2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
65 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
66 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
67 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
71 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
77 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
79 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
80 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
81 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
82 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
89 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
95 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
97 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
100 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
101 * ciphersuite or for SRP
103 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
112 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
113 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
114 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
115 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
117 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
118 * (transition not allowed)
120 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
122 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
125 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
126 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
130 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
131 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
132 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
135 switch (st->hand_state) {
139 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
140 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
141 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
146 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
153 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
154 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
164 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
173 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
174 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
176 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
177 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
182 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
191 /* No valid transition found */
196 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
197 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
198 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
199 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
201 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
202 * (transition not allowed)
204 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
206 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
210 * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
211 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
213 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
214 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
219 switch (st->hand_state) {
223 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
224 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
225 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
229 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
230 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
231 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
237 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
239 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
244 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
245 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
249 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
250 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
252 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
253 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
254 && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
255 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
257 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
258 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
259 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
260 * the server is resuming.
263 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
265 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
266 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
267 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
268 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
272 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
273 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
275 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
276 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
277 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
281 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
282 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
283 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
285 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
295 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
296 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
298 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
299 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
304 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
305 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
306 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
307 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
308 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
309 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
310 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
317 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
318 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
319 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
320 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
327 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
328 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
334 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
335 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
336 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
337 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
340 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
341 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
346 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
347 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
348 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
353 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
354 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
362 /* No valid transition found */
363 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
364 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
369 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
370 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
373 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
375 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
378 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
379 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
383 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
384 * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
385 * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
387 switch (st->hand_state) {
389 /* Shouldn't happen */
390 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
392 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
393 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
394 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
395 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
398 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
399 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
400 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
401 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
403 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
404 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
407 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
408 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
409 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
415 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
416 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
418 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
420 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
423 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
424 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
428 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
430 switch (st->hand_state) {
432 /* Shouldn't happen */
433 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
436 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
443 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
446 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
448 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
452 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
453 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
456 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
465 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
466 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
469 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
470 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
471 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
472 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
474 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
475 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
479 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
484 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
489 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
490 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
492 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
493 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
495 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
497 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
499 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
500 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
505 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
508 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
509 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
514 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
519 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
520 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
521 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
528 * the client to the server.
530 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
532 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
534 switch (st->hand_state) {
536 /* No pre work to be done */
539 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
541 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
542 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
543 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
544 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
550 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
551 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
554 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
555 * messages unless we need to.
559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
560 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
561 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
567 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
570 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
574 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
575 * client to the server.
577 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
579 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
583 switch (st->hand_state) {
585 /* No post work to be done */
588 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
589 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
592 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
593 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
598 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
599 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
603 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
604 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
605 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
606 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
608 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
609 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
611 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
613 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
616 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
617 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
620 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
624 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
627 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
632 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
636 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
638 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
640 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
643 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
647 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
650 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
651 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
652 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
658 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
662 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
665 * Valid return values are:
669 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
670 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
672 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
674 switch (st->hand_state) {
676 /* Shouldn't happen */
679 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
681 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
683 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
684 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
687 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
688 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
689 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
693 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
694 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
697 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
698 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
699 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
702 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
703 *confunc = tls_construct_client_verify;
704 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
707 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
708 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
709 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
710 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
713 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
714 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
715 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
723 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
724 * reading. Excludes the message header.
726 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
728 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
730 switch (st->hand_state) {
732 /* Shouldn't happen */
735 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
736 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
738 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
739 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
742 return s->max_cert_list;
744 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
745 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
747 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
748 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
750 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
752 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
753 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
754 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
756 return s->max_cert_list;
758 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
759 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
761 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
762 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
764 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
766 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
767 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
769 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
770 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
772 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
773 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
778 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
780 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
782 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
784 switch (st->hand_state) {
786 /* Shouldn't happen */
787 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
789 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
790 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
792 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
793 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
796 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
798 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
799 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
801 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
802 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
804 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
805 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
807 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
808 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
810 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
811 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
813 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
814 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
816 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
817 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
819 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
820 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
825 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
828 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
830 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
832 switch (st->hand_state) {
834 /* Shouldn't happen */
837 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
838 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
841 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
842 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
843 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
844 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
845 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
846 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
847 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
848 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
851 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
852 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
857 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
862 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
866 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
868 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
869 /* Should not happen */
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
874 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
875 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
881 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
883 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
884 * "ticket" without a session ID.
