2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include "statem_locl.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
27 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
30 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
31 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
32 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
36 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
42 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
44 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
45 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
46 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
47 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
54 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
60 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
62 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
65 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
66 * ciphersuite or for SRP
68 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
77 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
78 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
79 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
80 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
82 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
83 * (transition not allowed)
85 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
87 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
91 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
95 switch (st->hand_state) {
99 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
101 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
102 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
104 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
105 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
110 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
111 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
112 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
117 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
124 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
125 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
135 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
143 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
144 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
149 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
150 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
151 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
166 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
167 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
169 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
170 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
172 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
173 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
174 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
175 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
177 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
178 /* SSLfatal() already called */
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
188 /* No valid transition found */
193 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
194 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
195 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
196 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
198 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
199 * (transition not allowed)
201 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
203 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
207 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
208 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
210 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
211 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
216 switch (st->hand_state) {
220 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
221 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
222 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
226 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
227 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
228 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
234 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
236 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
237 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
246 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
248 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
253 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
254 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
258 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
259 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
261 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
262 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
263 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
264 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
266 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
267 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
268 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
269 * the server is resuming.
272 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
274 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
275 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
276 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
281 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
282 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
284 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
285 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
286 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
287 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
290 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
291 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
294 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
304 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
305 * |ext.status_expected| is set
307 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
308 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
313 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
314 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
315 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
316 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
317 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
318 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
319 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
326 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
327 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
328 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
336 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
337 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
343 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
344 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
345 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
346 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
349 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
350 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
355 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
356 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
362 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
363 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
370 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
371 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
378 /* No valid transition found */
379 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
383 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
384 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
387 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
388 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
389 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
390 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
393 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
394 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
395 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
400 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
401 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
404 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
406 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
409 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
410 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
411 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
413 switch (st->hand_state) {
415 /* Shouldn't happen */
416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
417 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
418 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
419 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
421 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
422 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
423 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
428 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
429 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
430 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
432 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
433 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
434 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
436 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
437 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
440 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
441 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
442 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
444 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
445 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
447 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
452 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
453 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
454 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
459 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
460 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
464 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
467 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
468 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
475 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
476 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
481 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
486 /* Try to read from the server instead */
487 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
492 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
493 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
495 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
497 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
500 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
501 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
505 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
507 switch (st->hand_state) {
509 /* Shouldn't happen */
510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
511 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
512 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
513 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
516 if (!s->renegotiate) {
518 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
519 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
521 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
526 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
527 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
529 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
530 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
532 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
533 * actually selected a version yet.
535 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
536 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
539 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
542 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
545 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
547 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
549 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
550 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
551 * because we did early data.
553 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
554 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
557 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
558 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
560 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
561 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
563 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
565 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
567 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
568 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
569 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
575 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
578 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
580 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
581 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
584 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
585 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
586 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
587 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
589 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
594 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
597 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
599 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
600 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
601 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
603 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
604 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
606 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
609 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
612 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
618 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
620 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
621 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
622 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
623 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
626 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
628 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
631 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
634 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
636 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
637 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
639 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
640 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
643 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
645 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
648 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
649 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
650 /* SSLfatal() already called */
651 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
653 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
654 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
662 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
663 * the client to the server.
665 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
667 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
669 switch (st->hand_state) {
671 /* No pre work to be done */
674 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
676 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
677 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
678 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
679 /* SSLfatal() already called */
685 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
686 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
689 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
690 * messages unless we need to.
694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
695 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
696 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
697 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
703 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
705 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
706 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
707 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
709 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
710 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
711 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
714 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
715 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
718 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
719 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
722 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
726 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
727 * client to the server.
