2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
16 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
19 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
21 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
23 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
24 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
25 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
26 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
27 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
28 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
29 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
30 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
33 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
36 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
37 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
40 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
41 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
43 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
44 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
45 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
46 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
47 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
48 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
49 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
50 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
51 strlen(s->ext.hostname))
52 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
53 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
54 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
55 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
56 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
59 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
62 /* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
63 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
64 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
67 if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED)
68 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
70 /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
72 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
73 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
75 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
76 /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
77 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
78 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
79 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
80 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
81 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
82 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
85 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
88 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
89 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
90 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
92 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
93 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
94 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
96 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
97 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
98 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
99 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
100 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
101 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
102 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
103 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP,
107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
108 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
111 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
116 static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
119 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
120 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
123 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
126 cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
127 end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
128 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
129 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
131 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
132 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
133 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
134 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
135 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
142 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
143 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
146 const unsigned char *pformats;
150 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
152 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
153 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
155 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
156 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
157 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
158 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
159 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
161 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
162 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
165 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
168 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
169 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
172 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
173 size_t num_groups = 0, i;
176 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
179 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
181 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
182 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
184 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
185 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
186 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
187 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
189 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
190 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
191 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
193 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
194 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
195 uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i];
197 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
198 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) {
199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
200 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
201 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
202 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
206 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
207 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
208 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
209 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
210 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
213 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
217 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
218 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
223 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
224 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
226 if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
227 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
228 && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
229 ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
230 } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
231 && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
232 ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
233 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
234 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
236 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET,
237 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
240 memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
241 s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
242 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
247 if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
248 s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
249 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
251 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
252 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
254 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
255 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
258 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
261 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
262 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
266 const uint16_t *salg;
268 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
269 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
271 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
272 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
273 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
274 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
275 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
276 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
277 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
278 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
279 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS,
281 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
282 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
285 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
289 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
290 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
295 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
297 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
299 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
300 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
302 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
303 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
304 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
305 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
306 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
307 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
309 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
310 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
312 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
313 unsigned char *idbytes;
314 OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
315 int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
318 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
319 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
320 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
322 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
323 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
324 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
327 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
328 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
330 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
331 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
333 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
334 unsigned char *extbytes;
335 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
338 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
339 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
340 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
341 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
343 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
344 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
347 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
349 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
352 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
354 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
355 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
358 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
363 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
364 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
366 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
367 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
370 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
371 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
373 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
374 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN,
376 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
377 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
380 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
384 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
385 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
387 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
389 if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
390 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
392 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
393 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
394 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
395 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
396 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
397 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN,
399 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
400 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
402 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
404 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
409 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
410 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
413 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
417 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
419 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
420 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
421 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
422 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
423 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
425 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
426 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
429 end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
430 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
431 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
432 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
434 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
436 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
437 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
440 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
441 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
442 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
443 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
445 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
446 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
449 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
453 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
454 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
456 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
457 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
459 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
460 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM,
462 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
463 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
466 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
470 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
471 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
473 if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
474 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
476 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
478 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
480 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
481 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT,
483 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
484 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
487 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
491 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
492 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
494 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
495 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS,
497 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
498 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
501 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
504 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
505 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
508 int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
510 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
513 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason);
514 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
518 * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
519 * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
521 if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
522 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
524 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
525 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
526 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
528 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
529 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
530 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
534 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether
535 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
538 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
539 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
540 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
541 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
543 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
544 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
545 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
547 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
549 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
550 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
551 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
554 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
556 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
557 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
558 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
561 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
565 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
567 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
568 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
572 int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
574 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
575 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
576 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
577 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
578 || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
579 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
580 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
582 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
583 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
586 s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
588 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
591 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
595 static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
597 unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL;
598 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
601 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
602 if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) {
603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
604 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
608 * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
610 key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
612 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
613 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
614 /* SSLfatal() already called */
619 /* Encode the public key. */
620 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
622 if (encodedlen == 0) {
623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
627 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
628 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
629 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
631 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
636 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
637 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
638 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
640 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
641 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
642 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
646 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL)
647 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
648 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
653 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
654 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
658 size_t i, num_groups = 0;
659 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
660 uint16_t curve_id = 0;
662 /* key_share extension */
663 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
664 /* Extension data sub-packet */
665 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
666 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
667 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
669 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
670 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
673 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
676 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
679 if (s->s3->group_id != 0) {
680 curve_id = s->s3->group_id;
682 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
684 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
687 curve_id = pgroups[i];
693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
694 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
695 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
698 if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) {
699 /* SSLfatal() already called */
700 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
703 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
705 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
706 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
708 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
710 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
714 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
715 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
717 EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
719 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
720 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
721 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
723 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
724 /* Extension data sub-packet */
725 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
726 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
727 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
728 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE,
730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
734 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
736 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
737 s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
738 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
743 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
744 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
747 const unsigned char *id = NULL;
749 SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
750 SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
751 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
753 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
754 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
756 if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
757 && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
759 && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
760 SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
763 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
767 if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) {
768 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
769 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
772 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
773 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, NULL, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
776 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
778 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
779 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
780 } else if (psklen > 0) {
781 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
782 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
784 idlen = strlen(identity);
785 if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
786 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
787 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
788 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
789 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
791 id = (unsigned char *)identity;
794 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
795 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
797 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
798 if (cipher == NULL) {
799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
800 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
801 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
802 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
805 psksess = SSL_SESSION_new();
807 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen)
808 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher)
809 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
811 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
812 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
813 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
814 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
816 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
819 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
821 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
822 s->psksession = psksess;
823 if (psksess != NULL) {
824 OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
825 s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
826 if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
827 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
828 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
829 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
831 s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
834 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
835 || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
836 && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
837 s->max_early_data = 0;
838 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
840 edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
841 s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
843 if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) {
844 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL
845 || (s->ext.hostname != NULL
846 && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) {
847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
848 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
849 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
850 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
854 if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
856 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
857 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
861 * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
864 if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
865 PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
868 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
869 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
870 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
871 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
873 while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
874 if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
875 edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
881 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
882 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
883 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
884 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
888 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
889 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
890 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
892 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
893 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
897 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
898 * extension, we set it to accepted.
