1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
156 #include "ssl_locl.h"
157 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
175 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
177 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
178 return(SSLv3_server_method());
183 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
185 ssl_undefined_function,
186 ssl3_get_server_method)
188 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
191 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
192 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
194 int new_state,state,skip=0;
196 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
205 /* init things to blank */
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
231 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
233 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
240 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
242 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
274 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
275 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
277 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
278 * client that doesn't support secure
281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
282 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
288 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
289 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
290 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
291 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
299 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
300 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
301 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
302 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
305 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
308 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
314 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
317 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
318 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
321 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
327 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
328 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
332 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
333 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
335 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
342 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
348 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
349 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
350 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
351 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
352 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
354 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
355 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
357 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
358 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
365 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
372 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
378 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
379 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
381 /* clear this, it may get reset by
382 * send_server_key_exchange */
383 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
385 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
386 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
388 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
389 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
390 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
391 * be able to handle this) */
392 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
394 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
397 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
398 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
400 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
402 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
403 * message only if the cipher suite is either
404 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
405 * server certificate contains the server's
406 * public key for key exchange.
408 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
409 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
410 * hint if provided */
411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
412 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
414 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
415 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
416 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
417 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
418 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
419 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
425 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
426 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
431 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
435 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
436 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
437 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
438 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
439 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
440 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
441 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
442 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
443 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
444 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
445 * and in RFC 2246): */
446 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
447 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
448 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
449 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
450 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
451 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
452 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
453 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
454 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
456 /* no cert request */
458 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
459 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
463 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
464 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
465 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
466 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
467 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
469 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
470 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
476 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
477 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
478 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
479 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
480 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
481 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
485 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
487 /* This code originally checked to see if
488 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
489 * and then flushed. This caused problems
490 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
491 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
492 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
493 * still exist. So instead we just flush
497 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
498 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
503 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
505 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
508 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
509 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
510 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
511 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
515 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
517 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
519 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
520 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
523 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
527 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
528 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
529 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
534 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
535 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
536 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
537 * message is not sent.
538 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
539 * the client uses its key from the certificate
542 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
543 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
545 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
546 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
548 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
557 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
560 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
561 * a client cert, it can be verified
562 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
563 * should be generalized. But it is next step
565 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
566 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
568 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
569 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
573 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
574 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
585 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
586 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
588 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
589 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
590 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
592 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
593 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
595 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
596 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
598 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
603 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
604 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
605 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
606 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
607 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
609 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
613 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
614 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
615 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
616 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
617 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
619 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
620 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
628 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
633 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
634 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
635 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
636 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
637 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
641 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
642 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
643 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
644 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
645 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
651 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
652 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
654 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
655 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
656 { ret= -1; goto end; }
658 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
659 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
661 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
662 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
665 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
666 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
674 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
675 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
676 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
677 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
678 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
679 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
680 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
681 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
684 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
685 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
687 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
688 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
690 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
694 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
699 /* clean a few things up */
700 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
702 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
705 /* remove buffering on output */
706 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
710 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
712 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
713 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
718 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
720 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
722 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
724 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
738 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
742 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
747 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
751 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
758 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
762 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
766 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
770 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
772 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
773 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
778 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
779 /* number of bytes to write */
784 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
785 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
788 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
793 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
794 * so permit appropriate message length */
795 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
801 if (!ok) return((int)n);
802 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
803 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
805 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
806 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
807 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
808 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
810 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
812 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
813 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
821 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
823 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
824 unsigned int cookie_len;
827 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
832 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
834 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
835 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
836 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
837 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
840 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
842 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
845 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
846 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
847 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
848 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
849 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
852 if (!ok) return((int)n);
854 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
856 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
857 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
858 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
861 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
862 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
865 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
867 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
868 s->version = s->client_version;
870 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
874 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
875 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
876 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
878 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
880 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
882 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
883 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
885 if (cookie_length == 0)
889 /* load the client random */
890 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
893 /* get the session-id */
897 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
898 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
899 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
900 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
901 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
902 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
903 * an earlier library version)
905 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
907 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
912 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
914 { /* previous session */
921 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
928 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
934 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
935 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
936 * does not cause an overflow.
