2 * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
12 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
13 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 int tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
16 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
18 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
22 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
23 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
24 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
25 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
26 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
27 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
34 int tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
35 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
37 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
40 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
41 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
42 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
43 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
44 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
45 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
46 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
47 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
48 strlen(s->ext.hostname))
49 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
50 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
51 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
58 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
59 int tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
60 size_t chainidx, int *al)
62 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
63 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
66 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
67 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
68 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
69 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
70 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
71 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
72 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
73 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
74 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
75 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
76 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
85 static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
88 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
89 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
91 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
92 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
95 cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
96 end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
97 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
98 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
100 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
101 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
102 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
103 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
104 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
111 int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
112 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
114 const unsigned char *pformats;
120 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
121 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
123 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
124 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
125 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
126 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
127 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
135 int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
136 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
137 size_t chainidx, int *al)
139 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL, *pcurvestmp;
140 size_t num_curves = 0, i;
146 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
148 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
149 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
151 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
154 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
156 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
157 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
158 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
159 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
161 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
164 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
165 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
166 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurvestmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
167 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
168 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
170 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
175 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
185 int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
186 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
187 size_t chainidx, int *al)
191 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
194 if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
195 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
196 && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
197 ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
198 } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
199 && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
200 ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
201 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
202 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
203 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET,
204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
207 memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
208 s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
209 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
214 if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
215 s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
218 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
219 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
227 int tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
228 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
231 const uint16_t *salg;
233 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
236 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
237 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
238 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
239 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
240 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
241 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
242 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
243 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
244 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
253 int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
254 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
255 size_t chainidx, int *al)
259 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
263 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
266 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
267 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
268 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
269 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
270 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
271 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
276 unsigned char *idbytes;
277 OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
278 int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
281 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
282 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
283 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
285 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
289 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
290 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
294 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
295 unsigned char *extbytes;
296 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
300 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
303 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
304 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
307 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
311 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
321 int tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
322 size_t chainidx, int *al)
324 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
328 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
329 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
331 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
332 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
333 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
341 int tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
342 size_t chainidx, int *al)
344 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
346 if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
349 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
350 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
351 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
352 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
353 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
354 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
358 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
365 int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
366 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
368 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
374 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
375 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
376 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
377 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
378 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
383 end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
384 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
385 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
386 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
388 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
393 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
394 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
395 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
396 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
405 int tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
406 size_t chainidx, int *al)
408 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
411 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
412 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
421 int tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
422 size_t chainidx, int *al)
424 if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
427 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
431 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
432 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
441 int tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
442 size_t chainidx, int *al)
444 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
445 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
446 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
453 int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
454 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
455 size_t chainidx, int *al)
457 int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
459 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
460 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
461 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
463 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
467 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason);
474 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
475 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
478 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
479 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
480 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
481 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
483 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
486 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
488 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
492 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
494 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
502 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension. We only have two modes we know about
503 * at this stage, so we send both.
505 int tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
506 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
510 * TODO(TLS1.3): Do we want this list to be configurable? For now we always
511 * just send both supported modes
513 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
514 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
515 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
516 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
517 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)
518 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
519 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
524 s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
531 static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
533 unsigned char *encoded_point;
534 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key;
537 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
538 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
539 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
543 /* Encode the public key. */
544 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
546 if (encodedlen == 0) {
547 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
548 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
552 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
553 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
554 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
555 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
556 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
557 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
562 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
563 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
564 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
566 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
567 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
568 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
574 int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
575 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
578 size_t i, num_curves = 0;
579 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
580 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
582 /* key_share extension */
583 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
584 /* Extension data sub-packet */
585 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
586 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
587 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
588 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
592 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
597 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
598 /* Shouldn't happen! */
599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
604 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
607 if (s->s3->group_id != 0) {
608 curve_id = s->s3->group_id;
610 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
612 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
615 curve_id = bytestogroup(pcurves);
621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
625 if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id))
628 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
637 int tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
638 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
642 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
643 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
646 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
647 /* Extension data sub-packet */
648 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
649 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
650 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
651 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
658 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
659 s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
660 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
665 int tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
666 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
668 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
669 || s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
670 s->max_early_data = 0;
673 s->max_early_data = s->session->ext.max_early_data;
675 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
676 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
677 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
683 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
684 * extension, we set it to accepted.
686 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
691 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
692 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
694 int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
695 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
697 unsigned char *padbytes;
700 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
704 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
705 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
706 * code calculates the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
709 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
714 if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
715 /* Calculate the amond of padding we need to add */
716 hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
719 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
720 * 2 bytes for length bytes)
727 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
728 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
729 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
732 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
739 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
741 int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
742 size_t chainidx, int *al)
744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
745 uint32_t now, agesec, agems;
746 size_t hashsize, binderoffset, msglen;
747 unsigned char *binder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
751 s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY;
754 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
755 * so don't add this extension.
