1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
276 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0,
279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
283 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
285 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
287 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
292 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
300 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
307 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
308 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
310 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
312 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
313 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
315 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
317 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
318 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
319 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
321 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
322 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
324 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
325 * client that doesn't support secure
328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
329 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
335 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
336 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
337 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
338 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
342 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
343 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
346 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
347 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
348 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
349 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
352 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
355 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
361 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
363 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
364 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
366 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
370 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
372 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
373 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
376 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
378 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
379 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
380 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
381 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
383 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
391 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
396 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
397 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
398 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
402 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
413 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
421 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
422 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
423 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s, &skip);
424 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
426 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
431 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
432 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
433 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
434 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
435 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
436 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
437 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
439 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
440 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
442 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
443 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
445 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
457 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
462 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
463 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
464 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
466 /* clear this, it may get reset by
467 * send_server_key_exchange */
468 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
470 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
471 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
473 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
474 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
475 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
476 * be able to handle this) */
477 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
479 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
482 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
483 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
485 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
487 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
488 * message only if the cipher suite is either
489 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
490 * server certificate contains the server's
491 * public key for key exchange.
493 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
494 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
495 * hint if provided */
496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
497 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
500 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
501 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
503 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
504 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
505 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
506 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
507 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
508 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
514 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
515 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
520 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
525 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
526 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
527 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
528 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
529 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
530 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
531 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
532 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
533 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
534 * and in RFC 2246): */
535 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
536 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
537 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
538 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
539 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
540 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
541 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
542 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
543 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
545 /* no cert request */
547 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
548 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
549 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
550 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
555 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
556 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
557 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
558 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
561 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
562 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
570 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
571 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
572 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
573 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
577 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
579 /* This code originally checked to see if
580 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
581 * and then flushed. This caused problems
582 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
583 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
584 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
585 * still exist. So instead we just flush
589 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
590 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
595 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
597 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
601 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
602 ret=tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(s);
603 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
604 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
605 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
609 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
610 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
611 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
612 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
616 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
619 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
622 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
624 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
625 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
628 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
632 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
633 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
634 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
639 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
640 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
641 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
642 * message is not sent.
643 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
644 * the client uses its key from the certificate
647 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
648 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
650 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
651 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
653 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
657 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
659 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
661 if (!s->session->peer)
663 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
664 * at this point and digest cached records.
666 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
671 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
672 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
680 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
683 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
684 * a client cert, it can be verified
685 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
686 * should be generalized. But it is next step
688 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
689 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
691 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
692 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
696 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
697 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
708 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
709 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
711 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
712 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
713 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
714 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
716 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
717 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
719 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
720 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
722 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
727 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
728 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
729 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
730 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
731 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
733 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
737 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
738 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
739 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
740 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
741 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
742 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
746 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
747 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
750 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
755 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
756 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
757 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
758 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
759 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
763 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
764 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
765 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
766 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
767 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
773 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
774 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
776 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
777 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
778 { ret= -1; goto end; }
780 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
781 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
783 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
784 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
787 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
788 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
796 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
797 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
798 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
799 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
800 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
801 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
802 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
803 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
806 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
807 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
809 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
811 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
812 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
815 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
819 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
824 /* clean a few things up */
825 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
827 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
830 /* remove buffering on output */
831 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
835 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
840 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
842 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
844 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
846 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
860 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
864 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
869 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
873 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
880 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
884 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
888 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
891 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
893 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
894 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
897 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
898 return ssl_do_write(s);
901 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
906 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
907 * so permit appropriate message length */
908 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
914 if (!ok) return((int)n);
915 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
917 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA)
920 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
922 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
924 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
929 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
930 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
932 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
934 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
935 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
939 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
941 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
942 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
945 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
951 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
953 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
954 unsigned int cookie_len;
959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
963 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
965 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
968 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
969 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
970 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
971 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
974 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
977 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
980 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
981 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
982 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
983 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
984 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
987 if (!ok) return((int)n);
989 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
991 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
992 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
993 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
996 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
997 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
998 : (s->client_version < s->version))
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1001 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
1002 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
1004 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1005 s->version = s->client_version;
1007 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1011 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
1012 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1013 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1015 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1017 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1019 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1020 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1022 if (cookie_length == 0)
1026 /* load the client random */
1027 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1028 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1030 /* get the session-id */
1034 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1035 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1036 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1037 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1038 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1040 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1041 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1042 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1043 * setting will be ignored.
