2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
296 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 * support secure renegotiation.
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
363 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
367 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
368 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
373 * callback indicates firther work to be done
375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
387 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
394 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
398 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
400 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
405 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
419 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
421 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
422 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
425 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
427 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
428 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
432 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
433 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
444 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
449 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
451 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
454 * clear this, it may get reset by
455 * send_server_key_exchange
457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
460 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
461 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
462 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
463 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
464 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
469 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
473 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
476 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
477 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
479 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
482 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
483 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
484 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
485 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
486 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
491 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
497 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
503 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
504 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
506 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
507 * during re-negotiation:
509 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
510 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
512 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
513 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
516 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
518 * ... except when the application insists on
519 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
522 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
524 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
526 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
527 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
528 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
530 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
533 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
534 /* no cert request */
536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
537 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
538 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
540 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
545 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
546 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
549 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
550 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
552 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
553 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
561 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
564 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
565 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
572 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
573 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
574 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
575 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
576 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
580 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
581 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
585 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
587 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
592 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
593 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
598 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
601 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
603 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
608 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
609 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
610 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
611 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
613 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
614 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
616 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
617 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
619 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
622 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
623 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
625 if (!s->session->peer)
628 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
629 * digest cached records.
631 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
633 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
636 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
637 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
638 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
645 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
649 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
650 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
651 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
654 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
655 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
656 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
660 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
661 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
664 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
673 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
675 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
684 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
685 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
686 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
690 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
691 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
693 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
694 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
696 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
701 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
705 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
706 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
707 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
709 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
710 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
711 * the client's Finished message is read.
713 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
714 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
716 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
720 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
724 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
725 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
727 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
728 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
729 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
730 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
731 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
732 * the client's Finished message is read.
734 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
735 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
736 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
737 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
741 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
743 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
744 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
747 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
752 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
753 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
754 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
757 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
763 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
766 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
772 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
773 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
775 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
776 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
778 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
782 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
784 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
788 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
791 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
792 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
795 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
801 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
802 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
803 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
804 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
805 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
807 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
809 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
812 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
814 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
815 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
817 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
818 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
820 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
823 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
828 /* clean a few things up */
829 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
831 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
834 /* remove buffering on output */
835 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
839 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
844 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
846 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
848 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
851 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
866 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
868 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
872 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
873 new_state = s->state;
875 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
876 s->state = new_state;
882 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
886 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
890 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
893 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
894 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
895 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
898 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
899 return ssl_do_write(s);
902 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
904 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
905 unsigned int cookie_len;
908 unsigned char *p, *d;
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
912 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
914 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
916 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
920 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
921 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
922 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
923 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
925 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
926 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
929 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
930 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
931 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
932 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
933 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
938 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
941 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
942 * for session id length
944 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
945 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
951 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
952 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
954 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
957 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
958 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
959 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
961 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
962 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
964 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
967 s->version = s->client_version;
969 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
974 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
975 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
978 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
979 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
981 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
983 if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
984 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
988 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
990 if (cookie_length == 0)
994 /* load the client random */
995 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
996 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
998 /* get the session-id */
1001 if ((d + n) - p < j) {
1002 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1007 if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
1008 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1015 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1016 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1017 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1018 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1019 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1020 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1021 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1022 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1023 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1024 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1027 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1028 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1031 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1033 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1035 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1036 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1037 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1038 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1039 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1041 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1048 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1055 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1057 if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
1058 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1062 cookie_len = *(p++);
1064 if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
1065 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1071 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1072 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1073 * does not cause an overflow.
1075 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1077 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1082 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1083 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1084 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1086 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1087 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1089 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1091 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1094 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1096 /* default verification */
1097 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1098 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1099 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1107 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1108 /* Select version to use */
1109 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1110 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1111 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1112 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1113 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1115 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1116 s->version = s->client_version;
1117 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1119 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1120 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1121 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1122 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1125 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1126 s->version = s->client_version;
1127 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1130 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1134 if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
1135 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1142 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1147 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1148 if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
1149 /* not enough data */
1150 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1154 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1159 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1162 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1165 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1166 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1168 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1169 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1171 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1172 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1180 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1184 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1185 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1187 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1188 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1189 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1190 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1191 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1193 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1194 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1195 s->session->cipher = c;
1202 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1205 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1207 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1214 if ((d + n) - p < i) {
1215 /* not enough data */
1216 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1223 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1231 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1236 /* TLS extensions */
1237 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1238 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1245 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1246 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1247 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1248 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1252 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1253 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1258 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1259 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1261 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1262 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1263 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1265 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1267 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1268 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1272 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1274 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1279 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1280 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1285 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1288 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1290 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1291 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1293 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1294 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1300 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1301 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1302 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1304 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1306 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1307 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1308 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1309 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1310 /* Can't disable compression */
1311 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1313 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1316 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1317 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1318 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1319 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1320 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1324 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1326 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1329 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1330 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1331 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1335 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1337 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1342 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1343 /* See if we have a match */
1344 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1346 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1347 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1348 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1350 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1360 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1366 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1367 * using compression.
