2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
66 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
68 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
69 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
73 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
79 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
81 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
82 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
83 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
84 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
91 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
97 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
99 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
102 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
103 * ciphersuite or for SRP
105 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
114 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
115 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
116 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
117 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
119 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
120 * (transition not allowed)
122 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
124 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
127 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
128 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
132 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
133 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
134 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
137 switch (st->hand_state) {
141 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
143 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
144 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
146 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
147 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
152 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
153 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
154 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
159 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
170 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
171 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
177 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
178 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
179 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
185 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
191 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
192 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
193 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
203 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
210 /* No valid transition found */
215 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
216 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
217 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
218 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
220 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
221 * (transition not allowed)
223 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
225 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
229 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
230 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
232 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
233 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
238 switch (st->hand_state) {
242 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
243 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
244 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
248 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
249 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
250 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
261 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
263 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
268 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
269 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
273 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
274 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
276 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
277 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
278 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
279 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
281 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
282 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
283 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
284 * the server is resuming.
287 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
289 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
290 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
291 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
296 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
297 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
299 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
300 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
301 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
302 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
305 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
306 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
309 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
310 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
319 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
320 * |ext.status_expected| is set
322 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
323 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
328 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
329 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
330 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
331 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
332 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
333 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
341 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
342 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
343 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
351 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
352 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
353 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
358 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
359 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
360 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
364 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
365 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
370 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
371 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
372 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
377 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
378 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
379 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
385 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
386 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
393 /* No valid transition found */
394 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
395 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
400 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
401 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
404 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
406 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
409 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
410 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
411 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
413 switch (st->hand_state) {
415 /* Shouldn't happen */
416 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
418 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
419 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
420 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
422 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
423 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
427 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
428 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
433 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
434 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
442 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
449 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
450 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
452 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
461 /* Try to read from the server instead */
462 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
467 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
468 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
470 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
472 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
475 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
476 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
480 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
482 switch (st->hand_state) {
484 /* Shouldn't happen */
485 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
488 if (!s->renegotiate) {
490 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
491 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
493 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
495 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
497 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
498 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
500 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
502 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
505 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
507 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
508 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
509 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
511 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
512 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
513 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
516 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
519 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
520 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
522 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
524 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
525 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
528 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
529 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
530 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
531 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
533 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
534 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
536 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
538 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
541 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
543 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
544 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
545 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
547 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
548 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
549 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
551 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
559 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
564 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
567 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
570 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
573 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
575 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
578 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
579 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
583 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
585 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
588 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
589 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
590 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
591 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
594 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
597 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
603 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
604 * the client to the server.
606 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
608 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
610 switch (st->hand_state) {
612 /* No pre work to be done */
615 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
617 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
618 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
619 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
620 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
626 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
627 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
630 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
631 * messages unless we need to.
635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
636 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
637 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
643 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
646 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
650 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
651 * client to the server.
653 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
655 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
659 switch (st->hand_state) {
661 /* No post work to be done */
664 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
665 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
668 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
669 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
674 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
675 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
679 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
680 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
681 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
682 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
684 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
685 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
687 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
689 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
692 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
693 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
696 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
700 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
703 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
708 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
712 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
714 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
716 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
719 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
723 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
726 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
727 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
728 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
733 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
734 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
736 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
741 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
745 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
748 * Valid return values are:
752 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
753 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
755 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
757 switch (st->hand_state) {
759 /* Shouldn't happen */
762 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
764 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
766 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
767 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
770 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
771 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
772 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
776 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
777 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
780 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
781 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
782 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
785 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
786 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
787 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
790 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
791 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
792 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
793 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
796 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
797 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
798 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
801 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
802 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
803 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
811 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
812 * reading. Excludes the message header.
814 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
816 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
818 switch (st->hand_state) {
820 /* Shouldn't happen */
823 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
824 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
826 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
827 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
829 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
830 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
833 return s->max_cert_list;
835 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
836 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
838 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
839 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
841 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
842 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
844 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
846 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
847 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
848 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
850 return s->max_cert_list;
852 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
853 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
855 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
856 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
858 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
860 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
861 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
863 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
864 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
866 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
867 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
869 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
870 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
875 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
877 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
879 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
881 switch (st->hand_state) {
883 /* Shouldn't happen */
884 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
886 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
887 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
889 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
890 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
892 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
893 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
896 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
898 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
899 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
901 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
902 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
904 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
905 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
907 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
908 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
910 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
911 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
913 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
914 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
916 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
917 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
919 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
920 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
922 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
923 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
925 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
926 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
928 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
929 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
934 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
937 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
939 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
941 switch (st->hand_state) {
943 /* Shouldn't happen */
946 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
947 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
950 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
951 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
952 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
953 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
954 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
955 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
956 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
957 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
960 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
961 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
966 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
971 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
975 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
977 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
978 /* Should not happen */
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
983 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
984 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
990 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
992 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
993 * "ticket" without a session ID.
