2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
66 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
68 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
72 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
78 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
80 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
81 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
82 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
83 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
90 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
96 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
98 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
101 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
102 * ciphersuite or for SRP
104 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
113 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
114 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
115 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
116 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
118 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
119 * (transition not allowed)
121 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
123 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
126 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
127 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
128 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
131 switch (st->hand_state) {
135 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
137 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
138 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
140 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
141 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
146 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
147 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
148 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
153 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
160 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
161 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
164 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
165 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
171 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
172 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
173 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
179 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
180 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
185 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
186 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
187 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
193 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
194 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
197 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
198 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
204 /* No valid transition found */
209 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
210 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
211 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
212 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
214 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
215 * (transition not allowed)
217 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
219 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
223 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
224 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
226 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
227 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
232 switch (st->hand_state) {
236 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
237 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
238 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
242 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
243 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
244 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
255 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
257 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
258 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
261 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
262 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
265 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
271 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
273 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
274 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
275 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
278 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
279 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
283 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
284 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
286 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
287 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
288 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
289 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
291 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
292 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
293 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
294 * the server is resuming.
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
299 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
300 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
301 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
302 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
306 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
307 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
309 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
310 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
311 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
312 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
315 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
316 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
317 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
319 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
320 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
329 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
330 * |ext.status_expected| is set
332 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
333 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
338 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
339 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
340 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
341 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
342 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
351 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
352 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
353 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
354 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
361 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
362 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
363 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
368 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
369 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
370 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
371 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
374 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
375 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
380 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
381 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
382 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
387 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
388 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
389 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
395 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
403 /* No valid transition found */
404 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
405 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
410 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
411 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
414 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
416 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
419 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
420 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
421 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
423 switch (st->hand_state) {
425 /* Shouldn't happen */
426 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
428 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
429 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
430 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
432 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
433 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
436 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
437 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
438 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
441 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
442 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
443 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
445 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
446 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
447 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
452 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
453 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
454 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
459 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
460 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
464 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
467 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
468 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
475 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
476 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
481 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
486 /* Try to read from the server instead */
487 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
492 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
493 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
495 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
497 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
500 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
501 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
505 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
507 switch (st->hand_state) {
509 /* Shouldn't happen */
510 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
513 if (!s->renegotiate) {
515 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
516 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
518 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
526 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
527 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
529 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
530 * actually selected a version yet.
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
533 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
536 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
539 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
541 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
542 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
544 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
548 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
549 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
553 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
559 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
561 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
562 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
565 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
566 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
567 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
568 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
570 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
575 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
576 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
580 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
584 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
585 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
587 hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
589 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
594 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
597 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
599 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
602 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
610 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
613 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
616 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
619 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
621 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
624 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
625 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
626 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
627 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
629 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
630 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
632 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
633 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
638 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
639 * the client to the server.
641 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
643 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
645 switch (st->hand_state) {
647 /* No pre work to be done */
650 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
652 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
653 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
654 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
655 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
661 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
662 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
665 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
666 * messages unless we need to.
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
671 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
672 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
677 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
679 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
680 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
681 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
683 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
684 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
685 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
688 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
690 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
693 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
697 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
698 * client to the server.
700 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
702 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
706 switch (st->hand_state) {
708 /* No post work to be done */
711 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
712 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
715 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
716 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
720 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
721 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
723 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
724 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
725 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
727 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
728 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
733 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
735 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
736 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
738 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
739 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
742 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
743 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
747 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
748 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
749 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
750 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
752 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
753 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
755 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
757 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
760 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
761 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
764 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
768 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
771 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
776 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
780 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
782 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
784 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
787 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
791 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
794 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
795 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
796 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
801 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
802 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
804 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
809 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
813 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
816 * Valid return values are:
820 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
821 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
823 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
825 switch (st->hand_state) {
827 /* Shouldn't happen */
830 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
832 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
834 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
835 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
838 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
839 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
840 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
843 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
844 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
845 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
848 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
854 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
855 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
858 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
859 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
860 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
863 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
864 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
865 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
868 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
869 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
870 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
871 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
874 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
875 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
876 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
879 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
880 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
881 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
889 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
890 * reading. Excludes the message header.