1369 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1376 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1380 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1381 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1383 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1385 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1386 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1387 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1388 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1389 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1394 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1398 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1400 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1401 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1403 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1408 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1411 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1413 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1416 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1420 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1422 /* Session-id reuse */
1423 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1424 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1425 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1426 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1428 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1429 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1430 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1431 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1432 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1434 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1438 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1439 else if (ec != NULL)
1440 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1442 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1445 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1448 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1449 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1454 * we now have the following setup.
1456 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1457 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1458 * compression - basically ignored right now
1459 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1460 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1461 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1462 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1465 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1466 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1467 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1473 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
1476 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1478 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1481 if (ciphers != NULL)
1482 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1486 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1489 unsigned char *p, *d;
1494 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1495 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1496 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1497 p = s->s3->server_random;
1498 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1499 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1503 /* Do the message type and length last */
1504 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1506 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1507 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1510 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1511 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1514 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1515 * back in the server hello:
1516 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1517 * we send back the old session ID.
1518 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1519 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1520 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1521 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1523 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1524 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1525 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1526 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1529 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1531 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1533 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1534 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1536 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1540 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1543 /* put the cipher */
1544 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1547 /* put the compression method */
1548 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1551 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1554 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1557 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1559 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1563 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1565 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1567 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1573 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1574 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1577 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1578 return ssl_do_write(s);
1581 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1584 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1585 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1586 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1589 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1590 return ssl_do_write(s);
1593 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1599 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1603 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1606 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1607 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1610 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1613 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1614 unsigned char *p, *d;
1624 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1625 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1626 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1631 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1634 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1635 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1636 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1637 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1638 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1640 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1643 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1645 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1649 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1652 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1654 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1659 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1663 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1665 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1666 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1667 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1669 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1672 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1674 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1678 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1680 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1684 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1690 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1700 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1701 const EC_GROUP *group;
1703 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1704 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1705 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1706 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1707 if (nid != NID_undef)
1708 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1709 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1710 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1711 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1713 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1714 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1716 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1717 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1719 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1723 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1725 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1729 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1730 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1734 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1736 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1741 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1742 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1743 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1744 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1745 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1752 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1753 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1754 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1759 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1760 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1762 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1767 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1768 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1772 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1775 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1780 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1781 * allocate memory accordingly.
1783 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1784 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1785 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1788 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1789 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1790 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1791 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1793 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1797 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1798 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1799 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1800 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1802 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1807 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1811 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1812 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1813 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1819 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1820 * can set these to NULLs
1827 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1829 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1831 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1833 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1835 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1837 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1838 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1839 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1840 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1842 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1845 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1846 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1847 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1848 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1852 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1854 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1857 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1858 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1860 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1867 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1868 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1869 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1871 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1874 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1880 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1884 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1886 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1888 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1899 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1901 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1902 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1903 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1904 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1906 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1914 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1915 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1916 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1917 encodedPoint = NULL;
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1923 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1924 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1925 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1926 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1927 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1928 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1935 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1936 * points to the space at the end.
