1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
193 int new_state,state,skip=0;
195 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
199 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
201 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
202 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
204 /* init things to blank */
206 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
220 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
222 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
226 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
227 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
230 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
232 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
237 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
239 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
241 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
246 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
254 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
262 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
264 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
265 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
267 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
269 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
270 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
271 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
273 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
274 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
276 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
277 * client that doesn't support secure
280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
281 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
287 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
288 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
289 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
294 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
298 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
299 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
300 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
301 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
304 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
307 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
311 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
316 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
317 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
320 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
326 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
327 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
331 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
332 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
338 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
345 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
347 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
348 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
349 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
350 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
351 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
353 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
354 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
356 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
357 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
359 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
364 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
371 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
376 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
378 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
380 /* clear this, it may get reset by
381 * send_server_key_exchange */
382 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
384 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
385 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
387 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
388 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
389 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
390 * be able to handle this) */
391 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
393 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
396 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
397 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
399 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
401 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
402 * message only if the cipher suite is either
403 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
404 * server certificate contains the server's
405 * public key for key exchange.
407 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
408 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
409 * hint if provided */
410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
411 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
413 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
414 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
415 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
416 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
417 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
418 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
424 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
425 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
430 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
434 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
435 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
436 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
437 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
438 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
439 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
440 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
441 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
442 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
443 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
444 * and in RFC 2246): */
445 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
446 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
447 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
448 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
449 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
450 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
451 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
452 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
453 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
455 /* no cert request */
457 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
458 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
462 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
463 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
464 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
465 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
466 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
468 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
469 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
475 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
476 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
477 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
478 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
479 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
480 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
484 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
486 /* This code originally checked to see if
487 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
488 * and then flushed. This caused problems
489 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
490 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
491 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
492 * still exist. So instead we just flush
496 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
497 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
502 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
504 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
507 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
508 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
509 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
510 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
514 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
516 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
518 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
519 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
522 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
526 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
527 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
528 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
533 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
534 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
535 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
536 * message is not sent.
537 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
538 * the client uses its key from the certificate
541 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
549 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
552 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
553 * a client cert, it can be verified
554 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
555 * should be generalized. But it is next step
557 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
558 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
560 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
561 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
565 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
566 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
577 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
580 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
581 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
582 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
584 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
588 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
589 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
590 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
591 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
592 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
594 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
595 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
603 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
608 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
609 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
610 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
611 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
612 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
616 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
617 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
618 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
619 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
620 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
626 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
627 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
629 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
630 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
631 { ret= -1; goto end; }
633 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
634 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
636 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
637 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
640 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
641 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
649 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
650 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
651 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
652 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
653 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
654 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
655 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
656 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
658 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
660 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
665 /* clean a few things up */
666 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
668 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
671 /* remove buffering on output */
672 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
676 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
678 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
679 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
683 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
685 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
687 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
689 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
703 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
707 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
712 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
716 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
723 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
727 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
731 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
735 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
737 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
738 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
743 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
744 /* number of bytes to write */
749 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
750 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
753 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
758 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
759 * so permit appropriate message length */
760 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
766 if (!ok) return((int)n);
767 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
768 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
770 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
771 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
772 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
773 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
775 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
777 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
778 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
786 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
788 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
789 unsigned int cookie_len;
792 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
797 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
799 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
800 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
801 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
802 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
805 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
807 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
810 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
811 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
812 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
813 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
814 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
817 if (!ok) return((int)n);
819 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
821 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
822 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
823 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
826 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
827 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
830 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
832 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
833 s->version = s->client_version;
835 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
839 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
840 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
841 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
843 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
845 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
847 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
848 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
850 if (cookie_length == 0)
854 /* load the client random */
855 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
858 /* get the session-id */
862 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
863 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
864 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
865 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
866 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
867 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
868 * an earlier library version)
870 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
872 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
877 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
879 { /* previous session */
886 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
893 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
899 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
900 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
901 * does not cause an overflow.
903 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
906 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
911 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
912 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
915 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
917 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
919 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
922 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
924 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
927 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
929 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
930 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
932 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
934 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
945 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
947 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
948 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
954 /* not enough data */
955 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
959 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
966 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
967 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
970 id=s->session->cipher->id;
973 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
975 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
977 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
979 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
980 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
988 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
990 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
991 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
992 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
993 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
994 * enabled, though. */
995 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
996 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
998 s->session->cipher = c;
1004 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1005 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1006 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1016 /* not enough data */
1017 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1024 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1031 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1038 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1040 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1042 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1047 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1052 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1053 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1054 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1055 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1059 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1060 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1062 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1064 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1069 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1071 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1073 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1074 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1075 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1078 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1079 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1083 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1084 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1085 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1087 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1092 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1095 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1097 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1098 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1100 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1101 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1106 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1107 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1108 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1109 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1111 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1112 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1114 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1115 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1116 /* Can't disable compression */
1117 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1119 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1123 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1124 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1126 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1127 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1129 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1133 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1135 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1139 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1140 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1142 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1147 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1154 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1155 { /* See if we have a match */
1156 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1158 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1159 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1161 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1174 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1179 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1180 * using compression.
