1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
156 #include "ssl_locl.h"
157 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
175 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
177 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
178 return(SSLv3_server_method());
183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
184 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s,int *al)
186 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
188 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
190 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
191 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
193 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
195 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
196 we do so if There is no srp login name */
198 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
202 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
209 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
211 ssl_undefined_function,
212 ssl3_get_server_method)
214 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
217 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
218 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
220 int new_state,state,skip=0;
222 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
226 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
228 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
229 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
231 /* init things to blank */
233 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
247 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
249 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
253 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
254 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
257 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
259 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
264 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
266 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
268 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
273 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
281 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
289 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
291 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
292 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
294 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
296 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
298 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
300 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
301 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
303 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
304 * client that doesn't support secure
307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
308 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
314 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
315 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
317 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
321 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
322 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
325 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
326 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
327 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
328 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
331 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
338 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
339 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
340 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
343 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
344 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
349 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
351 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
353 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
361 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
365 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
366 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
367 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
368 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
372 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
373 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
375 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
379 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
382 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
386 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
387 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
388 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
389 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
390 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
391 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
392 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
394 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
395 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
397 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
400 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
412 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
417 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
418 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
419 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
421 /* clear this, it may get reset by
422 * send_server_key_exchange */
423 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
425 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
426 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
428 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
429 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
430 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
431 * be able to handle this) */
432 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
434 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
437 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
438 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
440 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
442 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
443 * message only if the cipher suite is either
444 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
445 * server certificate contains the server's
446 * public key for key exchange.
448 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
449 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
450 * hint if provided */
451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
452 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
455 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
456 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
458 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
459 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
460 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
461 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
462 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
463 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
469 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
470 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
475 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
479 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
480 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
481 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
482 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
483 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
484 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
485 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
486 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
487 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
488 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
489 * and in RFC 2246): */
490 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
491 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
492 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
493 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
494 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
495 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
496 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
497 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
498 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
500 /* no cert request */
502 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
503 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
504 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
505 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
510 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
511 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
512 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
513 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
514 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
516 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
517 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
523 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
525 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
526 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
527 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
528 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
532 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
534 /* This code originally checked to see if
535 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
536 * and then flushed. This caused problems
537 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
538 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
539 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
540 * still exist. So instead we just flush
544 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
545 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
550 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
552 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
555 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
556 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
557 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
558 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
562 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
564 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
566 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
567 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
570 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
574 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
575 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
576 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
581 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
582 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
583 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
584 * message is not sent.
585 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
586 * the client uses its key from the certificate
589 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
590 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
592 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
593 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
595 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
599 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
601 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
603 if (!s->session->peer)
605 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
606 * at this point and digest cached records.
608 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
613 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
614 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
622 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
625 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
626 * a client cert, it can be verified
627 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
628 * should be generalized. But it is next step
630 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
631 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
633 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
634 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
638 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
639 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
650 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
651 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
653 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
654 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
655 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
657 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
658 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
660 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
661 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
663 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
668 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
669 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
670 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
671 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
672 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
674 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
678 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
679 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
680 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
681 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
682 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
686 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
687 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
690 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
695 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
696 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
697 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
698 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
699 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
703 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
704 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
705 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
706 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
707 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
713 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
714 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
716 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
717 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
718 { ret= -1; goto end; }
720 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
721 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
723 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
724 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
727 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
728 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
736 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
737 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
738 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
739 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
740 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
741 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
742 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
743 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
746 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
747 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
749 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
750 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
752 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
756 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
761 /* clean a few things up */
762 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
764 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
767 /* remove buffering on output */
768 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
772 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
777 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
779 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
781 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
783 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
797 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
801 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
806 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
810 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
817 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
821 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
825 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
829 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
831 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
832 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
837 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
838 /* number of bytes to write */
843 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
844 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
847 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
852 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
853 * so permit appropriate message length */
854 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
860 if (!ok) return((int)n);
861 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
862 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
864 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
865 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
867 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
869 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
870 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
874 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
876 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
877 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
885 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
887 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
888 unsigned int cookie_len;
891 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
896 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
898 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
899 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
900 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
901 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
904 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
907 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
910 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
911 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
912 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
913 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
914 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
917 if (!ok) return((int)n);
919 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
921 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
922 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
923 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
926 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
927 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
930 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
932 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
933 s->version = s->client_version;
935 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
939 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
940 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
941 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
943 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
945 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
947 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
948 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
950 if (cookie_length == 0)
954 /* load the client random */
955 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
958 /* get the session-id */
962 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
963 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
964 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
965 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
966 * won't even compile against older library versions).