729 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
731 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
735 switch (st->hand_state) {
737 /* No post work to be done */
740 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
741 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
742 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
744 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
745 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
746 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
748 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
749 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
750 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
751 /* SSLfatal() already called */
755 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
756 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
760 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
761 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
766 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
768 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
769 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
771 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
772 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
775 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
776 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
777 /* SSLfatal() already called */
782 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
783 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
785 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
786 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
788 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
789 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
790 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
792 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
793 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
797 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
798 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
799 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
801 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
802 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
804 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
806 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
807 /* SSLfatal() already called */
811 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
812 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
813 /* SSLfatal() already called */
817 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
821 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
824 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
829 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
833 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
835 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
837 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
840 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
844 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
847 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
848 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
849 /* SSLfatal() already called */
852 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
853 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
854 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
855 /* SSLfatal() already called */
862 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
863 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
865 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
866 /* SSLfatal() already called */
872 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
876 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
879 * Valid return values are:
883 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
884 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
886 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
888 switch (st->hand_state) {
890 /* Shouldn't happen */
891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
892 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
893 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
896 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
898 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
900 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
901 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
904 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
905 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
906 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
909 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
910 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
911 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
914 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
920 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
921 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
924 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
925 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
926 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
929 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
934 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
935 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
936 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
937 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
940 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
941 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
942 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
945 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
946 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
947 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
955 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
956 * reading. Excludes the message header.
958 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
960 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
962 switch (st->hand_state) {
964 /* Shouldn't happen */
967 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
968 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
970 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
971 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
974 return s->max_cert_list;
976 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
977 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
979 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
980 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
982 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
983 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
985 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
987 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
988 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
989 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
991 return s->max_cert_list;
993 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
994 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
996 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
997 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
999 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1001 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1002 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1004 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1005 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1007 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1008 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1010 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1011 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1016 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1018 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1020 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1022 switch (st->hand_state) {
1024 /* Shouldn't happen */
1025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1026 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1027 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1028 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1030 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1031 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1033 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1034 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1036 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1037 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1040 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1042 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1043 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1045 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1046 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1048 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1049 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1051 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1052 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1054 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1055 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1057 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1058 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1060 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1061 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1063 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1064 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1066 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1067 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1069 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1070 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1075 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1078 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1080 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1082 switch (st->hand_state) {
1084 /* Shouldn't happen */
1085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1086 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1087 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1090 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1091 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1095 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1103 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1104 unsigned char *session_id;
1106 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1107 /* Should not happen */
1108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1109 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1113 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1114 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1115 if (protverr != 0) {
1116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1122 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1123 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1124 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1125 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1126 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1130 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1132 p = s->s3->client_random;
1135 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1136 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1138 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1141 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1148 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1151 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1152 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1154 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1159 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1160 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1161 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1162 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1163 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1164 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1165 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1166 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1169 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1170 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1171 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1172 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1173 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1174 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1175 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1176 * know that is maximum server supports.
1177 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1178 * containing version 1.0.
1180 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1181 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1182 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1183 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1184 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1185 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1186 * the negotiated version.
1188 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1189 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1191 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1192 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1194 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1200 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1201 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1202 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1203 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1204 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1205 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1206 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1207 && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1209 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1210 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1218 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1219 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1220 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1221 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1224 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1225 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1227 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1229 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1234 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1235 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1236 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1237 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1239 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244 /* Ciphers supported */
1245 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1247 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1252 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1255 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1257 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1262 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1264 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1268 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1269 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1270 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1271 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1272 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1273 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1274 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1276 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1277 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1283 /* Add the NULL method */
1284 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1286 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1290 /* TLS extensions */
1291 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1292 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1299 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1304 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1305 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1307 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1308 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1311 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1312 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1314 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1315 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1318 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1319 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1320 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1321 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1323 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1325 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1328 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1330 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1331 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1334 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1336 /* unknown cipher */
1337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1338 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1342 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1343 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1345 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1347 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1351 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1352 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1354 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1356 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1360 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1361 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1362 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1364 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1369 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1370 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1371 * set and use it for comparison.
1373 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1374 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1375 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1376 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1378 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1379 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1381 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1382 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1384 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1385 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1390 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1394 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1398 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1403 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1405 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1406 size_t session_id_len;
1407 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1409 unsigned int compression;
1410 unsigned int sversion;
1411 unsigned int context;
1412 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1417 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1419 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1423 /* load the server random */
1424 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1425 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1426 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1427 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1428 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1430 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1432 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1436 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1438 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1443 /* Get the session-id. */
1444 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1446 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1449 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1450 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1451 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1453 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1457 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1459 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1463 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1465 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1469 /* TLS extensions */
1470 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1471 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1472 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1473 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1480 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1481 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1482 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1483 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1484 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1488 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1489 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1494 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1495 if (compression != 0) {
1496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1497 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1498 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1502 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1503 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1504 session_id_len) != 0) {
1505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1506 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1512 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1513 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1517 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1521 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1522 * are appropriate for this version.
