2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
16 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
19 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
21 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
23 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
24 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
25 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
26 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
27 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
28 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
29 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
30 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
33 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
36 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
37 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
40 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
41 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
43 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
44 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
45 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
46 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
47 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
48 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
49 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
50 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
51 strlen(s->ext.hostname))
52 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
53 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
54 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
55 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
56 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
59 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
62 /* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
63 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
64 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
67 if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED)
68 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
70 /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
72 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
73 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
75 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
76 /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
77 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
78 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
79 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
80 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
81 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
82 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
85 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
88 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
89 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
90 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
92 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
93 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
94 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
96 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
97 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
98 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
99 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
100 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
101 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
102 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
103 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP,
107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
108 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
111 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
116 static int use_ecc(SSL *s, int max_version)
119 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
120 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
121 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
122 size_t num_groups, j;
124 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
125 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
128 cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s);
129 end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
130 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
131 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
133 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
134 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
135 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
136 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
137 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
142 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack);
146 /* Check we have at least one EC supported group */
147 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
148 for (j = 0; j < num_groups; j++) {
149 uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[j];
151 if (tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, max_version)
152 && tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
159 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
160 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
163 const unsigned char *pformats;
165 int reason, min_version, max_version;
167 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
169 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
170 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, reason);
171 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
173 if (!use_ecc(s, max_version))
174 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
176 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
177 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
179 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
180 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
181 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
182 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
183 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
185 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
186 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
189 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
193 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
194 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
195 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
198 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
199 size_t num_groups = 0, i;
200 int min_version, max_version, reason;
202 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
205 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, reason);
206 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
209 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
210 if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
211 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
213 if (!use_ecc(s, max_version) && max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
214 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
218 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
220 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
222 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
223 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
224 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
225 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
226 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
227 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
228 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
229 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
230 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
232 /* Copy group ID if supported */
233 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
234 uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i];
236 if (tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, max_version)
237 && tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
238 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) {
239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
240 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
241 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
242 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
246 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
248 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
249 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
250 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
253 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
257 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
258 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
263 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
264 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
266 if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
267 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
268 && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
269 ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
270 } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
271 && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
272 ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
273 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
274 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
276 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET,
277 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
278 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
280 memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
281 s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
282 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
287 if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
288 s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
289 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
291 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
292 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
294 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
295 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
298 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
301 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
302 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
306 const uint16_t *salg;
308 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
309 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
311 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
312 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
313 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
314 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
315 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
316 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
317 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
318 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
319 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
320 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS,
321 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
322 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
325 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
329 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
330 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
335 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
337 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
339 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
340 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
342 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
343 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
344 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
345 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
346 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
347 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
349 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
350 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
352 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
353 unsigned char *idbytes;
354 OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
355 int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
358 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
359 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
360 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
362 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
363 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
364 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
367 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
368 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
370 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
371 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
373 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
374 unsigned char *extbytes;
375 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
379 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
380 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
381 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
383 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
384 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
387 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
388 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
389 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
392 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
394 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
395 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
398 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
403 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
404 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
406 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
407 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
410 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
411 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
413 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
414 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN,
416 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
417 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
420 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
424 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
425 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
429 if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
430 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
432 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
433 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
434 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
435 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
436 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
437 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN,
439 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
440 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
444 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
449 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
450 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
453 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
457 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
459 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
460 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
461 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
462 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
463 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
466 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
469 end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
470 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
471 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
472 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
474 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
476 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
477 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
480 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
481 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
482 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
483 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
485 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
486 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
489 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
493 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
494 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
496 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
497 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
499 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
500 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
501 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM,
502 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
503 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
506 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
510 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
511 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
513 if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
514 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
516 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
518 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
520 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
521 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT,
523 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
524 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
527 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
531 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
532 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
534 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
535 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
537 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
538 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS,
540 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
541 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
544 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
547 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
548 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
551 int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
553 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
556 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason);
557 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
561 * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
562 * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
564 if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
565 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
567 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
568 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
569 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
570 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
571 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
572 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
573 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
576 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
577 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
579 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
580 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
581 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
584 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
586 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
587 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
588 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
591 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
595 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
597 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
598 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
602 int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
604 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
605 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
606 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
607 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
608 || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
609 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
610 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
611 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
612 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
613 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
616 s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
618 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
621 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
625 static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
627 unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL;
628 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
631 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
632 if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) {
633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
634 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
638 * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
640 key_share_key = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
642 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
643 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
644 /* SSLfatal() already called */
649 /* Encode the public key. */
650 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
652 if (encodedlen == 0) {
