1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
156 #include "ssl_locl.h"
157 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
175 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
177 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
178 return(SSLv3_server_method());
183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
184 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s,int *al)
186 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
188 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
190 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
191 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
193 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
195 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
196 we do so if There is no srp login name */
198 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
202 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
209 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
211 ssl_undefined_function,
212 ssl3_get_server_method)
214 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
217 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
218 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
220 int new_state,state,skip=0;
222 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
226 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
228 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
229 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
231 /* init things to blank */
233 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
242 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
243 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
244 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
246 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
248 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
259 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
261 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
265 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
266 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
269 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
271 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
276 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
278 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
280 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
285 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
293 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
300 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
301 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
305 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
306 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
310 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
311 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
312 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
314 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
315 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
317 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
318 * client that doesn't support secure
321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
322 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
328 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
329 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
330 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
331 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
336 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
339 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
340 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
341 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
342 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
345 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
356 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
358 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
359 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
364 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
366 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
367 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
370 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
372 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
373 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
374 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
375 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
377 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
385 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
391 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
392 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
396 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
399 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
406 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
411 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
412 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
413 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
414 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
415 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
416 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
418 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
419 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
421 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
422 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
424 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
429 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
436 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
442 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
443 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
445 /* clear this, it may get reset by
446 * send_server_key_exchange */
447 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
449 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
450 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
452 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
453 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
454 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
455 * be able to handle this) */
456 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
458 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
461 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
462 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
464 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
466 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
467 * message only if the cipher suite is either
468 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
469 * server certificate contains the server's
470 * public key for key exchange.
472 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
473 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
474 * hint if provided */
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
476 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
479 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
480 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
482 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
483 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
484 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
485 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
486 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
487 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
493 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
494 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
499 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
504 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
505 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
506 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
507 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
508 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
509 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
510 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
511 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
512 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
513 * and in RFC 2246): */
514 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
515 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
516 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
517 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
518 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
519 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
520 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
521 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
522 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
524 /* no cert request */
526 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
527 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
528 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
529 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
534 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
535 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
536 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
537 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
538 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
540 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
541 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
549 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
550 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
551 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
552 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
556 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
558 /* This code originally checked to see if
559 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
560 * and then flushed. This caused problems
561 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
562 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
563 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
564 * still exist. So instead we just flush
568 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
569 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
574 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
576 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
580 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
581 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
582 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
586 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
588 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
590 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
591 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
594 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
598 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
600 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
605 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
606 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
607 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
608 * message is not sent.
609 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
610 * the client uses its key from the certificate
613 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
614 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
616 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
617 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
619 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
623 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
625 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
627 if (!s->session->peer)
629 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
630 * at this point and digest cached records.
632 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
637 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
638 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
646 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
649 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
650 * a client cert, it can be verified
651 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
652 * should be generalized. But it is next step
654 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
655 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
657 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
658 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
662 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
663 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
674 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
675 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
677 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
678 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
679 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
681 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
682 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
684 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
685 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
687 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
692 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
695 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
696 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
698 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
704 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
705 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
706 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
710 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
711 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
714 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
719 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
720 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
721 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
722 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
723 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
727 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
728 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
729 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
730 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
731 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
737 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
738 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
740 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
741 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
742 { ret= -1; goto end; }
744 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
745 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
747 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
748 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
751 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
752 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
760 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
762 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
763 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
764 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
765 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
766 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
767 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
770 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
771 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
773 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
774 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
776 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
780 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
785 /* clean a few things up */
786 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
788 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
791 /* remove buffering on output */
792 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
796 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
801 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
803 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
805 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
807 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
821 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
825 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
830 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
834 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
841 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
845 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
849 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
853 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
855 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
856 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
861 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
862 /* number of bytes to write */
867 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
868 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
871 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
876 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
877 * so permit appropriate message length */
878 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
884 if (!ok) return((int)n);
885 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
886 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
888 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
890 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
895 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
896 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
898 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
900 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
901 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
905 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
907 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
908 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
911 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
917 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
919 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
920 unsigned int cookie_len;
923 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
928 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
930 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
931 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
932 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
933 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
936 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
939 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
942 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
943 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
944 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
945 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
946 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
949 if (!ok) return((int)n);
951 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
953 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
954 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
955 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
958 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
959 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
962 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
964 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
965 s->version = s->client_version;
967 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
971 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
972 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
973 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
975 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
977 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
979 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
980 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
982 if (cookie_length == 0)
986 /* load the client random */
987 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
990 /* get the session-id */
994 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
995 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
996 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
997 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
998 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1000 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1001 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1002 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1003 * setting will be ignored.