1524 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1525 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1526 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1528 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1534 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1536 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1537 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1539 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1541 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1542 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1546 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1547 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1548 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1549 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1550 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1555 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1556 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1557 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1558 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1559 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1560 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1561 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1562 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1563 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1564 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1566 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1567 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1568 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1570 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1571 * backwards compat reasons
1573 int master_key_length;
1574 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1575 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1578 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1579 && master_key_length > 0) {
1580 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1581 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1582 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1585 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1590 if (session_id_len != 0
1591 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1592 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1593 session_id_len) == 0)
1598 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1599 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1600 /* actually a client application bug */
1601 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1602 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1603 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1608 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1609 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1610 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1611 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1612 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1614 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1616 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1617 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1618 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1619 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1620 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1625 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1627 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1628 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1629 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1630 * used for resumption.
1632 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1633 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1634 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1635 if (session_id_len > 0)
1636 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1641 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1642 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1644 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1648 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1651 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1652 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1654 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1655 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1659 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1660 if (compression != 0) {
1661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1662 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1666 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1667 * using compression.
1669 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1671 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1675 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1677 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1680 if (compression == 0)
1682 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1684 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1687 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1690 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1692 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1695 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1699 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1700 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1705 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1706 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1707 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1710 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1713 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1714 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1716 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1717 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1719 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1720 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1721 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1725 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1726 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1727 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1732 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1733 * we're done with this message
1736 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1737 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1738 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1743 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1744 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1746 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1747 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1750 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1753 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1756 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1757 * should not be used.
1759 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1760 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1762 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1763 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1764 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1765 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1766 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1770 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1773 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1774 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1775 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1779 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1780 * ClientHello will not change
1782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1783 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1784 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1789 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1790 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1792 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1793 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1798 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1799 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1800 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1803 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1804 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1805 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1809 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1811 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1812 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1815 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1818 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1819 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1821 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1822 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1823 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1824 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1825 unsigned int context = 0;
1826 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1828 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1830 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1834 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1836 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1837 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1838 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1840 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1843 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1844 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1845 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1847 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1848 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1852 certstart = certbytes;
1853 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1856 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1859 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1860 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1861 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1862 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1866 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1867 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1870 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1872 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1876 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1877 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1878 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1879 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1880 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1881 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1882 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1883 /* SSLfatal already called */
1886 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1889 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1891 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1892 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1898 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1900 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1901 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1902 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1903 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1904 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1905 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1906 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1907 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1908 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1909 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1910 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1911 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1913 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1914 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1915 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1916 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1919 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1922 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1926 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1928 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1929 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1931 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1934 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1936 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1939 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1943 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1946 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1947 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1951 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1952 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1955 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1956 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1959 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1960 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1964 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1966 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1968 s->session->peer = x;
1969 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1972 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1974 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1975 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1976 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1977 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1981 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1985 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1989 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1992 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1994 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1996 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1998 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2003 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2004 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2005 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2008 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2010 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2011 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2015 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2016 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2017 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2018 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2019 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2021 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2027 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2028 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2033 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2036 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2038 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2039 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2040 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2041 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2043 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2047 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2049 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2050 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2052 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2053 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2055 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2056 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2058 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2059 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2060 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2065 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2066 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2070 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2071 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2072 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2077 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2082 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2085 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2086 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2089 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2093 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2094 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2095 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2097 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2101 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2104 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2105 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2106 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2110 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2111 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2112 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2114 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2115 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2116 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2122 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2123 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2125 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2129 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2136 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2137 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2138 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2142 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2149 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2150 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2151 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2155 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2161 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2164 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2165 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2167 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2168 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2169 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2178 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2183 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2188 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2192 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2195 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2196 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2197 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2199 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2201 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2205 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2206 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2208 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2209 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2215 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2217 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2221 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2223 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2227 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2228 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2229 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2236 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2237 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2240 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2241 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2242 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2243 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2244 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2249 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2254 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2257 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2258 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2259 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2260 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2262 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2264 save_param_start = *pkt;
2266 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2267 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2268 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2271 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2272 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2273 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2278 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2279 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2280 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2281 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2282 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2285 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2286 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2287 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2290 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2291 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2292 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2297 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2301 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2305 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2311 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2312 * equals the length of the parameters.