1182 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1184 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1190 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1195 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1196 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1198 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1200 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1201 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1202 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1203 if (ciphers == NULL)
1205 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1210 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1211 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1215 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1219 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1223 /* Session-id reuse */
1224 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1225 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1226 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1227 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1229 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1231 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1232 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1234 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1235 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1237 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1241 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1242 else if (ec != NULL)
1243 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1245 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1249 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1252 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1255 /* we now have the following setup.
1257 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1258 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1259 * compression - basically ignored right now
1260 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1261 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1262 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1263 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1270 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1273 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1277 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1280 unsigned char *p,*d;
1283 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1287 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1289 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1290 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1291 p=s->s3->server_random;
1292 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1293 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1295 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1298 /* Do the message type and length last */
1301 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1302 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1305 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1306 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1308 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1309 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1310 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1311 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1312 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1313 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1314 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1316 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1317 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1318 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1319 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1320 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1323 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1325 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1327 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1328 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1334 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1337 /* put the cipher */
1338 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1341 /* put the compression method */
1342 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1345 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1348 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1351 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1356 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1365 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1368 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1369 /* number of bytes to write */
1374 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1375 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1378 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1382 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1384 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1387 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1392 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1393 /* number of bytes to write */
1398 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1399 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1402 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1408 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1415 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1416 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1419 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1422 unsigned char *p,*d;
1432 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1433 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1435 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1440 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1443 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1446 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1448 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1449 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1450 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1453 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1462 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1468 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1473 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1476 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1477 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1478 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1479 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1482 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1487 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1494 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1501 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1502 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1503 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1505 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1514 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1515 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1516 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1517 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1530 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1532 const EC_GROUP *group;
1534 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1535 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1537 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1538 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1539 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1543 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1548 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1550 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1561 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1568 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1569 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1570 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1571 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1573 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1580 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1581 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1582 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1588 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1589 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1595 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1596 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1597 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1600 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1607 /* Encode the public key.
1608 * First check the size of encoding and
1609 * allocate memory accordingly.
1611 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1612 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1613 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1616 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1617 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1618 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1619 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1626 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1627 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1628 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1629 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1631 if (encodedlen == 0)
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1637 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1639 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1640 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1641 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1642 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1647 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1648 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1656 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1658 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1660 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1661 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1664 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1666 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1670 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1672 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1676 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1677 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1679 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1682 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1685 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1693 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1698 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1701 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1709 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1711 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1712 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1713 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1714 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1715 * the actual encoded point itself
1717 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1725 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1726 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1728 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1734 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1736 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1737 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1738 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1739 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1746 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1747 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1749 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1753 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1755 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1756 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1757 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1758 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1759 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1760 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1761 (unsigned int *)&i);
1765 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1766 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1776 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1777 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1780 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1781 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1782 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1783 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1784 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1785 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1795 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1796 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1798 /* let's do ECDSA */
1799 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1800 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1801 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1802 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1803 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1804 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1815 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1816 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1822 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1825 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1831 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1832 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1833 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1835 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1838 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1839 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1841 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1845 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1847 unsigned char *p,*d;
1849 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1853 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1857 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1859 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1861 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1870 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1874 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1876 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1877 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1878 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1883 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1884 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1887 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1894 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1895 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1901 /* else no CA names */
1902 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1905 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1906 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1909 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1914 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1915 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1918 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1925 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1928 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1929 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1934 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1938 unsigned long alg_k;
1940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1942 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1944 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1950 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1953 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1954 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1955 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1956 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1959 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1960 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1961 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1962 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1966 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1967 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1969 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1971 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1972 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
1974 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1975 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1977 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1978 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1979 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1980 * be sent already */
1983 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1991 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1992 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1993 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1994 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1996 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2003 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2004 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2009 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2021 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2025 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2027 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2031 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2033 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2034 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2035 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2036 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2037 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2039 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2040 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2041 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2043 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2044 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2046 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2047 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2048 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2049 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2050 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2051 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2052 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2058 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2059 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2060 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2062 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2063 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2064 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2065 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2069 s->session->master_key_length=
2070 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2071 s->session->master_key,
2073 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2078 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2083 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2095 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2097 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2103 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2105 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2110 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2113 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2120 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2128 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2133 s->session->master_key_length=
2134 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2135 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2136 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2141 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2143 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2144 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2145 krb5_data authenticator;
2147 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2148 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2149 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2150 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2151 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2152 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2154 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2155 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2157 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2159 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2162 enc_ticket.length = i;
2164 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2167 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2171 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2172 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2175 authenticator.length = i;
2177 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2180 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2184 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2185 p+=authenticator.length;
2189 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2192 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2195 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2198 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2202 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2203 enc_pms.length + 6))
2205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2206 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2210 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2214 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2215 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2217 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2218 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2224 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2225 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2227 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2228 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2231 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2232 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2234 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2235 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2241 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2248 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2249 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2251 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2255 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2257 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2260 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2263 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2264 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2267 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2270 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2273 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2276 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2279 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2283 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2286 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2289 if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2291 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2292 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2293 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2294 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2295 * the protocol version.
