1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return(SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function,
187 ssl3_get_server_method)
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
193 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
195 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
197 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
198 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
200 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
202 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
203 we do so if There is no srp login name */
205 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
209 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
222 int new_state,state,skip=0;
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
279 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0,
282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
286 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
288 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
290 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
295 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
303 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
310 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
311 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
312 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
313 /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
314 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
316 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
318 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
319 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
321 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
323 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
324 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
325 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
327 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
328 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
330 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
331 * client that doesn't support secure
334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
335 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
341 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
342 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
343 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
344 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
349 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
352 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
353 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
354 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
355 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
358 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
361 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
365 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
366 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
369 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
370 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
372 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
373 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
376 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
378 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
379 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
382 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
384 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
385 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
386 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
387 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
389 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
401 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
403 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
404 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
408 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
411 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
415 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
418 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
422 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
424 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
425 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
426 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
427 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
429 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
430 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
432 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
440 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
447 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
452 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
453 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
454 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
456 /* clear this, it may get reset by
457 * send_server_key_exchange */
458 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
460 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
461 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
463 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
464 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
465 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
466 * be able to handle this) */
467 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
469 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
472 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
473 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
475 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
477 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
478 * message only if the cipher suite is either
479 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
480 * server certificate contains the server's
481 * public key for key exchange.
483 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
484 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
485 * hint if provided */
486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
487 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
490 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
491 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
493 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
494 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
495 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
496 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
497 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
498 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
504 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
505 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
510 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
514 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
515 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
516 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
517 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
518 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
519 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
520 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
521 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
522 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
523 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
524 * and in RFC 2246): */
525 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
526 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
527 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
528 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
529 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
530 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
531 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
532 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
533 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
534 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
535 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
537 /* no cert request */
539 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
540 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
541 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
542 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
547 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
548 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
549 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
550 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
551 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
553 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
554 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
562 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
563 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
564 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
565 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
571 /* This code originally checked to see if
572 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
573 * and then flushed. This caused problems
574 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
575 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
576 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
577 * still exist. So instead we just flush
581 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
582 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
587 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
589 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
594 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
595 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
599 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
601 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
603 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
604 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
607 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
611 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
612 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
613 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
618 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
619 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
620 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
621 * message is not sent.
622 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
623 * the client uses its key from the certificate
626 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
627 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
629 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
630 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
632 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
636 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
638 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
640 if (!s->session->peer)
642 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
643 * at this point and digest cached records.
645 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
650 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
651 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
659 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
662 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
663 * a client cert, it can be verified
664 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
665 * should be generalized. But it is next step
667 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
668 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
670 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
671 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
675 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
676 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
687 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
688 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
690 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
691 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
692 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
693 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
695 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
696 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
697 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
698 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
699 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
701 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
702 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
704 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
705 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
707 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
712 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
713 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
716 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
717 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
718 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
719 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
720 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
721 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
722 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
723 * the client's Finished message is read.
725 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
726 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
728 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
729 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
731 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
735 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
736 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
738 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
739 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
740 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
741 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
742 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
743 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
744 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
745 * the client's Finished message is read.
747 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
748 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
749 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
750 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
751 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
755 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
756 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
759 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
764 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
766 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
767 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
768 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
772 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
773 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
774 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
775 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
776 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
782 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
783 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
785 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
786 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
787 { ret= -1; goto end; }
789 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
790 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
792 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
793 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
796 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
797 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
805 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
806 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
807 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
808 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
809 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
810 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
811 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
812 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
815 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
816 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
818 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
820 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
823 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
827 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
832 /* clean a few things up */
833 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
835 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
838 /* remove buffering on output */
839 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
843 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
848 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
850 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
852 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
854 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
868 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
872 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
877 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
881 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
888 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
892 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
896 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
899 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
901 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
902 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
905 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
906 return ssl_do_write(s);
909 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
914 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
915 * so permit appropriate message length */
916 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
922 if (!ok) return((int)n);
923 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
924 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
926 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
928 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
933 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
934 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
936 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
938 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
939 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
943 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
945 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
946 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
949 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
955 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
957 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
958 unsigned int cookie_len;
963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
967 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
969 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
972 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
973 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
974 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
975 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
978 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
981 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
984 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
985 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
986 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
987 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
988 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
991 if (!ok) return((int)n);
993 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
995 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
996 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
997 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
1000 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
1001 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1002 : (s->client_version < s->version))
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1005 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
1006 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
1008 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1009 s->version = s->client_version;
1011 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1015 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
1016 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1017 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1019 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1021 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1023 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1024 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1026 if (cookie_length == 0)
1030 /* load the client random */
1031 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1032 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1034 /* get the session-id */
1038 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1039 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1040 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1041 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1042 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1044 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1045 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1046 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1047 * setting will be ignored.
