2 * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
17 int tls_parse_clienthello_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
20 const unsigned char *data;
22 /* Parse the length byte */
23 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
24 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
25 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE,
26 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
27 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
31 /* Check that the extension matches */
32 if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) {
33 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE,
34 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
35 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
39 if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
40 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
41 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE,
42 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
43 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
47 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
52 int tls_parse_clienthello_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
54 unsigned int servname_type;
58 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
60 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
61 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
62 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
63 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
64 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
65 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
66 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
67 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
68 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
69 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
70 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
71 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
72 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
73 * the value of the Host: field.
74 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
75 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
76 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
78 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
81 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
82 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
83 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
84 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
89 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
90 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
91 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
93 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
94 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
95 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
97 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
98 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
100 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
101 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
102 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
103 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
108 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
109 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
113 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
114 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
118 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
119 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
123 s->servername_done = 1;
126 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
127 * fall back to a full handshake.
129 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
130 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
131 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
138 int tls_parse_clienthello_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
142 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
143 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
144 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
149 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
150 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
152 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
153 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
162 int tls_parse_clienthello_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
164 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
166 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
167 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
168 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
173 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
174 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
175 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
176 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
183 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
185 int tls_parse_clienthello_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
187 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
188 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
189 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
190 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
191 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
198 int tls_parse_clienthello_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
200 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
202 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
203 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
204 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
205 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
209 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
210 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
211 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
218 int tls_parse_clienthello_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
220 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
221 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
225 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
226 const unsigned char *ext_data;
227 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
228 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
229 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
234 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
235 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
237 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
238 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
239 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
240 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
241 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
245 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
248 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
251 const unsigned char *id_data;
253 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
255 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
256 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
260 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
261 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
262 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
263 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
265 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
269 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
270 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
271 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
275 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
276 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
277 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
282 /* Read in request_extensions */
283 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
288 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
289 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
290 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
291 X509_EXTENSION_free);
292 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
293 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
294 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
295 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
296 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
304 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
306 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
313 int tls_parse_clienthello_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
315 if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
317 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
320 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
321 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
322 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
323 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
324 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
325 * anything like that, but this might change).
327 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
328 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
329 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
330 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
331 * Finished message could have been computed.)
333 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
341 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
342 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
343 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
344 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
346 int tls_parse_clienthello_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
348 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
350 if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0)
353 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
354 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
355 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
359 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
361 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
362 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
363 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
364 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
367 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
369 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
370 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
371 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
379 int tls_parse_clienthello_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
381 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof;
382 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
383 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
387 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
388 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
391 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
392 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct)
393 || (ct & 1) != 0 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP,
395 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
396 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
400 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
401 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
402 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
403 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
405 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
406 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP,
408 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
409 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
414 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
416 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
419 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
420 sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
421 if (sprof->id == id) {
422 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
430 * Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now
432 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP,
434 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
435 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
439 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
440 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
442 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
450 int tls_parse_clienthello_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
452 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
453 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
459 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
460 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
461 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
464 static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
465 const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
470 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
473 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
474 unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
476 if (group_id == share_id
477 && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
478 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
483 /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
484 return i < num_groups;
488 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
489 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
490 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
492 int tls_parse_clienthello_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
494 unsigned int group_id;
495 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
496 const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
497 size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves;
498 int group_nid, found = 0;
499 unsigned int curve_flags;
505 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
506 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
507 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
511 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
512 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
517 /* Get our list of supported curves */
518 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
519 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
524 /* Get the clients list of supported curves */
525 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
526 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
531 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
532 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
533 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
534 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
535 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_KEY_SHARE,
537 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
542 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
543 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
548 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
549 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
550 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
551 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
555 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
556 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) {
557 /* Share not suitable */
561 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
563 if (group_nid == 0) {
564 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_KEY_SHARE,
566 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
570 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
571 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
572 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
574 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
575 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
580 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
582 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
583 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
585 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
586 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
588 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
589 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
591 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
594 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
597 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
599 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
600 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
601 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
602 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
603 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
614 int tls_parse_clienthello_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
616 PACKET supported_groups_list;
618 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
619 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
620 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
621 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
622 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
627 && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
628 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
629 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
630 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
638 int tls_parse_clienthello_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
640 /* The extension must always be empty */
641 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
642 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
646 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
652 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
653 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
654 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
656 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
658 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
659 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
661 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
662 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
663 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
664 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
665 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
667 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
668 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
669 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
670 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
671 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
674 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
676 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
677 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
680 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
689 * Upon success, returns 1.
690 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
692 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
694 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
697 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
698 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
699 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
700 * influence which certificate is sent
702 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
705 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
706 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
707 if (certpkey != NULL) {
709 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
710 * et al can pick it up.
712 s->cert->key = certpkey;
713 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
715 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
716 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
717 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
719 /* status request response should be sent */
720 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
721 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
722 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
724 /* something bad happened */
725 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
727 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
733 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
740 /* Add the server's renegotiation binding */
741 int tls_construct_server_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
743 if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
746 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
747 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
748 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
749 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
750 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
751 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
752 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
753 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
754 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
762 int tls_construct_server_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
764 if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
765 || s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
768 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
769 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
778 int tls_construct_server_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
780 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
781 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
782 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
783 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
784 const unsigned char *plist;
790 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
792 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
793 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
794 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
795 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
796 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
804 int tls_construct_server_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
806 if (!s->tlsext_ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
807 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
811 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
812 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
820 int tls_construct_server_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
822 if (!s->tlsext_status_expected)
825 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
826 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
835 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
836 int tls_construct_server_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
838 const unsigned char *npa;
841 int next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
843 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
844 if (!next_proto_neg_seen || s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb == NULL)
847 ret = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
848 s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
849 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
850 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
851 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
853 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
856 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
863 int tls_construct_server_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
865 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
868 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
869 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
870 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
871 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
872 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
873 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
874 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
875 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
884 int tls_construct_server_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
886 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
889 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
890 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
891 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
892 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
893 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
894 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
903 int tls_construct_server_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
905 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) == 0)
909 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
910 * for other cases too.
912 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
913 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
914 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
915 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
916 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
920 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
921 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
929 int tls_construct_server_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
931 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
934 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
935 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
943 int tls_construct_server_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
945 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
946 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
947 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
957 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
958 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
959 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
964 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
970 /* Generate encoding of server key */
971 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
972 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
978 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
979 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
982 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
985 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
987 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
988 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
989 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
997 int tls_construct_server_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
999 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1000 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1001 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1002 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1003 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1004 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1005 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1008 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1009 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1010 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1013 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);