2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "statem_locl.h"
13 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15 #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0
18 * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for
19 * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for
20 * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen,
21 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie
22 * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing.
24 #define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \
25 + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
28 * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes +
29 * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id
30 * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression
31 * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension
32 * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie
34 #define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \
35 + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \
39 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
41 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
42 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
45 const unsigned char *data;
47 /* Parse the length byte */
48 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
49 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
50 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
51 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
55 /* Check that the extension matches */
56 if (ilen != s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) {
57 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
58 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
62 if (memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
63 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)) {
64 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
65 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
69 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
75 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
77 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
78 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
79 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
80 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
81 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
82 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
83 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
84 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
85 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
86 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
87 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
88 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
89 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
90 * the value of the Host: field.
91 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
92 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
93 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
95 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
97 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
98 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
100 unsigned int servname_type;
101 PACKET sni, hostname;
103 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
104 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
105 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
107 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
112 * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
113 * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
114 * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
115 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
116 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
117 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
119 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
120 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
122 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
123 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
124 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
126 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
130 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
131 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
133 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
134 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
138 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
140 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
141 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
146 * Store the requested SNI in the SSL as temporary storage.
147 * If we accept it, it will get stored in the SSL_SESSION as well.
149 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
150 s->ext.hostname = NULL;
151 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->ext.hostname)) {
152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
153 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
157 s->servername_done = 1;
161 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
162 * fall back to a full handshake.
164 s->servername_done = (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
165 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
166 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
168 if (!s->servername_done && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
169 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
175 int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
176 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
180 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
182 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
186 /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */
187 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
189 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
190 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
195 * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session
196 * including session resumptions.
197 * We should receive the same code as in resumed session !
199 if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) {
200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
201 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
202 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
207 * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us
208 * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello.
210 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
215 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
220 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
221 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
223 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
224 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
229 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
230 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
232 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
243 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
244 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
246 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
248 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
249 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS,
251 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
256 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
257 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
258 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
260 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
267 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
269 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
270 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
272 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
273 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
274 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
275 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
277 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
284 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
285 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
287 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
289 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
290 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
292 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
296 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
298 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
305 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
308 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
310 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
311 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
313 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
317 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
319 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
327 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
328 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
330 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
332 /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */
336 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
340 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
342 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
346 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
348 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
350 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
354 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
356 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
361 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
362 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
364 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
365 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
366 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
367 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
369 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
373 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
376 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
379 const unsigned char *id_data;
381 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
382 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
384 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
388 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
389 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
390 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
391 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
394 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
398 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
399 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
401 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
406 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
407 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
409 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
415 /* Read in request_extensions */
416 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
418 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
422 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
423 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
425 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
426 X509_EXTENSION_free);
428 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
429 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
431 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
441 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
445 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
448 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
456 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
457 * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
459 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
462 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
464 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
467 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
468 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
470 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
474 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
476 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
477 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
478 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
480 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
483 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
485 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_proposed);
486 s->s3.alpn_proposed = NULL;
487 s->s3.alpn_proposed_len = 0;
488 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
489 &s->s3.alpn_proposed, &s->s3.alpn_proposed_len)) {
490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
491 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
499 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
502 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
503 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
507 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
508 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
511 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
512 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
513 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
515 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
519 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
520 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
521 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
522 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
524 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
525 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
527 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
532 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
534 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
537 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
538 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
539 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
541 if (sprof->id == id) {
542 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
549 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
550 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
552 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
556 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
557 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
558 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
559 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
567 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
570 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
577 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
578 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
580 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
581 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
584 PACKET psk_kex_modes;
587 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
588 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES,
590 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
594 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
595 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
596 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
597 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
598 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0)
599 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
607 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
608 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
610 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
614 unsigned int group_id;
615 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
616 const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups;
617 size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups;
620 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
624 if (s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
626 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
630 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
632 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
636 /* Get our list of supported groups */
637 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups);
638 /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
639 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
640 if (clnt_num_groups == 0) {
642 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
643 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
647 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
651 if (s->s3.group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) {
653 * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR
654 * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an
657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
658 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
662 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
663 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
664 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
665 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
667 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
672 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
673 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
679 * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group
680 * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent.
