2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
63 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
64 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
65 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
69 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
75 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
77 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
78 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
79 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
87 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
93 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
95 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
98 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
99 * ciphersuite or for SRP
101 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
110 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
111 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
112 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
113 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
115 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
116 * (transition not allowed)
118 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
120 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
123 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
124 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
128 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
129 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
130 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
133 switch (st->hand_state) {
137 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
144 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
145 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
155 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
164 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
165 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
167 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
168 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
173 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
174 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
175 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
182 /* No valid transition found */
187 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
188 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
189 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
190 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
192 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
193 * (transition not allowed)
195 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
197 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
201 * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
202 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
204 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
205 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
210 switch (st->hand_state) {
214 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
215 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
216 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
220 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
221 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
222 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
228 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
230 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
231 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
235 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
236 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
240 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
241 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
243 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
244 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
245 && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
246 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
248 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
249 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
250 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
251 * the server is resuming.
254 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
256 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
257 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
258 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
263 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
264 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
266 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
267 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
268 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
269 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
272 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
273 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
276 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
286 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
287 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
289 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
295 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
296 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
297 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
298 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
299 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
300 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
301 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
308 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
309 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
310 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
311 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
318 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
319 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
320 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
325 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
326 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
327 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
331 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
332 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
337 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
338 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
339 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
344 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
345 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
346 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
353 /* No valid transition found */
354 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
360 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
361 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
364 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
366 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
369 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
370 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
374 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
375 * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
376 * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
378 switch (st->hand_state) {
380 /* Shouldn't happen */
381 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
383 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
384 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
385 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
386 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
389 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
390 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
391 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
392 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
394 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
395 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
396 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
398 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
399 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
400 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
401 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
407 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
409 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
411 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
414 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
415 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
419 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
421 switch (st->hand_state) {
423 /* Shouldn't happen */
424 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
427 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
434 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
437 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
439 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
441 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
444 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
447 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
452 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
456 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
457 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
460 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
461 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
462 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
463 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
465 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
470 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
480 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
481 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
483 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
486 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
490 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
491 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
496 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
498 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
499 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
500 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
505 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
510 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
511 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
512 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
519 * the client to the server.
521 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
523 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
525 switch (st->hand_state) {
527 /* No pre work to be done */
530 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
532 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
533 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
534 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
535 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
541 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
542 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
545 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
546 * messages unless we need to.
550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
551 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
552 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
558 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
561 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
565 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
566 * client to the server.
568 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
570 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
574 switch (st->hand_state) {
576 /* No post work to be done */
579 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
580 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
583 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
584 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
589 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
590 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
594 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
595 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
596 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
597 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
599 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
600 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
602 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
604 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
607 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
608 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
611 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
615 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
618 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
623 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
627 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
629 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
631 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
634 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
638 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
641 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
642 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
643 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
649 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
653 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
656 * Valid return values are:
660 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
661 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
663 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
665 switch (st->hand_state) {
667 /* Shouldn't happen */
670 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
672 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
674 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
675 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
678 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
679 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
680 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
684 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
685 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
688 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
689 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
690 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
693 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
694 *confunc = tls_construct_client_verify;
695 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
698 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
699 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
700 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
701 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
704 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
705 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
706 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
714 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
715 * reading. Excludes the message header.
717 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
719 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
721 switch (st->hand_state) {
723 /* Shouldn't happen */
726 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
727 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
729 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
730 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
733 return s->max_cert_list;
735 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
736 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
738 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
739 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
741 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
743 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
744 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
745 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
747 return s->max_cert_list;
749 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
750 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
752 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
753 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
755 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
757 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
758 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
760 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
761 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
766 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
768 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
770 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
772 switch (st->hand_state) {
774 /* Shouldn't happen */
775 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
777 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
778 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
780 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
781 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
784 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
786 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
787 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
789 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
790 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
792 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
793 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
795 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
796 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
798 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
799 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
801 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
802 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
804 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
805 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
810 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
813 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
815 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
817 switch (st->hand_state) {
819 /* Shouldn't happen */
822 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
823 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
826 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
827 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
828 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
829 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
830 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
831 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
832 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
833 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
836 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
837 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
842 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
847 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
851 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
854 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
855 /* Should not happen */
856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
860 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
861 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
867 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
869 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
870 * "ticket" without a session ID.
