2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "statem_locl.h"
13 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15 #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0
18 * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for
19 * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for
20 * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen,
21 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie
22 * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing.
24 #define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \
25 + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
28 * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes +
29 * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id
30 * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression
31 * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension
32 * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie
34 #define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \
35 + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \
39 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
41 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
42 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
45 const unsigned char *data;
47 /* Parse the length byte */
48 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
49 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
50 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
51 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
55 /* Check that the extension matches */
56 if (ilen != s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) {
57 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
58 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
62 if (memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
63 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)) {
64 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
65 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
69 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
75 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
77 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
78 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
79 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
80 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
81 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
82 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
83 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
84 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
85 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
86 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
87 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
88 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
89 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
90 * the value of the Host: field.
91 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
92 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
93 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
95 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
97 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
98 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
100 unsigned int servname_type;
101 PACKET sni, hostname;
103 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
104 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
105 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
107 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
112 * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
113 * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
114 * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
115 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
116 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
117 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
119 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
120 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
122 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
123 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
124 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
126 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
130 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
131 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
133 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
134 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
138 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
140 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
141 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
146 * Store the requested SNI in the SSL as temporary storage.
147 * If we accept it, it will get stored in the SSL_SESSION as well.
149 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
150 s->ext.hostname = NULL;
151 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->ext.hostname)) {
152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
153 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
157 s->servername_done = 1;
161 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
162 * fall back to a full handshake.
164 s->servername_done = (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
165 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
166 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
168 if (!s->servername_done && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
169 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
175 int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
176 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
180 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
182 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
186 /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */
187 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
189 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
190 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
195 * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session
196 * including session resumptions.
197 * We should receive the same code as in resumed session !
199 if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) {
200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
201 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
202 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
207 * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us
208 * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello.
210 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
215 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
220 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
221 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
223 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
224 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
229 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
230 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
232 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
243 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
244 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
246 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
248 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
249 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS,
251 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
256 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
257 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
258 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
260 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
267 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
269 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
270 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
272 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
273 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
274 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
275 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
277 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
284 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
285 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
287 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
289 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
290 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
292 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
296 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
298 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
305 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
308 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
310 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
311 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
313 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
317 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
319 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
327 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
328 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
330 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
332 /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */
336 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
340 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
342 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
346 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
348 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
350 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
354 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
356 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
361 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
362 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
364 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
365 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
366 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
367 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
369 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
373 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
376 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
379 const unsigned char *id_data;
381 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
382 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
384 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
388 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
389 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
390 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
391 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
394 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
398 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
399 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
401 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
406 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
407 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
409 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
415 /* Read in request_extensions */
416 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
418 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
422 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
423 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
425 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
426 X509_EXTENSION_free);
428 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
429 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
431 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
441 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
445 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
448 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
456 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
457 * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
459 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
462 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
464 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
467 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
468 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
470 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
474 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
476 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
477 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
478 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
480 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
483 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
485 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_proposed);
486 s->s3.alpn_proposed = NULL;
487 s->s3.alpn_proposed_len = 0;
488 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
489 &s->s3.alpn_proposed, &s->s3.alpn_proposed_len)) {
490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
491 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
499 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
502 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
503 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
507 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
508 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
511 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
512 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
513 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
515 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
519 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
520 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
521 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
522 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
524 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
525 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
527 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
532 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
534 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
537 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
538 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
539 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
541 if (sprof->id == id) {
542 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
549 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
550 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
552 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
556 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
557 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
558 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
559 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
567 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
570 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
577 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
578 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
580 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
581 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
584 PACKET psk_kex_modes;
587 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
588 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES,
590 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
594 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
595 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
596 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
597 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
598 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0)
599 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
607 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
608 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
610 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
614 unsigned int group_id;
615 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
616 const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups;
617 size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups;
620 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
624 if (s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
626 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
630 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
632 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
636 /* Get our list of supported groups */
637 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups);
638 /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
639 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
640 if (clnt_num_groups == 0) {
642 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
643 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
647 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
651 if (s->s3.group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) {
653 * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR
654 * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an
657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
658 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
662 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
663 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
664 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
665 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
667 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
672 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
673 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
679 * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group
680 * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent.
