1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
355 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
416 /* We promised to send an audit proof in the hello. */
417 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client)
419 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s);
420 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
425 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
430 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
431 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
432 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
433 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
434 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
435 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
436 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
438 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
439 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
441 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
442 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
444 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
449 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
456 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
461 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
462 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
463 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
465 /* clear this, it may get reset by
466 * send_server_key_exchange */
467 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
469 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
470 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
472 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
473 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
474 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
475 * be able to handle this) */
476 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
478 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
481 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
482 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
484 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
486 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
487 * message only if the cipher suite is either
488 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
489 * server certificate contains the server's
490 * public key for key exchange.
492 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
493 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
494 * hint if provided */
495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
496 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
499 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
500 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
502 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
503 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
504 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
505 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
506 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
507 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
513 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
514 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
519 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
523 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
525 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
526 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
527 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
528 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
529 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
530 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
531 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
532 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
533 * and in RFC 2246): */
534 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
535 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
536 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
537 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
538 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
539 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
540 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
541 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
542 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
544 /* no cert request */
546 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
548 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
549 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
554 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
555 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
556 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
557 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
558 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
560 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
561 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
567 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
569 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
570 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
571 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
572 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
576 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
578 /* This code originally checked to see if
579 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
580 * and then flushed. This caused problems
581 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
582 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
583 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
584 * still exist. So instead we just flush
588 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
589 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
594 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
596 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
601 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
602 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
606 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
608 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
610 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
611 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
614 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
618 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
619 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
620 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
625 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
626 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
627 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
628 * message is not sent.
629 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
630 * the client uses its key from the certificate
633 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
634 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
636 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
637 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
639 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
643 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
645 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
647 if (!s->session->peer)
649 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
650 * at this point and digest cached records.
652 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
657 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
658 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
666 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
669 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
670 * a client cert, it can be verified
671 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
672 * should be generalized. But it is next step
674 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
675 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
677 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
678 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
682 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
683 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
697 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
698 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
699 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
701 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
702 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
704 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
705 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
707 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
712 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
713 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
715 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
716 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
718 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
722 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
723 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
724 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
725 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
726 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
730 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
731 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
734 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
739 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
740 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
741 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
742 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
743 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
749 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
750 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
751 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
760 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
761 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
762 { ret= -1; goto end; }
764 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
765 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
767 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
768 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
771 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
772 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
780 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
782 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
783 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
784 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
785 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
786 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
787 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
790 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
791 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
793 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
794 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
796 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
800 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
805 /* clean a few things up */
806 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
808 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
811 /* remove buffering on output */
812 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
816 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
821 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
823 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
825 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
827 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
841 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
845 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
850 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
854 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
861 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
865 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
869 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
872 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
874 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
875 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
878 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
879 return ssl_do_write(s);
882 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
887 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
888 * so permit appropriate message length */
889 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
895 if (!ok) return((int)n);
896 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
897 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
899 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
901 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
906 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
907 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
909 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
911 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
912 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
916 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
918 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
919 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
922 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
928 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
930 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
931 unsigned int cookie_len;
936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
940 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
942 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
943 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
944 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
945 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
948 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
951 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
954 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
955 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
956 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
957 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
958 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
961 if (!ok) return((int)n);
963 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
965 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
966 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
967 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
970 if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version > s->version
971 && s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) ||
972 (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version < s->version))
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
975 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
977 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
978 s->version = s->client_version;
980 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
984 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
985 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
986 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
988 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
990 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
992 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
993 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
995 if (cookie_length == 0)
999 /* load the client random */
1000 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1001 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1003 /* get the session-id */
1007 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1008 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1009 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1010 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1011 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1013 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1014 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1015 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1016 * setting will be ignored.
1018 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1020 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1025 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1027 { /* previous session */
1034 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1044 cookie_len = *(p++);
1047 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1048 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1049 * does not cause an overflow.
