2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
66 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
68 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
69 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
73 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
79 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
81 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
82 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
83 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
84 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
91 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
97 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
99 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
102 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
103 * ciphersuite or for SRP
105 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
114 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
115 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
116 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
117 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
119 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
120 * (transition not allowed)
122 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
124 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
127 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
128 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
129 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
132 switch (st->hand_state) {
136 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
138 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
139 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
154 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
172 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
174 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
180 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
186 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
194 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
195 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
198 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
199 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
205 /* No valid transition found */
210 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
211 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
212 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
213 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
215 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
216 * (transition not allowed)
218 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
220 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
224 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
225 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
227 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
228 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
233 switch (st->hand_state) {
237 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
238 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
239 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
243 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
244 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
245 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
256 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
258 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
259 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
262 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
263 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
266 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
267 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
272 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
274 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
275 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
276 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
279 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
280 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
284 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
285 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
287 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
288 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
289 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
290 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
292 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
293 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
294 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
295 * the server is resuming.
298 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
300 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
301 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
302 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
303 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
307 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
308 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
310 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
311 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
312 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
313 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
316 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
317 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
318 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
320 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
321 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
330 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
331 * |ext.status_expected| is set
333 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
339 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
340 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
341 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
342 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
343 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
344 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
345 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
352 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
353 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
354 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
362 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
363 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
369 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
370 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
371 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
372 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
375 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
376 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
381 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
382 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
383 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
388 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
389 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
390 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
396 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
397 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
404 /* No valid transition found */
405 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
406 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
411 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
412 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
415 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
417 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
420 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
421 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
422 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
424 switch (st->hand_state) {
426 /* Shouldn't happen */
427 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
429 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
430 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
431 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
433 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
438 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
439 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
442 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
443 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
446 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
447 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
453 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
454 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
455 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
459 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
460 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
461 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
462 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
464 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
465 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
466 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
468 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
469 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
476 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
477 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
479 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
482 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
483 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
484 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
487 /* Try to read from the server instead */
488 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
493 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
494 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
496 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
498 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
501 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
502 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
506 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
508 switch (st->hand_state) {
510 /* Shouldn't happen */
511 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
514 if (!s->renegotiate) {
516 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
517 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
519 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
521 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
526 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
527 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
529 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
530 * actually selected a version yet.
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
533 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
536 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
539 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
541 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
542 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
544 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
548 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
549 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
553 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
559 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
561 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
562 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
565 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
566 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
567 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
568 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
570 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
575 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
576 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
580 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
584 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
585 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
587 hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
589 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
594 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
597 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
599 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
602 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
610 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
613 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
616 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
619 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
621 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
624 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
625 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
626 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
627 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
629 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
630 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
632 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
633 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
638 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
639 * the client to the server.
641 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
643 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
645 switch (st->hand_state) {
647 /* No pre work to be done */
650 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
652 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
653 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
654 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
655 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
661 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
662 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
665 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
666 * messages unless we need to.
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
671 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
672 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
677 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
679 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
680 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
681 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
683 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
684 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
685 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
688 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
690 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
693 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
697 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
698 * client to the server.
700 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
702 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
706 switch (st->hand_state) {
708 /* No post work to be done */
711 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
712 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
715 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
716 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
720 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
721 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
723 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
724 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
725 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
727 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
728 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
733 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
735 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
736 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
738 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
739 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
742 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
743 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
747 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
748 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
749 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
750 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
752 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
753 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
755 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
757 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
760 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
761 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
764 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
768 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
771 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
776 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
780 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
782 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
784 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
787 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
791 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
794 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
795 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
796 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
801 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
802 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
804 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
809 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
813 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
816 * Valid return values are:
820 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
821 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
823 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
825 switch (st->hand_state) {
827 /* Shouldn't happen */
830 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
832 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
834 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
835 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
838 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
839 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
840 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
843 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
844 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
845 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
848 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
854 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
855 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
858 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
859 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
860 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
863 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
864 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
865 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
868 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
869 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
870 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
871 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
874 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
875 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
876 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
879 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
880 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
881 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
889 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
890 * reading. Excludes the message header.
