1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
355 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
416 /* We promised to send an audit proof in the hello. */
417 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client)
419 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s);
420 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
425 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
430 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
431 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
432 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
433 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
434 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
435 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
436 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
438 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
439 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
441 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
442 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
444 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
449 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
456 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
461 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
462 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
463 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
465 /* clear this, it may get reset by
466 * send_server_key_exchange */
467 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
469 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
470 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
472 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
473 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
474 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
475 * be able to handle this) */
476 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
478 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
481 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
482 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
484 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
486 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
487 * message only if the cipher suite is either
488 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
489 * server certificate contains the server's
490 * public key for key exchange.
492 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
493 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
494 * hint if provided */
495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
496 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
499 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
500 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
502 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
503 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
504 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
505 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
506 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
507 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
513 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
514 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
519 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
523 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
525 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
526 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
527 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
528 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
529 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
530 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
531 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
532 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
533 * and in RFC 2246): */
534 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
535 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
536 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
537 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
538 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
539 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
540 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
541 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
542 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
544 /* no cert request */
546 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
548 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
549 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
554 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
555 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
556 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
557 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
558 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
560 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
561 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
567 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
569 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
570 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
571 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
572 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
576 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
578 /* This code originally checked to see if
579 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
580 * and then flushed. This caused problems
581 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
582 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
583 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
584 * still exist. So instead we just flush
588 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
589 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
594 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
596 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
601 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
602 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
606 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
608 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
610 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
611 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
614 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
618 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
619 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
620 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
625 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
626 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
627 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
628 * message is not sent.
629 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
630 * the client uses its key from the certificate
633 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
634 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
636 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
637 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
639 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
643 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
645 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
647 if (!s->session->peer)
649 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
650 * at this point and digest cached records.
652 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
657 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
658 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
666 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
669 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
670 * a client cert, it can be verified
671 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
672 * should be generalized. But it is next step
674 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
675 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
677 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
678 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
682 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
683 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
697 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
698 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
699 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
701 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
702 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
704 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
705 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
707 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
712 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
713 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
715 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
716 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
718 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
722 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
723 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
724 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
725 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
726 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
730 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
731 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
734 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
739 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
740 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
741 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
742 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
743 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
749 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
750 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
751 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
760 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
761 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
762 { ret= -1; goto end; }
764 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
765 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
767 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
768 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
771 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
772 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
780 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
782 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
783 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
784 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
785 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
786 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
787 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
790 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
791 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
793 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
794 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
796 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
800 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
805 /* clean a few things up */
806 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
808 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
811 /* remove buffering on output */
812 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
816 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
821 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
823 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
825 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
827 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
841 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
845 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
850 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
854 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
861 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
865 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
869 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
872 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
874 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
875 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
878 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
879 return ssl_do_write(s);
882 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
887 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
888 * so permit appropriate message length */
889 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
895 if (!ok) return((int)n);
896 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
897 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
899 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
901 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
906 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
907 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
909 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
911 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
912 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
916 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
918 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
919 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
922 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
928 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
930 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
931 unsigned int cookie_len;
936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
940 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
942 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
943 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
944 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
945 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
948 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
951 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
954 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
955 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
956 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
957 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
958 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
961 if (!ok) return((int)n);
963 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
965 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
966 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
967 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
970 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
971 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
974 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
976 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
977 s->version = s->client_version;
979 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
983 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
984 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
985 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
987 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
989 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
991 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
992 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
994 if (cookie_length == 0)
998 /* load the client random */
999 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1000 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1002 /* get the session-id */
1006 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1007 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1008 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1009 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1010 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1012 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1013 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1014 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1015 * setting will be ignored.
1017 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1019 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1024 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1026 { /* previous session */
1033 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1043 cookie_len = *(p++);
1046 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1047 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1048 * does not cause an overflow.