1051 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1054 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1059 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1060 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1063 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1065 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1067 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1070 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1072 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1075 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1077 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1078 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1080 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1082 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1085 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1090 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1092 /* Select version to use */
1093 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1094 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1096 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1097 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1099 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1102 s->version = s->client_version;
1103 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1106 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1107 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1109 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1110 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1115 s->version = s->client_version;
1116 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1119 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1124 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1126 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1127 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1133 /* not enough data */
1134 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1138 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1145 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1146 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1149 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1152 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1154 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1156 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1158 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1159 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1167 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1168 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1171 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1173 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1174 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1175 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1176 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1177 * enabled, though. */
1178 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1179 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1181 s->session->cipher = c;
1188 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1189 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1190 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1200 /* not enough data */
1201 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1210 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1217 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1224 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1226 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1233 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1234 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1235 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1236 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1240 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1241 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1243 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1249 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1251 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1253 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1254 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1255 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1258 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1259 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1263 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1264 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1265 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1267 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1272 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1275 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1277 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1278 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1280 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1281 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1286 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1287 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1288 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1289 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1291 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1292 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1294 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1295 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1296 /* Can't disable compression */
1297 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1302 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1303 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1305 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1306 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1308 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1312 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1317 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1318 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1320 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1325 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1332 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1333 { /* See if we have a match */
1334 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1336 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1337 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1339 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1352 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1357 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1358 * using compression.
1360 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1367 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1372 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1373 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1375 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1377 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1378 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1379 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1380 if (ciphers == NULL)
1382 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1387 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1388 if (s->cert->cert_cb
1389 && s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg) <= 0)
1391 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1395 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1396 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1400 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1404 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1405 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1406 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1407 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1408 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0));
1409 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1410 /* do not send a session ticket */
1411 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1415 /* Session-id reuse */
1416 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1417 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1418 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1419 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1421 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1423 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1424 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1426 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1427 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1429 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1433 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1434 else if (ec != NULL)
1435 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1437 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1441 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1444 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1446 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1450 /* we now have the following setup.
1452 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1453 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1454 * compression - basically ignored right now
1455 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1456 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1457 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1458 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1461 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1462 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1464 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1471 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1475 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1478 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1479 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1482 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1485 unsigned char *p,*d;
1488 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1492 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1494 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1495 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1496 p=s->s3->server_random;
1497 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1498 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1500 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1503 /* Do the message type and length last */
1504 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1506 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1507 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1510 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1511 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1513 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1514 * back in the server hello:
1515 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1516 * we send back the old session ID.
1517 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1518 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1519 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1520 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1522 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1523 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1524 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1525 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1528 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1529 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1531 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1533 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1534 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1540 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1543 /* put the cipher */
1544 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1547 /* put the compression method */
1548 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1551 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1554 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1557 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1562 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1570 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1571 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1574 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1575 return ssl_do_write(s);
1578 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1581 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1583 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1584 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1587 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1588 return ssl_do_write(s);
1591 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1597 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1604 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1605 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1608 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1611 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1612 unsigned char *p,*d;
1622 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1623 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1625 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1630 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1633 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1636 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1638 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1639 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1640 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1643 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1652 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1658 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1663 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1666 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1667 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1668 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1669 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1672 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1677 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1690 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1691 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1692 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1694 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1703 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1704 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1705 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1706 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1719 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1721 const EC_GROUP *group;
1723 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1724 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1726 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1727 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1728 if (nid != NID_undef)
1729 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1731 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1733 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1734 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1735 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1739 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1744 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1750 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1756 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1758 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1764 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1765 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1766 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1767 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1769 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1776 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1777 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1778 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1784 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1785 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1791 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1792 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1793 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1796 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1803 /* Encode the public key.
1804 * First check the size of encoding and
1805 * allocate memory accordingly.