1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1939 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1942 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1943 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1944 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1945 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
1946 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5
1949 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1950 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1951 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1952 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1953 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1954 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
1955 (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) {
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1958 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1964 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1965 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1974 /* send signature algorithm */
1975 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1976 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1977 /* Should never happen */
1978 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1980 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1986 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1988 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1989 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1990 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1991 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1992 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1993 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1994 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1995 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1997 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2002 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2005 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2006 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2008 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2013 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2016 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2017 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2018 return ssl_do_write(s);
2020 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2023 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2024 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2025 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2027 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2028 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2032 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2034 unsigned char *p, *d;
2035 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2036 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2040 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2043 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2045 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2047 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2052 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2053 const unsigned char *psigs;
2054 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2056 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2065 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2068 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2069 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2070 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2071 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2072 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2077 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2078 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2080 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2085 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2094 /* else no CA names */
2095 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2098 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2100 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2101 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2102 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2106 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2108 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2116 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2119 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2120 return ssl_do_write(s);
2122 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2126 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2130 unsigned long alg_k;
2132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2134 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2138 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2142 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2145 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2146 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2147 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2148 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2151 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2152 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2153 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2154 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2158 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2160 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2163 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2164 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2166 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2169 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2170 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2171 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2172 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2174 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2177 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2179 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2184 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2185 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2186 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2187 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2189 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2192 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2195 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2196 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2199 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2200 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2202 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2211 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2212 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2213 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2214 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2215 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2217 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2218 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2220 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2225 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2226 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2227 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2228 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2229 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2232 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2233 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2236 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2240 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2241 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2244 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2247 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2248 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2249 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2250 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2251 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2252 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2255 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2257 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2260 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2261 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2262 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2263 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2264 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2265 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2268 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2269 unsigned char workaround_good;
2271 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2273 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2274 version_good |= workaround_good;
2278 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2279 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2281 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2284 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2285 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2286 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2287 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2289 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2290 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2291 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2294 s->session->master_key_length =
2295 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2297 session->master_key,
2300 (rand_premaster_secret));
2301 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2305 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2307 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2311 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2312 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2314 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2319 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2320 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2322 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2329 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2330 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2331 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2332 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2334 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2335 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2336 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2337 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2339 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2342 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2343 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2344 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2346 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2349 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2352 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2353 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2355 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2356 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2358 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2359 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2361 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2364 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2365 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2367 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2373 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2381 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2382 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2388 s->session->master_key_length =
2389 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2391 session->master_key,
2393 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2399 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2400 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2401 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2402 krb5_data authenticator;
2404 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2405 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2406 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2407 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2408 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2410 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2411 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2414 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2417 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2420 enc_ticket.length = i;
2422 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2424 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2428 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2429 p += enc_ticket.length;
2432 authenticator.length = i;
2434 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2436 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2440 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2441 p += authenticator.length;
2445 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2446 p += enc_pms.length;
2449 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2451 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2453 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2457 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2458 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2460 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2464 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2467 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2468 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2470 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2471 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2477 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2478 * return authtime == 0.
2480 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2481 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2483 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2484 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2486 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2487 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2492 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2497 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2498 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2500 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2504 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2506 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2508 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2511 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2512 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2515 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2519 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2521 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2525 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2527 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2532 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2534 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2538 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2539 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2541 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2542 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2543 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2544 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2545 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2546 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2547 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2550 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2552 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2558 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2560 s->session->master_key_length =
2561 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2563 session->master_key,
2566 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2567 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2568 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2569 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2570 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2575 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2576 * but it caused problems for apache.
2577 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2578 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2582 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
2586 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2589 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2593 const EC_GROUP *group;
2594 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2596 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2597 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2602 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2603 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2604 /* use the certificate */
2605 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2608 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2609 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2611 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2614 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2615 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2617 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2618 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2623 /* Let's get client's public key */
2624 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2630 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2632 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2633 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2635 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2638 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2639 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2641 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2642 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2643 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2644 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2645 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2646 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2648 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2650 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2654 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2655 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2660 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2663 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2664 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2666 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2668 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2672 /* Get encoded point length */
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2679 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2684 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2687 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2690 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2691 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2692 if (field_size <= 0) {
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2696 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2703 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2704 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2705 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2706 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2707 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2708 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2710 /* Compute the master secret */
2711 s->session->master_key_length =
2712 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2714 session->master_key,
2717 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2722 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2723 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2724 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2725 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2727 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2729 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2736 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2738 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2741 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2743 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2748 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2750 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2751 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2752 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2754 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2755 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2757 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2760 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2762 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2765 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2766 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2770 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2771 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2773 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2775 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2779 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2780 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2781 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
2782 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2787 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2788 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2789 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2790 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2791 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2796 s->session->master_key_length =
2797 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2799 session->master_key,
2804 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2810 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2815 if (param_len > n) {
2816 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2818 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2821 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2825 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2826 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2827 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2829 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2832 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2833 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2834 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2835 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2840 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2841 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2842 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2849 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2850 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2852 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2853 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2854 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2855 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2856 unsigned long alg_a;
2860 /* Get our certificate private key */
2861 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2862 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2863 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2864 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2865 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2867 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2868 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2869 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2873 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2878 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2879 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2880 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2881 * client certificate for authorization only.