1050 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1053 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1058 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1059 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1062 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1064 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1066 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1069 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1071 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1074 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1076 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1077 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1079 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1081 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1092 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1094 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1095 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1101 /* not enough data */
1102 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1106 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1113 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1114 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1117 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1120 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1122 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1124 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1126 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1127 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1135 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1136 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1139 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1141 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1142 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1143 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1144 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1145 * enabled, though. */
1146 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1147 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1149 s->session->cipher = c;
1156 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1157 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1158 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1168 /* not enough data */
1169 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1178 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1185 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1192 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1194 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1201 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1202 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1203 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1204 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1208 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1209 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1211 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1217 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1219 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1221 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1222 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1223 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1226 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1227 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1231 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1232 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1233 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1235 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1240 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1243 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1245 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1246 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1248 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1249 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1254 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1255 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1256 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1257 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1259 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1260 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1262 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1263 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1264 /* Can't disable compression */
1265 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1270 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1271 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1273 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1274 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1276 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1280 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1285 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1286 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1288 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1293 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1300 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1301 { /* See if we have a match */
1302 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1304 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1305 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1307 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1320 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1325 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1326 * using compression.
1328 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1335 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1340 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1341 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1343 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1345 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1346 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1347 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1348 if (ciphers == NULL)
1350 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1355 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1356 if (s->cert->cert_cb
1357 && s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg) <= 0)
1359 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1363 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1364 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1368 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1372 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1373 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1374 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1375 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1376 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0));
1377 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1378 /* do not send a session ticket */
1379 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1383 /* Session-id reuse */
1384 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1385 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1386 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1387 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1389 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1391 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1392 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1394 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1395 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1397 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1401 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1402 else if (ec != NULL)
1403 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1405 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1409 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1412 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1414 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1418 /* we now have the following setup.
1420 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1421 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1422 * compression - basically ignored right now
1423 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1424 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1425 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1426 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1429 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1430 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1432 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1443 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1446 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1450 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1453 unsigned char *p,*d;
1456 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1460 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1462 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1463 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1464 p=s->s3->server_random;
1465 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1466 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1468 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1471 /* Do the message type and length last */
1472 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1474 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1475 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1478 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1479 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1481 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1482 * back in the server hello:
1483 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1484 * we send back the old session ID.
1485 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1486 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1487 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1488 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1490 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1491 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1492 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1493 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1496 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1497 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1499 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1501 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1502 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1508 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1511 /* put the cipher */
1512 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1515 /* put the compression method */
1516 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1519 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1522 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1525 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1530 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1538 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1539 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1542 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1543 return ssl_do_write(s);
1546 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1549 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1551 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1552 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1555 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1556 return ssl_do_write(s);
1559 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1565 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1572 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1573 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1576 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1579 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1580 unsigned char *p,*d;
1590 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1591 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1593 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1598 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1601 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1604 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1606 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1607 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1608 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1611 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1620 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1626 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1631 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1634 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1635 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1636 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1637 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1640 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1645 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1651 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1658 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1659 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1660 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1662 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1671 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1672 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1673 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1674 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1687 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1689 const EC_GROUP *group;
1691 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1692 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1694 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1695 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1696 if (nid != NID_undef)
1697 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1699 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1701 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1702 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1703 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1707 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1712 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1718 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1724 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1726 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1732 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1733 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1734 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1735 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1737 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1744 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1745 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1746 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1752 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1753 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1759 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1760 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1761 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1764 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1771 /* Encode the public key.
1772 * First check the size of encoding and
1773 * allocate memory accordingly.
1775 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1776 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1777 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1780 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1781 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1782 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1783 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1790 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1791 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1792 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1793 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1795 if (encodedlen == 0)
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1801 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1803 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1804 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1805 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1806 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1811 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1812 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1820 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1822 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1824 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1825 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1828 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1830 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1832 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1833 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1834 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1835 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1848 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1852 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1854 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1856 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1863 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1864 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1866 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1869 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1872 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1880 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1885 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1887 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1890 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1903 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1905 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1906 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1907 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1908 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1909 * the actual encoded point itself
1911 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1919 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1920 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1922 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1923 encodedPoint = NULL;
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1929 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1931 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1932 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1933 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1934 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1941 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1942 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1944 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1948 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1950 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1951 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1952 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1953 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1954 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1955 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1956 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1957 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1958 (unsigned int *)&i);