1005 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1007 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1012 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1014 { /* previous session */
1021 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1028 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1031 cookie_len = *(p++);
1034 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1035 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1036 * does not cause an overflow.
1038 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1041 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1046 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1047 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1050 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1052 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1054 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1057 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1059 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1062 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1064 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1065 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1067 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1069 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1080 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1082 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1083 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1089 /* not enough data */
1090 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1094 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1101 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1102 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1105 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1108 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1110 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1112 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1114 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1115 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1123 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1124 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1127 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1129 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1130 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1131 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1132 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1133 * enabled, though. */
1134 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1135 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1137 s->session->cipher = c;
1144 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1145 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1146 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1156 /* not enough data */
1157 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1164 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1171 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1178 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1180 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1182 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1187 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1192 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1193 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1194 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1195 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1199 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1200 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1202 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1204 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1209 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1211 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1213 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1214 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1215 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1218 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1219 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1223 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1224 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1225 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1227 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1232 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1235 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1237 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1238 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1240 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1241 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1246 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1247 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1248 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1249 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1251 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1252 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1254 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1255 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1256 /* Can't disable compression */
1257 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1259 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1263 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1264 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1266 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1267 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1269 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1273 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1275 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1279 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1280 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1282 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1287 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1294 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1295 { /* See if we have a match */
1296 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1298 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1299 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1301 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1314 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1319 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1320 * using compression.
1322 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1324 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1330 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1335 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1336 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1338 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1340 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1341 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1342 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1343 if (ciphers == NULL)
1345 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1350 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1351 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1355 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1359 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1360 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1361 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1362 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1363 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0));
1364 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1365 /* do not send a session ticket */
1366 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1370 /* Session-id reuse */
1371 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1372 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1373 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1374 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1376 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1378 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1379 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1381 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1382 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1384 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1388 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1389 else if (ec != NULL)
1390 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1392 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1396 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1399 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1401 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1405 /* we now have the following setup.
1407 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1408 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1409 * compression - basically ignored right now
1410 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1411 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1412 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1413 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1420 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1423 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1427 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1430 unsigned char *p,*d;
1433 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1437 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1439 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1440 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1441 p=s->s3->server_random;
1442 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1443 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1445 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1448 /* Do the message type and length last */
1451 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1452 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1455 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1456 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1458 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1459 * back in the server hello:
1460 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1461 * we send back the old session ID.
1462 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1463 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1464 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1465 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1467 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1468 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1469 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1470 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1473 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1474 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1476 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1478 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1479 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1485 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1488 /* put the cipher */
1489 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1492 /* put the compression method */
1493 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1496 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1499 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1502 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1507 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1516 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1519 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1520 /* number of bytes to write */
1525 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1526 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1529 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1533 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1535 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1538 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1543 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1544 /* number of bytes to write */
1549 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1550 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1553 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1559 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1566 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1567 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1570 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1573 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1574 unsigned char *p,*d;
1584 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1585 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1587 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1592 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1595 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1598 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1600 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1601 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1602 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1605 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1614 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1620 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1625 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1628 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1629 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1630 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1631 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1634 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1639 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1645 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1652 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1653 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1654 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1656 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1665 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1666 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1667 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1668 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1681 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1683 const EC_GROUP *group;
1685 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1686 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1688 /* Get NID of first shared curve */
1689 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, 0);
1690 if (nid != NID_undef)
1691 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1693 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1695 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1696 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1697 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1701 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1706 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1712 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1718 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1720 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1726 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1727 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1728 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1729 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1731 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1738 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1739 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1740 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1746 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1747 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1753 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1754 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1755 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1758 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1765 /* Encode the public key.
1766 * First check the size of encoding and
1767 * allocate memory accordingly.