2883 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2884 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2885 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2888 /* Decrypt session key */
2890 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2891 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2892 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2894 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2899 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2900 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2902 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2905 /* Generate master secret */
2906 s->session->master_key_length =
2907 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2909 session->master_key,
2910 premaster_secret, 32);
2911 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
2912 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2913 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2914 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2919 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2920 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2926 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2933 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2934 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2938 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2939 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2940 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2941 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2942 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2944 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2948 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2950 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2952 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2956 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2958 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2961 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2962 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2963 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2964 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2965 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2966 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2968 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2973 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2974 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2975 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2976 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2977 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2982 peer = s->session->peer;
2983 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2984 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2986 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2988 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2989 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2993 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2994 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2995 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2997 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3000 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3001 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
3004 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3005 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3007 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3009 } else if (rv == 0) {
3010 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3014 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3023 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3027 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3028 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3030 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3034 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3037 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3038 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3040 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3044 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3047 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3048 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3050 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3054 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3055 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3061 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3062 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3063 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3066 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3071 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3078 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3079 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3080 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3081 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3084 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3091 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3092 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3093 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3094 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3097 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3103 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3104 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3105 unsigned char signature[64];
3107 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3109 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3113 if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) {
3114 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3115 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3120 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3122 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3123 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3125 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3127 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3129 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3135 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3142 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3143 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3146 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3147 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3148 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3149 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3151 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3152 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3156 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3158 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3160 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3161 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3163 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3165 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3168 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3173 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3174 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3175 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3177 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3178 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3182 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3184 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3186 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3187 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3190 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3194 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3195 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3199 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3201 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3207 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3208 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3212 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3214 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3215 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3217 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3222 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3228 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3230 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3233 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3241 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3242 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3243 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3244 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3246 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3249 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3250 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3251 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3253 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3254 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3257 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3258 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3259 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3263 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3265 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3267 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3272 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3273 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3274 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3275 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3278 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3281 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3282 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3283 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3288 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3289 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3290 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3292 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3293 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3301 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3303 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3309 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3313 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3317 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3318 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3320 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3321 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3322 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3324 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3325 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3330 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3332 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3335 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3338 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3339 return ssl_do_write(s);
3342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3343 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3344 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3346 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3350 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3351 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3352 const unsigned char *const_p;
3353 int len, slen_full, slen;
3356 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3357 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3358 unsigned char key_name[16];
3360 /* get session encoding length */
3361 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3363 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3366 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3367 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3370 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3372 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3376 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3377 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3380 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3384 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3387 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3390 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3392 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3393 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3394 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3398 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3399 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3402 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3405 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3406 * follows handshake_header_length +
3407 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3408 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3409 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3410 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3412 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3413 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3414 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3417 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3419 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3420 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3422 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3423 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3427 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3429 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3430 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3432 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3433 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3435 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3439 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3440 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3441 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3443 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3445 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3447 /* Output key name */
3449 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3452 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3453 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3454 /* Encrypt session data */
3455 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3458 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3462 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3464 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3467 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3468 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3471 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3473 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3474 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3475 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3477 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3478 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3482 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3483 return ssl_do_write(s);
3487 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3488 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3489 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3493 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3495 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3498 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3499 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3500 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3503 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3504 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3508 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3511 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3512 /* message length */
3513 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3515 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3516 /* length of OCSP response */
3517 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3518 /* actual response */
3519 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3520 /* number of bytes to write */
3521 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3522 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3526 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3527 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3530 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3532 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3533 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3535 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3538 int proto_len, padding_len;
3540 const unsigned char *p;
3543 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3544 * extension in their ClientHello
3546 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3548 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3549 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3553 /* See the payload format below */
3554 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3555 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3556 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3557 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3563 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3564 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3565 * ssl3_get_finished).
3567 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3569 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3574 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3575 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3578 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3581 * The payload looks like:
3583 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3584 * uint8 padding_len;
3585 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3588 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3589 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3592 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3593 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3594 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3598 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3599 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3601 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3604 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3605 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;