2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
66 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
68 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
69 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
73 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
79 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
81 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
82 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
83 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
84 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
91 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
97 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
99 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
102 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
103 * ciphersuite or for SRP
105 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
114 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
115 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
116 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
117 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
119 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
120 * (transition not allowed)
122 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
124 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
127 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
128 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
132 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
133 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
134 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
137 switch (st->hand_state) {
141 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
143 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
144 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
146 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
147 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
152 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
153 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
154 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
159 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
170 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
171 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
177 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
178 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
179 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
185 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
191 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
192 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
193 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
203 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
210 /* No valid transition found */
215 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
216 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
217 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
218 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
220 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
221 * (transition not allowed)
223 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
225 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
229 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
230 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
232 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
233 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
238 switch (st->hand_state) {
242 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
243 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
244 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
248 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
249 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
250 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
261 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
263 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
268 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
269 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
273 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
274 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
276 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
277 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
278 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
279 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
281 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
282 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
283 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
284 * the server is resuming.
287 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
289 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
290 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
291 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
296 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
297 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
299 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
300 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
301 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
302 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
305 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
306 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
309 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
310 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
319 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
320 * |ext.status_expected| is set
322 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
323 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
328 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
329 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
330 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
331 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
332 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
333 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
341 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
342 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
343 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
351 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
352 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
353 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
358 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
359 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
360 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
364 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
365 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
370 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
371 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
372 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
377 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
378 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
379 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
385 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
386 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
393 /* No valid transition found */
394 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
395 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
400 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
401 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
404 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
406 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
409 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
410 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
411 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
413 switch (st->hand_state) {
415 /* Shouldn't happen */
416 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
418 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
419 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
420 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
422 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
423 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
427 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
428 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
433 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
434 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
442 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
449 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
450 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
452 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
461 /* Try to read from the server instead */
462 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
467 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
468 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
470 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
472 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
475 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
476 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
480 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
482 switch (st->hand_state) {
484 /* Shouldn't happen */
485 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
488 if (!s->renegotiate) {
490 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
491 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
493 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
495 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
497 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
498 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
500 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
502 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
505 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
507 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
508 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
509 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
511 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
512 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
513 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
516 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
519 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
520 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
522 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
524 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
525 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
528 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
529 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
530 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
531 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
533 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
534 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
536 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
538 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
541 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
543 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
544 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
545 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
547 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
548 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
549 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
551 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
559 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
564 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
567 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
570 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
573 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
575 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
578 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
579 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
583 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
585 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
588 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
589 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
590 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
591 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
594 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
597 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
603 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
604 * the client to the server.
606 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
608 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
610 switch (st->hand_state) {
612 /* No pre work to be done */
615 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
617 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
618 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
619 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
620 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
626 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
627 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
630 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
631 * messages unless we need to.
635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
636 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
637 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
643 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
646 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
650 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
651 * client to the server.
652 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
653 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
655 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
657 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
661 switch (st->hand_state) {
663 /* No post work to be done */
666 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
667 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
670 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
671 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
676 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
677 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
681 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
682 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
683 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
684 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
686 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
687 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
689 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
691 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
694 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
695 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
698 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
702 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
705 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
710 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
714 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
716 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
718 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
721 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
725 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
728 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
729 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
730 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
735 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
736 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
738 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
743 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
747 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
750 * Valid return values are:
754 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
755 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
757 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
759 switch (st->hand_state) {
761 /* Shouldn't happen */
764 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
766 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
768 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
769 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
772 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
773 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
774 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
778 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
779 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
782 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
783 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
784 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
787 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
788 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
789 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
792 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
793 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
794 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
795 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
798 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
799 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
800 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
803 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
804 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
805 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
813 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
814 * reading. Excludes the message header.
816 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
818 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
820 switch (st->hand_state) {
822 /* Shouldn't happen */
825 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
826 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
828 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
829 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
831 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
832 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
835 return s->max_cert_list;
837 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
838 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
840 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
841 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
843 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
844 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
846 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
848 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
849 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
850 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
852 return s->max_cert_list;
854 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
855 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
857 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
858 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
860 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
862 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
863 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
865 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
866 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
868 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
869 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
871 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
872 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
877 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
879 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
881 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
883 switch (st->hand_state) {
885 /* Shouldn't happen */
886 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
888 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
889 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
891 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
892 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
894 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
895 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
898 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
900 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
901 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
903 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
904 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
906 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
907 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
909 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
910 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
912 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
913 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
915 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
916 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
918 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
919 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
921 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
922 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
924 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
925 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
927 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
928 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
930 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
931 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
936 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
939 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
941 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
943 switch (st->hand_state) {
945 /* Shouldn't happen */
948 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
949 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
952 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
953 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
954 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
955 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
956 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
957 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
958 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
959 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
962 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
963 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
968 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
973 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
977 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
979 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
980 /* Should not happen */
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
985 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
986 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
992 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
994 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
995 * "ticket" without a session ID.
