1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
194 int new_state,state,skip=0;
196 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
205 /* init things to blank */
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
231 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
233 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
240 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
242 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
276 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
277 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
278 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
283 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
284 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
287 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
288 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
289 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
293 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
300 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
301 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
302 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
305 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
306 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
314 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
315 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
316 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
320 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
321 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
323 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
327 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
336 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
337 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
338 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
339 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
340 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
342 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
343 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
345 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
346 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
348 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
353 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
365 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
366 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
367 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
369 /* clear this, it may get reset by
370 * send_server_key_exchange */
371 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
373 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
374 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
376 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
377 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
378 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
379 * be able to handle this) */
380 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
382 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
385 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
386 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
388 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
390 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
391 * message only if the cipher suite is either
392 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
393 * server certificate contains the server's
394 * public key for key exchange.
396 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
397 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
398 * hint if provided */
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
400 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
402 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
403 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
404 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
405 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
406 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
407 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
413 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
414 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
425 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
426 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
427 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
428 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
429 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
430 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
431 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
432 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
433 * and in RFC 2246): */
434 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
435 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
436 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
437 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
438 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
439 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
440 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
441 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
442 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
444 /* no cert request */
446 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
447 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
451 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
452 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
453 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
454 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
455 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
457 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
458 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
464 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
465 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
466 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
467 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
468 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
469 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
473 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
474 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
475 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_WPENDING,0,NULL);
478 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
479 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
480 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
481 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
484 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
487 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
488 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
489 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
490 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
494 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
496 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
498 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
499 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
502 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
506 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
507 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
508 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
513 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
514 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
515 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
516 * message is not sent.
517 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
518 * the client uses its key from the certificate
521 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
529 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
532 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
533 * a client cert, it can be verified
534 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
535 * should be generalized. But it is next step
537 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
538 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
540 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
541 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
545 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
546 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
557 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
558 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
560 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
561 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
562 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
564 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
568 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
569 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
570 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
571 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
572 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
573 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
574 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
575 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
583 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
588 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
589 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
590 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
591 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
592 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
596 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
597 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
598 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
599 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
600 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
606 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
607 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
609 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
610 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
611 { ret= -1; goto end; }
613 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
614 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
616 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
617 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
620 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
621 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
629 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
630 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
631 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
632 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
633 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
634 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
635 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
636 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
638 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
640 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
645 /* clean a few things up */
646 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
648 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
651 /* remove buffering on output */
652 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
656 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
658 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
659 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
663 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
665 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
667 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
669 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
683 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
687 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
692 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
696 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
703 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
707 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
711 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
715 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
717 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
718 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
723 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
724 /* number of bytes to write */
729 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
730 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
733 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
738 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
739 * so permit appropriate message length */
740 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
746 if (!ok) return((int)n);
747 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
748 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
750 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
751 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
752 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
753 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
755 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
757 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
758 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
766 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
768 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
769 unsigned int cookie_len;
772 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
777 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
779 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
780 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
781 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
782 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
785 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
787 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
790 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
791 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
792 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
793 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
794 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
797 if (!ok) return((int)n);
799 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
801 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
802 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
803 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
806 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
807 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
810 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
812 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
813 s->version = s->client_version;
815 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
819 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
820 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
821 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
823 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
825 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
827 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
828 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
830 if (cookie_length == 0)
834 /* load the client random */
835 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
838 /* get the session-id */
842 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
843 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
844 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
845 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
846 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
847 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
848 * an earlier library version)
850 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
852 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
857 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
859 { /* previous session */
866 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
873 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
879 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
880 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
881 * does not cause an overflow.
883 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
886 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
891 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
892 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
895 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
897 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
899 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
902 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
904 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
907 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
909 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
910 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
912 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
914 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
925 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
927 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
928 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
934 /* not enough data */
935 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
939 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
946 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
947 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
950 id=s->session->cipher->id;
953 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
955 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
957 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
959 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
960 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
968 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
970 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
971 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
972 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
973 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
974 * enabled, though. */
975 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
976 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
978 s->session->cipher = c;
984 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
985 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
986 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
996 /* not enough data */
997 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1004 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1011 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1018 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1020 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1022 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1027 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1032 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1033 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1034 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1035 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1039 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1040 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1042 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1044 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1049 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1051 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1053 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1054 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1055 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1058 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1059 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1063 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1064 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1065 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1067 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1072 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1075 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1077 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1078 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1080 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1081 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1086 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1087 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1088 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1089 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1091 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1092 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1094 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1095 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1096 /* Can't disable compression */
1097 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1099 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1103 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1104 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1106 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1107 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1109 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1113 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1115 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1119 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1120 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1122 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1127 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1134 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1135 { /* See if we have a match */
1136 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1138 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1139 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1141 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1154 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1159 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1160 * using compression.