1049 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1051 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1056 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1058 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1060 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1061 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1062 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1063 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1064 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1066 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
1067 { /* previous session */
1074 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1084 cookie_len = *(p++);
1087 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1088 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1089 * does not cause an overflow.
1091 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1094 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1099 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1100 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1103 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1105 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1107 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1110 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1112 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1115 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1117 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1118 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1120 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1122 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1125 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1130 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1132 /* Select version to use */
1133 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1134 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1136 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1137 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1139 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1142 s->version = s->client_version;
1143 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1146 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1147 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1149 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1150 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1155 s->version = s->client_version;
1156 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1159 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1164 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1166 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1167 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1173 /* not enough data */
1174 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1178 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1185 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1186 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1189 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1192 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1194 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1196 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1198 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1199 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1207 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1208 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1211 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1213 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1214 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1215 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1216 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1217 * enabled, though. */
1218 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1219 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1221 s->session->cipher = c;
1228 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1229 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1230 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1240 /* not enough data */
1241 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1250 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1257 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1264 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1266 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1273 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1274 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1275 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1276 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1279 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1280 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1286 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1288 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1290 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1291 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1292 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1295 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1296 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1300 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1301 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1302 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1304 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1309 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1312 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1314 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1315 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1317 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1318 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1323 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1324 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1325 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1326 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1328 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1329 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1331 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1332 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1333 /* Can't disable compression */
1334 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s))
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1339 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1340 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1342 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1343 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1345 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1349 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1354 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1355 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1357 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1362 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1369 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1370 { /* See if we have a match */
1371 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1373 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1374 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1376 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1389 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1394 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1395 * using compression.
1397 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1404 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1409 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1410 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1412 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1414 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1415 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1416 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1417 if (ciphers == NULL)
1419 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1424 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s))
1426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1429 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1431 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1433 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1436 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1442 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1445 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1447 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1448 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1452 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1456 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1457 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1458 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1459 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1460 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1461 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1462 /* do not send a session ticket */
1463 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1467 /* Session-id reuse */
1468 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1469 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1470 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1471 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1473 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1475 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1476 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1478 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1479 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1481 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1485 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1486 else if (ec != NULL)
1487 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1489 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1493 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1496 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1498 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1502 /* we now have the following setup.
1504 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1505 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1506 * compression - basically ignored right now
1507 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1508 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1509 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1510 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1513 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1514 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1516 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1523 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1527 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1530 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1531 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1534 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1537 unsigned char *p,*d;
1542 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1544 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1545 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1546 p=s->s3->server_random;
1547 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1550 /* Do the message type and length last */
1551 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1553 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1554 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1557 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1558 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1560 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1561 * back in the server hello:
1562 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1563 * we send back the old session ID.
1564 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1565 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1566 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1567 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1569 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1570 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1571 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1572 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1575 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1576 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1578 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1580 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1581 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1587 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1590 /* put the cipher */
1591 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1594 /* put the compression method */
1595 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1598 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1601 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1604 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1609 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1611 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1618 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1619 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1622 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1623 return ssl_do_write(s);
1626 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1629 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1631 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1632 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1635 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1636 return ssl_do_write(s);
1639 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1645 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1652 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1653 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1656 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1659 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1660 unsigned char *p,*d;
1670 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1671 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1673 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1678 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1681 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1684 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1686 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1687 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1688 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1691 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1700 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1706 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1711 if (type & SSL_kDHE)
1713 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1715 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1718 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1725 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1726 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1727 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1728 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1731 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1735 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1736 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp))
1738 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1742 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1748 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1750 else if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1757 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1758 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1759 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1761 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1770 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1771 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1772 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1773 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1786 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1788 const EC_GROUP *group;
1790 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1791 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1793 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1794 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1795 if (nid != NID_undef)
1796 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1798 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1800 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1801 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1802 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1806 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1811 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1817 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1823 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1825 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1831 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1832 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1833 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1834 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1836 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1843 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1844 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1845 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1851 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1852 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1858 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1859 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1860 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1863 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1870 /* Encode the public key.
1871 * First check the size of encoding and
1872 * allocate memory accordingly.
