1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
355 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
416 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s, &skip);
417 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
425 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
426 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
427 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
428 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
429 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
430 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
432 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
433 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
435 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
436 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
438 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
443 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
455 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
456 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
457 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
459 /* clear this, it may get reset by
460 * send_server_key_exchange */
461 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
463 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
464 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
466 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
467 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
468 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
469 * be able to handle this) */
470 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
472 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
475 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
476 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
478 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
480 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
481 * message only if the cipher suite is either
482 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
483 * server certificate contains the server's
484 * public key for key exchange.
486 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
487 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
488 * hint if provided */
489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
490 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
493 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
494 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
496 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
497 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
498 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
499 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
500 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
501 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
507 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
508 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
513 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
517 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
518 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
519 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
520 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
521 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
522 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
523 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
524 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
525 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
526 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
527 * and in RFC 2246): */
528 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
529 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
530 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
531 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
532 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
533 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
534 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
535 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
536 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
538 /* no cert request */
540 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
541 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
542 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
543 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
548 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
549 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
550 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
551 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
552 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
554 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
555 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
562 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
563 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
564 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
565 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
566 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
572 /* This code originally checked to see if
573 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
574 * and then flushed. This caused problems
575 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
576 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
577 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
578 * still exist. So instead we just flush
582 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
583 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
588 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
590 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
594 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
595 ret=tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(s);
596 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
597 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
598 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
603 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
604 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
605 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
609 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
612 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
615 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
617 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
618 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
625 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
626 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
627 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
632 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
633 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
634 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
635 * message is not sent.
636 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
637 * the client uses its key from the certificate
640 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
641 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
643 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
644 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
646 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
650 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
652 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
654 if (!s->session->peer)
656 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
657 * at this point and digest cached records.
659 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
664 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
665 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
673 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
676 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
677 * a client cert, it can be verified
678 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
679 * should be generalized. But it is next step
681 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
682 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
684 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
685 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
689 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
690 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
704 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
705 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
706 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
708 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
709 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
711 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
712 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
714 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
719 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
720 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
721 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
722 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
723 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
725 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
729 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
730 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
731 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
732 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
733 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
737 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
738 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
741 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
746 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
748 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
749 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
750 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
754 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
755 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
756 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
757 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
758 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
764 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
767 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
768 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
769 { ret= -1; goto end; }
771 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
772 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
774 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
775 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
778 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
779 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
787 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
788 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
789 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
790 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
791 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
792 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
793 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
794 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
797 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
798 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
800 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
801 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
803 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
807 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
812 /* clean a few things up */
813 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
815 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
818 /* remove buffering on output */
819 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
823 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
828 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
830 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
832 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
834 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
848 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
852 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
857 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
861 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
868 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
872 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
876 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
879 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
881 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
882 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
885 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
886 return ssl_do_write(s);
889 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
894 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
895 * so permit appropriate message length */
896 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
902 if (!ok) return((int)n);
903 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
905 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA)
908 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
910 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
912 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
917 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
918 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
920 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
922 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
923 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
927 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
929 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
930 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
933 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
939 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
941 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
942 unsigned int cookie_len;
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
951 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
953 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
954 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
955 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
956 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
959 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
962 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
965 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
966 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
967 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
968 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
969 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
972 if (!ok) return((int)n);
974 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
976 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
977 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
978 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
981 if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version > s->version
982 && s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) ||
983 (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version < s->version))
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
986 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
988 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
989 s->version = s->client_version;
991 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
995 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
996 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
997 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
999 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1001 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1003 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1004 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1006 if (cookie_length == 0)
1010 /* load the client random */
1011 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1012 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1014 /* get the session-id */
1018 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1019 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1020 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1021 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1022 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1024 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1025 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1026 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1027 * setting will be ignored.
1029 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1031 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1036 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1038 { /* previous session */
1045 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1055 cookie_len = *(p++);
1058 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1059 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1060 * does not cause an overflow.
