2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
63 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
64 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
65 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
70 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
76 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
78 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
79 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
80 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
81 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
88 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
94 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
96 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
99 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
100 * ciphersuite or for SRP
102 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
111 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
112 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
113 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
114 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
117 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
118 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
120 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
122 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
125 switch(st->hand_state) {
126 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
127 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
128 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
132 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
133 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
134 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
140 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
142 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
143 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
144 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
147 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
148 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
152 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
153 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
155 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
156 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
157 && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
158 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
160 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
161 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
162 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
163 * the server is resuming.
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
168 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
169 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
170 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
171 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
175 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
176 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
178 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
179 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
180 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
184 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
185 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
188 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
189 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
198 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
199 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
201 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
202 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
207 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
208 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
209 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
211 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
212 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
213 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
214 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
221 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
222 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
223 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
224 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
231 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
232 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
233 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
238 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
239 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
244 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
245 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
250 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
251 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
252 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
257 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
258 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
269 /* No valid transition found */
270 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
271 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
276 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
277 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
279 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
281 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
283 switch(st->hand_state) {
285 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
287 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
288 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
290 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
292 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
295 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
297 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
298 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
299 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
301 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
302 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
303 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
305 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
306 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
309 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
310 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
312 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
314 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
315 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
318 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
319 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
320 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
321 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
323 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
326 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
328 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
331 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
333 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
335 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
337 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
338 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
339 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
341 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
342 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
346 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
348 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
349 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
350 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
351 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
354 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
356 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
357 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
358 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
360 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
363 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
365 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
366 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
369 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
370 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
374 /* Shouldn't happen */
375 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
380 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
381 * the client to the server.
383 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
385 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
387 switch(st->hand_state) {
388 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
390 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
391 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
392 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
393 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
399 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
400 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
403 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
404 * messages unless we need to.
408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
409 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
410 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
413 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
416 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
419 /* No pre work to be done */
423 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
427 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
428 * client to the server.
430 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
432 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
436 switch(st->hand_state) {
437 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
438 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
441 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
442 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
447 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
448 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
452 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
453 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
454 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
455 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
457 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
458 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
460 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
462 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
465 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
466 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
469 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
473 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
476 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
481 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
485 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
487 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
489 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
492 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
496 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
501 /* No post work to be done */
505 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
509 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
511 * Valid return values are:
515 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s)
517 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
519 switch(st->hand_state) {
520 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
521 return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
524 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
526 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
527 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
529 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
530 return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
532 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
534 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
536 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
538 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
539 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
540 return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
542 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
543 return tls_construct_finished(s,
545 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
547 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
550 /* Shouldn't happen */
558 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
559 * reading. Excludes the message header.
561 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
563 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
565 switch(st->hand_state) {
566 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
567 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
569 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
570 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
573 return s->max_cert_list;
575 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
576 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
578 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
579 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
581 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
582 /* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases.
583 * In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are
584 * configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
586 return s->max_cert_list;
588 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
589 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
591 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
592 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
594 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
595 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
597 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
598 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
601 /* Shouldn't happen */
609 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
611 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
613 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
615 switch(st->hand_state) {
616 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
617 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
619 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
620 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
623 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
625 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
626 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
628 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
629 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
631 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
632 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
634 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
635 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
637 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
638 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
640 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
641 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
643 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
644 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
647 /* Shouldn't happen */
651 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
655 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
658 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
660 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
662 switch(st->hand_state) {
663 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
664 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
667 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
668 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
669 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
670 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
671 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
672 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
673 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
674 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
677 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
678 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
685 /* Shouldn't happen */
689 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
692 unsigned char *p, *d;
697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
701 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
703 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
705 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
706 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
712 if ((sess == NULL) ||
713 !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
715 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
716 * "ticket" without a session ID.
718 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
719 (sess->not_resumable)) {
720 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
723 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
725 p = s->s3->client_random;
728 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
729 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
731 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
734 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
743 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
744 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
747 /* Do the message type and length last */
748 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
751 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
752 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
753 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
754 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
755 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
756 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
757 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
758 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
761 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
762 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
763 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
764 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
765 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
766 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
767 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
768 * know that is maximum server supports.