1045 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1047 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1052 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1054 { /* previous session */
1061 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1071 cookie_len = *(p++);
1074 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1075 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1076 * does not cause an overflow.
1078 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1081 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1086 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1087 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1090 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1092 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1094 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1097 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1099 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1102 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1104 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1105 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1107 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1109 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1112 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1117 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1119 /* Select version to use */
1120 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1121 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1123 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1124 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1126 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1129 s->version = s->client_version;
1130 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1133 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1134 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1136 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1137 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1142 s->version = s->client_version;
1143 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1146 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1151 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1153 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1154 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1160 /* not enough data */
1161 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1165 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1172 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1173 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1176 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1179 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1181 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1183 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1185 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1186 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1194 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1195 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1198 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1200 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1201 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1202 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1203 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1204 * enabled, though. */
1205 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1206 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1208 s->session->cipher = c;
1215 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1216 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1217 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1227 /* not enough data */
1228 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1237 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1244 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1251 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1253 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1260 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1261 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1262 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1263 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1266 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1267 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1273 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1275 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1277 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1278 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1279 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1282 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1283 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1287 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1288 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1289 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1291 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1296 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1299 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1301 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1302 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1304 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1305 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1310 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1311 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1312 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1313 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1315 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1316 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1318 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1319 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1320 /* Can't disable compression */
1321 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s))
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1326 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1327 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1329 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1330 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1332 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1336 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1341 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1342 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1344 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1349 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1356 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1357 { /* See if we have a match */
1358 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1360 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1361 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1363 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1376 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1381 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1382 * using compression.
1384 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1391 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1396 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1397 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1399 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1401 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1402 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1403 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1404 if (ciphers == NULL)
1406 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1411 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1413 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1415 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1418 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1424 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1427 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1429 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1430 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1434 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1438 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1439 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1440 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1441 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1442 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1443 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1444 /* do not send a session ticket */
1445 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1449 /* Session-id reuse */
1450 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1451 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1452 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1453 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1455 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1457 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1458 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1460 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1461 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1463 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1467 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1468 else if (ec != NULL)
1469 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1471 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1475 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1478 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1480 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1484 /* we now have the following setup.
1486 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1487 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1488 * compression - basically ignored right now
1489 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1490 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1491 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1492 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1495 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1496 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1498 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1505 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1509 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1512 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1513 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1516 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1519 unsigned char *p,*d;
1524 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1526 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1527 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1528 p=s->s3->server_random;
1529 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1532 /* Do the message type and length last */
1533 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1535 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1536 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1539 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1540 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1542 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1543 * back in the server hello:
1544 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1545 * we send back the old session ID.
1546 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1547 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1548 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1549 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1551 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1552 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1553 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1554 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1557 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1558 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1560 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1562 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1563 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1569 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1572 /* put the cipher */
1573 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1576 /* put the compression method */
1577 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1580 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1583 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1586 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1591 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1593 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1600 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1601 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1604 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1605 return ssl_do_write(s);
1608 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1611 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1613 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1614 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1617 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1618 return ssl_do_write(s);
1621 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1627 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1634 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1635 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1638 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1641 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1642 unsigned char *p,*d;
1652 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1653 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1655 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1660 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1663 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1666 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1668 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1669 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1670 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1673 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1682 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1688 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1693 if (type & SSL_kDHE)
1695 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1697 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1700 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1707 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1708 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1709 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1710 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1713 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1717 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1718 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp))
1720 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1724 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1730 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1732 else if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1739 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1740 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1741 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1743 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1752 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1753 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1754 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1755 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1768 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1770 const EC_GROUP *group;
1772 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1773 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1775 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1776 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1777 if (nid != NID_undef)
1778 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1780 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1782 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1783 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1784 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1788 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1793 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1799 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1807 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1813 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1814 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1815 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1816 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1818 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1825 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1826 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1827 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1833 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1834 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1840 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1841 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1842 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1845 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1852 /* Encode the public key.
1853 * First check the size of encoding and
1854 * allocate memory accordingly.
