2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_local.h"
12 #include "statem_local.h"
13 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15 #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0
18 * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for
19 * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for
20 * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen,
21 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie
22 * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing.
24 #define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \
25 + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
28 * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes +
29 * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id
30 * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression
31 * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension
32 * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie
34 #define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \
35 + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \
39 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
41 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
42 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
45 const unsigned char *data;
47 /* Parse the length byte */
48 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
49 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
50 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
51 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
55 /* Check that the extension matches */
56 if (ilen != s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) {
57 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
58 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
62 if (memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
63 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)) {
64 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
65 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
69 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
75 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
77 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
78 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
79 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
80 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
81 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
82 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
83 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
84 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
85 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
86 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
87 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
88 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
89 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
90 * the value of the Host: field.
91 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
92 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
93 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
95 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
97 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
98 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
100 unsigned int servname_type;
101 PACKET sni, hostname;
103 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
104 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
105 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
107 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
112 * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
113 * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
114 * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
115 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
116 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
117 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
119 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
120 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
122 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
123 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
124 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
126 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
131 * In TLSv1.2 and below the SNI is associated with the session. In TLSv1.3
132 * we always use the SNI value from the handshake.
134 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
135 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
137 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
138 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
142 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
144 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
145 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
150 * Store the requested SNI in the SSL as temporary storage.
151 * If we accept it, it will get stored in the SSL_SESSION as well.
153 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
154 s->ext.hostname = NULL;
155 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->ext.hostname)) {
156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
157 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
161 s->servername_done = 1;
164 * In TLSv1.2 and below we should check if the SNI is consistent between
165 * the initial handshake and the resumption. In TLSv1.3 SNI is not
166 * associated with the session.
169 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
170 * fall back to a full handshake.
172 s->servername_done = (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
173 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
174 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
180 int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
181 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
185 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
187 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
191 /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */
192 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
194 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
195 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
200 * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session
201 * including session resumptions.
202 * We should receive the same code as in resumed session !
204 if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) {
205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
206 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
207 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
212 * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us
213 * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello.
215 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
220 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
225 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
226 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
227 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
228 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
229 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
234 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
235 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
237 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
239 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
248 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
249 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
251 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
253 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
254 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS,
256 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
261 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
262 &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
263 &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len)) {
264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
265 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
272 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
274 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
275 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
277 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
278 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
279 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
280 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
282 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
289 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
290 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
292 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
294 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
295 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
297 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
301 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
303 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
310 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
313 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
315 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
316 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
318 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
322 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
324 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
332 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
333 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
335 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
337 /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */
341 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
345 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
347 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
351 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
353 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
355 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
359 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
361 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
366 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
367 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
369 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
370 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
371 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
372 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
374 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
378 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
381 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
384 const unsigned char *id_data;
386 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
387 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
389 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
393 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
394 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
395 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
396 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
399 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
403 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
404 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
406 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
411 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
412 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
414 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 /* Read in request_extensions */
421 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
423 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
427 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
428 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
430 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
431 X509_EXTENSION_free);
433 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
434 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
436 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
446 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
450 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
453 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
461 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
462 * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
464 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
467 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
469 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
472 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
473 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
475 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
479 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
481 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
482 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
483 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
485 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
488 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
490 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_proposed);
491 s->s3.alpn_proposed = NULL;
492 s->s3.alpn_proposed_len = 0;
493 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
494 &s->s3.alpn_proposed, &s->s3.alpn_proposed_len)) {
495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
496 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
504 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
507 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
508 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
512 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
513 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
516 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
517 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
518 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
520 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
524 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
525 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
526 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
527 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
529 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
530 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
532 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
537 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
539 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
542 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
543 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
544 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
546 if (sprof->id == id) {
547 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
554 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
555 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
557 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
561 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
562 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
564 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
572 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
575 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
582 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
583 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
585 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
586 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
589 PACKET psk_kex_modes;
592 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
593 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
594 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES,
595 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
599 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
600 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
601 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
602 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
603 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0)
604 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
612 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
613 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
615 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
619 unsigned int group_id;
620 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
621 const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups;
622 size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups;
625 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
629 if (s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
631 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
635 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
637 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
641 /* Get our list of supported groups */
642 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups);
643 /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
644 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
645 if (clnt_num_groups == 0) {
647 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
648 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
652 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
656 if (s->s3.group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) {
658 * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR
659 * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an
662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
663 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
667 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
668 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
669 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
670 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
671 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
672 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
677 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
678 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
684 * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group
685 * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent.