682 if (s->s3.group_id != 0
683 && (group_id != s->s3.group_id
684 || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) {
685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
686 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
690 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
691 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) {
692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
693 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
697 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
698 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) {
699 /* Share not suitable */
703 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(group_id)) == NULL) {
704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
705 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
709 s->s3.group_id = group_id;
711 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.peer_tmp,
712 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
713 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
715 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
726 int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
730 unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id;
733 PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie;
735 const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata;
736 unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
737 unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE];
738 size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen;
739 unsigned long tm, now;
741 /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */
742 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL
743 || (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
746 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) {
747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
748 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
753 data = PACKET_data(&raw);
754 rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw);
755 if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
756 || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
758 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
761 mdin = PACKET_data(&raw);
763 /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */
764 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
765 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
766 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
767 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
769 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
770 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
773 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
777 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
778 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
779 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data,
780 rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0
781 || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
782 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
785 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
789 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
792 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
794 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
798 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) {
799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
800 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
803 /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */
804 if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
808 * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the
812 /* Check the version number is sane */
813 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) {
814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
815 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
818 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
820 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
824 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) {
825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
826 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
830 ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie);
831 if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) {
832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
833 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
836 if (group_id != s->s3.group_id
837 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher
838 != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) {
840 * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is
841 * in the cookie. Something must have changed.
843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
848 if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share)
849 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie, &tm)
850 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash)
851 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie)
852 || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
854 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
858 /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */
859 now = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
860 if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) {
861 /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */
865 /* Verify the app cookie */
866 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie),
867 PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) {
868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
869 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
874 * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original
875 * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash.
876 * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions
878 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) {
879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
880 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
883 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
884 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt)
885 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION)
886 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
887 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id,
888 s->tmp_session_id_len)
889 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt,
891 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0)
892 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) {
893 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
895 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
898 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
899 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
900 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version)
901 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
902 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
904 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
908 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
909 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
910 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3.group_id)
911 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
912 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
914 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
918 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
919 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
920 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen)
921 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */
922 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */
923 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */
924 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen)
925 || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) {
926 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
932 /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */
933 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash),
934 PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr,
936 /* SSLfatal() already called */
940 /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */
941 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
949 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
950 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
951 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
953 PACKET supported_groups_list;
955 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
956 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
957 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
958 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
960 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
964 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
965 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
966 s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
967 s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
968 if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list,
969 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
970 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
971 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
972 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
973 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
982 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
985 /* The extension must always be empty */
986 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
988 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
992 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
995 s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1001 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1002 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1004 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1006 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1010 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1012 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1019 static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *tick,
1022 SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL;
1024 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1026 switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) {
1028 return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1030 case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH:
1034 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1037 tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick),
1038 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
1040 if (tmpsess == NULL)
1041 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1044 return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1047 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1050 PACKET identities, binders, binder;
1051 size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
1052 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1053 unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
1054 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1057 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
1058 * ignore this extension
1060 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
1061 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
1064 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
1065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1066 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1070 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1071 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
1073 unsigned long ticket_agel;
1076 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
1077 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
1078 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1079 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1083 idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity);
1084 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
1085 && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen,
1087 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1088 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1094 && s->psk_server_callback != NULL
1095 && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1097 unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
1098 unsigned int pskdatalen;
1100 if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) {
1101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1102 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1105 pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata,
1107 OPENSSL_free(pskid);
1108 if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
1109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1112 } else if (pskdatalen > 0) {
1113 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1114 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
1117 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
1118 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
1120 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
1121 if (cipher == NULL) {
1122 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1124 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1128 sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
1130 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata,
1132 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher)
1133 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess,
1135 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1137 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1140 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1143 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1146 /* We found a PSK */
1147 SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
1149 if (sesstmp == NULL) {
1150 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1151 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1158 * We've just been told to use this session for this context so
1159 * make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
1161 memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
1162 sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
1165 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1166 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1168 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
1172 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
1173 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
1174 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
1176 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
1177 || (s->max_early_data > 0
1178 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))
1179 ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess);
1181 ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
1182 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0,
1185 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) {
1186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1187 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1191 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
1192 || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
1193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1194 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1197 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1200 /* Check for replay */
1201 if (s->max_early_data > 0
1202 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0
1203 && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) {
1204 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1209 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
1210 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1211 agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
1212 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1213 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
1216 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the
1217 * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age
1218 * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be
1219 * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency).