1856 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1857 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1858 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1861 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1862 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1863 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1864 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1871 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1872 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1873 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1874 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1876 if (encodedlen == 0)
1878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1882 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1884 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1885 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1886 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1887 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1892 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1893 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1901 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1903 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1905 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1906 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1909 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1911 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1913 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1914 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1915 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1916 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1929 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1933 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1935 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1937 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1944 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1945 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1947 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1950 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1953 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1961 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1966 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1968 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1971 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1984 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1986 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1987 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1988 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1989 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1990 * the actual encoded point itself
1992 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
2000 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
2001 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
2003 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2004 encodedPoint = NULL;
2009 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2010 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
2012 /* copy PSK identity hint */
2013 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
2014 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
2015 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2022 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
2023 * and p points to the space at the end. */
2024 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2025 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2029 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
2031 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2032 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2033 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
2034 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2035 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2036 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2037 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2038 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
2039 (unsigned int *)&i);
2043 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2044 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2056 /* send signature algorithm */
2057 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2059 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2061 /* Should never happen */
2062 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2069 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2072 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2073 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2074 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2075 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2076 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2077 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2084 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2089 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2090 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2096 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2099 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2100 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2101 return ssl_do_write(s);
2103 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2106 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2107 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2109 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2113 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2115 unsigned char *p,*d;
2117 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2121 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2125 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2127 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2129 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2134 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2136 const unsigned char *psigs;
2137 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2138 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2139 /* Skip over length for now */
2141 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2142 /* Now fill in length */
2152 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2156 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2158 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2159 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2160 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2165 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2166 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2169 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2176 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2177 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2183 /* else no CA names */
2184 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2187 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2189 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2190 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2192 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2197 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2199 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2207 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2210 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2211 return ssl_do_write(s);
2216 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2220 unsigned long alg_k;
2222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2224 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2228 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2232 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2235 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2236 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2237 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2238 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2241 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2242 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2243 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2244 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2248 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2249 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2251 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2254 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2256 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2257 int decrypt_len, decrypt_good_mask;
2258 unsigned char version_good;
2260 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2261 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2263 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2264 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2265 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2266 * be sent already */
2269 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2277 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2278 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2279 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2280 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2282 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2289 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2290 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2295 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2307 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2308 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2309 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2310 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2311 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2312 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2314 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2315 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2316 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2318 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2321 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2322 * decrypt_good_mask will be zero if so and non-zero otherwise. */
2323 decrypt_good_mask = decrypt_len ^ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2325 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2326 * then version_good will be zero. The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa
2327 * extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2328 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2329 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2330 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2331 * decryption error. */
2332 version_good = p[0] ^ (s->client_version>>8);
2333 version_good |= p[1] ^ (s->client_version&0xff);
2335 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2336 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2337 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2338 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2339 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2340 * support the requested protocol version. If
2341 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2342 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2344 unsigned char workaround_mask = version_good;
2345 unsigned char workaround;
2347 /* workaround_mask will be 0xff if version_good is
2348 * non-zero (i.e. the version match failed). Otherwise
2350 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 4;
2351 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 2;
2352 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 1;
2353 workaround_mask = ~((workaround_mask & 1) - 1);
2355 workaround = p[0] ^ (s->version>>8);
2356 workaround |= p[1] ^ (s->version&0xff);
2358 /* If workaround_mask is 0xff (i.e. there was a version
2359 * mismatch) then we copy the value of workaround over
2361 version_good = (workaround & workaround_mask) |
2362 (version_good & ~workaround_mask);
2365 /* If any bits in version_good are set then they'll poision
2366 * decrypt_good_mask and cause rand_premaster_secret to be
2368 decrypt_good_mask |= version_good;
2370 /* decrypt_good_mask will be zero iff decrypt_len ==
2371 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed. We
2372 * fold the bottom 32 bits of it with an OR so that the LSB
2373 * will be zero iff everything is good. This assumes that we'll
2374 * never decrypt a value > 2**31 bytes, which seems safe. */
2375 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 16;
2376 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 8;
2377 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 4;
2378 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 2;
2379 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 1;
2380 /* Now select only the LSB and subtract one. If decrypt_len ==
2381 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed then
2382 * decrypt_good_mask will be all ones. Otherwise it'll be all
2384 decrypt_good_mask &= 1;
2385 decrypt_good_mask--;
2387 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2388 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2389 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2391 p[i] = (p[i] & decrypt_good_mask) |
2392 (rand_premaster_secret[i] & ~decrypt_good_mask);
2395 s->session->master_key_length=
2396 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2397 s->session->master_key,
2399 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2404 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2407 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2414 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2425 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2426 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2427 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2428 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2431 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2432 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2433 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2434 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2436 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2440 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2442 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2444 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2449 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2453 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2454 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2457 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2458 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2460 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2462 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2466 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2467 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2470 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2477 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2486 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2493 s->session->master_key_length=
2494 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2495 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2496 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2503 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2505 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2506 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2507 krb5_data authenticator;
2509 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2510 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2511 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2512 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2513 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2514 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2516 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2517 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2519 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2521 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2524 enc_ticket.length = i;
2526 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2529 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2533 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2534 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2537 authenticator.length = i;
2539 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2542 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2546 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2547 p+=authenticator.length;
2551 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2554 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2557 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2560 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2564 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2565 enc_pms.length + 6))
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2568 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2572 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2576 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2577 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2579 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2580 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2586 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2587 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2589 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2590 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2593 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2594 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2596 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2597 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2603 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2610 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2611 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2613 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2617 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2619 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2622 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2625 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2626 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2629 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2632 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2635 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2638 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2641 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2645 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2648 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2651 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2653 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2654 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2655 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2656 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2657 * the protocol version.