1062 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1065 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1070 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1071 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1074 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1076 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1078 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1081 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1083 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1086 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1088 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1089 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1091 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1093 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1096 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1101 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1103 /* Select version to use */
1104 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1105 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1107 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1108 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1110 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1113 s->version = s->client_version;
1114 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1117 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1118 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1120 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1121 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1126 s->version = s->client_version;
1127 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1130 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1135 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1137 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1138 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1144 /* not enough data */
1145 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1149 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1156 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1157 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1160 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1163 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1165 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1167 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1169 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1170 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1178 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1179 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1182 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1184 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1185 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1186 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1187 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1188 * enabled, though. */
1189 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1190 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1192 s->session->cipher = c;
1199 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1200 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1201 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1211 /* not enough data */
1212 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1221 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1228 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1235 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1237 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1244 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1245 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1246 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1247 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1250 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1251 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1257 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1259 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1261 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1262 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1263 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1266 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1267 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1271 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1272 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1273 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1275 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1280 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1283 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1285 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1286 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1288 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1289 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1294 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1295 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1296 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1297 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1299 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1300 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1302 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1303 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1304 /* Can't disable compression */
1305 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1310 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1311 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1313 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1314 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1316 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1320 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1325 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1326 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1328 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1333 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1340 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1341 { /* See if we have a match */
1342 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1344 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1345 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1347 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1360 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1365 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1366 * using compression.
1368 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1375 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1380 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1381 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1383 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1385 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1386 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1387 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1388 if (ciphers == NULL)
1390 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1395 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1396 if (s->cert->cert_cb
1397 && s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg) <= 0)
1399 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1403 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1404 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1408 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1412 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1413 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1414 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1415 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1416 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0));
1417 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1418 /* do not send a session ticket */
1419 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1423 /* Session-id reuse */
1424 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1425 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1426 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1427 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1429 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1431 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1432 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1434 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1435 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1437 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1441 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1442 else if (ec != NULL)
1443 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1445 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1449 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1452 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1454 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1458 /* we now have the following setup.
1460 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1461 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1462 * compression - basically ignored right now
1463 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1464 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1465 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1466 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1469 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1470 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1472 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1479 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1483 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1486 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1487 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1490 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1493 unsigned char *p,*d;
1497 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1499 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1500 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1501 p=s->s3->server_random;
1502 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1505 /* Do the message type and length last */
1506 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1508 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1509 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1512 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1513 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1515 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1516 * back in the server hello:
1517 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1518 * we send back the old session ID.
1519 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1520 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1521 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1522 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1524 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1525 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1526 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1527 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1530 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1531 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1533 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1535 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1536 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1545 /* put the cipher */
1546 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1549 /* put the compression method */
1550 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1553 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1556 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1559 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1564 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1572 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1573 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1576 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1577 return ssl_do_write(s);
1580 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1583 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1585 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1586 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1589 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1590 return ssl_do_write(s);
1593 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1599 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1606 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1607 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1610 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1613 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1614 unsigned char *p,*d;
1624 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1625 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1627 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1632 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1635 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1638 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1640 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1641 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1642 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1645 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1654 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1660 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1665 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1668 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1669 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1670 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1671 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1674 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1679 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1685 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1692 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1693 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1694 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1696 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1705 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1706 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1707 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1708 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1721 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1723 const EC_GROUP *group;
1725 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1726 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1728 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1729 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1730 if (nid != NID_undef)
1731 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1733 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1735 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1736 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1737 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1741 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1746 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1752 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1758 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1760 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1766 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1767 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1768 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1769 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1771 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1778 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1779 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1780 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1786 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1787 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1793 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1794 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1795 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1798 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1805 /* Encode the public key.
1806 * First check the size of encoding and
1807 * allocate memory accordingly.