886 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
887 (sess->not_resumable)) {
888 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
891 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
893 p = s->s3->client_random;
896 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
897 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
899 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
902 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
911 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
915 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
916 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
917 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
918 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
919 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
920 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
921 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
922 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
925 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
926 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
927 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
928 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
929 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
930 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
931 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
932 * know that is maximum server supports.
933 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
934 * containing version 1.0.
936 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
937 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
938 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
939 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
940 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
941 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
942 * the negotiated version.
944 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
945 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
947 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
948 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
957 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
958 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
959 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
960 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
962 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
967 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
968 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
969 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
970 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
971 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
977 /* Ciphers supported */
978 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
982 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
983 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
985 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
991 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
996 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
997 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
998 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
999 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1000 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1007 /* Add the NULL method */
1008 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1013 /* TLS extensions */
1014 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1015 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1023 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1029 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1030 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1031 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1036 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1037 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1038 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1043 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1044 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1048 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1050 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1052 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1053 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1054 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1057 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1059 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1060 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1061 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1062 size_t session_id_len;
1063 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1064 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1065 unsigned int compression;
1066 unsigned int sversion;
1067 unsigned int context;
1069 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1074 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1075 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1080 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1081 if (protverr != 0) {
1082 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1087 /* load the server hello data */
1088 /* load the server random */
1089 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1090 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1097 /* Get the session-id. */
1098 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1099 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1100 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1104 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1105 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1106 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1107 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1109 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1113 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1117 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1119 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1124 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1125 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1126 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1127 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1128 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1129 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1130 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1131 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1132 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1133 * server wants to resume.
1135 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1136 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->tlsext_tick) {
1137 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1139 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1140 * backwards compat reasons
1142 int master_key_length;
1143 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1144 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1147 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
1148 && master_key_length > 0) {
1149 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1150 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1151 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1159 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1160 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1161 session_id_len) == 0) {
1162 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1163 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1164 /* actually a client application bug */
1165 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1167 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1173 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1174 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1175 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1176 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1177 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1179 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1180 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1181 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1186 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1187 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1188 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1189 if (session_id_len > 0)
1190 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1194 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1195 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1196 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1199 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1203 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1205 /* unknown cipher */
1206 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1211 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1214 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1215 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1217 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1218 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1220 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1221 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1226 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1227 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1229 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1230 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1236 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1237 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1238 * set and use it for comparison.
1240 if (s->session->cipher)
1241 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1242 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1243 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1245 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1248 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1249 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1251 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1252 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1254 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1261 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1262 if (compression != 0) {
1263 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1265 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1269 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1270 * using compression.
1272 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1277 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1278 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1280 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1283 if (compression == 0)
1285 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1286 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1290 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1293 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1294 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1296 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1299 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1303 /* TLS extensions */
1304 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1305 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1306 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1307 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1312 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1313 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1314 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al)
1315 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1319 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1320 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1321 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1324 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1327 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1328 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1330 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1331 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1333 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1336 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1337 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1338 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1343 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1344 * we're done with this message
1347 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1348 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1349 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1350 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1351 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1352 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1357 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1358 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1360 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1361 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1362 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1363 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1366 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1368 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1369 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1371 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1372 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1373 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1375 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1380 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1381 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1382 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1386 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1387 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1388 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1389 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1391 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1395 certstart = certbytes;
1396 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1398 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1402 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1403 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1405 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1408 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1415 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1417 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1418 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1419 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1420 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1421 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1422 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1423 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1424 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1425 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1426 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1427 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1428 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1430 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1431 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1433 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1436 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1439 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1443 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1445 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1446 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1448 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1451 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1454 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1456 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1460 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1464 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1469 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1473 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1474 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1475 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1476 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1477 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1479 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1480 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1481 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1484 s->session->peer_type = i;
1486 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1488 s->session->peer = x;
1489 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1492 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1496 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1498 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1501 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1505 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1508 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1510 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1512 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1513 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1519 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1520 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1521 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1524 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1525 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1530 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1531 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1532 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1533 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1534 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1535 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1547 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1550 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1552 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1553 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1554 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1555 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1556 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1561 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1563 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1564 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1566 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1567 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1569 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1570 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1572 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1573 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1574 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1579 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1580 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1585 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1586 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1587 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1592 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1597 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1600 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1601 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1604 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1606 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1607 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1608 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1609 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1614 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1617 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1618 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1623 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1624 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1625 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1627 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1628 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1629 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1630 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1635 if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1636 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1641 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1642 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1648 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1649 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1655 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1656 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1661 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1662 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1667 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1670 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1671 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1673 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1674 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1675 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1684 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1689 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1694 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1698 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1700 unsigned int curve_flags;
1701 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1704 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1705 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1706 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1708 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1709 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1714 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1715 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1717 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1718 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1723 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1725 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1726 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1728 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1732 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1733 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1735 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1736 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1741 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1743 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1744 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1746 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1747 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1748 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1749 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1751 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1754 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1758 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1759 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1764 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1765 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1766 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1767 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1773 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1774 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1777 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
1778 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1779 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
1780 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1781 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1786 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1791 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1795 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1796 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1798 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1800 save_param_start = *pkt;
1802 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1803 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1804 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1807 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1808 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
1812 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1813 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1814 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1815 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1817 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1818 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1820 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1821 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1824 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1829 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1833 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1837 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1838 * equals the length of the parameters.