687 if (s->s3.group_id != 0
688 && (group_id != s->s3.group_id
689 || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) {
690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
691 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
695 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
696 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) {
697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
698 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
702 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
703 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) {
704 /* Share not suitable */
708 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, group_id)) == NULL) {
709 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
710 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
714 s->s3.group_id = group_id;
716 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.peer_tmp,
717 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
718 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
720 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
731 int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
735 unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id;
738 PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie;
740 const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata;
741 unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
742 unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE];
743 size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen;
744 unsigned long tm, now;
746 /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */
747 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL
748 || (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
751 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) {
752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
753 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
758 data = PACKET_data(&raw);
759 rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw);
760 if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
761 || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
763 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
766 mdin = PACKET_data(&raw);
768 /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */
769 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
770 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
771 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
772 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
774 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
775 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
778 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
782 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
783 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
784 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data,
785 rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0
786 || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
787 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
790 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
794 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
797 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
799 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
803 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) {
804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
805 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
808 /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */
809 if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
813 * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the
817 /* Check the version number is sane */
818 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) {
819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
820 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
823 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
825 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
829 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) {
830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
831 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
835 ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie);
836 if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) {
837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
838 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
841 if (group_id != s->s3.group_id
842 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher
843 != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) {
845 * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is
846 * in the cookie. Something must have changed.
848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
853 if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share)
854 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie, &tm)
855 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash)
856 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie)
857 || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
858 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
859 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
863 /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */
864 now = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
865 if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) {
866 /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */
870 /* Verify the app cookie */
871 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie),
872 PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) {
873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
874 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
879 * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original
880 * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash.
881 * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions
883 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) {
884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
888 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
889 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt)
890 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION)
891 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
892 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id,
893 s->tmp_session_id_len)
894 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt,
896 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0)
897 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) {
898 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
900 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
903 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
904 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
905 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version)
906 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
907 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
909 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
913 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
914 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
915 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3.group_id)
916 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
917 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
918 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
919 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
923 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
924 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
925 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen)
926 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */
927 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */
928 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */
929 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen)
930 || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) {
931 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
933 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
937 /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */
938 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash),
939 PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr,
941 /* SSLfatal() already called */
945 /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */
946 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
954 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
955 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
956 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
958 PACKET supported_groups_list;
960 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
961 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
962 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
963 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
965 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
969 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
970 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_supportedgroups);
971 s->ext.peer_supportedgroups = NULL;
972 s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len = 0;
973 if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list,
974 &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups,
975 &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len)) {
976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
977 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
978 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
987 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
990 /* The extension must always be empty */
991 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
993 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
997 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
1000 s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1006 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1007 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1009 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1010 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1011 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1015 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1016 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1017 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1024 static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *tick,
1027 SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL;
1029 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1031 switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) {
1033 return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1035 case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH:
1039 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1042 tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick),
1043 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
1045 if (tmpsess == NULL)
1046 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1049 return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1052 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1055 PACKET identities, binders, binder;
1056 size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
1057 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1058 unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
1059 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1062 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
1063 * ignore this extension
1065 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
1066 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
1069 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
1070 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1071 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1075 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1076 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
1078 unsigned long ticket_agel;
1081 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
1082 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
1083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1084 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1088 idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity);
1089 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
1090 && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen,
1092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1093 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1099 && s->psk_server_callback != NULL
1100 && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1102 unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
1103 unsigned int pskdatalen;
1105 if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) {
1106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1110 pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata,
1112 OPENSSL_free(pskid);
1113 if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
1114 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1115 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1117 } else if (pskdatalen > 0) {
1118 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1119 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
1122 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
1123 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
1125 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
1126 if (cipher == NULL) {
1127 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1129 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1133 sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
1135 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata,
1137 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher)
1138 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess,
1140 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1141 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1142 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1145 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1148 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1151 /* We found a PSK */
1152 SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
1154 if (sesstmp == NULL) {
1155 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1156 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1159 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1163 * We've just been told to use this session for this context so
1164 * make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
1166 memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
1167 sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
1170 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1171 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1173 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
1177 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
1178 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
1179 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
1181 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
1182 || (s->max_early_data > 0
1183 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))
1184 ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess);
1186 ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
1187 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0,
1190 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) {
1191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1192 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1196 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
1197 || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
1198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1199 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1205 /* Check for replay */
1206 if (s->max_early_data > 0
1207 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0
1208 && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) {
1209 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1214 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
1215 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1216 agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
1217 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1218 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
1221 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the
1222 * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age
1223 * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be
1224 * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency).
1225 * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for
1229 && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
1230 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
1231 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
1232 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
1234 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
1237 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1241 md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sess->cipher->algorithm2);
1242 if (!EVP_MD_is_a(md,
1243 EVP_MD_name(ssl_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)))) {
1244 /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
1245 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1247 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1248 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1257 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1258 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
1260 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
1261 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1262 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1266 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
1267 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
1268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1269 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1274 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) {
1275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1276 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1279 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1280 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0,
1282 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1286 s->ext.tick_identity = id;
1288 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1292 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1296 int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1297 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1299 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1301 SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR);
1305 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
1311 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
1313 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1314 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1317 if (!s->s3.send_connection_binding)
1318 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1320 /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
1321 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1322 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1323 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1324 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
1325 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
1326 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
1327 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
1328 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1329 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1330 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1331 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1332 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1335 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1338 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1339 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1342 if (s->servername_done != 1)
1343 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1346 * Prior to TLSv1.3 we ignore any SNI in the current handshake if resuming.
1347 * We just use the servername from the initial handshake.