872 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
873 (sess->not_resumable)) {
874 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
877 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
879 p = s->s3->client_random;
882 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
883 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
885 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
888 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
897 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
901 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
902 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
903 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
904 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
905 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
906 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
907 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
908 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
911 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
912 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
913 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
914 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
915 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
916 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
917 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
918 * know that is maximum server supports.
919 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
920 * containing version 1.0.
922 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
923 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
924 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
925 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
926 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
927 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
928 * the negotiated version.
930 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
931 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
933 client_version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->client_version;
934 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, client_version)
935 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
944 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
945 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
946 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
947 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
949 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
954 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
955 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
956 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
957 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
958 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
964 /* Ciphers supported */
965 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
969 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
970 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
972 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
978 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
983 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
984 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
985 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
986 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
987 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
994 /* Add the NULL method */
995 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 /* TLS extensions */
1001 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1005 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1007 * If extensions are of zero length then we don't even add the
1008 * extensions length bytes
1010 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1011 || !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al)
1012 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1013 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1021 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1027 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1028 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1029 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1030 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1034 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1035 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1036 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1041 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1042 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1046 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1048 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1050 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1051 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1052 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1055 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1057 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1058 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1060 size_t session_id_len;
1061 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1062 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1063 unsigned int compression;
1064 unsigned int sversion;
1066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1070 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1071 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1076 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1077 if (protverr != 0) {
1078 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1083 /* load the server hello data */
1084 /* load the server random */
1085 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1086 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1093 /* Get the session-id. */
1094 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1095 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1099 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1100 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1101 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1102 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1107 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1109 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1114 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1115 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1116 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1117 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1118 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1119 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1120 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1121 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1122 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1123 * server wants to resume.
1125 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
1126 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
1127 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1129 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1130 * backwards compat reasons
1132 int master_key_length;
1133 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1134 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1137 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
1138 && master_key_length > 0) {
1139 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1140 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1141 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1144 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1149 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1150 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1151 session_id_len) == 0) {
1152 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1153 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1154 /* actually a client application bug */
1155 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1157 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1163 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1164 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1165 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1166 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1167 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1169 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1170 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1171 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1176 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1177 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1178 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1179 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1183 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1184 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1185 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1188 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1192 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1194 /* unknown cipher */
1195 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1200 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1203 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1204 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1206 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1207 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1209 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1210 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1215 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1216 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1218 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1219 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1225 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1226 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1227 * set and use it for comparison.
1229 if (s->session->cipher)
1230 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1231 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1232 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1234 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1237 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1238 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1240 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1242 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1245 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1246 if (compression != 0) {
1247 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1249 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1253 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1254 * using compression.
1256 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1261 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1262 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1264 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1267 if (compression == 0)
1269 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1270 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1274 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1277 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1278 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1280 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1283 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1287 /* TLS extensions */
1288 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1293 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1294 /* wrong packet length */
1295 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1300 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1301 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1302 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1305 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1308 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1309 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1311 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1312 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1314 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1317 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1318 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1319 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1324 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1325 * we're done with this message
1328 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1329 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1330 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1331 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1332 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1333 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1338 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1340 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1342 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1343 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1346 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1348 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1349 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1351 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1352 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1353 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1355 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1360 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1361 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1362 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1363 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1366 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1367 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1368 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1369 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1371 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1375 certstart = certbytes;
1376 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1378 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1382 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1383 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1385 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1388 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1395 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1397 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1398 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1399 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1400 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1401 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1402 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1403 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1404 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1405 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1406 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1407 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1408 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1410 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1411 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1413 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1416 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1419 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1423 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1425 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1426 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1428 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1431 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1434 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1436 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1440 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1444 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1449 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1453 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1454 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1455 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1456 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1457 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1459 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1461 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1464 s->session->peer_type = i;
1466 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1468 s->session->peer = x;
1469 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1472 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1476 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1478 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1481 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1485 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1488 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1490 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1492 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1493 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1499 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1500 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1501 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1504 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1505 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1510 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1511 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1512 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1513 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1514 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1515 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1522 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1527 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1530 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1532 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1533 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1534 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1535 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1536 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1541 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1543 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1544 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1546 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1547 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1549 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1550 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1552 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1553 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1554 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1559 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1560 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1565 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1566 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1567 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1572 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1577 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1580 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1581 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1584 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1586 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1587 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1588 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1589 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1594 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1597 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1598 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1603 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1604 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1605 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1607 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1608 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1609 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1610 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1611 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1615 if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1616 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1621 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1622 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1628 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1629 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1635 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1636 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1641 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1642 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1647 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1650 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1651 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1653 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1654 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1655 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1664 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1669 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1674 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1678 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1680 unsigned int curve_flags;