653 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
657 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
658 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
659 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
661 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
666 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
667 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
668 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
670 s->s3.tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
671 s->s3.group_id = curve_id;
672 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
676 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL)
677 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
678 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
683 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
684 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
688 size_t i, num_groups = 0;
689 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
690 uint16_t curve_id = 0;
692 /* key_share extension */
693 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
694 /* Extension data sub-packet */
695 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
696 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
697 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
698 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
699 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
700 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
703 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
706 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
709 if (s->s3.group_id != 0) {
710 curve_id = s->s3.group_id;
712 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
714 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
717 curve_id = pgroups[i];
723 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
724 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
725 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
728 if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) {
729 /* SSLfatal() already called */
730 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
733 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
735 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
736 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
738 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
740 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
744 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
745 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
747 EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
749 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
750 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
751 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
753 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
754 /* Extension data sub-packet */
755 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
756 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
757 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
758 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
759 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE,
760 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
764 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
766 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
767 s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
768 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
773 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
774 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
778 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
779 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
780 const unsigned char *id = NULL;
782 SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
783 SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
784 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
786 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
787 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
789 if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
790 && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
792 && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
793 SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
794 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
796 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
800 if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) {
801 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
804 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
805 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, NULL, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
808 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
810 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
811 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
812 } else if (psklen > 0) {
813 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
814 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
816 idlen = strlen(identity);
817 if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
819 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
820 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
821 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
823 id = (unsigned char *)identity;
826 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
827 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
829 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
830 if (cipher == NULL) {
831 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
832 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
833 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
834 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
837 psksess = SSL_SESSION_new();
839 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen)
840 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher)
841 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
843 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
844 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
845 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
846 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
848 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
851 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
853 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
854 s->psksession = psksess;
855 if (psksess != NULL) {
856 OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
857 s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
858 if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
860 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
861 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
863 s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
866 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
867 || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
868 && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
869 s->max_early_data = 0;
870 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
872 edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
873 s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
875 if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) {
876 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL
877 || (s->ext.hostname != NULL
878 && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) {
879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
880 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
881 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
882 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
886 if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
888 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
889 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
893 * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
896 if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
897 PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
900 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
901 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
902 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
903 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
905 while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
906 if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
907 edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
914 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
915 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
916 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
920 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
921 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
922 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
923 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
924 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
925 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
929 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
930 * extension, we set it to accepted.
932 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
933 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
935 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
938 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
939 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
942 * PSK pre binder overhead =
943 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
944 * 2 bytes for extension length
945 * 2 bytes for identities list length
946 * 2 bytes for identity length
947 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
948 * 2 bytes for binder list length
949 * 1 byte for binder length
950 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
951 * subsequent binder bytes
953 #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
955 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
956 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
959 unsigned char *padbytes;
962 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
963 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
966 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
967 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
968 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
969 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
971 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
973 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
974 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
978 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
979 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
981 if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
982 && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
983 && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
984 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
988 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
991 hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
996 if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
997 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
998 hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
1001 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
1002 * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
1003 * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
1004 * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
1011 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1012 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
1014 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1015 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1017 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1020 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1024 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
1026 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1027 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1030 uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0;
1031 size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen;
1032 unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
1033 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
1036 s->ext.tick_identity = 0;
1039 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
1040 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
1041 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
1045 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
1046 * so don't add this extension.
1048 if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1049 || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
1050 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1052 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
1053 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
1055 if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
1056 /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
1057 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
1058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1059 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1060 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1062 mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
1063 if (mdres == NULL) {
1065 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1071 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) {
1073 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
1074 * so we can't use it.
1080 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
1081 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
1082 * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
1083 * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
1084 * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
1087 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1088 agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
1090 * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
1091 * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
1092 * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
1093 * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
1094 * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
1100 if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
1101 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
1106 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
1109 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1111 if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
1113 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
1114 * If so we just ignore it.
1120 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
1123 agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
1125 reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
1126 s->ext.tick_identity++;
1131 if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
1132 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1134 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1135 mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
1136 if (mdpsk == NULL) {
1138 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1139 * If this happens it's an application bug.
1141 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1143 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1146 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) {
1148 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
1149 * session. This is an application bug.
1151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1153 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1156 pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk);
1159 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
1160 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1161 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1162 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1164 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1169 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
1170 s->session->ext.ticklen)
1171 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
1172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1173 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1174 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1178 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1179 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
1180 s->psksession_id_len)
1181 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
1182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1183 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1186 s->ext.tick_identity++;
1189 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1190 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
1191 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1193 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
1194 || (s->psksession != NULL
1195 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
1196 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1197 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1198 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
1200 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
1201 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
1203 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
1204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1205 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1206 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1209 msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
1212 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1213 resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
1214 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1215 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1218 if (s->psksession != NULL
1219 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1220 pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) {
1221 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1222 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1225 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1227 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1231 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1232 unsigned int context,
1233 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1236 if (!s->pha_enabled)
1237 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1239 /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
1240 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
1241 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1242 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1244 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1245 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1249 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1251 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1253 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1259 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
1261 int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1262 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1264 size_t expected_len = s->s3.previous_client_finished_len
1265 + s->s3.previous_server_finished_len;
1267 const unsigned char *data;
1269 /* Check for logic errors */
1270 if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1271 || s->s3.previous_client_finished_len != 0)
1272 || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1273 || s->s3.previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
1274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1275 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 /* Parse the length byte */
1280 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
1281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1282 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1286 /* Consistency check */
1287 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
1288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1289 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1293 /* Check that the extension matches */
1294 if (ilen != expected_len) {
1295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1296 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1300 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
1301 || memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
1302 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
1303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1304 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1308 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
1309 || memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
1310 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
1311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1312 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1315 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1320 /* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
1321 int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1322 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1326 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
1327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1328 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1332 /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
1333 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
1334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1335 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1336 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1340 /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
1342 * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
1343 * response that differs from the length it requested, ...