892 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
894 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
896 switch (st->hand_state) {
898 /* Shouldn't happen */
901 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
902 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
904 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
905 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
907 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
908 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
911 return s->max_cert_list;
913 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
914 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
916 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
917 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
919 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
920 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
922 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
924 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
925 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
926 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
928 return s->max_cert_list;
930 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
931 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
933 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
934 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
936 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
938 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
939 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
941 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
942 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
944 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
945 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
947 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
948 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
953 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
955 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
957 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
959 switch (st->hand_state) {
961 /* Shouldn't happen */
962 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
964 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
965 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
967 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
968 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
970 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
971 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
974 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
976 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
977 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
979 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
980 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
982 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
983 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
985 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
986 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
988 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
989 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
991 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
992 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
994 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
995 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
997 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
998 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1000 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1001 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1004 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1006 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1007 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1012 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1015 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1017 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1019 switch (st->hand_state) {
1021 /* Shouldn't happen */
1024 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1025 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1029 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1034 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1038 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1040 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1041 /* Should not happen */
1042 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1046 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1047 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1048 if (protverr != 0) {
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1054 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1055 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1056 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1059 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1061 p = s->s3->client_random;
1064 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1065 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1067 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1070 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1079 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1080 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0)
1084 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1085 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1086 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1087 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1088 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1089 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1090 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1091 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1094 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1095 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1096 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1097 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1098 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1099 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1100 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1101 * know that is maximum server supports.
1102 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1103 * containing version 1.0.
1105 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1106 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1107 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1108 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1109 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1110 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1111 * the negotiated version.
1113 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1114 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1116 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1117 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1123 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1126 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1127 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1128 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1129 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1131 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1136 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1137 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1138 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1139 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1140 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1146 /* Ciphers supported */
1147 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1151 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1152 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1154 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1160 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1165 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1166 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1167 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1168 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1169 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1170 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1171 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1178 /* Add the NULL method */
1179 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 /* TLS extensions */
1185 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1193 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1199 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1200 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1201 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1206 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1207 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1208 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1213 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1214 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1218 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1220 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1222 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1223 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1224 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1227 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1229 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1230 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1233 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1235 /* unknown cipher */
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1240 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1241 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1243 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1248 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1249 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1251 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1256 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1257 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1258 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1264 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1265 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1266 * set and use it for comparison.
1268 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1269 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1270 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1271 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1273 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1274 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1276 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1277 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1279 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1284 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1288 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1292 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1297 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1299 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1300 size_t session_id_len;
1301 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1302 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1303 unsigned int compression;
1304 unsigned int sversion;
1305 unsigned int context;
1307 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1308 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1312 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1313 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1318 /* load the server random */
1319 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1320 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1326 * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
1327 * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
1328 * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
1330 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 1, &al);
1331 if (protverr != 0) {
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1337 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1338 * message must be on a record boundary.
1340 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1341 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1346 /* Get the session-id. */
1347 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1348 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1349 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1353 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1354 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1355 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1356 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1358 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1362 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1366 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1368 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1372 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1373 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1375 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1382 /* TLS extensions */
1383 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1384 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1385 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1386 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1387 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1392 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1393 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1394 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL, 1))
1399 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1400 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1401 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1402 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1403 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1407 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1408 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1409 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1410 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1411 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1412 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1413 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1414 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1415 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1416 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1418 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1419 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1420 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1422 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1423 * backwards compat reasons
1425 int master_key_length;
1426 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1427 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1430 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1431 && master_key_length > 0) {
1432 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1433 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1434 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1437 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1442 if (session_id_len != 0
1443 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1444 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1445 session_id_len) == 0)
1450 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1451 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1452 /* actually a client application bug */
1453 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1455 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1460 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1461 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1462 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1463 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1464 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1466 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1468 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1469 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1470 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1471 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1476 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1477 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1478 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1479 if (session_id_len > 0)
1480 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1484 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1485 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1486 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1489 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1493 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1496 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1497 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1499 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1500 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1504 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1505 if (compression != 0) {
1506 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1508 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1512 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1513 * using compression.