682 if (s->s3.group_id != 0
683 && (group_id != s->s3.group_id
684 || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) {
685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
686 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
690 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
691 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) {
692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
693 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
697 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
698 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) {
699 /* Share not suitable */
703 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(group_id)) == NULL) {
704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
705 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
709 s->s3.group_id = group_id;
711 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.peer_tmp,
712 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
713 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
715 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
726 int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
730 unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id;
733 PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie;
735 const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata;
736 unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
737 unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE];
738 size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen;
739 unsigned long tm, now;
741 /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */
742 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL
743 || (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
746 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) {
747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
748 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
753 data = PACKET_data(&raw);
754 rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw);
755 if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
756 || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
758 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
761 mdin = PACKET_data(&raw);
763 /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */
764 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
765 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
766 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
767 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
769 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
770 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
773 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
777 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
778 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
779 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data,
780 rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0
781 || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
782 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
785 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
789 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
792 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
794 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
798 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) {
799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
800 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
803 /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */
804 if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
808 * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the
812 /* Check the version number is sane */
813 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) {
814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
815 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
818 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
820 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
824 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) {
825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
826 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
830 ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie);
831 if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) {
832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
833 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
836 if (group_id != s->s3.group_id
837 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher
838 != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) {
840 * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is
841 * in the cookie. Something must have changed.
843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
848 if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share)
849 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie, &tm)
850 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash)
851 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie)
852 || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
854 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
858 /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */
859 now = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
860 if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) {
861 /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */
865 /* Verify the app cookie */
866 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie),
867 PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) {
868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
869 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
874 * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original
875 * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash.
876 * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions
878 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) {
879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
880 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
883 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
884 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt)
885 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION)
886 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
887 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id,
888 s->tmp_session_id_len)
889 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt,
891 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0)
892 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) {
893 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
895 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
898 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
899 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
900 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version)
901 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
902 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
904 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
908 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
909 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
910 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3.group_id)
911 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
912 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
914 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
918 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
919 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
920 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen)
921 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */
922 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */
923 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */
924 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen)
925 || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) {
926 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
932 /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */
933 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash),
934 PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr,
936 /* SSLfatal() already called */
940 /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */
941 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
950 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
951 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
953 PACKET supported_groups_list;
955 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
956 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
957 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
958 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
960 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
964 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
965 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
966 s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
967 s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
968 if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list,
969 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
970 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
971 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
972 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
973 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
982 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
985 /* The extension must always be empty */
986 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
988 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
992 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
995 s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1001 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1002 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1004 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1006 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1010 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1012 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1019 static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *tick,
1022 SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL;
1024 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1026 switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) {
1028 return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1030 case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH:
1034 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1037 tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick),
1038 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
1040 if (tmpsess == NULL)
1041 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1044 return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1047 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1050 PACKET identities, binders, binder;
1051 size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
1052 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1053 unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
1054 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1057 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
1058 * ignore this extension
1060 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
1061 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
1064 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
1065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1066 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1070 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1071 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
1073 unsigned long ticket_agel;
1076 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
1077 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
1078 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1079 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1083 idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity);
1084 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
1085 && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen,
1087 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1088 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1094 && s->psk_server_callback != NULL
1095 && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1097 unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
1098 unsigned int pskdatalen;
1100 if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) {
1101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1102 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1105 pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata,
1107 OPENSSL_free(pskid);
1108 if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
1109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1112 } else if (pskdatalen > 0) {
1113 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1114 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
1117 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
1118 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
1120 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
1121 if (cipher == NULL) {
1122 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1124 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1128 sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
1130 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata,
1132 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher)
1133 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess,
1135 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1137 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1140 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1143 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1146 /* We found a PSK */
1147 SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
1149 if (sesstmp == NULL) {
1150 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1151 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1158 * We've just been told to use this session for this context so
1159 * make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
1161 memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
1162 sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
1165 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1166 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1168 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
1172 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
1173 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
1174 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
1176 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
1177 || (s->max_early_data > 0
1178 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))
1179 ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess);
1181 ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
1182 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0,
1185 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) {
1186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1187 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1191 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
1192 || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
1193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1194 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1197 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1200 /* Check for replay */
1201 if (s->max_early_data > 0
1202 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0
1203 && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) {
1204 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1209 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
1210 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1211 agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
1212 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1213 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
1216 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the
1217 * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age
1218 * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be
1219 * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency).