1809 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1810 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1811 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1814 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1815 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1816 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1817 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1824 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1825 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1826 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1827 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1829 if (encodedlen == 0)
1831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1835 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1837 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1838 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1839 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1840 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1845 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1846 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1854 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1856 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1858 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1859 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1862 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1864 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1866 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1867 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1868 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1869 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1882 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1886 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1888 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1890 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1897 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1898 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1900 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1903 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1906 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1914 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1919 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1921 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1924 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1937 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1939 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1940 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1941 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1942 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1943 * the actual encoded point itself
1945 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1953 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1954 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1956 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1957 encodedPoint = NULL;
1962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1963 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1965 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1966 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1967 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1968 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1975 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1976 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1978 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1982 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1984 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1985 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1986 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1987 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1988 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1989 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1990 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1991 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1992 (unsigned int *)&i);
1996 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1997 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2009 /* send signature algorithm */
2010 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2012 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2014 /* Should never happen */
2015 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2022 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2025 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2026 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2027 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2028 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2029 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2030 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2037 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2042 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2043 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2049 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2052 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2053 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2054 return ssl_do_write(s);
2056 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2058 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2059 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2060 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2062 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2066 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2068 unsigned char *p,*d;
2070 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2074 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2078 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2080 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2082 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2087 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2089 const unsigned char *psigs;
2090 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2092 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2101 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2105 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2107 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2108 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2109 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2114 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2115 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2118 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2125 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2126 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2132 /* else no CA names */
2133 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2136 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2138 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2139 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2141 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2143 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2151 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2154 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2155 return ssl_do_write(s);
2160 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2164 unsigned long alg_k;
2166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2168 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2172 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2176 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2179 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2180 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2181 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2182 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2185 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2186 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2187 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2188 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2192 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2193 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2195 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2198 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2200 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2201 int decrypt_len, decrypt_good_mask;
2202 unsigned char version_good;
2204 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2205 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2207 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2208 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2209 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2210 * be sent already */
2213 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2221 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2222 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2223 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2224 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2226 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2233 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2234 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2239 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2251 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2252 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2253 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2254 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2255 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2256 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2258 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2259 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2260 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2262 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2265 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2266 * decrypt_good_mask will be zero if so and non-zero otherwise. */
2267 decrypt_good_mask = decrypt_len ^ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2269 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2270 * then version_good will be zero. The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa
2271 * extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2272 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2273 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2274 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2275 * decryption error. */
2276 version_good = p[0] ^ (s->client_version>>8);
2277 version_good |= p[1] ^ (s->client_version&0xff);
2279 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2280 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2281 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2282 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2283 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2284 * support the requested protocol version. If
2285 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2286 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2288 unsigned char workaround_mask = version_good;
2289 unsigned char workaround;
2291 /* workaround_mask will be 0xff if version_good is
2292 * non-zero (i.e. the version match failed). Otherwise
2294 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 4;
2295 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 2;
2296 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 1;
2297 workaround_mask = ~((workaround_mask & 1) - 1);
2299 workaround = p[0] ^ (s->version>>8);
2300 workaround |= p[1] ^ (s->version&0xff);
2302 /* If workaround_mask is 0xff (i.e. there was a version
2303 * mismatch) then we copy the value of workaround over
2305 version_good = (workaround & workaround_mask) |
2306 (version_good & ~workaround_mask);
2309 /* If any bits in version_good are set then they'll poision
2310 * decrypt_good_mask and cause rand_premaster_secret to be
2312 decrypt_good_mask |= version_good;
2314 /* decrypt_good_mask will be zero iff decrypt_len ==
2315 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed. We
2316 * fold the bottom 32 bits of it with an OR so that the LSB
2317 * will be zero iff everything is good. This assumes that we'll
2318 * never decrypt a value > 2**31 bytes, which seems safe. */
2319 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 16;
2320 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 8;
2321 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 4;
2322 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 2;
2323 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 1;
2324 /* Now select only the LSB and subtract one. If decrypt_len ==
2325 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed then
2326 * decrypt_good_mask will be all ones. Otherwise it'll be all
2328 decrypt_good_mask &= 1;
2329 decrypt_good_mask--;
2331 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2332 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2333 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2335 p[i] = (p[i] & decrypt_good_mask) |
2336 (rand_premaster_secret[i] & ~decrypt_good_mask);
2339 s->session->master_key_length=
2340 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2341 s->session->master_key,
2343 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2348 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2351 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2358 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2369 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2370 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2371 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2372 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2375 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2376 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2377 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2378 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2380 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2384 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2386 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2388 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2393 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2397 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2398 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2401 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2402 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2404 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2406 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2410 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2411 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2414 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2421 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2430 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2437 s->session->master_key_length=
2438 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2439 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2440 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2447 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2449 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2450 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2451 krb5_data authenticator;
2453 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2454 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2455 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2456 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2457 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2458 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2460 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2461 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2463 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2465 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2468 enc_ticket.length = i;
2470 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2473 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2477 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2478 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2481 authenticator.length = i;
2483 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2486 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2490 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2491 p+=authenticator.length;
2495 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2498 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2501 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2504 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2508 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2509 enc_pms.length + 6))
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2512 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2516 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2520 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2521 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2523 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2524 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2530 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2531 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2533 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2534 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2537 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2538 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2540 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2541 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2547 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2554 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2555 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2557 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2561 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2563 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2566 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2569 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2570 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2573 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2576 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2579 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2582 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2585 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2589 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2592 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2595 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2597 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2598 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2599 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2600 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2601 * the protocol version.