892 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
894 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
896 switch (st->hand_state) {
898 /* Shouldn't happen */
901 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
902 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
904 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
905 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
907 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
908 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
911 return s->max_cert_list;
913 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
914 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
916 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
917 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
919 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
920 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
922 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
924 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
925 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
926 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
928 return s->max_cert_list;
930 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
931 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
933 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
934 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
936 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
938 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
939 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
941 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
942 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
944 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
945 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
947 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
948 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
953 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
955 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
957 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
959 switch (st->hand_state) {
961 /* Shouldn't happen */
962 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
964 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
965 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
967 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
968 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
970 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
971 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
974 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
976 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
977 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
979 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
980 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
982 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
983 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
985 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
986 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
988 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
989 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
991 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
992 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
994 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
995 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
997 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
998 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1000 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1001 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1004 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1006 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1007 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1012 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1015 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1017 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1019 switch (st->hand_state) {
1021 /* Shouldn't happen */
1024 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1025 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1028 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1029 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
1030 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1031 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1032 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1033 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1034 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1035 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1038 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1039 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1044 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1049 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1050 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1053 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1055 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1056 /* Should not happen */
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1061 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1062 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1063 if (protverr != 0) {
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1068 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
1070 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
1071 * "ticket" without a session ID.
1073 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
1074 (sess->not_resumable)) {
1075 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1078 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1080 p = s->s3->client_random;
1083 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1084 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1086 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1089 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1098 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
1102 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1103 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1104 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1105 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1106 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1107 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1108 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1109 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1112 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1113 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1114 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1115 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1116 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1117 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1118 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1119 * know that is maximum server supports.
1120 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1121 * containing version 1.0.
1123 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1124 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1125 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1126 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1127 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1128 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1129 * the negotiated version.
1131 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1132 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1134 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1135 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1141 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1144 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1145 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1146 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1147 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1149 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1155 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1156 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1157 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1158 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1164 /* Ciphers supported */
1165 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1169 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1170 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1172 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1178 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1183 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1184 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1185 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1186 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1187 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1188 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1196 /* Add the NULL method */
1197 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 /* TLS extensions */
1203 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1204 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1212 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1218 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1219 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1220 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1225 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1226 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1227 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1232 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1233 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1237 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1239 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1241 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1242 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1243 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1246 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1248 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1249 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1250 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1251 size_t session_id_len;
1252 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1253 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1254 unsigned int compression;
1255 unsigned int sversion;
1256 unsigned int context;
1258 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1263 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1264 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1269 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1270 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1271 if (protverr != 0) {
1272 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1278 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1279 * message must be on a record boundary.
1281 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1282 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1287 /* load the server hello data */
1288 /* load the server random */
1289 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1290 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1295 /* Get the session-id. */
1296 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1297 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1298 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1302 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1303 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1304 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1305 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1307 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1311 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1315 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1317 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1321 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1322 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1324 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1331 /* TLS extensions */
1332 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1333 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1334 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1335 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1340 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1341 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1342 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL))
1347 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1348 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1349 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1350 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1351 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1355 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1356 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1357 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1358 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1359 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1360 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1361 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1362 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1363 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1364 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1366 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1367 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1368 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1370 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1371 * backwards compat reasons
1373 int master_key_length;
1374 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1375 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1378 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1379 && master_key_length > 0) {
1380 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1381 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1382 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1385 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1390 if (session_id_len != 0
1391 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1392 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1393 session_id_len) == 0)
1398 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1399 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1400 /* actually a client application bug */
1401 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1403 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1408 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1409 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1410 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1411 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1412 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1414 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1416 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1417 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1418 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1419 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1424 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1425 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1426 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1427 if (session_id_len > 0)
1428 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1432 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1433 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1434 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1437 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1441 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1443 /* unknown cipher */
1444 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1449 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1452 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1453 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1455 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1456 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1458 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1459 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1464 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1465 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1467 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1468 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1474 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1475 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1476 * set and use it for comparison.
1478 if (s->session->cipher)
1479 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1480 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1481 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1483 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1486 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1488 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1489 if (compression != 0) {
1490 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1492 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1496 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1497 * using compression.