1220 * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for
1224 && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
1225 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
1226 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
1227 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
1229 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
1232 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1236 md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
1237 if (md != ssl_md(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)) {
1238 /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
1239 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1241 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1242 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1251 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1252 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
1254 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
1255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1256 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1260 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
1261 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
1262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1263 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1268 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) {
1269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1270 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1273 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1274 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0,
1276 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1280 s->ext.tick_identity = id;
1282 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1286 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1290 int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1291 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1293 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1295 SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR);
1299 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
1305 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
1307 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1308 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1311 if (!s->s3.send_connection_binding)
1312 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1314 /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
1315 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1316 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1317 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1318 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
1319 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
1320 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
1321 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
1322 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1323 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1325 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1329 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1332 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1333 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1336 if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
1337 || s->ext.hostname == NULL)
1338 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1340 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1341 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1344 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1347 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1350 /* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */
1351 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1352 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1355 if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1356 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1359 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
1360 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
1362 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
1363 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1364 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
1365 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1367 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1368 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1371 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1375 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1376 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1379 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1380 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1381 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
1382 && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL);
1383 const unsigned char *plist;
1387 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1389 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1390 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1391 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1392 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1393 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1395 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1396 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1399 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1403 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1404 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1405 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1408 const uint16_t *groups;
1409 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
1411 /* s->s3.group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
1412 if (s->s3.group_id == 0)
1413 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1415 /* Get our list of supported groups */
1416 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups);
1417 if (numgroups == 0) {
1418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1419 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1420 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1423 /* Copy group ID if supported */
1424 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) {
1425 uint16_t group = groups[i];
1427 if (tls_valid_group(s, group, SSL_version(s))
1428 && tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1431 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
1432 * so we don't need to add this extension
1434 if (s->s3.group_id == group)
1435 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1437 /* Add extension header */
1438 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1439 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1440 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1441 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1442 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1443 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1444 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1445 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1450 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) {
1451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1452 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1453 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1454 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1459 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1461 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1462 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1463 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1466 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1470 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1471 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1474 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1475 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1476 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1479 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1480 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1482 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1483 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1486 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1490 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1491 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1494 if (!s->ext.status_expected)
1495 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1497 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
1498 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1500 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1501 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1503 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1504 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1508 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
1509 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
1512 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
1513 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1514 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1516 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1518 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1519 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1522 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1527 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1528 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1531 const unsigned char *npa;
1532 unsigned int npalen;
1534 int npn_seen = s->s3.npn_seen;
1537 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
1538 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1540 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1541 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
1542 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1543 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1544 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1546 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
1547 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1548 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1553 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1557 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1558 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1560 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL)
1561 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1563 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1564 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1565 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1566 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1567 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected,
1568 s->s3.alpn_selected_len)
1569 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1570 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1572 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1576 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1580 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1581 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1584 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
1585 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1587 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1588 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1589 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1590 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1591 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1592 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1594 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1595 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1598 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1602 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1603 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1605 if (!s->ext.use_etm)
1606 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1609 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1610 * for other cases too.
1612 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1613 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1614 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1615 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
1617 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1620 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1621 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM,
1623 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1624 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1627 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1630 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1631 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1633 if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
1634 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1636 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1637 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1638 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS,
1639 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1640 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1643 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1646 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1647 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1650 if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1652 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1653 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1654 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1657 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1658 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1659 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
1660 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1662 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1663 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1664 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1667 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1670 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1671 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1675 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1676 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1677 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1679 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
1681 /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */
1682 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1684 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1685 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1686 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
1687 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1688 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1689 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1690 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1691 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1694 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1698 /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */
1699 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1700 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1701 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1702 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1704 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1707 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1708 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1709 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)) {
1710 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1711 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1712 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1715 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1718 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1719 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1722 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1723 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1724 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1727 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1728 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1731 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1732 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1734 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1735 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1736 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1737 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1739 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1741 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1742 s->s3.tmp.pkey = skey;
1743 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1744 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1745 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1747 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1749 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1753 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1754 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1757 unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie;
1758 unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2;
1759 size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen;
1762 int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1764 if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
1765 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1767 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) {
1768 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1769 SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET);
1770 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1773 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
1774 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1775 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1776 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen)
1777 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie)
1778 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
1779 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION)
1780 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
1781 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
1783 /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */
1784 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)
1785 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, (unsigned int)time(NULL))
1786 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1787 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) {
1788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1789 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1790 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1794 * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates
1795 * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then
1796 * subsequently allocate them (below)
1798 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
1799 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
1800 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1801 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1804 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2)
1805 || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2)
1806 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1807 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1808 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) {
1809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1810 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1811 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1814 /* Generate the application cookie */
1815 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) {
1816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1817 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1818 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1821 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2)
1822 || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2)
1823 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1824 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen)
1825 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) {
1826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1827 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1828 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1830 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1832 totcookielen -= startlen;
1833 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
1834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1835 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1836 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1839 /* HMAC the cookie */
1840 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
1841 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
1842 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
1843 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
1845 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
1846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1847 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1851 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
1852 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie,
1853 totcookielen) <= 0) {
1854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1855 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1859 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) {
1860 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1861 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1865 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2)
1866 || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2)
1867 || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen)
1868 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1869 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1871 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1875 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1878 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
1879 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1882 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1886 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1887 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1890 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1891 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1892 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1893 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1894 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1895 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1896 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1899 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1900 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1901 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1902 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1904 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1906 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1907 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1910 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1913 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1914 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1917 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1918 if (s->max_early_data == 0)
1919 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1921 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1922 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1923 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
1924 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1926 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1927 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1930 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1933 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
1934 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1936 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1937 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1938 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1940 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1941 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1944 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1947 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1948 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1951 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1953 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1954 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1955 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.tick_identity)
1956 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1958 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1959 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1962 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;