1807 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1808 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1809 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1812 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1813 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1814 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1815 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1822 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1823 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1824 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1825 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1827 if (encodedlen == 0)
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1833 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1835 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1836 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1837 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1838 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1843 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1844 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1852 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1854 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1856 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1857 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1860 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1862 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1864 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1865 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1866 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1867 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1880 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1884 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1886 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1888 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1895 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1896 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1898 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1901 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1904 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1912 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1917 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1919 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1922 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1935 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1937 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1938 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1939 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1940 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1941 * the actual encoded point itself
1943 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1951 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1952 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1954 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1955 encodedPoint = NULL;
1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1961 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1963 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1964 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1965 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1966 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1973 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1974 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1976 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1980 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1982 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1983 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1984 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1985 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1986 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1987 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1988 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1989 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1990 (unsigned int *)&i);
1994 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1995 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2007 /* send signature algorithm */
2008 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2010 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2012 /* Should never happen */
2013 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2020 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2023 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2024 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2025 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2026 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2027 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2028 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2035 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2040 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2041 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2047 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2050 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2051 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2052 return ssl_do_write(s);
2054 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2057 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2058 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2060 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2064 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2066 unsigned char *p,*d;
2068 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2072 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2076 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2078 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2080 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2085 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2087 const unsigned char *psigs;
2088 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2090 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2099 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2103 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2105 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2106 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2107 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2112 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2113 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2116 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2123 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2124 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2130 /* else no CA names */
2131 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2134 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2136 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2137 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2139 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2141 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2149 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2152 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2153 return ssl_do_write(s);
2158 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2162 unsigned long alg_k;
2164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2166 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2170 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2174 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2177 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2178 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2179 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2180 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2183 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2184 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2185 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2186 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2190 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2191 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2193 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2196 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2198 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2199 int decrypt_len, decrypt_good_mask;
2200 unsigned char version_good;
2202 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2203 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2205 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2206 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2207 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2208 * be sent already */
2211 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2219 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2220 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2221 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2222 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2224 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2231 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2232 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2237 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2249 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2250 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2251 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2252 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2253 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2254 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2256 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2257 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2258 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2260 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2263 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2264 * decrypt_good_mask will be zero if so and non-zero otherwise. */
2265 decrypt_good_mask = decrypt_len ^ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2267 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2268 * then version_good will be zero. The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa
2269 * extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2270 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2271 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2272 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2273 * decryption error. */
2274 version_good = p[0] ^ (s->client_version>>8);
2275 version_good |= p[1] ^ (s->client_version&0xff);
2277 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2278 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2279 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2280 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2281 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2282 * support the requested protocol version. If
2283 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2284 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2286 unsigned char workaround_mask = version_good;
2287 unsigned char workaround;
2289 /* workaround_mask will be 0xff if version_good is
2290 * non-zero (i.e. the version match failed). Otherwise
2292 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 4;
2293 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 2;
2294 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 1;
2295 workaround_mask = ~((workaround_mask & 1) - 1);
2297 workaround = p[0] ^ (s->version>>8);
2298 workaround |= p[1] ^ (s->version&0xff);
2300 /* If workaround_mask is 0xff (i.e. there was a version
2301 * mismatch) then we copy the value of workaround over
2303 version_good = (workaround & workaround_mask) |
2304 (version_good & ~workaround_mask);
2307 /* If any bits in version_good are set then they'll poision
2308 * decrypt_good_mask and cause rand_premaster_secret to be
2310 decrypt_good_mask |= version_good;
2312 /* decrypt_good_mask will be zero iff decrypt_len ==
2313 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed. We
2314 * fold the bottom 32 bits of it with an OR so that the LSB
2315 * will be zero iff everything is good. This assumes that we'll
2316 * never decrypt a value > 2**31 bytes, which seems safe. */
2317 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 16;
2318 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 8;
2319 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 4;
2320 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 2;
2321 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 1;
2322 /* Now select only the LSB and subtract one. If decrypt_len ==
2323 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed then
2324 * decrypt_good_mask will be all ones. Otherwise it'll be all
2326 decrypt_good_mask &= 1;
2327 decrypt_good_mask--;
2329 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2330 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2331 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2333 p[i] = (p[i] & decrypt_good_mask) |
2334 (rand_premaster_secret[i] & ~decrypt_good_mask);
2337 s->session->master_key_length=
2338 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2339 s->session->master_key,
2341 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2346 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2349 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2356 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2367 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2368 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2369 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2370 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2373 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2374 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2375 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2376 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2378 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2382 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2384 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2386 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2391 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2395 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2396 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2399 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2400 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2402 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2404 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2408 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2409 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2412 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2419 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2428 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2435 s->session->master_key_length=
2436 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2437 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2438 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2445 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2447 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2448 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2449 krb5_data authenticator;