1840 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1841 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1842 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1843 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1848 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1849 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1851 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1852 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1856 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1858 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1860 } else if (rv == 0) {
1861 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1865 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1867 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1868 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1873 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1874 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1875 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1879 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1881 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1887 * Check signature length
1889 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
1890 /* wrong packet length */
1891 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1893 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1897 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1898 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1899 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1904 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1905 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1906 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1907 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1908 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1909 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1910 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1911 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1912 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1916 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1917 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1918 (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature),
1921 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1922 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1926 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1928 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1929 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1930 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1931 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1932 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
1933 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1934 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1937 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1941 /* still data left over */
1942 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1943 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1949 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1952 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1953 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1954 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1957 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1959 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1960 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1961 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1962 const unsigned char *data;
1963 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1964 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1966 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
1967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1971 /* get the certificate types */
1972 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
1973 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
1974 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1978 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
1979 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
1980 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
1981 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1982 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
1983 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1987 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
1988 s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num;
1989 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
1991 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
1992 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
1994 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1995 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1996 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
1997 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1999 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2003 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2004 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2005 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2006 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2008 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
2009 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2011 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2014 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2015 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2020 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2023 /* get the CA RDNs */
2024 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2025 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2026 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2031 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2032 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2033 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2034 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2036 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2040 namestart = namebytes;
2042 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2043 name_len)) == NULL) {
2044 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2049 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2050 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2052 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2055 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2062 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2063 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2064 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2065 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2066 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2069 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2072 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2075 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2079 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2081 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2084 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2087 unsigned int ticklen;
2088 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
2089 unsigned int sess_len;
2091 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2092 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2093 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
2094 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2099 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2101 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2103 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2104 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2105 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2107 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2110 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2112 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2114 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2117 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2118 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2123 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2124 s->session = new_sess;
2127 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2128 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2130 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2131 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2135 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
2136 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2137 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2141 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2142 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2144 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2145 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2146 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2147 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2148 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2149 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2150 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2151 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2152 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2155 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2156 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2158 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
2159 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2160 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2164 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2165 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2167 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2169 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2170 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2173 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2179 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2180 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2181 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2185 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2186 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2187 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2191 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2192 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
2193 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2194 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2197 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
2198 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2202 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2203 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2205 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2206 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2207 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2211 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2212 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2213 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2216 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2219 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2222 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2223 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2228 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2229 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2230 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2232 if (s->tlsext_status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2233 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
2235 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2237 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2239 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2243 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2245 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2250 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2251 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2252 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2253 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2262 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2264 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2266 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2267 /* should contain no data */
2268 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2273 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2274 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2282 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2284 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2288 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2289 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2290 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2291 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2294 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2297 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2298 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2299 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2302 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2307 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2308 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2311 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2312 size_t identitylen = 0;
2313 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2314 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2315 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2318 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2320 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2324 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2326 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2327 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2330 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2332 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2334 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2336 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2337 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2341 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2342 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2344 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2348 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2349 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2350 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2352 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2356 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2357 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2358 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2360 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2361 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2364 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2366 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2373 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2374 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2375 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2376 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2381 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2386 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2389 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2390 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2391 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2393 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2396 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2398 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2404 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2405 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2410 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2411 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2414 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2418 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2419 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2420 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2421 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2425 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2426 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2430 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2431 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2432 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2436 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2437 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2441 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2444 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2446 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2450 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2451 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2456 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2457 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2461 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2462 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2467 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2472 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2476 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2477 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2478 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2480 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2484 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2488 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2490 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2493 /* send off the data */