1962 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1963 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1975 /* send signature algorithm */
1976 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1978 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1980 /* Should never happen */
1981 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1988 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1991 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1992 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1993 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1994 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1995 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1996 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2003 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2008 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2009 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2015 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2018 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2019 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2020 return ssl_do_write(s);
2022 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2024 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2025 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2026 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2028 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2032 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2034 unsigned char *p,*d;
2036 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2040 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2044 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2046 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2048 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2053 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2055 const unsigned char *psigs;
2056 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2058 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2067 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2071 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2073 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2074 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2075 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2080 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2081 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2084 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2091 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2092 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2098 /* else no CA names */
2099 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2102 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2104 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2105 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2107 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2109 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2117 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2120 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2121 return ssl_do_write(s);
2126 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2130 unsigned long alg_k;
2132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2134 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2138 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2142 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2145 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2146 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2147 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2148 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2151 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2152 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2153 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2154 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2158 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2159 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2161 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2164 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2166 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2167 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2169 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2170 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2171 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2172 * be sent already */
2175 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2183 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2184 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2185 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2186 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2188 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2195 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2196 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2201 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2213 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2217 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2219 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2220 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2223 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2225 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2226 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2227 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2228 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2229 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2231 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2232 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2233 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2235 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2236 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2238 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2239 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2240 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2241 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2242 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2243 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2244 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2250 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2251 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2252 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2254 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2255 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2256 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2257 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2261 s->session->master_key_length=
2262 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2263 s->session->master_key,
2265 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2270 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2273 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2280 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2291 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2292 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2293 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2294 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2297 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2298 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2299 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2300 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2302 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2306 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2308 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2310 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2315 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2319 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2320 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2323 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2324 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2326 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2328 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2332 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2333 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2336 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2343 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2352 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2359 s->session->master_key_length=
2360 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2361 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2362 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2369 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2371 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2372 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2373 krb5_data authenticator;
2375 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2376 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2377 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2378 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2379 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2380 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2382 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2383 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2385 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2387 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2390 enc_ticket.length = i;
2392 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2395 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2399 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2400 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2403 authenticator.length = i;
2405 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2408 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2412 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2413 p+=authenticator.length;
2417 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2420 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2423 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2426 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2430 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2431 enc_pms.length + 6))
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2434 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2438 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2442 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2443 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2445 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2446 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2452 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2453 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2455 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2456 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2459 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2460 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2462 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2463 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2469 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2476 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2477 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2479 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2483 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2485 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2488 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2491 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2492 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2495 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2498 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2501 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2504 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2507 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2511 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2514 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2517 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2519 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2520 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2521 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2522 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2523 * the protocol version.
2524 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2525 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2527 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2530 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2535 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2537 s->session->master_key_length=
2538 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2539 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2541 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2543 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2544 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2546 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2547 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2552 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2553 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2554 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2555 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2559 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2562 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2567 const EC_GROUP *group;
2568 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2570 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2571 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2574 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2578 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2579 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2581 /* use the certificate */
2582 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2586 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2587 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2589 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2592 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2593 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2595 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2596 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2603 /* Let's get client's public key */
2604 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2607 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2613 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2615 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2617 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2621 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2623 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2625 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2626 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2627 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2628 * never executed. When that support is
2629 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2630 * received in the certificate is
2631 * authorized for key agreement.
2632 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2633 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2636 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2638 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2642 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2643 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2649 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2653 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2654 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2656 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2659 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2663 /* Get encoded point length */
2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2672 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2673 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2679 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2680 * currently, so set it to the start
2682 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2685 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2686 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2687 if (field_size <= 0)
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2693 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2701 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2702 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2703 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2704 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2705 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2706 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2708 /* Compute the master secret */
2709 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2710 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2712 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2718 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2720 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2721 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2722 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2724 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2726 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2732 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2735 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2738 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2741 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2744 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2748 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2749 * string for the callback */
2750 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2751 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2752 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2753 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2754 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2756 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2759 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2762 else if (psk_len == 0)
2764 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2766 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2767 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2771 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2772 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2774 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2776 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2780 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2781 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2782 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2783 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2786 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2790 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2791 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2792 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2793 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2794 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2797 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2801 s->session->master_key_length=