2296 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2297 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2299 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2300 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2303 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2308 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2310 s->session->master_key_length=
2311 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2312 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2314 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2316 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2317 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2319 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2320 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2325 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2326 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2327 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2328 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2332 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2335 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2340 const EC_GROUP *group;
2341 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2343 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2344 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2347 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2351 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2352 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2354 /* use the certificate */
2355 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2359 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2360 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2362 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2365 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2366 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2368 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2369 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2376 /* Let's get client's public key */
2377 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2380 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2386 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2388 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2390 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2394 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2396 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2398 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2399 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2400 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2401 * never executed. When that support is
2402 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2403 * received in the certificate is
2404 * authorized for key agreement.
2405 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2406 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2409 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2411 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2415 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2416 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2422 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2426 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2427 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2429 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2432 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2436 /* Get encoded point length */
2439 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2440 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2446 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2447 * currently, so set it to the start
2449 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2452 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2453 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2454 if (field_size <= 0)
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2460 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2468 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2469 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2470 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2471 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2472 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2473 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2475 /* Compute the master secret */
2476 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2477 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2479 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2485 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2487 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2488 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2489 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2491 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2493 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2499 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2502 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2505 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2508 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2511 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2515 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2516 * string for the callback */
2517 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2518 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2519 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2520 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2521 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2523 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2526 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2529 else if (psk_len == 0)
2531 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2533 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2534 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2538 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2539 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2541 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2543 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2547 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2548 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2549 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2550 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2553 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2557 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2558 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2559 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2560 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2561 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2564 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2568 s->session->master_key_length=
2569 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2570 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2573 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2579 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2582 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2583 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL;
2584 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2585 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2587 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2588 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL);
2589 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2590 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2591 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2592 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2593 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2594 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2595 if (client_pub_pkey)
2597 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2600 /* Decrypt session key */
2601 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2611 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2621 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2627 /* Generate master secret */
2628 s->session->master_key_length=
2629 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2630 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2631 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2632 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2637 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2638 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2646 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2648 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2654 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2655 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2659 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2660 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2661 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2662 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2663 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2668 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2670 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2677 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2678 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2679 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2684 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2686 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2688 peer=s->session->peer;
2689 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2690 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2698 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2700 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2701 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2703 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2714 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2718 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2721 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2725 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2728 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2732 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2733 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2734 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2735 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2736 * signature without length field */
2737 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2738 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2749 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2753 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2754 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2757 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2762 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2764 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2765 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2769 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2775 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2783 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2785 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2786 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2787 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2791 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2799 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2801 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2802 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2803 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2807 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2809 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2815 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2816 { unsigned char signature[64];
2818 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2819 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2821 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2823 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2824 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2826 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2827 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2830 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2832 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2839 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2848 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2851 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2855 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2857 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2859 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2860 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2862 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2864 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2871 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2873 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2875 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2876 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2879 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2882 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2883 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2886 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2889 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2893 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2895 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2899 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2901 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2910 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2914 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2917 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2919 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2925 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2933 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2937 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2946 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2948 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2949 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2951 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2955 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2956 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2957 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2960 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2966 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2969 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2975 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2976 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2977 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2978 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2980 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2981 * when we arrive here. */
2982 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2984 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2985 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2991 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2992 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2993 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2994 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2995 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3003 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3006 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3007 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3011 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3016 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3018 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3021 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3022 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3023 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3030 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3031 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3036 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3037 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3040 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3042 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3044 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3049 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3050 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3051 unsigned char key_name[16];
3053 /* get session encoding length */
3054 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3055 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3060 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3061 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3062 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3063 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3064 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3065 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3067 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3068 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3069 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3071 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
3075 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3077 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3079 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3080 /* Skip message length for now */
3082 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3083 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3084 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3085 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3088 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3090 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3099 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3100 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3101 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3102 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3103 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3104 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3106 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3107 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3109 /* Output key name */
3111 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3114 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3115 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3116 /* Encrypt session data */
3117 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3119 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3121 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3123 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3124 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3125 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3128 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3130 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3131 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3132 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3134 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3136 /* number of bytes to write */
3138 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3143 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3144 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3147 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3149 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3152 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3153 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3154 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3157 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3160 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3163 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3164 /* message length */
3165 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3167 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3168 /* length of OCSP response */
3169 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3170 /* actual response */
3171 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3172 /* number of bytes to write */
3173 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3174 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3178 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3179 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));