2451 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2452 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2453 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2454 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2455 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2456 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2458 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2459 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2461 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2463 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2466 enc_ticket.length = i;
2468 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2471 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2475 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2476 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2479 authenticator.length = i;
2481 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2484 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2488 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2489 p+=authenticator.length;
2493 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2496 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2499 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2502 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2506 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2507 enc_pms.length + 6))
2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2510 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2514 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2518 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2519 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2521 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2522 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2528 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2529 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2531 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2532 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2535 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2536 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2538 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2539 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2545 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2552 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2553 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2555 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2559 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2561 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2564 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2567 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2568 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2571 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2574 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2577 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2580 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2583 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2587 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2590 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2593 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2595 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2596 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2597 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2598 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2599 * the protocol version.
2600 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2601 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2603 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2606 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2611 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2613 s->session->master_key_length=
2614 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2615 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2617 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2619 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2620 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2622 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2623 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2628 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2629 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2630 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2631 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2635 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2638 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2643 const EC_GROUP *group;
2644 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2646 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2647 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2650 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2654 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2655 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2657 /* use the certificate */
2658 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2662 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2663 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2665 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2668 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2669 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2671 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2672 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2679 /* Let's get client's public key */
2680 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2683 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2689 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2691 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2693 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2697 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2699 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2701 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2702 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2703 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2704 * never executed. When that support is
2705 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2706 * received in the certificate is
2707 * authorized for key agreement.
2708 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2709 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2712 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2714 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2718 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2719 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2725 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2729 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2730 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2732 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2735 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2739 /* Get encoded point length */
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2748 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2749 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2755 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2756 * currently, so set it to the start
2758 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2761 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2762 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2763 if (field_size <= 0)
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2769 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2777 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2778 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2779 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2780 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2781 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2782 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2784 /* Compute the master secret */
2785 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2786 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2788 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2794 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2796 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2797 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2798 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2800 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2802 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2808 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2811 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2814 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2817 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2820 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2824 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2825 * string for the callback */
2826 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2827 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2828 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2829 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2830 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2832 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2835 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2838 else if (psk_len == 0)
2840 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2842 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2843 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2847 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2848 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2850 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2852 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2856 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2857 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2858 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2859 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2862 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2866 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2867 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2868 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2869 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2870 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2873 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2877 s->session->master_key_length=
2878 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2879 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2882 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2889 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2897 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2901 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2906 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2907 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2908 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2909 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2912 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2916 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2925 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2926 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2929 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2930 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2931 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2932 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2933 unsigned long alg_a;
2935 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2936 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2937 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2938 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2939 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2940 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2942 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2943 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2944 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2945 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2946 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2947 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2948 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2949 if (client_pub_pkey)
2951 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2954 /* Decrypt session key */
2955 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2965 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2975 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2981 /* Generate master secret */
2982 s->session->master_key_length=
2983 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2984 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2985 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2986 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2991 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2992 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3000 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3002 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3008 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3009 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3013 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3014 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3015 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3016 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3017 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3022 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3024 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3030 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3032 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3034 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3035 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3036 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3038 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
3041 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3043 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3045 peer=s->session->peer;
3046 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3047 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3055 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3057 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3058 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3060 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3071 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3075 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3078 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3082 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3085 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3089 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3090 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3091 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3092 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3093 * signature without length field */