1874 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1875 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1876 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1879 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1880 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1881 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1882 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1889 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1890 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1891 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1892 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1894 if (encodedlen == 0)
1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1900 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1902 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1903 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1904 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1905 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1910 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1911 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1919 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1921 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1923 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1924 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1927 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1929 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1931 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1932 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1933 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1934 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1947 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1951 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1953 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1955 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1962 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1963 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1965 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1968 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1971 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1979 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1984 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1986 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1989 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
2001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2002 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
2004 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
2005 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
2006 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2007 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
2008 * the actual encoded point itself
2010 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
2018 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
2019 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
2021 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2022 encodedPoint = NULL;
2027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2028 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
2030 /* copy PSK identity hint */
2031 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
2032 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
2033 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2040 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
2041 * and p points to the space at the end. */
2042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2043 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2047 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
2049 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2050 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2051 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
2052 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2053 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2054 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2055 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2056 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
2057 (unsigned int *)&i);
2061 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2062 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2074 /* send signature algorithm */
2075 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2077 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2079 /* Should never happen */
2080 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2087 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2090 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2091 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2092 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2093 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2094 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2095 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2102 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2107 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2108 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2114 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2117 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2118 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2119 return ssl_do_write(s);
2121 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2124 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2125 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2127 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2131 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2133 unsigned char *p,*d;
2135 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2139 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2143 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2145 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2147 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2152 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2154 const unsigned char *psigs;
2155 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2156 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2157 /* Skip over length for now */
2159 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2160 /* Now fill in length */
2170 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2174 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2176 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2177 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2178 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2183 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2184 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2187 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2194 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2195 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2201 /* else no CA names */
2202 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2205 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2207 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2208 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2210 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2215 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2217 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2225 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2228 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2229 return ssl_do_write(s);
2234 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2238 unsigned long alg_k;
2240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2242 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2246 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2250 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2253 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2254 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2255 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2256 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2259 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2260 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2261 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2262 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2266 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2267 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2269 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2272 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2274 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2276 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2278 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2279 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2281 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2282 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2283 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2284 * be sent already */
2287 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2295 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2296 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2297 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2298 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2300 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2307 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2308 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2313 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2325 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2326 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2327 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2328 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2329 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2330 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2332 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2333 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2334 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2336 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2339 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2340 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2341 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2343 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2344 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2345 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2346 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2347 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2348 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2349 * decryption error. */
2350 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2351 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2353 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2354 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2355 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2356 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2357 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2358 * support the requested protocol version. If
2359 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2360 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2362 unsigned char workaround_good;
2363 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2364 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2365 version_good |= workaround_good;
2368 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2369 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2370 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2372 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2373 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2374 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2376 p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
2377 rand_premaster_secret[i]);
2380 s->session->master_key_length=
2381 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2382 s->session->master_key,
2384 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2389 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2392 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2399 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2410 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2411 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2412 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2413 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2416 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2417 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2418 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2419 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2421 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2425 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2427 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2429 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2434 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2438 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2439 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2442 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2443 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2445 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2447 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2451 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2452 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2455 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2462 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2471 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2478 s->session->master_key_length=
2479 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2480 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2481 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2488 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2490 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2491 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2492 krb5_data authenticator;
2494 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2495 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2496 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2497 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2498 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2499 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2501 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2502 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2504 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2506 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2509 enc_ticket.length = i;
2511 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2514 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2518 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2519 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2522 authenticator.length = i;
2524 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2527 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2531 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2532 p+=authenticator.length;
2536 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2539 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2542 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2545 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2549 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2550 enc_pms.length + 6))
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2553 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2557 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2561 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2562 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2564 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2565 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2571 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2572 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2574 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2575 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2578 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2579 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2581 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2582 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2588 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2595 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2596 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2598 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2602 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2604 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2607 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2610 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2611 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2614 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2617 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2620 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2623 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2626 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2630 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2633 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2636 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2638 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2639 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2640 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2641 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2642 * the protocol version.
2643 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2644 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2646 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2649 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2654 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2656 s->session->master_key_length=
2657 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2658 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2660 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2662 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2663 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2665 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2666 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2671 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2672 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2673 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2674 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2678 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2681 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2686 const EC_GROUP *group;
2687 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2689 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2690 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2693 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2697 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2698 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2700 /* use the certificate */
2701 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2705 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2706 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2708 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2711 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2712 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2714 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2715 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2722 /* Let's get client's public key */
2723 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2726 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2732 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2734 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
2736 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2740 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2742 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2744 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2745 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2746 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2747 * never executed. When that support is
2748 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2749 * received in the certificate is
2750 * authorized for key agreement.