1499 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1504 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1505 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1507 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1510 if (compression == 0)
1512 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1513 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1517 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1520 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1521 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1523 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1526 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1530 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1534 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1535 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1536 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1539 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1542 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1543 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1545 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1546 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1548 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1551 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1552 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1553 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1558 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1559 * we're done with this message
1562 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1563 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1564 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1565 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1570 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1571 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1573 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1574 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1575 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1576 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1579 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1581 unsigned int sversion;
1583 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1587 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1588 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1593 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1595 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1596 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1597 if (errorcode != 0) {
1598 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1603 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1604 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1609 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1610 &extensions, &al, NULL)
1611 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1612 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1615 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1617 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1619 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1620 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1621 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1622 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1625 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1627 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1628 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1630 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1631 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1632 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1634 unsigned int context = 0;
1636 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1641 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1643 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1644 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1645 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1646 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1649 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1650 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1651 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1652 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1654 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1658 certstart = certbytes;
1659 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1661 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1665 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1666 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1668 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1672 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1673 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1676 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1677 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1681 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1682 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
1683 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1684 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1685 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1688 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1691 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1698 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1700 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1701 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1702 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1703 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1704 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1705 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1706 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1707 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1708 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1709 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1710 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1711 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1713 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1714 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1716 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1719 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1722 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1726 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1728 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1729 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1731 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1734 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1737 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1739 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1743 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1747 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1751 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1752 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1756 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1757 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1760 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1761 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1762 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1763 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1764 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1765 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1767 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1769 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1773 s->session->peer_type = i;
1775 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1777 s->session->peer = x;
1778 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1781 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1783 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1784 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1785 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1786 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1791 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1795 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1797 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1800 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1804 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1807 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1809 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1811 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1812 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1818 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1819 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1820 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1823 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1824 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1829 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1830 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1831 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1832 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1833 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1834 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1841 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1846 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1849 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1851 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1852 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1853 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1854 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1855 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1860 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1862 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1863 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1865 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1866 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1868 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1869 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1871 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1872 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1873 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1878 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1879 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1884 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1885 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1886 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1891 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1896 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1899 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1900 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1903 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1907 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1908 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1909 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1910 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1915 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1918 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1919 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1924 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1925 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1926 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1928 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1929 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1930 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1931 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1936 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1937 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1938 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1943 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1944 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1950 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1951 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1956 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1957 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1958 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1963 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1964 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1969 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1970 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1975 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1978 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1979 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1981 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1982 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1983 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1992 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1997 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2002 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
2004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2006 const unsigned char *ecparams;
2008 unsigned int curve_flags;
2009 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2012 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2013 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
2014 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2016 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
2017 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2022 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
2023 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
2025 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
2026 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2031 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
2033 if (curve_nid == 0) {
2034 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2036 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2040 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2041 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2043 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
2044 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2049 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2051 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2052 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2054 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2055 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
2056 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2057 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2059 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2062 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2066 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2067 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2072 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2073 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2074 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2075 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2081 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2082 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2085 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2086 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2087 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2088 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2089 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2094 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2099 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2103 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2104 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2105 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2106 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2108 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2110 save_param_start = *pkt;
2112 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2113 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2114 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2117 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2118 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2122 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2123 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2124 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2125 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2127 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2128 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2130 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2131 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2134 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2139 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2143 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2146 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2147 * equals the length of the parameters.
2149 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2150 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2151 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2152 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2157 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2158 unsigned int sigalg;
2161 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2162 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2163 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2166 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2168 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2170 } else if (rv == 0) {
2171 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2175 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2177 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2178 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2182 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
2184 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2185 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2186 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2190 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2192 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2198 * Check signature length
2200 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2201 /* wrong packet length */
2202 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2204 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2208 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2209 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2210 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2215 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2216 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2220 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2221 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2222 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2223 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2224 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2229 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2230 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2231 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2232 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2233 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2234 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2235 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2239 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2240 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2242 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2246 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2249 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2250 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2251 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2252 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2253 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2254 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2255 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2258 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2262 /* still data left over */
2263 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2264 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2270 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2273 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2274 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2275 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2276 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2279 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2281 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2282 unsigned int i, name_len;
2283 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2284 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2285 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2288 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2293 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2296 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2297 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2298 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2299 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2300 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2301 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2303 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2309 /* get the certificate types */
2310 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2311 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2313 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2317 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2323 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2326 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2327 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2329 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2333 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2334 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2335 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2336 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2337 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2339 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2342 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2343 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2349 /* get the CA RDNs */
2350 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2351 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2352 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2356 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2357 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2358 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2359 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2361 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2365 namestart = namebytes;
2367 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2368 name_len)) == NULL) {
2369 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2374 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2375 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2377 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2380 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2386 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to parse and process extensions, for now ignore */
2387 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2390 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &reqexts)) {
2391 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2393 SSL_R_EXT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2398 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2399 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2404 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2405 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2406 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2407 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2410 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2413 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2416 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2420 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2422 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2425 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2427 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2428 unsigned int ticklen;
2429 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2430 unsigned int sess_len;
2431 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2433 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2434 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2435 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2436 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2438 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2444 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2445 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2446 * be 0 here in that instance
2449 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2451 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2452 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2453 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2454 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2456 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2459 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2461 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2463 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2466 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2467 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2472 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2473 s->session = new_sess;