3094 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3095 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3101 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3103 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3106 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3111 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3115 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3125 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3129 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3130 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3133 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3137 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3141 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3145 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3149 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3152 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3153 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3156 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3160 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3162 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3169 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3171 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3172 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3176 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3182 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3190 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3192 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3193 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3194 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3198 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3206 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3208 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3209 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3210 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3214 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3216 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3222 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3223 { unsigned char signature[64];
3225 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3226 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3228 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3230 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3231 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3233 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3234 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3237 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3239 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3246 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3255 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3258 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3260 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3261 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3262 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3264 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3265 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3269 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3271 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3273 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3274 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3276 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3278 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3285 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3287 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3289 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3290 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3293 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3296 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3297 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3300 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3303 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3307 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3309 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3313 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3315 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3324 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3328 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3331 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3333 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3339 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3347 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3351 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3360 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3362 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3363 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3365 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3369 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3370 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3371 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3374 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3377 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3378 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3380 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3386 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3389 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3395 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3396 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3397 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3398 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3400 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3401 * when we arrive here. */
3402 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3404 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3405 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3411 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3412 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3413 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3414 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3415 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3423 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3426 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3427 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3431 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3435 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3437 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3440 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3441 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3442 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3449 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3450 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3453 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3454 return ssl_do_write(s);
3457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3458 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3459 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3461 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3463 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3464 const unsigned char *const_p;
3465 int len, slen_full, slen;
3470 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3471 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3472 unsigned char key_name[16];
3474 /* get session encoding length */
3475 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3476 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3479 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3481 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3485 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3487 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3489 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3495 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3497 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3498 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3504 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3505 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3507 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3508 * follows handshake_header_length +
3509 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3510 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3511 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3512 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3514 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3515 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3516 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3518 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3519 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3520 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3521 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3522 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3525 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3527 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3536 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3537 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3538 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3539 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3540 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3541 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3544 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3545 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3546 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3547 * as their sessions. */
3548 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3550 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3552 /* Output key name */
3554 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3557 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3558 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3559 /* Encrypt session data */
3560 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3562 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3564 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3566 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3567 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3568 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3571 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3573 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3574 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3575 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3576 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3578 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3582 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3583 return ssl_do_write(s);
3586 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3588 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3591 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3592 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3593 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3596 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3599 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3602 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3603 /* message length */
3604 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3606 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3607 /* length of OCSP response */
3608 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3609 /* actual response */
3610 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3611 /* number of bytes to write */
3612 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3613 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3617 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3618 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3621 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3622 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3623 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3624 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3627 int proto_len, padding_len;
3629 const unsigned char *p;
3631 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3632 * extension in their ClientHello */
3633 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3639 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3640 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3641 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3643 514, /* See the payload format below */
3649 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3650 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3651 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3652 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3659 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3661 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3663 /* The payload looks like:
3665 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3666 * uint8 padding_len;
3667 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3670 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3672 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3673 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3676 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3677 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3682 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3683 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3689 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3692 const unsigned char *authz, *orig_authz;
3694 size_t authz_length, i;
3696 if (s->state != SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A)
3697 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3699 orig_authz = authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
3702 /* This should never occur. */
3706 /* First we walk over the authz data to see how long the handshake
3707 * message will be. */
3708 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3715 /* n2s increments authz by 2*/
3718 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3720 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3721 length += 1 /* authz type */ + 2 /* length */ + len;
3727 length += 1 /* handshake type */ +
3728 3 /* handshake length */ +
3729 3 /* supplemental data length */ +
3730 2 /* supplemental entry type */ +
3731 2 /* supplemental entry length */;
3733 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, length))
3735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3739 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3740 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3741 /* Handshake length */
3742 l2n3(length - 4, p);
3743 /* Length of supplemental data */
3744 l2n3(length - 7, p);
3745 /* Supplemental data type */
3746 s2n(TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data, p);
3748 s2n(length - 11, p);
3752 /* Walk over the authz again and append the selected elements. */
3753 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3760 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
3763 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3765 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3769 memcpy(p, authz, len);
3777 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3778 s->init_num = length;
3781 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);