997 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
998 (sess->not_resumable)) {
999 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1002 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1004 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
1005 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
1007 p = s->s3->client_random;
1010 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1011 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1013 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1016 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1025 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
1029 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1030 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1031 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1032 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1033 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1034 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1035 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1036 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1039 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1040 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1041 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1042 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1043 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1044 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1045 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1046 * know that is maximum server supports.
1047 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1048 * containing version 1.0.
1050 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1051 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1052 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1053 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1054 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1055 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1056 * the negotiated version.
1058 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1059 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1061 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1062 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1068 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1071 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1072 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1073 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1074 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1076 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1081 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1082 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1083 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1084 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1085 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1091 /* Ciphers supported */
1092 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1096 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1097 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1099 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1105 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1110 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1111 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1112 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1113 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1114 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1121 /* Add the NULL method */
1122 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1127 /* TLS extensions */
1128 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1129 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1143 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1144 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1145 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1150 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1151 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1152 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1157 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1158 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1162 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1164 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1166 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1167 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1168 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1171 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1173 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1174 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1175 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1176 size_t session_id_len;
1177 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1178 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1179 unsigned int compression;
1180 unsigned int sversion;
1181 unsigned int context;
1183 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1188 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1189 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1194 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1195 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1196 if (protverr != 0) {
1197 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1202 /* load the server hello data */
1203 /* load the server random */
1204 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1205 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1210 /* Get the session-id. */
1211 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1212 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1213 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1217 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1218 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1219 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1220 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1222 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1226 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1230 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1232 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1236 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1237 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1239 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1246 /* TLS extensions */
1247 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1248 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1249 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1250 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1255 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1256 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1257 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL))
1262 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1263 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1264 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1265 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1266 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1270 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1271 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1272 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1273 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1274 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1275 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1276 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1277 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1278 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1279 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1281 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1282 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1283 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1285 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1286 * backwards compat reasons
1288 int master_key_length;
1289 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1290 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1293 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1294 && master_key_length > 0) {
1295 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1296 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1297 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1300 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1305 if (session_id_len != 0
1306 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1307 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1308 session_id_len) == 0)
1313 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1314 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1315 /* actually a client application bug */
1316 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1318 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1323 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1324 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1325 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1326 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1327 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1329 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1331 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1332 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1333 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1334 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1339 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1340 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1341 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1342 if (session_id_len > 0)
1343 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1347 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1348 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1349 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1352 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1356 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1358 /* unknown cipher */
1359 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1364 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1367 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1368 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1370 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1371 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1373 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1374 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1379 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1380 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1382 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1383 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1389 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1390 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1391 * set and use it for comparison.
1393 if (s->session->cipher)
1394 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1395 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1396 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1398 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1401 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1403 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1404 if (compression != 0) {
1405 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1407 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1411 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1412 * using compression.