2602 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2603 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2605 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2608 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2613 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2615 s->session->master_key_length=
2616 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2617 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2619 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2621 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2622 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2624 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2625 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2630 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2631 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2632 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2633 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2637 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2640 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2645 const EC_GROUP *group;
2646 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2648 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2649 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2652 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2656 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2657 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2659 /* use the certificate */
2660 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2664 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2665 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2667 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2670 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2671 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2673 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2674 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2681 /* Let's get client's public key */
2682 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2685 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2691 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2693 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2695 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2699 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2701 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2703 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2704 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2705 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2706 * never executed. When that support is
2707 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2708 * received in the certificate is
2709 * authorized for key agreement.
2710 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2711 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2714 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2716 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2720 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2721 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2727 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2731 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2732 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2734 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2737 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2741 /* Get encoded point length */
2746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2750 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2751 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2757 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2758 * currently, so set it to the start
2760 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2763 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2764 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2765 if (field_size <= 0)
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2771 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2779 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2780 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2781 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2782 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2783 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2784 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2786 /* Compute the master secret */
2787 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2788 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2790 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2796 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2798 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2799 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2800 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2802 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2804 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2810 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2813 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2816 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2819 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2822 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2826 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2827 * string for the callback */
2828 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2829 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2830 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2831 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2832 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2834 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2837 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2840 else if (psk_len == 0)
2842 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2844 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2845 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2849 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2850 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2852 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2854 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2858 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2859 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2860 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2861 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2864 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2868 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2869 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2870 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2871 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2872 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2875 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2879 s->session->master_key_length=
2880 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2881 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2884 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2891 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2899 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2903 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2908 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2909 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2910 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2911 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2914 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2918 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2927 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2928 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2931 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2932 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2933 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2934 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2935 unsigned long alg_a;
2937 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2938 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2939 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2940 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2941 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2942 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2944 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2945 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2946 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2947 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2948 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2949 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2950 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2951 if (client_pub_pkey)
2953 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2956 /* Decrypt session key */
2957 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2967 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2977 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2983 /* Generate master secret */
2984 s->session->master_key_length=
2985 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2986 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2987 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2988 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2993 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2994 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3002 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3004 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3010 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3011 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3015 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3016 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3017 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3018 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3019 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3024 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3026 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3032 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3034 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3036 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3037 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3038 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3040 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
3043 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3045 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3047 peer=s->session->peer;
3048 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3049 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3057 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3059 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3060 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3062 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3073 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3077 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3080 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3084 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3087 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3091 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3092 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3093 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3094 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3095 * signature without length field */
3096 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3097 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3103 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3105 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3108 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3113 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3117 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3127 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3131 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3132 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3135 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3139 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3143 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3147 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3151 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3154 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3155 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3158 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3162 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3164 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3171 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3173 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3174 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3178 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3184 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3192 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3194 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3195 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3196 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3200 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3208 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3210 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3211 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3212 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3216 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3218 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3224 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3225 { unsigned char signature[64];