769 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
770 * containing version 1.0.
772 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
773 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
774 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
775 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
776 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
777 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
778 * the negotiated version.
780 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
781 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
784 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
785 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
791 i = s->session->session_id_length;
794 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
798 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
802 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
803 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
804 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
808 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
809 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
810 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
813 /* Ciphers supported */
814 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));
816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
819 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
821 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
822 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
825 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
826 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
827 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
833 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
837 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
840 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
842 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
843 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
847 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
850 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
855 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
857 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
863 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
864 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
871 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
875 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
878 unsigned int cookie_len;
881 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
882 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
883 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
884 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
888 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
889 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
890 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
895 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
896 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
900 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
902 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
904 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
905 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
906 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
909 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
911 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
914 size_t session_id_len;
915 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
916 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
917 unsigned int compression;
918 unsigned int sversion;
920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
924 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
925 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
930 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
932 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
937 /* load the server hello data */
938 /* load the server random */
939 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
940 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
947 /* Get the session-id. */
948 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
949 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
953 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
954 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
955 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
956 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
961 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
963 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
968 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
969 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
970 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
971 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
972 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
973 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
974 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
975 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
976 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
977 * server wants to resume.
979 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
980 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
981 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
982 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
983 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
984 &s->session->master_key_length,
986 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
987 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
988 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
991 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
996 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
997 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
998 session_id_len) == 0) {
999 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1000 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1001 /* actually a client application bug */
1002 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1004 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1010 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1011 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1012 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1013 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1014 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1016 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1017 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1018 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1023 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1024 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1025 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1026 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1030 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1031 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1032 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1035 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1039 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1041 /* unknown cipher */
1042 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1047 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1050 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1051 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1053 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1054 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1056 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1057 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1062 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1063 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1065 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1066 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1072 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1073 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1074 * set and use it for comparison.
1076 if (s->session->cipher)
1077 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1078 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1079 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1081 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1084 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1085 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1087 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1089 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1092 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1093 if (compression != 0) {
1094 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1096 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1100 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1101 * using compression.
1103 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1108 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1109 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1111 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1114 if (compression == 0)
1116 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1117 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1121 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1124 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1125 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1127 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1130 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1134 /* TLS extensions */
1135 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1140 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1141 /* wrong packet length */
1142 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1148 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1149 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1150 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1153 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1156 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1157 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1159 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1160 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1162 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
1166 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1167 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1168 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1172 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1174 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1176 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1177 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1180 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1182 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1183 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1185 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1186 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1187 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1189 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1194 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1195 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1196 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1200 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1201 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1202 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1203 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1205 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1209 certstart = certbytes;
1210 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1212 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1216 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1217 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1219 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1222 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1229 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1230 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && i <= 0) {
1231 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1233 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1236 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1239 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1243 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1245 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1246 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1248 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1251 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1254 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1256 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1260 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1264 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1269 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1273 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1274 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1275 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1276 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1277 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1279 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1281 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1284 s->session->peer_type = i;
1286 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1288 s->session->peer = x;
1289 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1292 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1296 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1298 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1301 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1305 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1308 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1310 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1312 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1313 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1319 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1320 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1321 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1324 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1325 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1330 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1331 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1332 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1333 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1334 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1335 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1342 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1347 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1350 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1352 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1353 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1354 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1355 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1356 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1362 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1363 PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1365 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1366 PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1368 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1369 PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1371 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1372 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1373 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1378 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1379 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1384 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1385 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1386 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1391 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1396 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1399 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1400 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1403 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1405 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1406 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1407 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1408 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1413 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1416 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1417 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1422 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1423 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1425 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key),
1427 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1428 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1433 if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1434 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1439 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1440 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1446 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1447 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1453 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1454 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1459 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1460 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1465 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1468 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1469 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1471 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1472 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1473 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1482 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1487 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1492 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1497 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1498 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1500 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1501 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1502 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1507 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1509 save_param_start = *pkt;
1511 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1512 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1513 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1516 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1518 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1519 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
1523 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1524 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1525 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1526 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1528 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1529 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1533 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1535 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1537 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1540 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1541 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1542 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1544 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1549 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1550 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1552 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1557 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2));
1558 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1559 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1561 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1565 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1566 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1568 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1569 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1570 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1571 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1573 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1576 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1579 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1584 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->peer_tmp),
1585 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1586 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), NULL) == 0) {
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1592 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1593 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1597 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1598 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1599 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1601 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1602 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1603 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1605 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1607 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1611 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1613 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1617 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1619 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1620 * equals the length of the parameters.