2494 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2495 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2498 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2499 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2503 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2506 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2510 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2513 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2514 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2515 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2518 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2524 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2530 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2535 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2536 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2538 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2543 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2550 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2551 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2555 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2560 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2563 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2564 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2567 unsigned int md_len;
2568 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2569 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2570 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2571 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2574 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2575 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2578 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2580 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2582 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2583 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2584 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2588 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2589 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2590 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2595 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2596 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2597 * certificate key for key exchange
2600 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2602 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2604 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2609 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2610 /* Generate session key
2611 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2613 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2614 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2619 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2622 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2623 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2624 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2625 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2626 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2627 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2628 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2629 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2630 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2634 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2636 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2637 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2638 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2642 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2644 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2647 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2648 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2653 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2654 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2655 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2656 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2661 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2662 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2663 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2667 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2668 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2669 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2673 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2678 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2681 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2683 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
2684 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
2686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2689 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
2691 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2692 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2693 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2701 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2706 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2708 unsigned long alg_k;
2711 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2713 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
2714 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2717 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2718 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2720 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2721 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2723 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2724 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2726 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2727 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2729 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2730 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2732 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
2733 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2741 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2742 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
2743 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2745 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2746 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2751 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2753 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2756 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2757 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2761 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2762 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2764 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2771 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2772 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2776 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2777 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2779 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2788 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2789 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2790 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2793 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2796 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2797 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2799 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2800 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2801 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2804 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2805 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2811 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2812 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2816 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2819 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2820 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
2824 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
2826 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2831 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2833 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2834 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2839 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2844 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2846 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey));
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2851 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2852 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2853 || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2854 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2855 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
2856 s->session->master_key))
2857 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &u, pkey)) {
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2863 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2864 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2865 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2866 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
2867 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, u);
2871 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, u)) {
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2876 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2877 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2881 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2885 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2886 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2891 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2892 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2893 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2895 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2897 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2899 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2900 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2903 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2904 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2906 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2907 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2912 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2915 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2918 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2919 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2920 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
2921 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2923 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2927 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2928 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2931 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2933 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2934 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2936 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2940 /* We need to get a client cert */
2941 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2943 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2944 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2946 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
2948 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2951 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2952 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
2953 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
2955 } else if (i == 1) {
2957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2958 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
2962 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2963 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2966 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2967 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2968 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
2969 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2971 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
2972 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2973 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2974 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2980 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2983 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2987 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2989 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
2990 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
2992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2993 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3000 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3002 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3009 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3010 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3012 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3013 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3015 /* we don't have a certificate */
3016 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3019 /* This is the passed certificate */
3021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3022 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3023 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3024 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3031 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3033 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3037 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3038 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3040 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3041 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3043 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3047 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3049 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3054 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3055 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3057 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3062 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3063 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3071 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3076 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3078 size_t len, padding_len;
3079 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3081 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3082 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3084 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->next_proto_negotiated, len)
3085 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3086 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3090 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3094 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3099 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3101 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3103 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3105 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3106 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3112 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we are processing Encrypted Extensions and
3113 * Certificate extensions as part of this one message. Later we need to
3114 * split out the Certificate extensions into the Certificate message
3116 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3117 EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
3118 | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3120 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
3121 EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
3122 | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3123 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3126 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3127 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3130 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3131 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3132 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3133 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3136 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3140 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3141 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3142 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3143 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3148 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3149 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3153 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3156 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3157 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3158 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3159 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3164 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3165 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3166 # error Max cipher length too short
3169 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3170 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3173 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3174 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3177 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3180 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3182 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3185 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3186 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3188 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3189 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3190 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3193 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3207 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3208 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3209 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3211 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3216 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3217 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3218 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3220 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);