968 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
969 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
970 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
971 * setting will be ignored.
973 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
975 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
980 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
982 { /* previous session */
989 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
996 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1002 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1003 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1004 * does not cause an overflow.
1006 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1009 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1014 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1015 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1018 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1020 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1022 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1025 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1027 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1030 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1032 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1033 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1035 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1037 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1048 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1050 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1051 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1057 /* not enough data */
1058 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1062 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1069 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1070 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1073 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1076 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1078 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1080 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1082 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1083 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1091 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1092 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1095 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1097 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1098 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1099 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1100 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1101 * enabled, though. */
1102 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1103 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1105 s->session->cipher = c;
1112 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1113 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1114 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1124 /* not enough data */
1125 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1132 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1139 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1146 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1148 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1150 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1155 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1160 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1161 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1162 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1163 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1167 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1168 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1170 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1172 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1177 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1179 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1181 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1182 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1183 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1186 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1187 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1191 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1192 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1193 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1195 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1200 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1203 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1205 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1206 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1208 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1209 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1214 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1215 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1216 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1217 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1219 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1220 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1222 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1223 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1224 /* Can't disable compression */
1225 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1227 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1231 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1232 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1234 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1235 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1237 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1241 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1243 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1247 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1248 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1250 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1255 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1262 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1263 { /* See if we have a match */
1264 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1266 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1267 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1269 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1282 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1287 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1288 * using compression.
1290 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1292 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1298 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1303 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1304 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1306 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1308 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1309 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1310 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1311 if (ciphers == NULL)
1313 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1318 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1319 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1323 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1327 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1328 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1329 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1330 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1331 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0));
1332 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1333 /* do not send a session ticket */
1334 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1338 /* Session-id reuse */
1339 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1340 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1341 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1342 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1344 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1346 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1347 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1349 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1350 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1352 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1356 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1357 else if (ec != NULL)
1358 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1360 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1364 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1367 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1369 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1373 /* we now have the following setup.
1375 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1376 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1377 * compression - basically ignored right now
1378 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1379 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1380 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1381 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1388 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1391 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1395 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1398 unsigned char *p,*d;
1401 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1405 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1407 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1408 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1409 p=s->s3->server_random;
1410 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1411 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1413 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1416 /* Do the message type and length last */
1419 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1420 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1423 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1424 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1426 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1427 * back in the server hello:
1428 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1429 * we send back the old session ID.
1430 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1431 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1432 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1433 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1435 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1436 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1437 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1438 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1441 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1442 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1444 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1446 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1447 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1453 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1456 /* put the cipher */
1457 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1460 /* put the compression method */
1461 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1464 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1467 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1470 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1475 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1484 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1488 /* number of bytes to write */
1493 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1494 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1497 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1501 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1503 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1506 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1511 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1512 /* number of bytes to write */
1517 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1518 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1521 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1523 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1527 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1534 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1535 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1538 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1541 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1542 unsigned char *p,*d;
1552 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1553 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1555 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1560 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1563 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1566 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1568 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1569 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1570 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1573 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1582 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1588 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1593 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1596 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1597 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1598 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1599 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1602 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1607 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1613 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1620 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1621 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1622 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1624 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1633 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1634 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1635 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1636 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1649 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1651 const EC_GROUP *group;
1653 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1654 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1656 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1657 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1658 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1662 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1667 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1673 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1679 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1685 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1686 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1687 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1688 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1690 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1697 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1698 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1699 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1705 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1706 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1712 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1713 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1714 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1717 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1724 /* Encode the public key.
1725 * First check the size of encoding and
1726 * allocate memory accordingly.