757 if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
758 || s->session->ext.ticklen == 0)
761 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
766 md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
768 /* Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */
773 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
774 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most implementations
775 * follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in seconds since epoch.
776 * We've already made the assumption that we can do this in multiple places
777 * in the code, so portability shouldn't be an issue.
779 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
780 agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
782 if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
783 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
788 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
791 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
793 if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
795 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. If
796 * so we just ignore it.
802 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed to
805 agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
807 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
809 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
810 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
811 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
812 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
813 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
814 s->session->ext.ticklen)
815 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)
816 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
817 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
818 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
819 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, hashsize, &binder)
820 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
821 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
822 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
824 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
825 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
827 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
832 msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
834 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, binder,
835 s->session, 1) != 1) {
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
840 s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0;
851 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
853 int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
854 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
856 size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
857 + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
859 const unsigned char *data;
861 /* Check for logic errors */
862 assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0);
863 assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0);
865 /* Parse the length byte */
866 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
868 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
869 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
873 /* Consistency check */
874 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
876 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
877 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
881 /* Check that the extension matches */
882 if (ilen != expected_len) {
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
884 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
885 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
889 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
890 || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
891 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
893 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
894 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
898 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
899 || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
900 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
902 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
903 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
906 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
911 int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
912 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
914 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
915 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
920 if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
921 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
924 s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
925 if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
926 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
935 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
936 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
938 unsigned int ecpointformats_len;
939 PACKET ecptformatlist;
941 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
942 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
946 ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
947 s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0;
949 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.ecpointformats);
950 s->session->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
951 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) {
952 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
956 s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
958 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
959 s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
960 ecpointformats_len)) {
961 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
970 int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
971 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
973 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
974 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
975 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
976 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
977 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
981 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
982 *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
986 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
992 int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
993 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
996 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
997 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
999 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
1000 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0)) {
1001 *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1005 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1006 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1007 * the chain. We ignore any other repsonses.
1011 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, al);
1014 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1015 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1023 int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1024 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1027 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1028 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1029 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1031 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1032 size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1034 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1035 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
1038 s->ext.scts_len = size;
1040 s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
1041 if (s->ext.scts == NULL
1042 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
1043 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1048 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1049 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), al) <= 0)
1058 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1060 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1061 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1062 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1064 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
1066 PACKET tmp_protocol;
1068 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1069 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
1070 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
1077 int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1078 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1080 unsigned char *selected;
1081 unsigned char selected_len;
1084 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1085 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1088 /* We must have requested it. */
1089 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
1090 *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1094 /* The data must be valid */
1096 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&tmppkt)) {
1097 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1100 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1102 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1103 s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
1104 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1105 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1110 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1111 * a single Serverhello
1113 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
1114 s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1115 if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
1116 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1120 memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
1121 s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
1122 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1128 int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1129 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1133 /* We must have requested it. */
1134 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
1135 *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1139 * The extension data consists of:
1140 * uint16 list_length
1141 * uint8 proto_length;
1142 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1144 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
1145 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
1146 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
1147 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1150 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1151 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
1152 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1153 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1156 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
1157 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1160 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
1165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1166 int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1167 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1169 unsigned int id, ct, mki;
1171 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
1172 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1174 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
1175 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
1176 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
1177 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1179 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1180 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1185 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
1187 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1191 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1192 clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
1195 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1200 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1201 * presumably offered)
1203 for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
1204 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1206 if (prof->id == id) {
1207 s->srtp_profile = prof;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1214 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1215 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1220 int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1221 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1223 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1224 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1225 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
1226 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
1232 int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1233 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1235 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1237 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
1242 int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1243 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1246 unsigned int group_id;
1248 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
1252 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1257 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
1258 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1263 if ((context & EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
1264 unsigned const char *pcurves = NULL;
1265 size_t i, num_curves;
1267 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1268 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1274 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1275 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1277 if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) {
1278 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1283 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1284 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1288 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1289 if (group_id == bytestogroup(pcurves))
1293 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1294 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1299 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
1300 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1301 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
1305 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
1307 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1310 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1315 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
1316 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
1317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1322 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1324 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1328 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1329 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1330 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1332 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1336 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
1337 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1339 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1342 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1348 int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1349 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1353 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
1354 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
1355 &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
1356 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1364 int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1365 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
1367 if (context == EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1368 unsigned long max_early_data;
1370 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
1371 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1373 SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
1374 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1378 s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
1383 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1384 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1388 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
1390 || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) {
1392 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1393 * using the first identity so the server should not be accepting it.
1395 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1399 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
1404 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1405 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1408 unsigned int identity;
1410 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1411 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1416 if (s->session->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) {
1417 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);