1769 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1770 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1771 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1774 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1775 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1776 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1777 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1784 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1785 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1786 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1787 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1789 if (encodedlen == 0)
1791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1795 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1797 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1798 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1799 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1800 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1805 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1806 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1814 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1816 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1818 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1819 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1822 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1824 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1826 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1827 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1828 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1829 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1842 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1846 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1848 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1850 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1857 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1858 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1860 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1863 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1866 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1874 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1879 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1882 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1884 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1885 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1898 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1900 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1901 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1902 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1903 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1904 * the actual encoded point itself
1906 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1914 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1915 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1917 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1918 encodedPoint = NULL;
1923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1924 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1926 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1927 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1928 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1929 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1936 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1937 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1939 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1940 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1944 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1946 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1947 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1948 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1949 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1950 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1951 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1952 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1953 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1954 (unsigned int *)&i);
1958 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1959 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1971 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1973 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1975 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1977 /* Should never happen */
1978 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1985 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1988 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1989 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1990 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1991 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1992 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1993 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2000 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2005 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2006 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2012 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2015 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2021 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2022 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2023 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2025 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2028 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2029 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2031 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2035 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2037 unsigned char *p,*d;
2039 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2043 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2047 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2049 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2051 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2056 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2058 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2068 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2072 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2074 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2075 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2076 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2081 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2082 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2085 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2092 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2093 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2099 /* else no CA names */
2100 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2103 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2104 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2107 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2112 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2113 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2116 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2123 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2126 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2127 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2132 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2136 unsigned long alg_k;
2138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2140 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2144 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2148 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2151 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2152 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2153 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2154 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2157 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2158 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2159 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2160 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2164 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2165 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2167 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2170 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2172 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2173 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2175 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2176 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2177 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2178 * be sent already */
2181 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2189 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2190 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2191 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2192 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2194 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2201 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2202 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2207 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2219 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2223 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2225 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2226 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2229 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2231 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2232 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2233 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2234 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2235 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2237 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2238 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2239 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2241 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2242 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2244 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2245 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2246 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2247 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2248 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2249 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2250 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2256 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2257 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2258 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2260 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2261 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2262 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2263 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2267 s->session->master_key_length=
2268 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2269 s->session->master_key,
2271 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2276 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2279 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2286 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2297 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2298 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2299 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2300 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2303 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2304 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2305 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2306 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2308 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2312 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2314 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2316 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2321 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2325 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2326 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2329 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2330 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2332 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2334 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2338 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2339 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2342 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2349 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2358 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2365 s->session->master_key_length=
2366 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2367 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2368 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2375 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2377 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2378 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2379 krb5_data authenticator;
2381 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2382 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2383 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2384 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2385 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2386 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2388 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2389 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2391 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2393 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2396 enc_ticket.length = i;
2398 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2401 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2405 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2406 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2409 authenticator.length = i;
2411 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2414 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2418 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2419 p+=authenticator.length;
2423 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2426 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2429 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2432 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2436 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2437 enc_pms.length + 6))
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2440 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2444 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2448 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2449 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2451 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2452 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2458 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2459 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2461 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2462 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2465 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2466 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2468 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2469 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2475 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2482 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2483 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2485 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2489 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2491 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2494 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2497 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2498 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2501 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2504 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2507 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2510 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2513 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2517 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2520 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2523 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2525 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2526 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2527 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2528 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2529 * the protocol version.
2530 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2531 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2533 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2536 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2541 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2543 s->session->master_key_length=
2544 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2545 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2547 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2549 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2550 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2552 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2553 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2558 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2559 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2560 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2561 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2565 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2568 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2573 const EC_GROUP *group;
2574 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2576 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2577 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2580 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2584 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2585 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2587 /* use the certificate */
2588 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2592 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2593 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2595 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2598 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2599 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2601 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2602 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2609 /* Let's get client's public key */
2610 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2613 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2619 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2621 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2623 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2627 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2629 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2631 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2632 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2633 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2634 * never executed. When that support is
2635 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2636 * received in the certificate is
2637 * authorized for key agreement.