3227 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3228 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3230 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3232 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3233 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3235 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3236 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3239 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3241 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3248 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3257 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3260 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3262 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3263 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3264 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3266 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3267 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3271 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3273 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3275 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3276 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3278 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3280 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3287 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3289 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3291 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3292 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3295 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3298 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3299 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3302 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3305 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3309 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3311 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3315 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3317 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3326 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3330 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3333 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3335 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3341 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3349 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3353 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3362 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3364 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3365 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3367 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3371 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3372 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3373 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3376 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3379 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3380 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3382 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3388 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3391 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3397 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3398 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3399 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3400 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3402 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3403 * when we arrive here. */
3404 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3406 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3407 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3413 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3414 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3415 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3416 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3417 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3425 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3428 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3429 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3433 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3437 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3439 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3442 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3443 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3444 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3451 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3452 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3455 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3456 return ssl_do_write(s);
3459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3460 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3461 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3463 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3465 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3466 const unsigned char *const_p;
3467 int len, slen_full, slen;
3472 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3473 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3474 unsigned char key_name[16];
3476 /* get session encoding length */
3477 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3478 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3481 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3483 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3487 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3489 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3491 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3497 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3499 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3500 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3506 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3507 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3509 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3510 * follows handshake_header_length +
3511 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3512 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3513 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3514 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3516 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3517 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3518 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3520 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3521 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3522 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3523 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3524 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3527 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3529 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3538 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3539 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3540 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3541 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3542 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3543 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3546 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3547 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3548 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3549 * as their sessions. */
3550 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3552 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3554 /* Output key name */
3556 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3559 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3560 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3561 /* Encrypt session data */
3562 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3564 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3566 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3568 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3569 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3570 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3573 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3575 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3576 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3577 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3578 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3580 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3584 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3585 return ssl_do_write(s);
3588 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3590 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3593 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3594 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3595 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3598 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3601 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3604 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3605 /* message length */
3606 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3608 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3609 /* length of OCSP response */
3610 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3611 /* actual response */
3612 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3613 /* number of bytes to write */
3614 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3619 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3620 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3623 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3624 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3625 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3626 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3629 int proto_len, padding_len;
3631 const unsigned char *p;
3633 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3634 * extension in their ClientHello */
3635 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3641 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3642 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3643 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3645 514, /* See the payload format below */
3651 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3652 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3653 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3654 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3661 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3663 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3665 /* The payload looks like:
3667 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3668 * uint8 padding_len;
3669 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3672 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3674 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3675 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3678 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3679 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3684 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3685 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3691 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s, int *skip)
3693 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count)
3695 unsigned char *p = NULL;
3696 unsigned char *size_loc = NULL;
3697 srv_supp_data_record *record = NULL;
3701 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3703 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
3704 unsigned short outlen = 0;
3706 record = &s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i];
3708 /* NULL callback or -1 omits supp data entry */
3711 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->supp_data_type,
3714 if (cb_retval == -1)
3715 continue; /* skip this supp data entry */
3718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3721 if (outlen == 0 || TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data < outlen + 4 + length)
3723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3726 /* write supp data entry...
3727 * if first entry, write handshake message type
3728 * jump back to write length at end */
3731 /* 1 byte message type + 3 bytes for
3733 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, 4))
3735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3738 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3739 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3740 /* hold on to length field to update later */
3742 /* skip over handshake length field (3
3743 * bytes) and supp_data length field
3748 /* 2 byte supp data type + 2 byte length + outlen */
3749 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, outlen + 4))
3751 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3754 s2n(record->supp_data_type, p);
3756 memcpy(p, out, outlen);
3757 /* update length to supp data type (2 bytes) +
3758 * supp data length (2 bytes) + supp data */
3759 length += (outlen + 4);
3764 /* write handshake length */
3765 l2n3(length - 4, size_loc);
3766 /* supp_data length */
3767 l2n3(length - 7, size_loc);
3768 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3769 s->init_num = length;
3772 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3776 /* no supp data message sent */
3783 int tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3789 const unsigned char *p, *d;
3790 unsigned short supp_data_entry_type = 0;
3791 unsigned long supp_data_entry_len = 0;
3792 unsigned long supp_data_len = 0;
3795 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3796 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A,
3797 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B,
3798 SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,
3799 /* use default limit */
3800 TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data,
3803 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3805 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3808 /* The message cannot be empty */
3811 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3815 n2l3(p, supp_data_len);
3816 while (p<d+supp_data_len)
3818 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_type);
3819 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_len);
3820 /* if there is a callback for this supp data type, send it */
3821 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3823 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].supp_data_type == supp_data_entry_type && s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2)
3825 cb_retval = s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2(s, supp_data_entry_type, p, supp_data_entry_len, &al, s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].arg);
3828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3833 p+=supp_data_entry_len;
3837 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);