900 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
901 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
903 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
906 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
907 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
910 * PSK pre binder overhead =
911 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
912 * 2 bytes for extension length
913 * 2 bytes for identities list length
914 * 2 bytes for identity length
915 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
916 * 2 bytes for binder list length
917 * 1 byte for binder length
918 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
919 * subsequent binder bytes
921 #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
923 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
924 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
927 unsigned char *padbytes;
930 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
931 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
934 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
935 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
936 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
937 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
939 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
941 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
942 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
946 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
947 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
949 if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
950 && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
951 && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
952 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
956 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
959 hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
964 if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
965 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
966 hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
969 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
970 * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
971 * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
972 * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
979 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
980 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
981 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
982 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
983 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
985 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
988 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
992 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
994 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
995 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
998 uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0;
999 size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen;
1000 unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
1001 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
1004 s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY;
1007 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
1008 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
1009 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
1013 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
1014 * so don't add this extension.
1016 if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1017 || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
1018 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1020 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
1021 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
1023 if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
1024 /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
1025 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
1026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1027 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1028 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1030 mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
1031 if (mdres == NULL) {
1033 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1039 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) {
1041 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
1042 * so we can't use it.
1048 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
1049 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
1050 * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
1051 * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
1052 * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
1055 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1056 agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
1058 * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
1059 * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
1060 * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
1061 * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
1062 * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
1068 if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
1069 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
1074 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
1077 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1079 if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
1081 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
1082 * If so we just ignore it.
1088 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
1091 agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
1093 reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
1098 if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
1099 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1101 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1102 mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
1103 if (mdpsk == NULL) {
1105 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1106 * If this happens it's an application bug.
1108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1110 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1113 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) {
1115 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
1116 * session. This is an application bug.
1118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1120 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1123 pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk);
1126 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
1127 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1128 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1129 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1131 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1132 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1136 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
1137 s->session->ext.ticklen)
1138 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
1139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1140 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1141 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1145 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1146 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
1147 s->psksession_id_len)
1148 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
1149 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1150 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1151 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1155 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1156 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
1157 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1159 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
1160 || (s->psksession != NULL
1161 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
1162 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1163 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1164 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
1166 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
1167 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
1169 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
1170 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1171 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1172 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1175 msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
1178 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1179 resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
1180 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1181 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1184 if (s->psksession != NULL
1185 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1186 pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) {
1187 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1188 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1192 s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0;
1193 if (s->psksession != NULL)
1194 s->psksession->ext.tick_identity = (dores ? 1 : 0);
1196 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1198 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1202 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1203 unsigned int context,
1204 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1207 if (!s->pha_forced) {
1210 /* check for cert, if present, we can do post-handshake auth */
1211 if (s->cert == NULL)
1212 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1214 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1215 if (s->cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL
1216 && s->cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
1220 /* no identity certificates, so no extension */
1222 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1225 /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
1226 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
1227 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1228 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1230 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1231 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1232 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1235 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1237 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1239 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1245 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
1247 int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1248 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1250 size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
1251 + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
1253 const unsigned char *data;
1255 /* Check for logic errors */
1256 if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1257 || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0)
1258 || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1259 || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
1260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1261 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1265 /* Parse the length byte */
1266 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
1267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1268 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1272 /* Consistency check */
1273 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
1274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1275 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1279 /* Check that the extension matches */
1280 if (ilen != expected_len) {
1281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1282 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1286 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1287 || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1288 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
1289 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1290 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1294 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
1295 || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
1296 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
1297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1298 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1301 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1306 /* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
1307 int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1308 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1312 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
1313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1314 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1318 /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
1319 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
1320 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1321 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1322 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1326 /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
1328 * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
1329 * response that differs from the length it requested, ...