938 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
941 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
946 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
947 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
950 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
952 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
954 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
957 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
959 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
962 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
964 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
965 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
967 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
969 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
980 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
982 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
983 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
989 /* not enough data */
990 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
994 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1001 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1002 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1005 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1008 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1010 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1012 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1014 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1015 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1023 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1024 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1027 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1029 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1030 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1031 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1032 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1033 * enabled, though. */
1034 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1035 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1037 s->session->cipher = c;
1044 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1045 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1046 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1056 /* not enough data */
1057 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1064 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1071 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1078 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1080 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1082 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1087 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1092 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1093 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1094 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1095 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1099 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1100 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1102 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1104 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1109 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1111 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1113 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1114 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1115 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1118 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1119 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1123 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1124 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1125 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1127 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1132 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1135 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1137 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1138 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1140 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1141 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1146 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1147 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1148 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1149 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1151 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1152 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1154 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1155 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1156 /* Can't disable compression */
1157 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1159 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1163 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1164 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1166 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1167 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1169 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1173 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1175 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1179 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1180 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1182 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1187 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1194 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1195 { /* See if we have a match */
1196 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1198 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1199 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1201 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1214 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1219 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1220 * using compression.
1222 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1224 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1230 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1235 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1236 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1238 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1240 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1241 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1242 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1243 if (ciphers == NULL)
1245 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1250 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1251 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1255 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1259 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1260 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1261 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1262 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1263 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0));
1264 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1265 /* do not send a session ticket */
1266 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1270 /* Session-id reuse */
1271 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1272 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1273 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1274 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1276 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1278 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1279 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1281 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1282 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1284 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1288 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1289 else if (ec != NULL)
1290 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1292 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1296 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1299 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1302 /* we now have the following setup.
1304 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1305 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1306 * compression - basically ignored right now
1307 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1308 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1309 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1310 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1317 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1320 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1324 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1327 unsigned char *p,*d;
1330 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1334 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1336 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1337 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1338 p=s->s3->server_random;
1339 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1340 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1342 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1345 /* Do the message type and length last */
1348 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1349 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1352 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1353 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1355 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1356 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1357 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1358 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1359 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1360 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1361 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1363 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1364 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1365 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1366 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1367 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1370 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1371 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1373 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1375 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1376 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1385 /* put the cipher */
1386 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1389 /* put the compression method */
1390 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1393 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1396 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1399 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1404 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1413 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1416 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1417 /* number of bytes to write */
1422 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1423 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1426 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1430 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1432 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1435 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1440 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1441 /* number of bytes to write */
1446 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1447 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1450 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1456 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1463 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1464 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1467 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1470 unsigned char *p,*d;
1480 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1481 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1483 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1488 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1491 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1494 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1496 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1497 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1498 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1501 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1510 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1516 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1521 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1524 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1525 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1526 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1527 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1530 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1535 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1549 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1550 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1551 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1553 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1562 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1563 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1564 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1565 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1578 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1580 const EC_GROUP *group;
1582 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1583 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1585 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1586 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1587 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1591 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1596 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1598 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1603 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1609 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1616 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1617 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1618 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1619 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1621 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1628 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1629 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1630 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1636 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1637 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1643 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1644 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1645 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1648 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1655 /* Encode the public key.
1656 * First check the size of encoding and
1657 * allocate memory accordingly.