995 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
996 (sess->not_resumable)) {
997 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1000 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1002 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
1003 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
1005 p = s->s3->client_random;
1008 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1009 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1011 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1014 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1023 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
1027 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1028 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1029 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1030 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1031 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1032 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1033 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1034 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1037 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1038 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1039 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1040 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1041 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1042 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1043 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1044 * know that is maximum server supports.
1045 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1046 * containing version 1.0.
1048 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1049 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1050 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1051 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1052 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1053 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1054 * the negotiated version.
1056 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1057 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1059 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1060 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1066 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1069 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1070 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1071 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1072 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1074 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1079 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1080 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1081 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1082 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1083 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1089 /* Ciphers supported */
1090 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1094 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1095 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1097 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1103 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1107 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1108 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1109 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1110 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1111 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1112 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1119 /* Add the NULL method */
1120 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1125 /* TLS extensions */
1126 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1127 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1135 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1141 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1142 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1143 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1148 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1149 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1150 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1155 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1156 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1160 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1162 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1164 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1165 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1166 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1169 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1171 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1172 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1173 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1174 size_t session_id_len;
1175 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1176 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1177 unsigned int compression;
1178 unsigned int sversion;
1179 unsigned int context;
1181 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1186 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1187 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1192 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1193 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1194 if (protverr != 0) {
1195 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1200 /* load the server hello data */
1201 /* load the server random */
1202 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1203 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1208 /* Get the session-id. */
1209 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1210 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1211 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1215 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1216 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1217 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1218 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1220 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1224 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1228 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1230 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1234 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1235 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1237 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1244 /* TLS extensions */
1245 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1246 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1247 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1248 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1253 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1254 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1255 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL))
1260 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1261 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1262 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1263 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1264 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1268 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1269 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1270 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1271 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1272 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1273 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1274 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1275 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1276 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1277 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1279 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1280 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1281 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1283 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1284 * backwards compat reasons
1286 int master_key_length;
1287 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1288 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1291 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1292 && master_key_length > 0) {
1293 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1294 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1295 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1298 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1303 if (session_id_len != 0
1304 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1305 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1306 session_id_len) == 0)
1311 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1312 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1313 /* actually a client application bug */
1314 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1316 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1321 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1322 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1323 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1324 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1325 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1327 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1329 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1330 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1331 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1332 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1337 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1338 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1339 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1340 if (session_id_len > 0)
1341 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1345 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1346 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1347 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1350 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1354 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1356 /* unknown cipher */
1357 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1362 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1365 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1366 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1368 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1369 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1371 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1372 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1377 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1378 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1380 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1381 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1387 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1388 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1389 * set and use it for comparison.
1391 if (s->session->cipher)
1392 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1393 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1394 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1396 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1399 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1401 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1402 if (compression != 0) {
1403 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1405 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1409 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1410 * using compression.