1622 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1623 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1624 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1625 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1630 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1631 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1633 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1637 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1644 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1646 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1647 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1652 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1653 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1657 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1664 * Check signature length
1666 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
1667 /* wrong packet length */
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1671 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1672 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1673 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1674 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1675 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1676 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1677 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1678 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1682 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1683 PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
1685 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1690 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1691 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1692 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1693 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1694 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1698 /* still data left over */
1699 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1704 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1705 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1708 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1711 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1712 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1713 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1714 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1717 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1719 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1720 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1721 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1722 const unsigned char *data;
1723 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1724 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1726 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1731 /* get the certificate types */
1732 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
1733 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
1734 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1738 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
1739 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
1740 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
1741 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1742 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
1743 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1747 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
1748 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
1749 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
1751 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
1752 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
1754 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1755 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1756 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
1757 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1759 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1763 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1764 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1765 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1766 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1768 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
1769 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1771 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
1774 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1775 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1780 ssl_set_default_md(s);
1783 /* get the CA RDNs */
1784 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1785 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
1786 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1791 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1792 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
1793 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
1794 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1796 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1800 namestart = namebytes;
1802 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
1803 name_len)) == NULL) {
1804 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1809 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
1810 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1812 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1815 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1822 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
1823 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
1824 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
1825 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
1826 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
1829 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1832 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1835 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
1839 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
1841 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
1844 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1847 unsigned int ticklen;
1848 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
1850 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
1851 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
1852 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
1853 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1858 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
1860 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1862 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1863 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
1864 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
1866 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
1869 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
1871 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
1873 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1876 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
1877 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1882 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1883 s->session = new_sess;
1886 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
1887 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
1889 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1890 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1894 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
1895 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1900 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
1901 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1903 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
1904 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
1905 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
1906 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
1907 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
1908 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
1909 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
1910 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
1911 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
1913 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
1914 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
1915 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1919 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1921 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1923 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1924 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1927 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1930 unsigned long resplen;
1933 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
1934 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1935 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
1939 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)
1940 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
1941 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1945 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
1946 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
1947 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1951 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
1952 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1956 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
1957 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1959 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1960 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1961 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1964 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1966 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1967 /* should contain no data */
1968 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1970 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1971 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1975 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
1976 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
1978 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1979 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1980 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1986 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
1989 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
1990 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1991 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1992 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1996 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
1997 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
1998 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2000 if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
2002 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2004 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
2005 SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2007 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2008 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2011 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2013 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2018 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2019 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2020 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2021 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2022 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2028 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2029 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2030 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2031 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2034 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2037 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2038 size_t *pskhdrlen, int *al)
2040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2043 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2044 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2047 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2048 size_t identitylen = 0;
2049 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2050 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2051 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2054 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2056 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2060 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2062 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2063 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2066 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2068 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2070 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2072 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2073 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2077 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2078 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2080 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2084 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2085 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2086 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2088 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2092 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2093 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2094 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2096 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2097 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2099 s2n(identitylen, *p);
2100 memcpy(*p, identity, identitylen);
2101 *pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
2107 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2108 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2109 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2110 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2115 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2120 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
2122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2124 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2125 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2127 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2130 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2132 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2138 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2139 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2140 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2144 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2145 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2147 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2148 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2152 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2153 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2154 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) {
2159 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2160 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2162 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2163 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2164 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2168 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, *p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2173 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2176 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2178 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2182 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2183 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2188 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2189 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2193 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2194 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2199 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2204 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
2206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2208 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2209 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2211 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2216 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
2217 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2219 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
2220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2221 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2225 /* send off the data */
2226 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2227 *len = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
2229 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, *p);
2231 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2236 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2241 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
2243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2244 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2245 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2246 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2248 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2249 if ((skey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(skey) == NULL) {