1659 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1660 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1661 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1664 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1665 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1666 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1667 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1674 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1675 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1676 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1677 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1679 if (encodedlen == 0)
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1685 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1687 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1688 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1689 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1690 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1695 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1696 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1704 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1706 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1708 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1709 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1712 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1714 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1718 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1720 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1724 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1725 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1727 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1730 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1733 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1741 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1746 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1749 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1757 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1759 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1760 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1761 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1762 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1763 * the actual encoded point itself
1765 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1773 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1774 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1776 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1782 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1784 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1785 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1786 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1787 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1794 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1795 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1797 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1801 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1803 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1804 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1805 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1806 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1807 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1808 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1809 (unsigned int *)&i);
1813 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1814 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1824 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1825 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1828 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1829 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1830 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1831 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1832 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1833 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1843 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1844 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1846 /* let's do ECDSA */
1847 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1848 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1849 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1850 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1851 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1852 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1863 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1864 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1870 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1873 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1879 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1880 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1881 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1883 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1885 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1886 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1887 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1889 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1893 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1895 unsigned char *p,*d;
1897 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1901 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1905 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1907 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1909 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1918 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1922 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1924 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1925 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1926 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1931 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1932 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1935 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1942 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1943 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1949 /* else no CA names */
1950 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1953 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1954 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1957 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1962 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1963 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1966 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1973 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1976 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1977 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1982 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1986 unsigned long alg_k;
1988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1990 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1998 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2001 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2002 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2003 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2004 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2007 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2008 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2009 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2010 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2014 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2015 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2017 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2020 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2022 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2023 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2025 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2026 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2027 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2028 * be sent already */
2031 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2039 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2040 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2041 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2042 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2044 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2051 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2052 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2057 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2069 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2073 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2075 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2076 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2079 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2081 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2082 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2083 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2084 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2085 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2087 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2088 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2089 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2091 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2092 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2094 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2095 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2096 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2097 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2098 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2099 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2100 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2106 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2107 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2108 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2110 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2111 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2112 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2113 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2117 s->session->master_key_length=
2118 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2119 s->session->master_key,
2121 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2126 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2131 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2143 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2145 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2151 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2153 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2158 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2161 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2168 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2176 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2181 s->session->master_key_length=
2182 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2183 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2184 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2189 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2191 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2192 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2193 krb5_data authenticator;
2195 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2196 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2197 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2198 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2199 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2200 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2202 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2203 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2205 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2207 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2210 enc_ticket.length = i;
2212 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2215 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2219 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2220 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2223 authenticator.length = i;
2225 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2228 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2232 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2233 p+=authenticator.length;
2237 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2240 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2243 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2246 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2250 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2251 enc_pms.length + 6))
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2254 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2258 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2262 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2263 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2265 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2266 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2272 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2273 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2275 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2276 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2279 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2280 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2282 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2283 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2289 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2296 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2297 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2299 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2303 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2305 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2308 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2311 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2312 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2315 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2318 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2321 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2324 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2327 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2331 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2334 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2337 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2339 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2340 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2341 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2342 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2343 * the protocol version.
2344 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2345 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2347 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2350 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2355 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2357 s->session->master_key_length=
2358 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2359 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2361 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2363 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2364 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2366 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2367 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2372 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2373 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2374 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2375 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2379 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2382 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2387 const EC_GROUP *group;
2388 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2390 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2391 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2394 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2398 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2399 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2401 /* use the certificate */
2402 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2406 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2407 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2409 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2412 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2413 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2415 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2416 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2423 /* Let's get client's public key */
2424 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2427 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2433 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2435 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2437 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2441 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2443 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2445 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2446 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2447 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2448 * never executed. When that support is
2449 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2450 * received in the certificate is
2451 * authorized for key agreement.