1728 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1729 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1730 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1733 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1734 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1735 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1736 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1743 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1744 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1745 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1746 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1748 if (encodedlen == 0)
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1754 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1756 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1757 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1758 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1759 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1764 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1765 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1773 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1775 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1777 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1778 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1781 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1783 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1785 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1786 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1787 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1788 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1801 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1805 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1807 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1809 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1816 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1817 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1819 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1822 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1825 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1833 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1838 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1841 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1844 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1857 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1859 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1860 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1861 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1862 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1863 * the actual encoded point itself
1865 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1873 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1874 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1876 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1877 encodedPoint = NULL;
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1883 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1885 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1886 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1887 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1888 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1895 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1896 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1898 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1899 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1903 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1905 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1906 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1907 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1908 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1909 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1910 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1911 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1912 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1913 (unsigned int *)&i);
1917 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1918 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1930 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1932 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1934 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1936 /* Should never happen */
1937 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1944 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1947 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1948 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1949 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1950 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1951 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1952 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1959 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1964 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1965 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1971 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1974 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1980 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1981 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1982 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1984 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1987 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1988 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1990 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1994 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1996 unsigned char *p,*d;
1998 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2002 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2006 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2008 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2010 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2015 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2017 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2027 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2031 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2033 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2034 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2035 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2040 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2041 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2044 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2051 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2052 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2058 /* else no CA names */
2059 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2062 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2063 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2066 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2071 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2072 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2075 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2082 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2085 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2086 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2091 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2095 unsigned long alg_k;
2097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2099 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2101 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2107 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2110 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2111 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2112 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2113 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2116 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2117 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2118 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2119 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2123 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2124 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2126 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2129 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2131 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2132 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2134 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2135 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2136 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2137 * be sent already */
2140 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2148 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2149 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2150 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2151 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2153 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2160 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2161 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2166 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2178 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2182 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2184 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2188 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2190 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2191 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2192 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2193 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2194 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2196 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2197 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2198 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2200 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2201 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2203 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2204 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2205 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2206 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2207 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2208 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2209 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2215 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2216 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2217 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2219 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2220 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2221 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2222 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2226 s->session->master_key_length=
2227 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2228 s->session->master_key,
2230 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2235 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2240 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2252 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2254 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2260 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2262 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2267 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2270 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2277 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2285 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2290 s->session->master_key_length=
2291 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2292 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2293 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2298 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2300 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2301 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2302 krb5_data authenticator;
2304 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2305 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2306 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2307 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2308 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2309 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2311 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2312 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2314 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2316 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2319 enc_ticket.length = i;
2321 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2324 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2328 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2329 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2332 authenticator.length = i;
2334 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2337 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2341 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2342 p+=authenticator.length;
2346 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2349 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2352 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2355 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2359 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2360 enc_pms.length + 6))
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2363 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2367 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2371 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2372 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2374 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2375 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2381 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2382 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2384 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2385 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2388 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2389 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2391 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2392 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2398 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2405 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2406 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2408 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2412 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2414 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2417 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2420 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2421 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2424 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2427 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2430 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2433 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2436 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2440 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2443 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2446 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2448 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2449 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2450 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2451 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2452 * the protocol version.
2453 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2454 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2456 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2459 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2464 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2466 s->session->master_key_length=
2467 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2468 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2470 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2472 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2473 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2475 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2476 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2481 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2482 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2483 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2484 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2488 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2491 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2496 const EC_GROUP *group;
2497 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2499 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2500 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2503 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2507 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2508 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2510 /* use the certificate */
2511 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2515 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2516 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2518 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2521 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2522 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2524 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2525 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 /* Let's get client's public key */
2533 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2536 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2542 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2544 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2546 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2550 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2552 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2554 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2555 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2556 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2557 * never executed. When that support is
2558 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2559 * received in the certificate is
2560 * authorized for key agreement.