1414 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1419 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1420 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1422 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1425 if (compression == 0)
1427 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1428 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1432 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1435 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1436 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1438 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1441 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1445 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1449 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1450 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1451 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1454 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1457 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1458 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1460 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1461 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1463 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1466 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1467 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1468 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1473 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1474 * we're done with this message
1477 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1478 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1479 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1480 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1481 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1482 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1487 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1488 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1490 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1491 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1492 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1493 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1496 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1498 unsigned int sversion;
1500 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1504 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1505 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1510 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1512 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1513 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1514 if (errorcode != 0) {
1515 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1520 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1521 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1526 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1527 &extensions, &al, NULL)
1528 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1529 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1532 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1534 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1536 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1537 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1538 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1539 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1542 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1544 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1545 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1547 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1548 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1549 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1551 unsigned int context = 0;
1553 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1558 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1560 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1561 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1562 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1566 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1567 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1568 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1569 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1570 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1571 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1575 certstart = certbytes;
1576 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1578 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1582 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1583 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1585 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1589 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1590 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1593 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1594 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1598 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1599 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
1600 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1601 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1602 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1605 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1608 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1615 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1617 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1618 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1619 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1620 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1621 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1622 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1623 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1624 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1625 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1626 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1627 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1628 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1630 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1631 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1633 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1636 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1639 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1643 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1645 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1646 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1648 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1651 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1654 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1656 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1660 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1664 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1669 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1673 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1674 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1677 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1678 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1679 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1680 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1681 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1682 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1684 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1686 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1690 s->session->peer_type = i;
1692 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1694 s->session->peer = x;
1695 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1698 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1700 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1701 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1702 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1703 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1708 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1712 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1714 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1717 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1721 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1724 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1726 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1728 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1729 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1735 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1736 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1737 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1740 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1741 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1746 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1747 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1748 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1749 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1750 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1751 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1758 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1763 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1766 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1768 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1769 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1770 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1771 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1772 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1777 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1779 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1780 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1782 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1783 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1785 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1786 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1788 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1789 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1790 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1795 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1796 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1801 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1802 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1803 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1808 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1813 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1816 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1817 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1820 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1824 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1825 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1826 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1827 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1832 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1835 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1836 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1841 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1842 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1843 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1845 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1846 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1847 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1848 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1853 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1854 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1855 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1860 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1861 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1867 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1868 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1873 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1874 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1880 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1881 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1886 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1887 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1892 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1895 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1896 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1898 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1899 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1900 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1909 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1914 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1919 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1923 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1925 unsigned int curve_flags;
1926 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1929 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1930 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1931 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1933 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1934 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1939 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1940 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1942 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1943 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1948 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1950 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1951 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1953 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1957 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1958 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1960 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1961 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1966 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1968 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1969 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1971 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1972 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1973 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1974 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1976 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1979 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1983 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1984 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1989 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1990 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1991 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1992 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1998 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1999 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2002 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2003 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2004 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2005 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2006 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2011 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2016 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2020 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2021 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2022 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2023 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2025 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2027 save_param_start = *pkt;
2029 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2030 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2031 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2034 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2035 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2039 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2040 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2041 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2042 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2044 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2045 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2047 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2048 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2051 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2056 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2060 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2063 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2064 * equals the length of the parameters.
2066 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2067 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2068 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2069 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2074 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2075 unsigned int sigalg;
2078 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2079 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2083 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2085 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2087 } else if (rv == 0) {
2088 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2092 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2094 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2095 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2099 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
2101 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2102 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2103 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2107 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2109 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2110 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2115 * Check signature length
2117 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2118 /* wrong packet length */
2119 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2121 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2125 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2126 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2127 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2132 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2133 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2137 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2138 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2139 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2140 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2141 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2146 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2147 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2148 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2149 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2150 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2151 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2152 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2156 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2157 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2159 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2163 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2166 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2167 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2168 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2169 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2170 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2171 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2172 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2175 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2179 /* still data left over */
2180 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2181 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2187 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2190 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2191 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2192 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2193 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2196 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2198 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2199 unsigned int list_len, i, name_len;
2200 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2201 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2202 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2205 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2210 /* get the certificate types */
2211 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2212 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2217 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2222 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2225 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2226 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2228 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2232 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2233 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2234 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2235 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2236 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2238 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2241 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2242 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2248 /* get the CA RDNs */
2249 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2250 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2251 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2256 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2257 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2258 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2259 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2261 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2265 namestart = namebytes;
2267 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2268 name_len)) == NULL) {
2269 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2274 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2275 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2277 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2280 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2287 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2288 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2289 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2290 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2293 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2296 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2299 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2303 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2305 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2308 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2310 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2311 unsigned int ticklen;
2312 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2313 unsigned int sess_len;
2314 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2316 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2317 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2318 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2319 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2321 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2327 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2328 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2329 * be 0 here in that instance
2332 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2334 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2335 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2336 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2337 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2339 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2342 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2344 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2346 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2349 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2350 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2355 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2356 s->session = new_sess;