1412 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1417 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1418 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1420 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1423 if (compression == 0)
1425 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1426 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1430 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1433 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1434 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1436 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1439 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1443 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1447 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1448 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1449 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1452 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1455 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1456 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1458 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1459 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1461 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1464 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1465 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1466 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1471 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1472 * we're done with this message
1475 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1476 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1477 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1478 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1479 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1480 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1485 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1486 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1488 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1489 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1490 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1491 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1494 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1496 unsigned int sversion;
1498 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1502 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1503 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1508 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1510 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1511 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1512 if (errorcode != 0) {
1513 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1518 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1519 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1524 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1525 &extensions, &al, NULL)
1526 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1527 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1530 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1532 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1534 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1535 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1536 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1537 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1540 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1542 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1543 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1545 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1546 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1547 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1549 unsigned int context = 0;
1551 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1556 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1558 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1559 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1560 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1564 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1565 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1566 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1567 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1569 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1573 certstart = certbytes;
1574 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1576 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1580 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1581 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1583 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1587 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1588 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1591 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1592 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1596 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1597 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
1598 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1599 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1600 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1603 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1606 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1613 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1615 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1616 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1617 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1618 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1619 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1620 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1621 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1622 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1623 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1624 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1625 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1626 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1628 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1629 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1631 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1634 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1637 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1641 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1643 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1644 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1646 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1649 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1652 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1654 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1658 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1662 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1667 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1671 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1672 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1675 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1676 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1677 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1678 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1679 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1680 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1682 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1684 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1688 s->session->peer_type = i;
1690 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1692 s->session->peer = x;
1693 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1696 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1698 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1699 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1700 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1701 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1706 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1710 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1712 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1715 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1719 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1722 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1724 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1726 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1727 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1733 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1734 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1735 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1738 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1739 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1744 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1745 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1746 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1747 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1748 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1749 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1756 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1761 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1764 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1766 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1767 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1768 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1769 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1770 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1775 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1777 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1778 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1780 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1781 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1783 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1784 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1786 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1787 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1788 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1793 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1794 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1799 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1800 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1801 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1806 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1811 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1814 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1815 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1818 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1822 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1823 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1824 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1825 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1826 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1830 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1833 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1834 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1839 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1840 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1841 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1843 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1844 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1845 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1846 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1851 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1852 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1853 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1858 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1859 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1865 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1866 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1871 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1872 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1878 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1879 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1884 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1885 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1890 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1893 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1894 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1896 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1897 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1898 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1907 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1912 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1917 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1921 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1923 unsigned int curve_flags;
1924 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1927 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1928 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1929 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1931 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1932 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1937 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1938 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1940 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1941 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1946 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1948 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1949 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1951 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1955 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1956 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1958 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1959 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1964 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1966 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1967 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1969 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1970 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1971 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1972 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1974 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1977 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1981 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1982 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1987 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1988 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1989 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1990 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1996 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1997 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2000 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2001 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2002 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2003 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2004 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2009 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2014 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2018 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2019 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2020 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2021 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2023 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2025 save_param_start = *pkt;
2027 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2028 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2029 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2032 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2033 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2037 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2038 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2039 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2040 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2042 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2043 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2045 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2046 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2049 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2054 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2058 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2061 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2062 * equals the length of the parameters.
2064 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2065 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2066 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2067 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2072 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2073 unsigned int sigalg;
2076 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2077 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2081 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2083 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2085 } else if (rv == 0) {
2086 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2090 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2092 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2093 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2097 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
2099 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2100 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2101 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2105 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2107 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2113 * Check signature length
2115 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2116 /* wrong packet length */
2117 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2119 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2123 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2124 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2125 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2130 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2131 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2135 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2136 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2137 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2138 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2139 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2140 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2144 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2145 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2146 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2147 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2148 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2149 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2150 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2154 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2155 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2157 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2161 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2164 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2165 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2166 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2167 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2168 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2169 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2170 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2173 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2177 /* still data left over */
2178 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2179 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2185 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2188 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2189 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2190 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2191 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2194 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2196 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2197 unsigned int i, name_len;
2198 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2199 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2200 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2203 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2208 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2211 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2212 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2213 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2214 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2215 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2216 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2218 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2224 /* get the certificate types */
2225 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2226 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2228 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2232 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2233 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2238 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2241 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2242 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2244 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2248 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2249 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2250 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2251 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2252 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2254 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2257 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2258 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2264 /* get the CA RDNs */
2265 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2266 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2271 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2272 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2273 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2274 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2276 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2280 namestart = namebytes;
2282 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2283 name_len)) == NULL) {
2284 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2289 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2290 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2292 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2295 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2301 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to parse and process extensions, for now ignore */
2302 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2305 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &reqexts)) {
2306 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2308 SSL_R_EXT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2313 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2314 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2319 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2320 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2321 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2322 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2325 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2328 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2331 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2335 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2337 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2340 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2342 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2343 unsigned int ticklen;
2344 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2345 unsigned int sess_len;
2346 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2348 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2349 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2350 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2351 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2353 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2359 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2360 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2361 * be 0 here in that instance
2364 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2366 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2367 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2368 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2369 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2371 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2374 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2376 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2378 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2381 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2382 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2387 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2388 s->session = new_sess;