2658 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2659 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2661 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2664 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2669 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2671 s->session->master_key_length=
2672 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2673 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2675 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2677 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2678 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2680 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2681 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2686 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2687 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2688 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2689 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2693 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2695 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2696 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2701 const EC_GROUP *group;
2702 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2704 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2705 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2708 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2712 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2713 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2715 /* use the certificate */
2716 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2720 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2721 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2723 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2726 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2727 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2729 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2730 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2737 /* Let's get client's public key */
2738 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2741 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2747 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2749 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
2751 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2755 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2757 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2759 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2760 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2761 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2762 * never executed. When that support is
2763 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2764 * received in the certificate is
2765 * authorized for key agreement.
2766 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2767 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2770 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2772 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2776 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2777 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2783 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2787 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2788 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2790 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2793 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2797 /* Get encoded point length */
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2806 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2807 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2813 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2814 * currently, so set it to the start
2816 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2819 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2820 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2821 if (field_size <= 0)
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2827 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2835 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2836 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2837 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2838 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2839 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2840 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2842 /* Compute the master secret */
2843 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2844 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2846 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2852 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2854 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2855 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2856 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2858 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2860 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2866 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2869 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2872 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2875 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2878 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2882 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2883 * string for the callback */
2884 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2885 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2886 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2887 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2888 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2890 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2893 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2896 else if (psk_len == 0)
2898 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2900 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2901 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2905 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2906 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2908 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2910 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2914 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2915 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2916 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2917 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2920 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2924 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2925 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2926 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2927 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2928 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2931 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2935 s->session->master_key_length=
2936 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2937 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2940 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2947 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2955 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2959 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2964 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2965 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2966 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2967 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2970 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2974 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2983 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2984 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2987 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2988 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2989 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2990 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2991 unsigned long alg_a;
2995 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2996 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2997 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2998 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2999 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
3000 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3002 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
3003 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
3004 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3005 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3006 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
3007 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
3008 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3009 if (client_pub_pkey)
3011 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3014 /* Decrypt session key */
3015 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
3016 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
3017 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3024 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3030 /* Generate master secret */
3031 s->session->master_key_length=
3032 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3033 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
3034 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3035 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3040 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
3041 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3049 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3051 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3057 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3058 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3062 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3063 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3064 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3065 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3066 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3071 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3073 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3079 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3081 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3083 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3084 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3085 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3087 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
3090 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3092 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3094 peer=s->session->peer;
3095 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3096 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3104 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3106 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3107 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3109 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3120 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3124 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3127 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3131 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3134 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3138 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3139 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3140 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3141 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3142 * signature without length field */
3143 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3144 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3150 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3152 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3155 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3160 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3164 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3174 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3178 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3179 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3182 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3186 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3190 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3194 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3198 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3201 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3202 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3205 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3209 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3211 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3218 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3220 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3221 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3225 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3231 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3239 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3241 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3242 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3243 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3247 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3255 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3257 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3258 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3259 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3263 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3265 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3271 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3272 { unsigned char signature[64];