2360 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2361 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2363 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2365 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2366 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2367 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2369 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2370 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2374 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2375 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2380 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2381 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2382 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2384 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2387 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2388 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2389 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2391 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2392 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2399 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2400 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2401 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2402 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2403 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2404 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2405 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2406 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2407 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2410 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2411 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2413 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2414 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2415 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2419 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2421 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2422 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2424 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2425 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2428 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2430 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2432 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2434 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2438 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2439 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2440 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2442 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2447 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2448 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2449 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2451 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2454 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2455 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2456 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2460 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2461 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2462 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2466 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2467 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2471 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2477 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2481 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2482 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2483 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2484 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2487 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2491 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2492 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2493 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2496 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2499 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2502 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2503 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2508 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2509 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2510 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2512 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2513 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2514 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2517 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2519 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2523 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2525 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2530 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2531 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2532 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2533 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2542 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2544 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2546 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2547 /* should contain no data */
2548 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2553 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2554 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2562 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2564 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2568 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2569 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2570 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2571 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2574 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2577 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2578 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2579 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2582 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2587 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2588 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2591 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2592 size_t identitylen = 0;
2593 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2594 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2595 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2598 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2600 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2604 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2606 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2607 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2610 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2612 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2614 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2616 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2617 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2621 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2622 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2624 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2628 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2629 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2630 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2632 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2636 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2637 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2638 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2640 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2641 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2644 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2646 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2653 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2654 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2655 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2656 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2661 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2666 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2669 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2670 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2671 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2673 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2676 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2678 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2684 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2685 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2690 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2691 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2694 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2698 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2699 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2700 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2701 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2705 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2706 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2710 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2711 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2712 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2716 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2717 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2721 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2724 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2726 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2730 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2731 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2736 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2737 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2739 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2740 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2745 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2746 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2751 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2756 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2760 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2761 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2762 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2764 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2768 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2772 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2774 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2777 /* send off the data */
2778 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2779 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2782 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2783 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2787 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2790 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2794 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2797 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2798 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2799 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2802 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2808 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2814 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2819 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2820 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2822 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2827 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2834 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2835 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2839 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2844 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2847 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2848 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2851 unsigned int md_len;
2852 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2853 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2854 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2855 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2858 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2859 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2862 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2864 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2866 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2868 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2872 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2873 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2874 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2879 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2880 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2881 * certificate key for key exchange
2884 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2886 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2888 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2893 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2894 /* Generate session key
2895 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2897 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2898 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2903 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2906 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2907 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2908 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2909 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2910 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2911 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2912 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2913 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2914 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2918 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2920 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2921 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2922 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2926 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2928 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2931 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2932 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2937 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2938 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2939 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2940 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2945 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2946 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2947 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2951 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2952 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2953 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2957 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2962 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2965 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2967 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
2968 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2973 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
2975 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2976 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2977 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2985 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2990 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2992 unsigned long alg_k;
2995 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2997 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
2998 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3001 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3002 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3004 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3005 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3007 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3008 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3010 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3011 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3013 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3014 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3016 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3017 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3025 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3026 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3027 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3029 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3030 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3035 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3037 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3040 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3041 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3045 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3046 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3048 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3055 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3056 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3060 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3061 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3063 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3072 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3073 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3074 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3077 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3080 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3081 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3083 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3084 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3085 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3088 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3089 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3095 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3096 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3101 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3102 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3103 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3105 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3107 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3108 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3111 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3112 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3114 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3115 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3120 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3123 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3126 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3127 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3128 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3129 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3131 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3135 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3136 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3139 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3141 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3142 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3144 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3148 /* We need to get a client cert */
3149 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3151 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3152 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3154 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3156 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3159 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3160 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3161 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3163 } else if (i == 1) {
3165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3166 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3170 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3171 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3174 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3175 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3176 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3177 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3179 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3180 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3181 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3182 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3188 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3191 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3195 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3197 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3200 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3203 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3204 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3205 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3209 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3216 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3218 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3225 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3226 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3228 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3229 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3231 /* we don't have a certificate */
3232 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3235 /* This is the passed certificate */
3237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3238 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3239 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3240 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3247 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3249 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3253 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3254 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3256 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3257 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3259 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3263 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3265 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3270 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3271 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3273 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3278 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3279 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3287 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3292 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3294 size_t len, padding_len;
3295 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3297 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3298 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3300 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3301 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3306 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3310 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3315 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3317 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3318 /* should contain no data */
3319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3320 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3321 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3322 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3326 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3327 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3328 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3329 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3330 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3335 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3337 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3340 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3342 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3344 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3346 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3347 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3352 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3353 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
3354 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3355 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3358 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3359 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3362 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3363 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3364 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3365 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3368 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3372 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3373 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3374 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3375 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3380 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3381 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3385 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3388 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3389 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3390 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3391 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3396 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3397 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3398 # error Max cipher length too short
3401 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3402 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3405 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3406 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3409 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3412 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3414 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3417 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3418 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3420 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3421 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3422 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3425 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3439 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3440 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3441 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3443 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3448 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3449 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3450 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3452 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);