1515 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1520 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1521 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1523 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1526 if (compression == 0)
1528 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1529 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1533 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1536 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1537 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1539 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1542 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1546 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
1549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1550 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1551 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1552 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1555 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1558 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1559 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1561 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1562 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1564 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1567 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1568 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1569 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1574 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1575 * we're done with this message
1578 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1579 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1580 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1581 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1586 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1587 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1589 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1590 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1591 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1592 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1595 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1597 unsigned int sversion;
1599 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1600 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1604 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1605 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1610 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1612 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1613 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 0, &al);
1614 if (errorcode != 0) {
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1619 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1621 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1625 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1626 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1630 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1631 /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
1632 || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt) == 0
1633 /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
1634 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1635 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1640 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1641 &extensions, &al, NULL, 1)
1642 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1643 extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
1646 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1649 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1651 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1652 * ClientHello will not change
1654 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1656 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1661 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1662 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1664 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1665 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1670 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1671 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1672 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1675 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1676 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1677 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1682 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1684 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1685 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1686 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1687 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1690 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1692 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1693 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1695 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1696 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1697 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1699 unsigned int context = 0;
1701 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1706 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1708 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1709 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1710 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1711 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1715 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1716 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1717 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1718 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1720 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1724 certstart = certbytes;
1725 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1727 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1731 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1732 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1734 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1738 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1739 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1742 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1743 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1747 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1748 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1749 &al, NULL, chainidx == 0)
1750 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1751 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al,
1752 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1753 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1756 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1759 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1766 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1768 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1769 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1770 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1771 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1772 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1773 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1774 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1775 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1776 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1777 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1778 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1779 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1781 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1782 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1784 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1787 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1790 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1794 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1796 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1797 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1799 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1802 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1805 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1807 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1809 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1810 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1811 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1815 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1820 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1824 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1825 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1828 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1829 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1830 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1831 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1832 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1833 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1835 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1837 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1841 s->session->peer_type = i;
1843 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1845 s->session->peer = x;
1846 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1849 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1851 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1852 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1853 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1854 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1859 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1863 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1865 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1868 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1872 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1875 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1877 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1879 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1880 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1886 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1887 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1888 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1891 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1892 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1897 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1898 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1899 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1900 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1901 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1902 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1909 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1914 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1917 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1919 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1920 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1921 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1922 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1923 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1928 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1930 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1931 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1933 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1934 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1936 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1937 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1939 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1940 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1941 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1946 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1951 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1952 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1953 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1958 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1963 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1966 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1967 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1970 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1974 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1975 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1976 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1977 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1982 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1985 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1986 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1991 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1992 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1993 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1995 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1996 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1997 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1998 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2003 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2004 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2005 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2010 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2011 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2017 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2018 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2023 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2024 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2030 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2031 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2036 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2037 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2042 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2045 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2046 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2048 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2049 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2050 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2059 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2063 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2064 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2069 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
2071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2073 const unsigned char *ecparams;
2075 unsigned int curve_flags;
2076 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2079 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2080 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
2081 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2083 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
2084 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2089 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
2090 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
2092 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
2093 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2098 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
2100 if (curve_nid == 0) {
2101 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2103 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2107 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2108 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2110 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
2111 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2116 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2118 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2119 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2121 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2122 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
2123 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2124 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2126 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2129 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2133 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2134 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2139 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2140 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2141 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2142 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2148 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2149 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2152 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2153 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2154 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2155 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2156 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2161 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2166 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2170 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2171 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2172 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2173 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2175 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2177 save_param_start = *pkt;
2179 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2180 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2181 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2184 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2185 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2189 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2190 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2191 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2192 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2194 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2195 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2197 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2198 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2201 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2206 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2210 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2213 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2214 * equals the length of the parameters.
2216 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2217 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2218 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2219 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2224 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2225 unsigned int sigalg;
2228 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2229 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2233 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2235 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2237 } else if (rv == 0) {
2238 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2242 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2244 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2245 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2249 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
2251 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2252 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2253 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2257 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2259 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2265 * Check signature length
2267 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2268 /* wrong packet length */
2269 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2271 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2275 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2276 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2277 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2282 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2283 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2287 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2288 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2289 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2290 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2291 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2296 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2297 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2298 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2299 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2300 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2301 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2302 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2303 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2306 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2307 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2309 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2313 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2316 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2317 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2318 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2319 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2320 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2321 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2322 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2325 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2329 /* still data left over */
2330 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2331 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2337 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2340 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2341 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2342 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2343 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2346 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2348 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2349 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2352 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2353 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2354 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2356 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2357 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2358 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2360 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2361 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2362 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2363 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2365 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2366 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2368 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2372 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2376 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2377 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2378 &rawexts, &al, NULL, 1)
2379 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2380 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
2381 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2384 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2385 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2386 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2393 /* get the certificate types */
2394 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2396 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2400 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2401 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2406 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2409 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2411 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2415 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2417 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2420 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2421 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2423 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2428 /* get the CA RDNs */
2429 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt, &al))
2433 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2438 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2439 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2441 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2444 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2445 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2450 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2452 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2453 unsigned int ticklen;
2454 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2455 unsigned int sess_len;
2456 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2458 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2459 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2460 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2461 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2463 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2469 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2470 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2471 * be 0 here in that instance
2474 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2477 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2478 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2479 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2480 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2481 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2484 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2485 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2486 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2488 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2491 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2493 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2495 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2498 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2499 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2504 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2505 s->session = new_sess;
2509 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2510 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2512 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2514 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2515 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2516 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2518 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2519 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2523 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2524 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2525 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2529 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2530 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2531 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2533 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2536 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2537 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2538 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2539 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2540 &exts, &al, NULL, 1)