2452 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2453 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2456 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2458 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2462 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2463 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2469 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2473 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2474 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2476 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2479 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2483 /* Get encoded point length */
2486 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2487 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2493 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2494 * currently, so set it to the start
2496 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2499 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2500 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2501 if (field_size <= 0)
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2507 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2515 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2516 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2517 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2518 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2519 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2520 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2522 /* Compute the master secret */
2523 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2524 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2526 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2532 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2534 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2535 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2536 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2538 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2540 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2546 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2549 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2552 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2555 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2558 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2562 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2563 * string for the callback */
2564 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2565 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2566 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2567 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2568 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2570 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2573 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2576 else if (psk_len == 0)
2578 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2580 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2581 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2585 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2586 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2588 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2590 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2594 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2595 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2596 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2597 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2600 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2604 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2605 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2606 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2607 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2608 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2611 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2615 s->session->master_key_length=
2616 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2617 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2620 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2626 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2629 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2630 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2631 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2632 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2633 unsigned long alg_a;
2635 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2636 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2637 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2638 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2639 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2640 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2642 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2643 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2644 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2645 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2646 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2647 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2648 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2649 if (client_pub_pkey)
2651 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2654 /* Decrypt session key */
2655 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2665 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2675 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2681 /* Generate master secret */
2682 s->session->master_key_length=
2683 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2684 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2685 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2686 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2691 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2692 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2700 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2702 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2708 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2709 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2713 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2714 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2715 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2716 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2717 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2722 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2724 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2731 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2732 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2733 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2738 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2740 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2742 peer=s->session->peer;
2743 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2744 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2752 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2754 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2755 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2757 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2768 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2772 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2775 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2779 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2782 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2786 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2787 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2788 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2789 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2790 * signature without length field */
2791 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2792 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2803 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2807 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2808 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2811 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2816 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2818 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2819 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2823 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2829 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2837 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2839 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2840 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2841 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2845 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2853 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2855 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2856 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2857 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2861 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2863 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2869 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2870 { unsigned char signature[64];
2872 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2873 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2875 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2877 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2878 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2880 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2881 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2884 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2886 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2893 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2902 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2905 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2909 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2911 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2913 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2914 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2916 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2918 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2925 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2927 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2929 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2930 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2933 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2936 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2937 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2940 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2943 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2947 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2949 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2953 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2955 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2964 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2968 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2971 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2973 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2979 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2987 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2991 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3000 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3002 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3003 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3005 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3009 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3010 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3011 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3014 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3020 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3023 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3029 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3030 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3031 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3032 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3034 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3035 * when we arrive here. */
3036 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3038 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3039 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3045 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3046 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3047 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3048 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3049 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3057 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3060 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3061 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3065 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3070 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3072 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3075 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3076 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3077 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3084 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3085 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3090 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3091 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3094 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3096 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3098 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3103 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3104 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3105 unsigned char key_name[16];
3107 /* get session encoding length */
3108 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3109 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3114 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3115 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3116 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3117 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3118 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3119 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3121 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3122 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3123 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3125 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
3129 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3131 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3133 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3134 /* Skip message length for now */
3136 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3137 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3138 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3139 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3142 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3144 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3153 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3154 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3155 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3156 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3157 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3158 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3160 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3161 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3163 /* Output key name */
3165 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3168 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3169 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3170 /* Encrypt session data */
3171 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3173 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3175 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3177 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3178 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3179 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3182 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3184 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3185 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3186 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3188 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3190 /* number of bytes to write */
3192 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3197 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3198 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3201 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3203 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3206 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3207 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3208 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3211 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3214 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3217 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3218 /* message length */
3219 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3221 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3222 /* length of OCSP response */
3223 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3224 /* actual response */
3225 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3226 /* number of bytes to write */
3227 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3228 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3232 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3233 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3236 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
3237 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3238 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3239 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3242 int proto_len, padding_len;
3244 const unsigned char *p;
3246 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3247 * extension in their ClientHello */
3248 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3254 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3255 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3256 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3258 514, /* See the payload format below */
3264 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3265 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3266 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3267 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3274 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3276 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3278 /* The payload looks like:
3280 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3281 * uint8 padding_len;
3282 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3285 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3287 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3288 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3291 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3292 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3297 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3298 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;