3274 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3275 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3277 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3279 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3280 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3282 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3283 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3286 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3288 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3295 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3304 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3307 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3309 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3310 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3311 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3313 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3314 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3318 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3320 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3322 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3323 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3325 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3327 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3334 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3336 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3338 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3339 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3342 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3345 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3346 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3349 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3352 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3356 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3358 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3362 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3364 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3373 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3377 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3380 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3382 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3388 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3396 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3400 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3409 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3411 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3412 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3414 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3418 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3419 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3420 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3423 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3426 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3427 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3429 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3436 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3439 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3446 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3449 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3452 al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3454 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3457 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3460 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3461 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3462 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3463 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3465 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3466 * when we arrive here. */
3467 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3469 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3470 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3476 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3477 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3478 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3479 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3480 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3488 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3491 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3492 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3496 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3500 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3502 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3505 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3506 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3507 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3514 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk))
3516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3519 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3522 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3523 return ssl_do_write(s);
3526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3527 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3528 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3530 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3532 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3533 const unsigned char *const_p;
3534 int len, slen_full, slen;
3539 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3540 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3541 unsigned char key_name[16];
3543 /* get session encoding length */
3544 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3545 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3548 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3550 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3554 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3556 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3558 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3564 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3566 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3567 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3573 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3574 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3576 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3577 * follows handshake_header_length +
3578 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3579 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3580 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3581 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3583 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3584 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3585 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3587 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3588 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3589 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3590 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3591 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3594 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3596 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3605 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3606 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3607 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3608 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3609 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3610 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3613 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3614 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3615 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3616 * as their sessions. */
3617 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3619 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3621 /* Output key name */
3623 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3626 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3627 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3628 /* Encrypt session data */
3629 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3631 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3633 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3635 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3636 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3637 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3640 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3642 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3643 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3644 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3645 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3647 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3651 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3652 return ssl_do_write(s);
3655 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3657 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3660 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3661 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3662 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3665 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3668 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3671 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3672 /* message length */
3673 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3675 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3676 /* length of OCSP response */
3677 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3678 /* actual response */
3679 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3680 /* number of bytes to write */
3681 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3682 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3686 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3687 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3690 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3691 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3692 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3693 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3696 int proto_len, padding_len;
3698 const unsigned char *p;
3700 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3701 * extension in their ClientHello */
3702 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3708 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3709 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3710 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3712 514, /* See the payload format below */
3718 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3719 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3720 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3721 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3728 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3730 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3732 /* The payload looks like:
3734 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3735 * uint8 padding_len;
3736 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3739 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3741 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3742 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3745 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3746 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3751 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3752 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3758 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s, int *skip)
3761 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count)
3763 unsigned char *p = NULL;
3764 unsigned char *size_loc = NULL;
3765 srv_supp_data_record *record = NULL;
3769 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3771 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
3772 unsigned short outlen = 0;
3774 record = &s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i];
3776 /* NULL callback or -1 omits supp data entry */
3779 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->supp_data_type,
3780 &out, &outlen, &al, record->arg);
3781 if (cb_retval == -1)
3782 continue; /* skip this supp data entry */
3785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3788 if (outlen == 0 || TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data < outlen + 4 + length)
3790 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3793 /* write supp data entry...
3794 * if first entry, write handshake message type
3795 * jump back to write length at end */
3798 /* 1 byte message type + 3 bytes for
3800 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, 4))
3802 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3805 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3806 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3807 /* hold on to length field to update later */
3809 /* skip over handshake length field (3
3810 * bytes) and supp_data length field
3815 /* 2 byte supp data type + 2 byte length + outlen */
3816 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, outlen + 4))
3818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3821 s2n(record->supp_data_type, p);
3823 memcpy(p, out, outlen);
3824 /* update length to supp data type (2 bytes) +
3825 * supp data length (2 bytes) + supp data */
3826 length += (outlen + 4);
3831 /* write handshake length */
3832 l2n3(length - 4, size_loc);
3833 /* supp_data length */
3834 l2n3(length - 7, size_loc);
3835 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3836 s->init_num = length;
3839 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3843 /* no supp data message sent */
3849 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3853 int tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3859 const unsigned char *p, *d;
3860 unsigned short supp_data_entry_type = 0;
3861 unsigned short supp_data_entry_len = 0;
3862 unsigned long supp_data_len = 0;
3865 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3866 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A,
3867 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B,
3868 SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,
3869 /* use default limit */
3870 TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data,
3873 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3875 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3878 /* The message cannot be empty */
3881 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3885 n2l3(p, supp_data_len);
3886 while (p<d+supp_data_len)
3888 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_type);
3889 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_len);
3890 /* if there is a callback for this supp data type, send it */
3891 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3893 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].supp_data_type == supp_data_entry_type && s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2)
3895 cb_retval = s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2(s, supp_data_entry_type, p, supp_data_entry_len, &al, s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].arg);
3898 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3903 p+=supp_data_entry_len;
3907 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);