1681 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1684 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1685 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1686 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1688 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1689 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1694 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1695 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1697 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1698 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1703 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1705 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1706 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1708 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1712 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1713 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1715 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1716 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1721 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1723 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1724 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1726 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1727 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1728 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1729 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1731 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1734 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1738 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1739 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1744 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1745 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1746 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1747 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1753 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1754 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1757 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
1758 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1759 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
1760 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1761 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1766 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1771 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1775 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1776 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1778 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1780 save_param_start = *pkt;
1782 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1783 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1784 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1787 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1788 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
1792 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1793 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1794 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1795 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1797 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1798 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1800 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1801 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1804 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1809 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1813 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1817 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1818 * equals the length of the parameters.
1820 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1821 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1822 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1823 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1828 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1829 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1831 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1832 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1833 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1836 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1838 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1840 } else if (rv == 0) {
1841 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1845 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1847 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1848 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1853 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1854 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1855 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1859 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1861 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1867 * Check signature length
1869 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
1870 /* wrong packet length */
1871 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1873 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1877 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1878 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1879 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1884 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1885 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1886 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1887 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1888 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1889 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1890 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1891 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1892 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1896 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1897 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1898 (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature),
1901 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1902 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1906 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1908 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1909 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1910 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1911 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1912 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
1913 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1914 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1917 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1921 /* still data left over */
1922 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1923 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1929 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1932 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1933 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1934 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1937 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1939 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1940 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1941 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1942 const unsigned char *data;
1943 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1944 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1946 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1951 /* get the certificate types */
1952 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
1953 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
1954 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1958 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
1959 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
1960 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
1961 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1962 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
1963 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1967 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
1968 s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num;
1969 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
1971 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
1972 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
1974 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1975 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1976 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
1977 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1979 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1983 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1984 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1985 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1986 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1988 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
1989 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1991 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
1994 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1995 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2000 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2003 /* get the CA RDNs */
2004 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2005 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2006 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2011 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2012 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2013 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2014 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2016 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2020 namestart = namebytes;
2022 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2023 name_len)) == NULL) {
2024 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2029 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2030 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2032 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2035 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2042 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2043 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2044 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2045 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2046 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2049 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2052 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2055 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2059 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2061 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2064 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2067 unsigned int ticklen;
2068 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
2069 unsigned int sess_len;
2071 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2072 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2073 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
2074 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2079 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2081 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2083 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2084 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2085 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2087 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2090 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2092 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2094 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2097 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2098 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2103 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2104 s->session = new_sess;
2107 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2108 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2110 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2111 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2115 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
2116 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2121 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2122 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2124 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2125 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2126 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2127 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2128 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2129 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2130 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2131 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2132 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2135 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2136 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2138 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
2139 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2140 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2144 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2145 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2147 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2149 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2150 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2153 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2159 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2160 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2161 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2165 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2166 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2167 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2171 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2172 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
2173 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2177 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
2178 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2182 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2183 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2185 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2186 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2187 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2191 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2192 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2193 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2196 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2199 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2202 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2203 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2208 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2209 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2210 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2212 if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
2214 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2216 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2218 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2222 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2224 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2229 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2230 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2231 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2232 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2241 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2243 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2245 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2246 /* should contain no data */
2247 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2252 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2253 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2261 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2263 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2267 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2268 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2269 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2270 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2273 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2276 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2277 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2278 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2281 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2286 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2287 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2290 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2291 size_t identitylen = 0;