2802 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2803 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2806 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2813 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2821 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2825 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2830 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2831 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2832 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2833 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2836 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2840 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2849 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2850 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2853 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2854 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2855 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2856 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2857 unsigned long alg_a;
2859 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2860 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2861 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2862 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2863 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2864 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2866 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2867 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2868 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2869 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2870 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2871 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2872 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2873 if (client_pub_pkey)
2875 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2878 /* Decrypt session key */
2879 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2889 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2899 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2905 /* Generate master secret */
2906 s->session->master_key_length=
2907 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2908 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2909 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2910 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2915 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2916 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2924 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2926 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2932 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2933 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2937 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2938 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2939 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2940 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2941 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2946 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2948 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2954 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2956 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2958 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2959 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2960 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2962 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2965 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2967 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2969 peer=s->session->peer;
2970 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2971 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2979 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2981 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2982 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2984 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2995 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2999 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3002 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3006 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3009 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3013 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3014 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3015 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3016 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3017 * signature without length field */
3018 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3019 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3025 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3027 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3030 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3035 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3039 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3049 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3053 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3054 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3057 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3061 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3065 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3069 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3073 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3076 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3077 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3080 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3084 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3086 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3093 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3095 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3096 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3100 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3106 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3114 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3116 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3117 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3118 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3122 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3130 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3132 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3133 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3134 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3138 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3140 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3146 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3147 { unsigned char signature[64];
3149 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3150 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3152 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3154 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3155 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3157 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3158 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3161 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3163 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3170 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3179 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3182 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3184 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3185 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3186 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3188 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3189 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3193 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3195 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3197 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3198 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3200 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3202 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3209 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3211 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3213 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3214 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3217 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3220 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3221 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3224 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3227 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3231 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3233 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3237 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3239 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3248 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3252 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3255 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3257 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3263 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3271 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3275 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3284 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3286 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3287 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3289 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3293 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3294 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3295 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3298 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3301 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3302 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3304 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3310 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3313 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3319 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3320 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3321 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3322 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3324 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3325 * when we arrive here. */
3326 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3328 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3329 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3335 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3336 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3337 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3338 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3339 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3347 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3350 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3351 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3355 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3359 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3361 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3364 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3365 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3366 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3373 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3374 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3377 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3378 return ssl_do_write(s);
3381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3382 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3383 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3385 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3387 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3388 const unsigned char *const_p;
3389 int len, slen_full, slen;
3394 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3395 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3396 unsigned char key_name[16];
3398 /* get session encoding length */
3399 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3400 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3403 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3405 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3409 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3411 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3413 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3419 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3421 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3422 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3428 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3429 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3431 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3432 * follows handshake_header_length +
3433 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3434 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3435 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3436 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3438 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3439 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3440 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3442 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3443 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3444 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3445 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3446 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3449 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3451 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3460 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3461 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3462 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3463 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3464 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3465 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3468 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3469 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3470 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3471 * as their sessions. */
3472 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3474 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3476 /* Output key name */
3478 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3481 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3482 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3483 /* Encrypt session data */
3484 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3486 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3488 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3490 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3491 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3492 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3495 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3497 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3498 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3499 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3500 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3502 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3506 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3507 return ssl_do_write(s);
3510 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3512 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3515 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3516 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3517 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3520 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3523 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3526 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3527 /* message length */
3528 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3530 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3531 /* length of OCSP response */
3532 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3533 /* actual response */
3534 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3535 /* number of bytes to write */
3536 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3537 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3541 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3542 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3545 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3546 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3547 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3548 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3551 int proto_len, padding_len;
3553 const unsigned char *p;
3555 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3556 * extension in their ClientHello */
3557 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3563 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3564 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3565 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3567 514, /* See the payload format below */
3573 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3574 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3575 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3576 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3583 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3585 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3587 /* The payload looks like:
3589 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3590 * uint8 padding_len;
3591 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3594 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3596 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3597 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3600 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3601 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3606 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3607 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3613 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3616 const unsigned char *authz, *orig_authz;
3618 size_t authz_length, i;
3620 if (s->state != SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A)
3621 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3623 orig_authz = authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
3626 /* This should never occur. */
3630 /* First we walk over the authz data to see how long the handshake
3631 * message will be. */
3632 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3639 /* n2s increments authz by 2*/
3642 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3644 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3645 length += 1 /* authz type */ + 2 /* length */ + len;
3651 length += 1 /* handshake type */ +
3652 3 /* handshake length */ +
3653 3 /* supplemental data length */ +
3654 2 /* supplemental entry type */ +
3655 2 /* supplemental entry length */;
3657 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, length))
3659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3663 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3664 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3665 /* Handshake length */
3666 l2n3(length - 4, p);
3667 /* Length of supplemental data */
3668 l2n3(length - 7, p);
3669 /* Supplemental data type */
3670 s2n(TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data, p);
3672 s2n(length - 11, p);
3676 /* Walk over the authz again and append the selected elements. */
3677 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3684 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
3687 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3689 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3693 memcpy(p, authz, len);
3701 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3702 s->init_num = length;
3705 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);