2314 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2315 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2316 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2318 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2322 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2323 unsigned int sigalg;
2325 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2327 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2330 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2331 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2334 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2336 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2340 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2342 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2346 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2347 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2350 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2351 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2353 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2356 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2359 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2364 * Check signature length
2366 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2367 /* wrong packet length */
2368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2369 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2373 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2374 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2376 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2380 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2385 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2386 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2387 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2388 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2390 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2394 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2395 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2397 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2401 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2402 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2406 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2409 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2412 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2413 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2414 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2415 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2416 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2420 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2423 /* still data left over */
2424 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2426 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2431 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2433 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2434 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2437 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2441 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2442 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2443 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2445 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2446 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2447 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2449 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2450 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2451 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2452 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2453 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2454 s->pha_context = NULL;
2456 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2457 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2459 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2460 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2461 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2464 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2466 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2468 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2470 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2471 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2473 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2474 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2475 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2476 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2477 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2479 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2480 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2482 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2484 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2489 /* get the certificate types */
2490 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2492 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2493 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2494 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2497 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2499 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2500 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2501 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2504 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2507 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2509 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2510 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2511 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2515 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2516 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2518 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2520 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2521 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2522 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2524 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2526 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2527 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2528 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2532 /* get the CA RDNs */
2533 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2534 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2535 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2539 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2541 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2542 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2543 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2546 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2547 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2549 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2552 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2554 unsigned int ticklen;
2555 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2556 unsigned int sess_len;
2557 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2560 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2562 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2564 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2565 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2566 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2567 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2568 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2570 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2575 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2576 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2577 * be 0 here in that instance
2580 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2583 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2584 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2585 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2586 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2587 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2590 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2591 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2594 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2597 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2598 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2599 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2600 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2604 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2605 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2607 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2608 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2609 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2611 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2614 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2615 s->session = new_sess;
2619 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2620 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2622 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2624 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2625 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2626 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2628 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2629 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2631 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2634 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2636 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2640 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2641 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2642 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2644 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2647 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2648 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2650 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2651 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2655 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2656 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2658 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2659 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2660 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2661 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2667 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2668 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2669 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2670 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2671 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2672 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2673 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2674 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2675 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2678 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2679 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2681 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2682 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2683 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2688 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2689 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2691 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2692 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2693 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2694 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
2696 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2698 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2699 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2700 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2701 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2702 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2705 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2707 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2709 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2710 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2711 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2712 s->session->master_key,
2714 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2717 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2720 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2721 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2724 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2727 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2731 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2732 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2734 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2739 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2740 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2742 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2745 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2746 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2748 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2751 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2752 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2754 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2757 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2758 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2759 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2762 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2768 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2770 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2771 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2772 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2775 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2779 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2780 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2781 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2784 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2787 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2790 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2791 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2796 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2797 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2798 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2800 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2801 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2802 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2805 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2806 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2807 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2812 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2813 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2818 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2819 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2820 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2821 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2830 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2832 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2833 /* should contain no data */
2834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2835 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2836 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2839 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2840 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2841 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2843 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2848 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2849 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2850 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2853 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2856 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2858 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2861 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2862 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2865 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2866 size_t identitylen = 0;
2867 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2868 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2869 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2872 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2874 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2878 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2880 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2881 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2884 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2886 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2888 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2890 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2891 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2895 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2896 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2898 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2902 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2903 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2904 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2906 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2910 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2911 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2912 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2914 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2915 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2918 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2920 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2927 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2928 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2929 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2930 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2934 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2935 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2940 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2943 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2944 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2945 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2947 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2950 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2952 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2955 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2959 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2960 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2961 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2962 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2966 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2967 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2969 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2970 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2974 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2975 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2976 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2977 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2979 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2983 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2984 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2986 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2989 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2990 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2991 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2996 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2997 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2999 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3002 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3005 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3006 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3008 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3012 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3013 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3014 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3018 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3019 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3023 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3024 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3029 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3034 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3038 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