1162 if (s->session->compress_id != 0)
1164 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1170 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1175 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1176 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1178 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1180 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1181 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1182 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1183 if (ciphers == NULL)
1185 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1190 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1191 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1195 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1199 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1203 /* Session-id reuse */
1204 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1205 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1206 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1207 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1209 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1211 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1212 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1214 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1215 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1217 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1221 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1222 else if (ec != NULL)
1223 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1225 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1229 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1232 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1235 /* we now have the following setup.
1237 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1238 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1239 * compression - basically ignored right now
1240 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1241 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1242 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1243 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1250 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1253 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1257 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1260 unsigned char *p,*d;
1263 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1267 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1269 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1270 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1271 p=s->s3->server_random;
1272 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1273 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1275 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1278 /* Do the message type and length last */
1281 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1282 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1285 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1286 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1288 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1289 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1290 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1291 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1292 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1293 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1294 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1296 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1297 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1298 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1299 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1300 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1303 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1305 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1307 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1308 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1314 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1317 /* put the cipher */
1318 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1321 /* put the compression method */
1322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1325 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1328 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1331 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1336 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1348 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1349 /* number of bytes to write */
1354 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1355 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1358 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1362 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1364 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1367 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1372 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1373 /* number of bytes to write */
1378 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1379 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1382 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1388 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1395 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1396 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1399 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1402 unsigned char *p,*d;
1412 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1413 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1415 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1420 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1423 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1426 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1428 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1429 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1430 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1433 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1442 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1448 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1453 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1456 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1457 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1458 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1459 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1462 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1467 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1474 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1481 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1482 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1483 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1485 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1494 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1495 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1496 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1497 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1510 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1512 const EC_GROUP *group;
1514 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1515 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1517 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1518 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1519 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1523 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1528 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1530 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1535 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1541 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1548 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1549 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1550 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1551 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1553 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1560 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1561 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1562 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1568 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1569 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1575 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1576 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1577 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1580 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1587 /* Encode the public key.
1588 * First check the size of encoding and
1589 * allocate memory accordingly.
1591 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1592 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1593 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1596 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1597 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1598 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1599 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1606 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1607 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1608 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1609 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1611 if (encodedlen == 0)
1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1617 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1619 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1620 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1621 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1622 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1627 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1628 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1636 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1638 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1640 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1641 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1644 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1646 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1650 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1652 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1656 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1657 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1659 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1662 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1665 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1673 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1678 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1681 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1689 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1691 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1692 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1693 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1694 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1695 * the actual encoded point itself
1697 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1705 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1706 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1708 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1714 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1716 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1717 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1718 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1719 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1726 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1727 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1729 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1733 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1735 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1736 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1737 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1738 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1739 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1740 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1741 (unsigned int *)&i);
1745 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1746 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1756 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1757 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1760 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1761 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1762 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1763 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1764 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1765 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1775 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1776 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1778 /* let's do ECDSA */
1779 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1780 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1781 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1782 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1783 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1784 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1795 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1796 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1802 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1805 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1811 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1812 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1813 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1815 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1818 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1819 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1821 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1825 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1827 unsigned char *p,*d;
1829 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1833 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1837 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1839 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1841 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1850 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1854 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1856 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1857 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1858 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1863 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1864 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1867 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1874 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1875 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1881 /* else no CA names */
1882 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1885 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1886 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1889 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1894 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1895 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1898 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1905 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1908 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1909 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1914 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1918 unsigned long alg_k;
1920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1922 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1930 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1932 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1933 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1934 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1935 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1936 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1939 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1940 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1941 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1942 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1946 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1947 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1949 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1952 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
1954 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1955 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1957 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1958 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1959 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1960 * be sent already */
1963 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1971 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1972 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1973 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1974 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1976 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1983 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
1984 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1989 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2001 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2005 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2007 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2008 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2011 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2013 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2014 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2015 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2016 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2017 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2019 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2020 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2021 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2023 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2024 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2026 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2027 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2028 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2029 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2030 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2031 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2032 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2038 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2039 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2040 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2042 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2043 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2044 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2045 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2049 s->session->master_key_length=
2050 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2051 s->session->master_key,
2053 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2057 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2058 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2063 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2075 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2077 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2083 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2085 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2090 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2093 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2100 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2108 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2113 s->session->master_key_length=
2114 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2115 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2116 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2121 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2123 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2124 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2125 krb5_data authenticator;
2127 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2128 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2129 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2130 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2131 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2132 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2134 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2135 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2137 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2139 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2142 enc_ticket.length = i;
2144 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2147 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2151 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2152 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2155 authenticator.length = i;
2157 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2160 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2164 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2165 p+=authenticator.length;
2169 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2172 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2175 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2178 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2182 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2183 enc_pms.length + 6))
2185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2186 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2190 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2194 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2195 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2197 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2198 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2204 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2205 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2207 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2208 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2211 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2212 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2214 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2215 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2221 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2228 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2229 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2231 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2235 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2237 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2240 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2243 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2244 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2247 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2250 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2253 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2256 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2259 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2263 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2266 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2269 if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2271 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2272 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2273 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2274 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2275 * the protocol version.