2292 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2293 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2294 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2297 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2299 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2303 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2305 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2306 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2309 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2311 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2313 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2315 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2316 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2320 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2321 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2323 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2327 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2328 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2329 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2331 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2335 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2336 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2337 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2339 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2340 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2343 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2345 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2352 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2353 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2354 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2355 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2360 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2365 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2368 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2369 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2370 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2372 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2375 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2377 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2383 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2384 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2389 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2390 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2393 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2397 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2398 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2399 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2400 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2404 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2405 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2409 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2410 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2411 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2412 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2415 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2416 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2420 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2423 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2425 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2429 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2430 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2435 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2436 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2440 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2441 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2446 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2451 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2455 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2456 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2457 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2459 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2463 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2464 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2466 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2469 /* send off the data */
2470 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2471 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2474 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2475 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2479 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2482 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2486 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2489 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2490 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2491 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2494 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2500 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2502 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2507 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2508 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2510 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2515 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2522 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2523 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2527 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2532 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2535 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2536 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2539 unsigned int md_len;
2540 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2541 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2542 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2543 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2546 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2547 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2550 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2552 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2554 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2556 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2560 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2561 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2562 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2567 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2568 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2569 * certificate key for key exchange
2572 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2574 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2576 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2581 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2582 /* Generate session key
2583 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2585 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2586 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2591 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2594 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2595 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2596 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2597 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2598 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2599 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2600 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2601 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2602 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2603 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2606 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2608 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2609 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2610 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2614 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2616 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2619 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2620 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2625 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2626 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2627 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2628 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2633 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2634 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2635 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2639 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2640 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2641 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2645 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2650 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2653 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2655 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
2656 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2661 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
2663 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2664 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2665 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2673 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2678 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2680 unsigned long alg_k;
2683 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2685 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
2686 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2689 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2690 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2692 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2693 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2695 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2696 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2698 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2699 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2701 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2702 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2704 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
2705 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2713 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2714 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
2715 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2717 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2718 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2723 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2725 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2728 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2729 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2733 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2734 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2736 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2743 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2744 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2748 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2749 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2751 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2760 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2761 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2762 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2765 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2768 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2769 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2771 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2772 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2773 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2776 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2777 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2783 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2784 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2788 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2791 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2792 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
2796 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
2798 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2803 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2805 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2806 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2811 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2816 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2818 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey));
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2823 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2824 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2825 || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2826 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2827 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
2828 s->session->master_key))
2829 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &u, pkey)) {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2835 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2836 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2837 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2838 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
2839 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, u);
2843 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, u)) {
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2848 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2849 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2853 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2857 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2858 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2863 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2864 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2865 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2867 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2869 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2871 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2872 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2875 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2876 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2878 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2879 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2884 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2887 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2890 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2891 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2892 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
2893 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2895 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2899 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2900 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2903 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2905 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2906 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2908 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2912 /* We need to get a client cert */
2913 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2915 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2916 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2918 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
2920 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2923 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2924 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
2925 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
2927 } else if (i == 1) {
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2930 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
2934 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2935 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2938 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2939 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2940 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
2941 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2943 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
2944 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2945 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2946 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2952 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2955 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2959 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2961 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
2962 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2965 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2972 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2974 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
2977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2981 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2982 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2984 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2985 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2987 /* we don't have a certificate */
2988 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
2991 /* This is the passed certificate */
2993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2994 idx = s->session->peer_type;
2995 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
2996 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
2998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3003 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3005 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3009 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3010 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3012 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3013 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3015 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3019 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3021 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3026 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3027 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3029 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3033 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3034 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3035 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3043 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3048 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3050 size_t len, padding_len;
3051 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3053 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3054 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3056 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->next_proto_negotiated, len)
3057 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3062 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3066 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3071 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3075 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3076 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3077 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3078 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3083 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3084 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3088 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3091 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3092 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3093 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3094 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3099 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3100 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3101 # error Max cipher length too short
3104 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3105 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3108 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3109 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3112 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3115 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3117 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3120 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3121 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3123 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3124 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3125 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3128 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3142 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3143 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3144 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3146 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3151 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3152 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3153 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3155 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);