2541 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2542 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2543 exts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2550 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2551 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2552 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2553 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2554 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2555 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2556 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2557 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2558 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2561 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2562 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2564 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2565 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2566 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2570 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2572 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2573 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2575 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2576 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2579 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2581 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2585 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2589 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2590 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2591 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2593 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2598 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2599 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2600 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2602 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2605 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2606 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2607 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2611 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2612 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2613 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2617 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2618 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2622 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2628 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2632 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2633 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2634 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2635 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2638 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2642 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2643 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2644 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2647 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2650 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2653 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2654 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2659 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2660 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2661 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2663 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2664 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2665 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2668 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2670 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2674 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2676 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2681 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2682 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2683 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2684 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2693 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2695 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2697 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2698 /* should contain no data */
2699 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2704 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2705 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2713 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2715 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2718 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2721 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2722 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2723 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2726 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2731 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2732 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2735 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2736 size_t identitylen = 0;
2737 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2738 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2739 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2742 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2744 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2748 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2750 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2751 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2754 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2756 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2758 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2760 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2761 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2765 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2766 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2768 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2772 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2773 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2774 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2776 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2780 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2781 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2782 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2784 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2785 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2788 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2790 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2797 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2798 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2799 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2800 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2805 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2810 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2813 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2814 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2815 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2817 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2820 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2822 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2828 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2829 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2834 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2835 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2838 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2842 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2843 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2844 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2845 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2849 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2850 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2854 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2855 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2856 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2860 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2861 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2865 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2868 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2869 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2874 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2875 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2878 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2879 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2883 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2884 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2889 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2894 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2898 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2899 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2900 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2902 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2906 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2910 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2912 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2915 /* send off the data */
2916 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2917 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2920 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2921 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2925 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2928 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2932 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2935 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2936 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2937 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2940 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2946 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2952 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2957 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2958 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2960 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2965 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2972 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2973 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2976 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2977 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2982 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2985 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2986 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2989 unsigned int md_len;
2990 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2991 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2992 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2993 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2996 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2997 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3000 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3002 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3004 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3006 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3010 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3011 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3012 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3017 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3018 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3019 * certificate key for key exchange
3022 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3024 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3026 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3031 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3032 /* Generate session key
3033 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3035 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3036 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3041 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3044 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3045 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3046 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3047 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3048 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3049 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3050 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3051 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3052 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3056 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3058 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3059 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3060 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3064 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3066 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3069 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3070 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3075 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3076 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3077 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3078 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3083 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3084 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3085 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3089 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3090 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3091 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3095 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3100 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3103 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3105 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3106 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3111 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3113 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3114 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3115 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3122 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3123 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3128 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3130 unsigned long alg_k;
3133 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3135 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3136 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3139 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3140 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3142 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3143 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3145 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3146 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3148 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3149 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3151 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3152 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3154 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3155 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3163 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3164 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3165 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3167 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3168 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3173 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3175 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3178 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3179 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3183 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3184 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3186 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3193 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3194 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3198 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3199 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3201 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3210 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3211 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3212 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3215 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3218 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3219 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3221 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3222 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3223 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3226 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3227 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3233 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3234 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3239 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3240 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3241 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3243 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3245 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3246 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3249 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3250 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3252 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3253 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3258 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3261 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3264 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3265 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3266 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3267 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3269 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3273 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3274 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3277 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3279 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3280 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3282 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3286 /* We need to get a client cert */
3287 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3289 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3290 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3292 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3294 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3297 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3298 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3299 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3301 } else if (i == 1) {
3303 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3304 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3308 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3309 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3312 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3313 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3314 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3315 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3317 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3318 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3319 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3320 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3326 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3329 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3333 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3335 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3338 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3341 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3342 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3343 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3351 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3352 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3353 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3355 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3361 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3365 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3367 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3374 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3375 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3377 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3378 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3380 /* we don't have a certificate */
3381 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3384 /* This is the passed certificate */
3386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3387 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3388 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3389 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3396 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3398 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3402 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3403 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3405 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3406 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3408 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3412 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3414 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3419 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3420 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3422 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3427 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3428 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3436 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3441 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3443 size_t len, padding_len;
3444 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3446 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3447 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3449 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3450 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3455 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3459 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3464 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3466 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3467 /* should contain no data */
3468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3469 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3470 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3471 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3474 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3475 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3476 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3480 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3481 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3482 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3483 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3484 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3489 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3491 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3494 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3496 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3498 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3500 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3501 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3502 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3507 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3508 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3510 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3511 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
3514 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3515 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3518 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3519 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3520 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3521 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3524 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3528 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3529 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3530 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3531 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3536 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3537 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3541 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3544 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3545 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3546 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3547 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3552 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3553 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3554 # error Max cipher length too short
3557 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3558 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3561 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3562 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3565 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3568 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3570 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3573 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3574 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3576 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3577 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3578 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3581 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3586 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3588 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3589 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3590 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3593 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3594 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3602 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3606 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3613 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3614 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3615 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3617 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3622 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3623 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3624 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3626 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3636 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3638 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3639 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3640 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3641 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3645 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;