2276 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2277 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2279 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2280 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2283 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2288 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2290 s->session->master_key_length=
2291 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2292 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2294 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2296 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2297 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2299 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2300 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2305 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2306 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2307 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2308 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2312 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2315 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2320 const EC_GROUP *group;
2321 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2323 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2324 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2327 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2331 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2332 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2334 /* use the certificate */
2335 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2339 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2340 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2342 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2345 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2346 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2348 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2349 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2356 /* Let's get client's public key */
2357 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2360 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2366 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2368 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2370 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2374 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2376 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2378 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2379 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2380 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2381 * never executed. When that support is
2382 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2383 * received in the certificate is
2384 * authorized for key agreement.
2385 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2386 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2389 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2391 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2395 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2396 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2402 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2406 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2407 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2409 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2412 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2416 /* Get encoded point length */
2419 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2420 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2426 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2427 * currently, so set it to the start
2429 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2432 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2433 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2434 if (field_size <= 0)
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2440 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2448 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2449 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2450 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2451 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2452 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2453 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2455 /* Compute the master secret */
2456 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2457 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2459 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2465 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2467 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2468 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2469 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2471 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2473 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2479 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2482 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2485 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2488 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2491 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2495 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2496 * string for the callback */
2497 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2498 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2499 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2500 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2501 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2503 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2506 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2509 else if (psk_len == 0)
2511 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2513 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2514 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2518 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2519 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2521 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2523 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2527 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2528 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2529 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2530 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2533 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2537 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2538 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2539 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2540 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2541 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2544 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2548 s->session->master_key_length=
2549 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2550 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2553 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2559 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2562 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2563 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL;
2564 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2565 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2567 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2568 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL);
2569 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2570 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2571 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2572 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2573 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2574 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2575 if (client_pub_pkey)
2577 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2580 /* Decrypt session key */
2581 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2591 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2601 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2607 /* Generate master secret */
2608 s->session->master_key_length=
2609 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2610 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2611 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2612 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2617 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2618 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2626 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2628 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2634 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2635 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2639 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2640 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2641 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2642 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2643 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2648 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2650 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2657 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2658 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2659 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2664 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2666 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2668 peer=s->session->peer;
2669 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2670 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2678 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2680 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2681 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2683 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2694 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2698 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2701 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2705 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2708 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2712 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2713 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2714 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2715 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2716 * signature without length field */
2717 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2718 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2729 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2733 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2734 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2737 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2742 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2744 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2745 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2749 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2755 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2763 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2765 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2766 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2767 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2771 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2779 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2781 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2782 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2783 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2787 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2789 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2795 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2796 { unsigned char signature[64];
2798 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2799 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2801 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2803 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2804 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2806 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2807 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2810 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2812 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2819 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2828 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2831 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2835 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2837 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2839 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2840 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2842 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2844 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2851 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2853 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2855 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2856 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2859 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2862 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2863 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2866 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2869 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2873 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2875 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2879 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2881 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2890 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2894 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2897 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2899 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2905 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2913 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2917 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2926 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2928 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2929 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2931 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2935 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2936 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2937 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2940 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2946 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2949 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2955 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2956 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2957 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2958 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2960 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2961 * when we arrive here. */
2962 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2964 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2965 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2971 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2972 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2973 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2974 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2975 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2983 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2986 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2987 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2991 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2996 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2998 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3001 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3002 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3003 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3010 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3011 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3016 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3017 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3020 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3022 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3024 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3029 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3030 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3031 unsigned char key_name[16];
3033 /* get session encoding length */
3034 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3035 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3040 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3041 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3042 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3043 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3044 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3045 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3047 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3048 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3049 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3051 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
3055 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3057 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3059 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3060 /* Skip message length for now */
3062 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3063 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3064 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3065 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3068 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3070 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3079 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3080 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3081 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3082 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3083 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3084 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3086 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3087 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3089 /* Output key name */
3091 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3094 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3095 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3096 /* Encrypt session data */
3097 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3099 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3101 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3103 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3104 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3105 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3108 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3110 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3111 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3112 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3114 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3116 /* number of bytes to write */
3118 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3123 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3124 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3127 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3129 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3132 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3133 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3134 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3137 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3140 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3143 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3144 /* message length */
3145 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3147 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3148 /* length of OCSP response */
3149 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3150 /* actual response */
3151 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3152 /* number of bytes to write */
3153 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3154 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3158 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3159 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));