3039 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3040 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3042 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3044 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3045 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3049 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3051 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3052 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3056 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3058 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
3059 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3060 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3064 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3065 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3069 /* send off the data */
3070 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
3071 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
3073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3074 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3078 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
3079 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3083 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3086 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3087 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3092 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3095 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3096 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3097 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3100 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3103 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3107 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3110 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3114 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3115 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3119 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3120 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3122 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3128 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3130 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3136 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3137 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3141 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3146 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3149 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3150 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3153 unsigned int md_len;
3154 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3155 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3156 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3157 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3160 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3161 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3164 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3166 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3168 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3169 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3173 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3174 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3175 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3176 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3180 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3181 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3182 * certificate key for key exchange
3185 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3187 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3190 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3194 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3195 /* Generate session key
3196 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3198 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3200 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3204 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3207 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3208 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3209 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3210 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3211 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3212 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3213 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3214 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3216 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3219 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3221 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3222 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3227 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3229 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3232 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3238 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3239 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3240 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3242 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3246 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3247 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3248 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3252 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3253 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3254 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3258 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3263 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3265 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3266 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3268 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3269 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3272 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3275 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3277 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3278 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3279 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3281 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3288 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3293 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3295 unsigned long alg_k;
3297 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3300 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3301 * no need to do so here.
3303 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3304 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3307 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3308 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3310 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3311 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3313 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3314 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3316 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3317 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3319 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3320 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3322 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3324 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3330 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3331 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3333 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3334 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3339 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3341 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3344 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3345 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3349 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3350 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3351 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3358 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3360 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3363 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3364 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3365 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3374 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3375 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3376 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3379 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3382 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3383 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3385 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3386 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3387 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3389 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3390 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3394 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3395 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3401 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3402 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3407 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3408 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3409 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3411 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3413 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3414 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3417 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3418 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3420 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3421 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3426 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3429 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3432 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3433 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3434 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3435 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3437 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3442 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3443 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3446 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3448 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3449 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3450 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3452 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3455 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3459 /* We need to get a client cert */
3460 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3462 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3463 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3465 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3467 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3470 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3471 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3472 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3474 } else if (i == 1) {
3476 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3477 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3481 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3482 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3485 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3486 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3487 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3488 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3490 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3491 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3492 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3498 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3499 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3500 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3503 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3505 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3509 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3511 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3512 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3513 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3514 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3515 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3516 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3519 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3521 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3525 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3526 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3528 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3533 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3534 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3535 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3537 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3538 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3541 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3548 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3550 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3554 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3555 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3557 /* we don't have a certificate */
3558 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3561 /* This is the passed certificate */
3562 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3564 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3565 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3567 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3568 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3573 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3574 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3577 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3582 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3584 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3585 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3590 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3592 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3601 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3603 size_t len, padding_len;
3604 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3606 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3607 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3609 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3610 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3611 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3612 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3616 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3622 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3624 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3625 /* should contain no data */
3626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3627 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3628 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3631 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3632 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3633 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3637 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3638 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3639 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3640 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3641 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3646 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3648 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3651 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3654 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3656 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3657 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3658 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3659 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3663 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3664 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3666 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3667 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3668 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3672 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3673 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3676 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3677 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3680 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3684 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3685 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3686 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3687 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3692 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3693 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3697 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3700 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3701 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3703 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3704 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3706 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3712 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3716 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3717 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3718 # error Max cipher length too short
3721 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3722 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3725 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3726 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3729 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3732 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3734 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3737 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3738 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3740 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3741 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3742 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3745 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3746 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3747 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3751 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3753 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3754 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3755 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3758 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3759 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3767 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3768 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3769 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3772 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3779 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3780 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3781 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3783 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3785 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3789 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3790 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3791 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3793 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3794 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3795 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3804 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3806 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3807 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3809 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3810 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3814 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;