2392 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2393 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2395 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2397 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2398 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2399 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2401 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2402 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2406 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2407 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2412 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2413 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2414 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2416 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2419 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2420 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2421 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2423 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2424 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2431 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2432 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2433 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2434 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2435 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2436 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2437 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2438 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2439 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2442 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2443 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2445 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2446 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2447 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2451 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2453 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2454 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2456 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2457 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2460 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2462 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2464 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2466 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2470 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2471 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2472 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2474 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2479 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2480 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2481 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2483 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2486 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2487 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2488 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2492 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2493 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2494 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2498 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2499 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2503 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2509 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2513 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2514 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2515 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2516 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2519 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2523 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2524 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2525 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2528 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2531 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2534 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2535 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2540 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2541 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2542 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2544 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2545 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2546 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2549 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2551 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2555 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2556 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2557 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2562 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2563 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2564 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2565 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2574 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2576 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2578 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2579 /* should contain no data */
2580 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2585 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2586 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2594 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2596 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2600 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2601 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2602 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2603 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2606 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2609 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2610 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2611 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2614 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2619 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2620 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2623 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2624 size_t identitylen = 0;
2625 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2626 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2627 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2630 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2632 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2636 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2638 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2639 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2642 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2644 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2646 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2648 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2649 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2653 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2654 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2656 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2660 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2661 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2662 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2664 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2668 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2669 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2670 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2672 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2673 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2676 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2678 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2685 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2686 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2687 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2688 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2693 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2698 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2701 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2702 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2703 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2705 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2708 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2710 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2716 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2717 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2722 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2723 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2726 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2730 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2731 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2732 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2733 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2737 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2738 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2742 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2743 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2744 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2748 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2749 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2753 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2756 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2758 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2762 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2763 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2768 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2769 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2771 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2772 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2777 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2778 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2782 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2783 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2788 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2792 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2793 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2794 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2796 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2800 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2804 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2806 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2809 /* send off the data */
2810 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2811 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2814 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2815 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2819 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2822 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2826 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2829 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2830 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2831 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2834 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2840 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2846 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2851 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2852 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2854 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2859 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2866 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2867 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2871 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2876 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2879 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2880 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2883 unsigned int md_len;
2884 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2885 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2886 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2887 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2890 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2891 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2894 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2896 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2898 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2900 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2904 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2905 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2906 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2911 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2912 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2913 * certificate key for key exchange
2916 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2918 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2920 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2925 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2926 /* Generate session key
2927 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2929 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2930 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2935 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2938 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2939 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2940 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2941 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2942 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2943 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2944 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2945 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2946 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2950 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2952 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2953 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2954 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2958 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2960 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2963 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2964 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2969 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2970 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2971 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2972 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2977 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2978 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2979 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2983 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2984 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2985 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2989 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2994 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2997 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2999 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3000 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3005 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3007 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3008 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3009 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3017 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3022 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3024 unsigned long alg_k;
3027 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3029 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3030 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3033 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3034 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3036 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3037 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3039 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3040 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3042 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3043 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3045 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3046 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3048 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3049 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3057 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3058 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3059 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3061 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3062 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3067 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3069 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3072 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3073 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3077 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3078 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3080 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3087 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3088 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3092 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3093 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3095 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3104 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3105 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3106 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3109 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3112 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3113 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3115 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3116 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3117 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3120 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3121 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3127 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3128 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3133 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3134 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3135 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3137 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3139 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3140 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3143 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3144 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3146 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3147 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3152 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3155 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3158 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3159 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3160 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3161 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3163 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3167 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3168 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3171 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3173 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3174 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3176 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3180 /* We need to get a client cert */
3181 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3183 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3184 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3186 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3188 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3191 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3192 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3193 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3195 } else if (i == 1) {
3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3198 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3202 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3203 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3206 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3207 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3208 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3209 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3211 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3212 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3213 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3214 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3220 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3223 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3227 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3229 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3232 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3235 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3236 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3237 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3241 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3248 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3250 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3257 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3258 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3260 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3261 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3263 /* we don't have a certificate */
3264 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3267 /* This is the passed certificate */
3269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3270 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3271 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3272 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3279 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3281 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3285 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3286 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3288 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3289 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3291 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3295 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3297 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3302 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3303 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3305 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3310 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3311 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3319 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3324 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3326 size_t len, padding_len;
3327 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3329 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3330 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3332 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3333 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3338 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3342 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3347 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3349 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3350 /* should contain no data */
3351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3352 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3353 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3354 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3358 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3359 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3360 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3361 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3362 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3367 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3369 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3372 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3374 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3376 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3378 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3379 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3384 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3385 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
3386 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3387 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3390 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3391 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3394 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3395 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3396 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3397 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3400 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3404 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3405 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3406 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3407 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3412 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3413 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3417 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3420 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3421 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3422 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3423 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3428 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3429 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3430 # error Max cipher length too short
3433 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3434 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3437 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3438 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3441 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3444 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3446 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3449 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3450 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3452 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3453 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3454 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3457 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3471 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3472 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3473 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3475 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3480 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3481 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3482 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3484 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);