1220 * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for
1224 && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
1225 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
1226 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
1227 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
1229 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
1232 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1236 md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
1237 if (md != ssl_md(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)) {
1238 /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
1239 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1241 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1242 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1251 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1252 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
1254 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
1255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1256 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1260 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
1261 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
1262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1263 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1268 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) {
1269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1270 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1273 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1274 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0,
1276 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1280 s->ext.tick_identity = id;
1282 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1286 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1290 int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1291 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1293 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1295 SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR);
1299 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
1305 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
1307 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1308 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1311 if (!s->s3.send_connection_binding)
1312 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1314 /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
1315 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1316 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1317 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1318 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
1319 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
1320 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
1321 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
1322 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1323 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1325 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1329 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1332 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1333 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1336 if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
1337 || s->ext.hostname == NULL)
1338 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1340 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1341 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1344 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1347 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1350 /* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */
1351 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1352 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1355 if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1356 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1359 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
1360 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
1362 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
1363 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1364 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
1365 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1367 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1368 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1371 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1375 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1376 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1379 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1380 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1381 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
1382 && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL);
1383 const unsigned char *plist;
1387 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1389 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1390 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1391 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1392 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1393 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1395 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1396 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1399 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1404 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1405 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1408 const uint16_t *groups;
1409 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
1411 /* s->s3.group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
1412 if (s->s3.group_id == 0)
1413 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1415 /* Get our list of supported groups */
1416 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups);
1417 if (numgroups == 0) {
1418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1419 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1420 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1423 /* Copy group ID if supported */
1424 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) {
1425 uint16_t group = groups[i];
1427 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1430 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
1431 * so we don't need to add this extension
1433 if (s->s3.group_id == group)
1434 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1436 /* Add extension header */
1437 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1438 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1439 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1440 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1442 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1443 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1444 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1449 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) {
1450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1451 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1452 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1453 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1458 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1459 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1460 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1461 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1462 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1465 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1469 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1470 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1473 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1474 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1475 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1478 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1479 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1481 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1482 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1485 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1489 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1490 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1493 if (!s->ext.status_expected)
1494 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1496 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
1497 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1499 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1500 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1501 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1502 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1503 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1507 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
1508 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
1511 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
1512 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1513 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1515 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1516 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1517 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1518 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1521 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1526 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1527 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1530 const unsigned char *npa;
1531 unsigned int npalen;
1533 int npn_seen = s->s3.npn_seen;
1536 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
1537 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1539 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1540 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
1541 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1542 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1543 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1545 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
1546 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1547 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1552 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1556 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1557 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1559 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL)
1560 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1562 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1563 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1564 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1565 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1566 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected,
1567 s->s3.alpn_selected_len)
1568 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1569 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1570 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1571 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1572 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1575 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1579 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1580 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1583 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
1584 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1586 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1587 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1588 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1589 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1590 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1591 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1593 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1594 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1597 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1601 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1602 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1604 if (!s->ext.use_etm)
1605 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1608 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1609 * for other cases too.
1611 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1612 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1613 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1614 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
1616 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1619 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1620 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM,
1622 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1623 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1626 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1629 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1630 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1632 if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
1633 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1635 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1636 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS,
1638 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1639 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1642 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1645 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1646 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1649 if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1651 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1652 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1653 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1656 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1657 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1658 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
1659 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1661 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1662 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1666 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1669 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1670 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1674 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1675 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1676 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1678 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
1680 /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */
1681 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1683 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1684 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1685 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
1686 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1688 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1689 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1690 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1693 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1697 /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */
1698 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1700 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1701 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1703 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1706 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1707 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1708 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)) {
1709 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1710 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1711 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1714 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1717 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1718 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1721 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1722 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1723 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1726 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1727 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1730 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1731 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1732 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1733 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1734 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1735 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1736 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1738 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1740 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1741 s->s3.tmp.pkey = skey;
1742 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1743 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1744 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1746 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1748 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1752 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1753 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1756 unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie;
1757 unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2;
1758 size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen;
1761 int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1763 if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
1764 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1766 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) {
1767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1768 SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET);
1769 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1772 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
1773 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1774 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1775 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen)
1776 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie)
1777 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
1778 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION)
1779 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
1780 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
1782 /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */
1783 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)
1784 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, (unsigned int)time(NULL))
1785 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1786 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) {
1787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1788 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1789 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1793 * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates
1794 * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then
1795 * subsequently allocate them (below)
1797 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
1798 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
1799 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1800 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1803 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2)
1804 || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2)
1805 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1806 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1807 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) {
1808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1809 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1810 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1813 /* Generate the application cookie */
1814 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) {
1815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1816 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1817 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1820 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2)
1821 || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2)
1822 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1823 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen)
1824 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) {
1825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1826 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1827 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1829 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1831 totcookielen -= startlen;
1832 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
1833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1834 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1835 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1838 /* HMAC the cookie */
1839 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
1840 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
1841 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
1842 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
1844 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
1845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1846 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1850 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
1851 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie,
1852 totcookielen) <= 0) {
1853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1854 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1858 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) {
1859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1860 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1864 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2)
1865 || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2)
1866 || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen)
1867 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1868 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1869 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1870 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1874 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1877 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
1878 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1881 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1885 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1886 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1889 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1890 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1891 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1892 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1893 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1894 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1895 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1898 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1899 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1900 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1901 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1903 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1905 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1906 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1909 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1912 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1913 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1916 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1917 if (s->max_early_data == 0)
1918 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1920 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1921 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1922 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
1923 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1924 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1925 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1926 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1929 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1932 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
1933 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1935 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1936 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1937 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1939 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1940 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1943 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1946 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1947 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1950 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1952 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1953 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1954 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.tick_identity)
1955 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1956 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1957 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1958 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1961 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;