1349 if (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1350 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1352 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1353 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1355 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1356 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1359 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1362 /* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */
1363 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1364 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1367 if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1368 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1371 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
1372 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
1374 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
1375 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1376 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
1377 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1379 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1380 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1383 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1387 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1388 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1391 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1392 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1393 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
1394 && (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL);
1395 const unsigned char *plist;
1399 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1401 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1402 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1403 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1404 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1405 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1406 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1407 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1408 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1411 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1415 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1416 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1417 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1420 const uint16_t *groups;
1421 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
1423 /* s->s3.group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
1424 if (s->s3.group_id == 0)
1425 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1427 /* Get our list of supported groups */
1428 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups);
1429 if (numgroups == 0) {
1430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1431 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1432 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1435 /* Copy group ID if supported */
1436 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) {
1437 uint16_t group = groups[i];
1439 if (tls_valid_group(s, group, SSL_version(s))
1440 && tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1443 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
1444 * so we don't need to add this extension
1446 if (s->s3.group_id == group)
1447 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1449 /* Add extension header */
1450 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1451 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1452 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1453 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1455 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1456 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1457 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1462 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) {
1463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1464 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1466 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1471 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1473 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1474 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1475 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1478 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1482 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1483 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1486 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1487 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1488 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1491 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1492 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1494 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1495 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1498 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1502 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1503 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1506 /* We don't currently support this extension inside a CertificateRequest */
1507 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
1508 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1510 if (!s->ext.status_expected)
1511 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1513 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
1514 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1516 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1517 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1519 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1520 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1524 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
1525 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
1528 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
1529 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1530 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1532 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1534 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1535 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1538 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1543 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1544 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1547 const unsigned char *npa;
1548 unsigned int npalen;
1550 int npn_seen = s->s3.npn_seen;
1553 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
1554 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1556 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1557 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
1558 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1559 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1560 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1562 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
1563 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1569 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1573 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1574 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1576 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL)
1577 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1579 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1580 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1581 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1582 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1583 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected,
1584 s->s3.alpn_selected_len)
1585 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1586 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1588 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1589 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1592 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1596 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1597 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1600 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
1601 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1603 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1604 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1605 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1606 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1607 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1608 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1610 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1611 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1614 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1618 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1619 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1621 if (!s->ext.use_etm)
1622 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1625 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1626 * for other cases too.
1628 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1629 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1630 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1631 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
1633 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1636 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1637 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1638 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM,
1639 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1640 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1643 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1646 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1647 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1649 if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
1650 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1652 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1653 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS,
1655 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1656 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1659 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1662 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1663 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1666 if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1668 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1669 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1673 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1674 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1675 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
1676 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1678 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1679 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1680 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1683 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1686 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1687 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1691 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1692 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1693 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1695 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
1697 /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */
1698 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1700 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1701 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1702 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
1703 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1705 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1706 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1707 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1710 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1714 /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */
1715 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1717 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1718 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1720 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1723 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1724 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1725 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)) {
1726 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1727 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1728 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1731 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, ckey);
1733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1734 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1735 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1738 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1739 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1740 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1743 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1744 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1747 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1748 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1749 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1750 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1751 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1752 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1753 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1755 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1757 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1758 s->s3.tmp.pkey = skey;
1759 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1760 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1761 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1763 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1765 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1769 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1770 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1773 unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie;
1774 unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2;
1775 size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen;
1778 int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1780 if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
1781 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1783 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) {
1784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1785 SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET);
1786 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1789 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
1790 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1791 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1792 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen)
1793 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie)
1794 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
1795 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION)
1796 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
1797 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
1799 /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */
1800 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)
1801 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, (unsigned int)time(NULL))
1802 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1803 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) {
1804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1805 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1806 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1810 * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates
1811 * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then
1812 * subsequently allocate them (below)
1814 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
1815 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
1816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1817 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1820 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2)
1821 || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2)
1822 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1823 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1824 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) {
1825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1826 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1827 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1830 /* Generate the application cookie */
1831 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) {
1832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1833 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1834 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1837 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2)
1838 || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2)
1839 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1840 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen)
1841 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) {
1842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1843 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1844 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1846 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1848 totcookielen -= startlen;
1849 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
1850 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1851 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1852 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1855 /* HMAC the cookie */
1856 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
1857 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
1858 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
1859 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
1861 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
1862 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1863 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1867 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
1868 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie,
1869 totcookielen) <= 0) {
1870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1871 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1875 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) {
1876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1877 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1881 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2)
1882 || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2)
1883 || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen)
1884 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1885 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1886 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1887 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1891 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1894 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
1895 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1898 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1902 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1903 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1906 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1907 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1908 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1909 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1910 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1911 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1912 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1915 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1916 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1917 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1918 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1920 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1922 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1923 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1926 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1929 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1930 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1933 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1934 if (s->max_early_data == 0)
1935 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1937 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1938 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1939 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
1940 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1941 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1942 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1943 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1946 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1949 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
1950 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1952 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1953 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1954 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1956 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1957 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1960 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1963 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1964 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1967 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1969 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1970 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1971 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.tick_identity)
1972 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1974 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1975 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1978 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;