2751 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2752 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2755 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2757 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2761 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2762 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2768 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2772 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2773 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2775 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2778 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2782 /* Get encoded point length */
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2791 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2792 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2798 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2799 * currently, so set it to the start
2801 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2804 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2805 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2806 if (field_size <= 0)
2808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2812 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2820 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2821 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2822 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2823 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2824 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2825 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2827 /* Compute the master secret */
2828 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2829 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2831 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2837 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2839 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2840 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2841 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2843 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2845 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2851 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2854 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2857 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2860 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2863 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2867 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2868 * string for the callback */
2869 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2870 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2871 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2872 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2873 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2875 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2878 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2881 else if (psk_len == 0)
2883 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2885 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2886 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2890 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2891 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2893 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2895 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2899 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2900 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2901 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2902 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2905 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2909 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2910 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2911 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2912 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2913 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2916 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2920 s->session->master_key_length=
2921 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2922 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2925 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2932 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2940 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2944 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2949 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2950 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2952 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2956 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2957 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2958 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2959 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2962 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2966 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2975 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2976 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2979 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2980 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2981 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2982 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2983 unsigned long alg_a;
2987 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2988 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2989 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2990 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2991 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2992 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2994 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2995 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2996 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2997 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2998 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2999 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
3000 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3001 if (client_pub_pkey)
3003 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3006 /* Decrypt session key */
3007 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
3008 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
3009 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
3011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3016 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3022 /* Generate master secret */
3023 s->session->master_key_length=
3024 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3025 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
3026 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3027 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3032 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
3033 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3041 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3043 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3049 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3050 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3054 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3055 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3056 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3057 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3058 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3063 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3065 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3071 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3073 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3075 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3076 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3077 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3079 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3082 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3084 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3086 peer=s->session->peer;
3087 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3088 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3096 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3098 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3099 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3101 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3112 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3116 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3119 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3123 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3126 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3130 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3131 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3132 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3133 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3134 * signature without length field */
3135 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3136 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3142 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3144 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3147 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3152 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3156 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3166 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3170 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3171 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3174 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3178 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3182 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3186 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3190 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3193 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3194 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3197 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3201 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3203 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3210 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3212 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3213 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3217 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3223 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3231 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3233 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3234 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3235 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3239 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3247 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3249 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3250 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3251 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3255 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3257 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3263 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3264 { unsigned char signature[64];
3266 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3267 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3269 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3271 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3272 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3274 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3275 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3278 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3280 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3287 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3296 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3299 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3301 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3302 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3303 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3305 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3306 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3310 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3312 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3314 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3315 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3317 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3319 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3326 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3328 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3330 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3331 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3334 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3337 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3338 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3341 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3344 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3348 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3350 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3354 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3356 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3365 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3369 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3372 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3374 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3380 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3388 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3392 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3401 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3403 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3404 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3406 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3410 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3411 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3412 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3415 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3418 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3419 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3421 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3428 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3431 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3438 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3441 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3444 al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3446 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3449 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3452 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3453 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3454 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3455 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3457 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3458 * when we arrive here. */
3459 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3461 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3462 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3468 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3469 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3470 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3471 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3472 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3480 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3483 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3484 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3488 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3492 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3494 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3497 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3498 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3499 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3506 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk))
3508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3511 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3514 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3515 return ssl_do_write(s);
3518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3519 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3520 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3522 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3524 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3525 const unsigned char *const_p;
3526 int len, slen_full, slen;
3531 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3532 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3533 unsigned char key_name[16];
3535 /* get session encoding length */
3536 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3537 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3540 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3542 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3546 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3548 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3550 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3556 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3558 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3559 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3565 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3566 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3568 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3569 * follows handshake_header_length +
3570 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3571 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3572 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3573 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3575 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3576 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3577 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3579 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3580 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3581 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3582 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3583 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3586 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3588 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3597 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3598 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3599 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3600 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3601 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3602 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3605 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3606 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3607 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3608 * as their sessions. */
3609 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3611 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3613 /* Output key name */
3615 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3618 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3619 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3620 /* Encrypt session data */
3621 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3623 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3625 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3627 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3628 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3629 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3632 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3634 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3635 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3636 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3637 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3639 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3643 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3644 return ssl_do_write(s);
3647 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3649 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3652 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3653 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3654 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3657 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3660 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3663 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3664 /* message length */
3665 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3667 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3668 /* length of OCSP response */
3669 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3670 /* actual response */
3671 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3672 /* number of bytes to write */
3673 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3674 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3678 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3679 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3682 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3683 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3684 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3685 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3688 int proto_len, padding_len;
3690 const unsigned char *p;
3692 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3693 * extension in their ClientHello */
3694 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3700 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3701 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3702 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3704 514, /* See the payload format below */
3710 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3711 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3712 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3713 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3720 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3722 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3724 /* The payload looks like:
3726 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3727 * uint8 padding_len;
3728 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3731 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3733 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3734 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3737 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3738 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3743 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3744 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;