 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2980 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
2981 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2982 int i = s->session->peer_type;
2983 EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
2984 clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2985 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
2986 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
2989 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2991 /* Compare server and client parameters */
2992 i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
2993 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
2997 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
3002 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3005 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3008 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3009 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3010 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3011 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3013 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3017 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3018 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3021 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3023 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3024 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3026 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3030 /* We need to get a client cert */
3031 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3033 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3034 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3036 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3038 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3041 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3042 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3043 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3045 } else if (i == 1) {
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3048 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3052 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3053 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3056 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3057 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3058 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3059 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3061 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3062 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3063 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3064 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3070 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3073 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3077 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3079 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
3080 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
3081 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
3082 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3083 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3084 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3091 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3093 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3097 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3098 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3101 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3103 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3104 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3106 /* we don't have a certificate */
3107 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3110 dh = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp;
3113 /* This is the passed certificate */
3115 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3117 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3118 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3125 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3127 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3129 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
3134 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3135 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3136 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3138 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3139 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3141 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3145 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3147 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3152 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3153 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3155 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3160 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (dh == NULL)) {
3161 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3164 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3165 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
3166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3167 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
3170 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3171 else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3172 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3174 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
3182 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3187 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
3189 unsigned int len, padding_len;
3192 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3193 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3194 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3196 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
3197 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
3198 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
3199 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
3200 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
3201 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
3208 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3212 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3213 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3214 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3215 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3220 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3221 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3225 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
3231 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3232 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3233 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3239 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
3240 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3241 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3242 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3244 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3245 if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
3246 if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3249 empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0;
3252 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
3256 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
3260 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3261 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3262 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3264 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
3266 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3268 "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
3271 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3272 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3273 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3275 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);