1344 * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
1346 if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) {
1347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1348 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1349 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1354 * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
1355 * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
1357 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
1362 int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1363 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1365 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1367 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1371 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1373 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1378 if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
1379 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1380 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1383 s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
1384 if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1386 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1395 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1396 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1398 size_t ecpointformats_len;
1399 PACKET ecptformatlist;
1401 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
1402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS,
1403 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1407 ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
1408 if (ecpointformats_len == 0) {
1409 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1410 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1414 s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0;
1415 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.ecpointformats);
1416 s->session->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
1417 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) {
1418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1419 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1423 s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
1425 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
1426 s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
1427 ecpointformats_len)) {
1428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1429 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1438 int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1439 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1441 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
1442 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
1443 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1444 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
1445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1446 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1450 if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1452 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1455 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1457 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1461 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1467 int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1468 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1470 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1471 /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
1472 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1477 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1478 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1480 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1482 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1485 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1486 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1487 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1491 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1492 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1493 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1498 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1499 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt);
1502 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1503 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1511 int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1514 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1515 /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
1516 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1521 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1522 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1523 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1525 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1526 size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1528 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1529 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
1532 s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size;
1534 s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
1535 if (s->ext.scts == NULL
1536 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
1537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1538 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1543 ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
1544 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH;
1547 * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
1548 * otherwise this is unsolicited.
1550 if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role,
1551 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1553 SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1554 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1558 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context,
1559 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1560 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1562 /* SSLfatal already called */
1572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1574 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1575 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1576 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1578 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1580 PACKET tmp_protocol;
1582 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1583 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
1584 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) {
1585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE,
1586 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1594 int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1597 unsigned char *selected;
1598 unsigned char selected_len;
1601 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1602 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1605 /* We must have requested it. */
1606 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
1607 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1608 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1612 /* The data must be valid */
1614 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) {
1615 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1618 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1620 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1621 s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
1622 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1624 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1629 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1630 * a single Serverhello
1632 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
1633 s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1634 if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
1635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1636 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1640 memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
1641 s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
1648 int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1653 /* We must have requested it. */
1654 if (!s->s3.alpn_sent) {
1655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1656 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1660 * The extension data consists of:
1661 * uint16 list_length
1662 * uint8 proto_length;
1663 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1665 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
1666 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
1667 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
1668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1669 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1672 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
1673 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
1674 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1676 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1679 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)) {
1680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1681 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1684 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = len;
1686 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
1687 || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
1688 || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)
1690 /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
1691 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1695 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
1696 * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
1698 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
1699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1700 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1703 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
1704 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
1705 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1707 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1710 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
1716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1717 int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1720 unsigned int id, ct, mki;
1722 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
1723 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1725 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
1726 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
1727 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
1728 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1730 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1735 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1736 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1737 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
1741 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1742 clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1744 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1745 SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
1750 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1751 * presumably offered)
1753 for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
1754 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1756 if (prof->id == id) {
1757 s->srtp_profile = prof;
1762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1763 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1768 int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1771 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1772 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1773 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
1774 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
1780 int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1783 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
1785 s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1787 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
1792 int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1793 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1795 unsigned int version;
1797 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)
1798 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1800 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1801 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1806 * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
1807 * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
1809 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1811 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1812 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
1816 /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
1817 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
1820 /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
1821 s->version = version;
1826 int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1830 unsigned int group_id;
1832 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
1835 if (ckey == NULL || s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
1836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1837 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1841 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
1842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1843 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1847 if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
1848 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
1849 size_t i, num_groups;
1851 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1853 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1858 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1859 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1861 if (group_id == s->s3.group_id) {
1862 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1863 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1867 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1868 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
1869 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
1870 if (group_id == pgroups[i])
1874 || !tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1876 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1880 s->s3.group_id = group_id;
1881 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
1882 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
1886 if (group_id != s->s3.group_id) {
1888 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1892 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1896 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
1897 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
1898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1899 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1903 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1906 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1909 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1910 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1911 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1913 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1917 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
1918 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1919 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1922 s->s3.peer_tmp = skey;
1928 int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1933 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
1934 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
1935 &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
1936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE,
1937 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1944 int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1945 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1947 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1948 unsigned long max_early_data;
1950 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
1951 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1953 SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
1957 s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
1962 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1964 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1968 if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
1971 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1972 * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
1973 * server should not be accepting it.
1975 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1976 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1980 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
1985 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1989 unsigned int identity;
1991 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1993 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1997 if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) {
1998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1999 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
2004 * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
2005 * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
2006 * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
2008 if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) {
2010 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
2011 s->psksession = NULL;
2015 if (s->psksession == NULL) {
2016 /* Should never happen */
2017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
2018 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2023 * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
2024 * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
2025 * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
2027 if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
2028 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
2029 || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
2030 || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
2031 memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
2033 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2034 s->session = s->psksession;
2035 s->psksession = NULL;
2037 /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
2039 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;