2477 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2478 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2480 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2482 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2483 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2484 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2486 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2487 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2491 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2492 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2497 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2498 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2499 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2501 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2504 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2505 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2506 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2508 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2509 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2516 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2517 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2518 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2519 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2520 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2521 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2522 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2523 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2524 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2527 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2528 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2530 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2531 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2532 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2536 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2538 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2539 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2541 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2542 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2545 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2547 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2549 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2551 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2555 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2556 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2557 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2559 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2564 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2565 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2566 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2568 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2571 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2572 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2573 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2577 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2578 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2579 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2583 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2584 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2588 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2594 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2598 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2599 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2600 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2601 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2604 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2608 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2609 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2610 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2613 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2616 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2619 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2620 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2625 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2626 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2627 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2629 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2630 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2631 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2634 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2636 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2640 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2642 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2647 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2648 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2649 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2650 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2659 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2661 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2663 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2664 /* should contain no data */
2665 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2670 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2671 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2679 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2681 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2685 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2686 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2687 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2688 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2691 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2694 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2695 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2696 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2699 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2704 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2705 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2708 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2709 size_t identitylen = 0;
2710 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2711 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2712 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2715 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2717 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2721 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2723 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2724 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2727 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2729 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2731 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2733 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2734 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2738 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2739 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2741 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2745 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2746 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2747 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2749 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2753 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2754 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2755 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2757 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2758 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2761 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2763 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2770 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2771 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2772 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2773 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2778 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2783 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2786 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2787 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2788 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2790 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2793 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2795 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2801 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2802 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2807 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2808 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2811 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2815 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2816 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2817 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2818 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2822 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2823 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2827 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2828 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2829 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2833 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2834 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2838 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2841 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2842 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2847 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2848 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2850 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2851 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2856 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2857 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2862 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2867 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2871 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2872 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2873 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2875 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2879 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2883 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2885 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2888 /* send off the data */
2889 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2890 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2893 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2894 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2898 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2901 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2905 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2908 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2909 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2910 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2913 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2919 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2925 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2930 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2931 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2933 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2938 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2945 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2946 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2950 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2955 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2958 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2959 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2962 unsigned int md_len;
2963 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2964 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2965 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2966 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2969 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2970 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2973 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2975 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2977 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2979 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2983 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2984 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2985 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2990 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2991 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2992 * certificate key for key exchange
2995 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2997 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2999 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3004 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3005 /* Generate session key
3006 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3008 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3009 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3014 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3017 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3018 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3019 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3020 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3021 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3022 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3023 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3024 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3025 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3029 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3031 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3032 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3033 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3037 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3039 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3042 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3043 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3048 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3049 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3050 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3051 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3056 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3057 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3058 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3062 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3063 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3064 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3068 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3073 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3076 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3078 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3079 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3084 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3086 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3087 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3088 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3096 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3101 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3103 unsigned long alg_k;
3106 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3108 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3109 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3112 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3113 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3115 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3116 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3118 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3119 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3121 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3122 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3124 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3125 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3127 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3136 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3137 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3138 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3140 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3141 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3146 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3148 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3151 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3152 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3156 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3157 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3159 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3166 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3167 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3171 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3172 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3174 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3183 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3184 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3185 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3188 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3191 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3192 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3194 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3195 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3196 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3199 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3200 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3206 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3207 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3212 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3213 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3214 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3216 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3218 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3219 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3222 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3223 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3225 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3226 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3231 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3234 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3237 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3238 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3239 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3240 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3242 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3246 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3247 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3250 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3252 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3253 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3255 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3259 /* We need to get a client cert */
3260 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3262 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3263 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3265 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3267 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3270 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3271 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3272 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3274 } else if (i == 1) {
3276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3277 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3281 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3282 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3285 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3286 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3287 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3288 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3290 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3291 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3292 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3293 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3299 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3302 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3306 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3308 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3311 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3314 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3315 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3316 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3324 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3325 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3326 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3328 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3334 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3338 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3340 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3347 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3348 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3350 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3351 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3353 /* we don't have a certificate */
3354 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3357 /* This is the passed certificate */
3359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3360 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3361 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3362 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3369 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3371 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3375 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3376 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3378 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3379 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3381 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3385 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3387 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3392 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3393 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3395 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3400 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3401 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3409 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3414 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3416 size_t len, padding_len;
3417 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3419 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3420 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3422 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3423 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3428 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3432 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3437 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3439 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3440 /* should contain no data */
3441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3442 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3443 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3444 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3448 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3449 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3450 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3451 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3452 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3457 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3459 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3462 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3464 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3466 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3468 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3469 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3474 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3475 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
3476 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3477 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3480 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3481 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3484 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3485 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3486 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3487 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3490 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3494 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3495 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3496 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3497 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3502 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3503 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3507 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3510 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3511 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3512 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3513 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3518 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3519 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3520 # error Max cipher length too short
3523 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3524 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3527 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3528 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3531 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3534 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3536 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3539 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3540 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3542 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3543 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3544 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3547 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3561 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3562 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3563 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3565 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3570 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3571 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3572 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3574 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3584 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3586 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3587 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3588 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3589 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3593 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;