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2254 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
2256 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2261 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2262 encoded_pt_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey),
2263 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2264 &encodedPoint, NULL);
2266 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2271 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2274 *len = encoded_pt_len;
2276 /* length of encoded point */
2279 /* copy the point */
2280 memcpy(*p, encodedPoint, *len);
2281 /* increment len to account for length field */
2284 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2288 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2292 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2297 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
2299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2300 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2301 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2304 unsigned int md_len;
2305 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2306 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2307 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2308 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2311 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2312 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2315 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2317 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2319 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2321 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2325 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2326 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2327 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2332 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2333 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2334 * certificate key for key exchange
2337 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2339 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2341 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2346 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2347 /* Generate session key */
2348 || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2349 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2354 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2356 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2357 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2358 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2360 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2367 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2370 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2371 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2372 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2373 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2374 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2375 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2376 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2377 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2378 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2382 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2384 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2385 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2386 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2390 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2392 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2394 *((*p)++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2396 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2397 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2398 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2401 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2403 *((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff;
2406 *((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff;
2409 memcpy(*p, tmp, msglen);
2410 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2411 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
2413 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2414 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2416 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2417 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2418 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2422 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2423 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2424 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2428 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2433 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
2435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRT
2436 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2437 /* send off the data */
2438 *len = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2440 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, *p);
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2446 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2447 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2448 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2456 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2461 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2465 size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
2466 unsigned long alg_k;
2469 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2471 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2473 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
2474 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, &p, &pskhdrlen, &al))
2477 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2479 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2480 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, &p, &len, &al))
2482 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2483 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, &p, &len, &al))
2485 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2486 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, &p, &len, &al))
2488 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2489 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, &p, &len, &al))
2491 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2492 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, &p, &len, &al))
2495 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2502 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, len)) {
2503 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2511 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2512 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
2513 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2515 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2516 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2518 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2522 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2524 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2527 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2528 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2532 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2533 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2535 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2542 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2543 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2547 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2548 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2550 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2559 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2560 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2561 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2564 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2567 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2568 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2570 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2571 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2572 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2575 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2576 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2582 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2583 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2587 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
2591 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2594 unsigned long n = 0;
2598 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2604 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2605 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2607 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2608 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2612 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2613 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2621 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2623 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2624 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2625 || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2626 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2627 s->session->master_key_length,
2628 s->session->master_key))
2629 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
2630 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2635 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2636 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2637 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2638 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
2639 BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);
2645 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2646 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2648 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2653 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2656 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2661 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2662 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2663 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2665 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2667 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2669 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2670 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2673 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2674 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2676 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2677 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2682 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2685 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2688 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2689 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2690 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
2691 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2693 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2697 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2698 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2701 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2703 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2704 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2706 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2710 /* We need to get a client cert */
2711 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2713 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2714 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2716 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
2718 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2721 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2722 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
2723 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
2725 } else if (i == 1) {
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2728 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
2732 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2733 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2736 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2737 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2738 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
2739 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2741 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
2742 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2743 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2744 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2750 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2753 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2757 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2759 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
2760 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
2761 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2763 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2764 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2771 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2773 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
2776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2780 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2781 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2783 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2784 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2786 /* we don't have a certificate */
2787 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
2790 /* This is the passed certificate */
2792 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2793 idx = s->session->peer_type;
2794 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
2795 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
2802 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2804 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2808 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2809 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
2811 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
2812 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2814 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2818 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2820 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2825 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
2826 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
2827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2828 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
2832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2833 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
2834 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2842 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2847 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
2849 unsigned int len, padding_len;
2852 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
2853 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
2854 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2856 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
2857 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
2858 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
2859 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
2860 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
2861 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
2868 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
2871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
2872 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
2873 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
2874 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
2875 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
2880 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
2881 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
2885 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
2889 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2891 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
2892 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
2893 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
2899 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
2900 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2901 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2902 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
2904 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
2908 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
2912 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
2913 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
2914 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2916 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
2919 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
2920 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
2921 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2923 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);