2638 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2639 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2642 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2644 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2648 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2649 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2655 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2659 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2660 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2662 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2665 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2669 /* Get encoded point length */
2674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2678 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2679 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2685 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2686 * currently, so set it to the start
2688 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2691 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2692 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2693 if (field_size <= 0)
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2699 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2707 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2708 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2709 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2710 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2711 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2712 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2714 /* Compute the master secret */
2715 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2716 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2718 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2724 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2726 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2727 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2728 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2730 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2732 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2738 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2741 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2744 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2747 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2750 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2754 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2755 * string for the callback */
2756 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2757 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2758 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2759 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2760 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2762 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2765 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2768 else if (psk_len == 0)
2770 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2772 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2773 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2777 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2778 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2780 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2782 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2786 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2787 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2788 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2789 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2792 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2796 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2797 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2798 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2799 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2800 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2803 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2807 s->session->master_key_length=
2808 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2809 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2812 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2819 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2827 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2831 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2836 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2837 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2838 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2839 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2842 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2846 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2855 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2856 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2859 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2860 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2861 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2862 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2863 unsigned long alg_a;
2865 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2866 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2867 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2868 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2869 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2870 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2872 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2873 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2874 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2875 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2876 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2877 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2878 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2879 if (client_pub_pkey)
2881 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2884 /* Decrypt session key */
2885 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2895 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2905 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2911 /* Generate master secret */
2912 s->session->master_key_length=
2913 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2914 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2915 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2916 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2921 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2922 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2930 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2932 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2938 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2939 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2943 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2944 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2945 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2946 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2947 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2952 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2954 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2960 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2962 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2964 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2965 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2966 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2968 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2971 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2973 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2975 peer=s->session->peer;
2976 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2977 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2985 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2987 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2988 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2990 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3001 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3005 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3008 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3012 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3015 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3019 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3020 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3021 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3022 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3023 * signature without length field */
3024 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3025 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3031 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3033 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
3034 /* Should never happen */
3037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3038 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3041 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3042 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3045 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3048 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3052 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3056 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3066 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3070 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3071 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3074 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3078 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3082 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3086 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3090 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3093 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3094 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3097 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3101 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3103 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3110 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3112 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3113 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3117 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3123 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3131 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3133 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3134 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3135 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3139 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3147 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3149 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3150 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3151 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3155 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3157 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3163 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3164 { unsigned char signature[64];
3166 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3167 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3169 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3171 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3172 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3174 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3175 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3178 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3180 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3187 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3196 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3199 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3201 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3202 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3203 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3205 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3206 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3210 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3212 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3214 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3215 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3217 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3219 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3226 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3228 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3230 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3231 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3234 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3237 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3238 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3241 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3244 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3248 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3250 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3254 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3256 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3265 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3269 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3272 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3274 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3280 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3288 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3292 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3301 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3303 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3304 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3306 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3310 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3311 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3312 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3315 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3318 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3319 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3321 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3327 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3330 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3336 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3337 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3338 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3339 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3341 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3342 * when we arrive here. */
3343 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3345 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3346 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3352 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3353 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3354 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3355 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3356 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3364 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3367 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3368 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3372 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3377 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3379 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3382 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3383 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3384 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3391 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3392 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3397 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3398 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3402 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3403 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3405 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3407 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3408 const unsigned char *const_p;
3409 int len, slen_full, slen;
3414 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3415 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3416 unsigned char key_name[16];
3418 /* get session encoding length */
3419 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3420 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3423 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3425 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3429 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3431 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3433 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3439 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3441 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3442 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3448 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3449 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3451 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3452 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3453 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3454 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3455 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3456 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3458 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3459 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3460 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3463 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3465 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3466 /* Skip message length for now */
3468 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3469 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3470 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3471 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3474 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3476 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3485 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3486 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3487 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3488 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3489 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3490 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3493 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3494 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3495 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3496 * as their sessions. */
3497 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3499 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3501 /* Output key name */
3503 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3506 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3507 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3508 /* Encrypt session data */
3509 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3511 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3513 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3515 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3516 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3517 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3520 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3522 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3523 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3524 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3526 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3528 /* number of bytes to write */
3530 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3535 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3536 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3539 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3541 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3544 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3545 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3546 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3549 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3552 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3555 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3556 /* message length */
3557 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3559 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3560 /* length of OCSP response */
3561 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3562 /* actual response */
3563 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3564 /* number of bytes to write */
3565 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3566 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3570 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3571 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3574 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
3575 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3576 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3577 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3580 int proto_len, padding_len;
3582 const unsigned char *p;
3584 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3585 * extension in their ClientHello */
3586 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3592 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3593 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3594 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3596 514, /* See the payload format below */
3602 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3603 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3604 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3605 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3612 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3614 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3616 /* The payload looks like:
3618 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3619 * uint8 padding_len;
3620 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3623 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3625 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3626 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3629 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3630 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3635 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3636 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;