2561 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2562 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2565 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2567 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2571 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2572 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2578 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2582 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2583 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2585 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2588 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2592 /* Get encoded point length */
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2601 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2602 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2608 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2609 * currently, so set it to the start
2611 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2614 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2615 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2616 if (field_size <= 0)
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2622 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2630 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2631 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2632 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2633 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2634 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2635 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2637 /* Compute the master secret */
2638 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2639 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2641 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2647 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2649 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2650 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2651 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2653 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2655 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2661 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2664 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2667 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2670 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2673 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2677 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2678 * string for the callback */
2679 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2680 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2681 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2682 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2683 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2685 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2688 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2691 else if (psk_len == 0)
2693 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2695 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2696 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2700 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2701 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2703 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2705 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2709 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2710 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2711 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2712 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2715 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2719 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2720 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2721 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2722 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2723 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2726 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2730 s->session->master_key_length=
2731 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2732 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2735 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2742 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2750 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2754 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2759 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2760 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2761 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2762 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2765 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2769 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2778 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2779 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2782 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2783 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2784 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2785 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2786 unsigned long alg_a;
2788 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2789 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2790 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2791 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2792 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2793 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2795 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2796 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2797 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2798 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2799 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2800 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2801 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2802 if (client_pub_pkey)
2804 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2807 /* Decrypt session key */
2808 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2818 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2828 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2834 /* Generate master secret */
2835 s->session->master_key_length=
2836 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2837 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2838 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2839 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2844 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2845 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2853 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2855 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2861 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2862 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2865 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2866 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2867 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2868 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2869 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2870 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2875 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2877 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2883 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2885 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2887 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2888 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2889 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2894 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2896 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2898 peer=s->session->peer;
2899 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2900 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2908 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2910 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2911 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2913 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2924 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2928 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2931 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2935 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2938 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2942 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2943 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2944 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2945 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2946 * signature without length field */
2947 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2948 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2954 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2956 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2957 /* Should never happen */
2960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2961 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2964 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
2965 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2968 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2971 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
2974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
2975 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2979 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2989 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2993 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2994 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2997 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3001 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3005 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3009 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3013 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3016 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3017 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3020 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3024 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3026 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3032 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3033 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3035 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3036 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3040 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3046 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3054 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3056 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3057 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3058 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3062 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3070 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3072 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3073 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3074 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3078 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3080 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3086 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3087 { unsigned char signature[64];
3089 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3090 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3092 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3094 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3095 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3097 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3098 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3101 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3103 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3110 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3119 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3122 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3124 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3125 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3126 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3128 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3129 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3133 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3135 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3137 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3138 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3140 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3142 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3149 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3151 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3153 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3154 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3157 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3160 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3161 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3164 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3167 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3171 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3173 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3177 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3179 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3188 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3192 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3195 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3197 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3203 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3211 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3215 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3224 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3226 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3227 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3229 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3233 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3234 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3235 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3238 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3241 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3242 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3244 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3250 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3253 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3259 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3260 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3261 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3262 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3264 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3265 * when we arrive here. */
3266 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3268 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3269 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3275 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3276 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3277 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3278 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3279 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3287 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3290 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3291 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3295 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3300 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3302 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3305 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3306 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3307 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3314 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3315 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3320 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3321 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3325 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3326 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3328 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3330 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3331 const unsigned char *const_p;
3332 int len, slen_full, slen;
3337 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3338 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3339 unsigned char key_name[16];
3341 /* get session encoding length */
3342 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3343 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3346 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3348 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3352 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3354 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3356 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3362 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3364 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3365 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3371 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3372 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3374 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3375 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3376 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3377 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3378 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3379 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3381 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3382 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3383 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3386 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3388 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3389 /* Skip message length for now */
3391 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3392 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3393 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3394 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3397 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3399 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3408 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3409 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3410 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3411 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3412 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3413 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3416 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3417 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3418 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3419 * as their sessions. */
3420 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3422 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3424 /* Output key name */
3426 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3429 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3430 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3431 /* Encrypt session data */
3432 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3434 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3436 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3438 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3439 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3440 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3443 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3445 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3446 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3447 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3449 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3451 /* number of bytes to write */
3453 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3458 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3459 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3462 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3464 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3467 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3468 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3469 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3472 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3475 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3478 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3479 /* message length */
3480 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3482 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3483 /* length of OCSP response */
3484 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3485 /* actual response */
3486 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3487 /* number of bytes to write */
3488 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3489 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3493 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3494 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3497 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
3498 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3499 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3500 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3503 int proto_len, padding_len;
3505 const unsigned char *p;
3507 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3508 * extension in their ClientHello */
3509 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3515 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3516 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3517 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3519 514, /* See the payload format below */
3525 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3526 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3527 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3528 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3535 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3537 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3539 /* The payload looks like:
3541 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3542 * uint8 padding_len;
3543 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3546 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3548 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3549 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3552 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3553 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3558 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3559 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;