1330 * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
1332 if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) {
1333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1334 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1335 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1340 * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
1341 * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
1343 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
1348 int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1349 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1351 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1353 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1357 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1359 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1364 if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
1365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1366 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1369 s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
1370 if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1372 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1381 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1382 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1384 size_t ecpointformats_len;
1385 PACKET ecptformatlist;
1387 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
1388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS,
1389 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1393 ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
1394 if (ecpointformats_len == 0) {
1395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1396 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1400 s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0;
1401 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.ecpointformats);
1402 s->session->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
1403 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) {
1404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1405 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1409 s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
1411 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
1412 s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
1413 ecpointformats_len)) {
1414 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1415 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1424 int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1425 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1427 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
1428 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
1429 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1430 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
1431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1432 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1436 if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1438 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1441 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1442 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1443 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1447 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1453 int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1454 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1456 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1457 /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
1458 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1463 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1464 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1466 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1468 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1471 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1473 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1477 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1478 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1479 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1484 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1485 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt);
1488 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1489 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1497 int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1500 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1501 /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
1502 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1507 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1508 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1509 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1511 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1512 size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1514 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1515 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
1518 s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size;
1520 s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
1521 if (s->ext.scts == NULL
1522 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
1523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1524 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1529 ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
1530 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH;
1533 * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
1534 * otherwise this is unsolicited.
1536 if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role,
1537 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1539 SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1540 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1544 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context,
1545 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1546 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1548 /* SSLfatal already called */
1558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1560 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1561 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1562 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1564 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1566 PACKET tmp_protocol;
1568 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1569 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
1570 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) {
1571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE,
1572 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1580 int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1583 unsigned char *selected;
1584 unsigned char selected_len;
1587 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1588 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1591 /* We must have requested it. */
1592 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
1593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1594 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1598 /* The data must be valid */
1600 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) {
1601 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1604 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1606 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1607 s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
1608 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1610 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1615 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1616 * a single Serverhello
1618 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
1619 s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1620 if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
1621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1622 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1626 memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
1627 s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
1628 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1634 int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1639 /* We must have requested it. */
1640 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
1641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1642 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1646 * The extension data consists of:
1647 * uint16 list_length
1648 * uint8 proto_length;
1649 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1651 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
1652 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
1653 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
1654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1655 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1658 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1659 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
1660 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1662 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1665 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
1666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1667 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1670 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
1672 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
1673 || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
1674 || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)
1676 /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
1677 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1680 /* If a new session then update it with the selected ALPN */
1681 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
1682 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
1683 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1685 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1688 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1695 int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1698 unsigned int id, ct, mki;
1700 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
1701 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1703 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
1704 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
1705 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
1706 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1708 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1713 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1715 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
1719 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1720 clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1723 SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
1728 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1729 * presumably offered)
1731 for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
1732 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1734 if (prof->id == id) {
1735 s->srtp_profile = prof;
1740 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1741 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1746 int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1749 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1750 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1751 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
1752 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
1758 int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1761 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1763 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
1768 int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1769 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1771 unsigned int version;
1773 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)
1774 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1775 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1776 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1777 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1781 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1782 if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1783 version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1786 * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
1787 * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
1789 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1791 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1792 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
1796 /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
1797 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
1800 /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
1801 s->version = version;
1806 int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1810 unsigned int group_id;
1812 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
1815 if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
1816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1817 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1821 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
1822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1823 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1827 if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
1828 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
1829 size_t i, num_groups;
1831 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1833 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1838 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1839 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1841 if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) {
1842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1843 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1847 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1848 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
1849 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
1850 if (group_id == pgroups[i])
1854 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1856 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1860 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
1861 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1862 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
1866 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
1868 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1872 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1876 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
1877 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
1878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1879 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1883 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1886 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1889 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1890 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1893 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1897 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
1898 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1899 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1902 s->s3->peer_tmp = skey;
1908 int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1913 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
1914 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
1915 &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
1916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE,
1917 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1924 int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1925 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1927 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1928 unsigned long max_early_data;
1930 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
1931 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1933 SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
1937 s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
1942 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1944 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1948 if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
1950 || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) {
1952 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1953 * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
1954 * server should not be accepting it.
1956 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1957 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1961 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
1966 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1970 unsigned int identity;
1972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1974 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1978 if (s->session->ext.tick_identity == (int)identity) {
1980 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
1981 s->psksession = NULL;
1985 if (s->psksession == NULL
1986 || s->psksession->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) {
1987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1988 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
1993 * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
1994 * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
1995 * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
1997 if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
1998 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
1999 || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
2000 || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
2001 memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
2003 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2004 s->session = s->psksession;
2005 s->psksession = NULL;