2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
296 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 * support secure renegotiation.
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
363 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
367 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
368 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
373 * callback indicates firther work to be done
375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
387 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
394 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
398 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
400 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
405 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
419 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
421 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
422 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
425 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
427 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
428 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
432 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
433 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
444 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
449 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
451 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
454 * clear this, it may get reset by
455 * send_server_key_exchange
457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
460 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
461 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
462 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
463 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
464 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
469 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
473 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
476 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
477 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
479 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
482 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
483 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
484 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
485 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
486 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
491 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
497 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
503 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
504 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
506 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
507 * during re-negotiation:
509 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
510 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
512 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
513 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
516 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
518 * ... except when the application insists on
519 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
522 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
524 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
526 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
527 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
528 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
530 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
533 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
534 /* no cert request */
536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
537 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
538 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
540 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
545 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
546 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
549 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
550 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
552 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
553 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
561 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
564 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
565 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
572 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
573 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
574 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
575 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
576 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
580 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
581 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
585 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
587 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
592 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
593 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
598 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
601 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
603 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
608 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
609 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
610 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
611 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
613 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
614 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
616 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
617 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
619 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
622 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
623 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
625 if (!s->session->peer)
628 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
629 * digest cached records.
631 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
633 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
636 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
637 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
638 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
645 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
649 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
650 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
651 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
654 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
655 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
656 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
660 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
661 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
664 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
673 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
675 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
684 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
685 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
686 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
690 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
691 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
693 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
694 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
696 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
701 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
705 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
706 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
707 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
709 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
710 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
711 * the client's Finished message is read.
713 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
714 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
716 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
720 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
724 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
725 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
727 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
728 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
729 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
730 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
731 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
732 * the client's Finished message is read.
734 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
735 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
736 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
737 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
741 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
743 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
744 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
747 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
752 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
753 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
754 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
757 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
763 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
766 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
772 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
773 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
775 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
776 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
778 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
782 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
784 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
788 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
791 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
792 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
795 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
801 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
802 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
803 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
804 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
805 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
807 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
809 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
812 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
814 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
815 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
817 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
818 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
820 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
823 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
828 /* clean a few things up */
829 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
831 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
834 /* remove buffering on output */
835 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
839 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
844 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
846 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
848 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
851 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
866 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
868 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
872 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
873 new_state = s->state;
875 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
876 s->state = new_state;
882 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
886 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
890 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
893 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
894 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
895 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
898 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
899 return ssl_do_write(s);
902 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
904 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
905 unsigned int cookie_len;
908 unsigned char *p, *d;
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
912 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
914 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
916 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
920 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
921 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
922 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
923 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
925 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
926 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
929 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
930 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
931 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
932 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
933 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
938 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
941 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
942 * for session id length
944 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
945 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
951 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
952 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
954 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
957 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
958 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
959 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
961 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
962 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
964 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
967 s->version = s->client_version;
969 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
974 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
975 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
978 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
979 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
981 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
983 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
984 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
988 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
990 if (cookie_length == 0)
994 /* load the client random */
995 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
996 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
998 /* get the session-id */
1001 if (p + j > d + n) {
1002 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1009 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1010 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1011 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1012 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1013 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1014 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1015 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1016 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1017 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1018 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1021 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1022 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1025 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1027 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1029 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1030 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1031 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1032 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1033 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1035 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1042 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1049 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1051 if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1052 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1056 cookie_len = *(p++);
1058 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1059 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1065 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1066 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1067 * does not cause an overflow.
1069 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1071 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1076 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1077 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1078 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1080 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1081 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1083 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1085 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1088 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1090 /* default verification */
1091 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1092 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1093 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1101 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1102 /* Select version to use */
1103 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1104 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1105 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1106 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1107 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1109 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1110 s->version = s->client_version;
1111 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1113 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1114 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1115 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1116 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1119 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1120 s->version = s->client_version;
1121 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1124 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1128 if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1129 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1136 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1141 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1142 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1143 /* not enough data */
1144 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1148 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1153 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1156 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1159 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1160 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1162 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1163 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1165 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1166 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1174 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1178 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1179 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1181 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1182 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1183 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1184 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1185 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1187 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1188 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1189 s->session->cipher = c;
1196 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1199 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1201 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1208 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1209 /* not enough data */
1210 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1217 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1225 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1230 /* TLS extensions */
1231 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1232 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) {
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1239 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1240 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1241 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1242 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1246 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1247 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1252 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1253 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1255 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1256 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1257 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1259 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1261 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1262 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1266 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1268 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1273 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1274 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1279 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1282 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1284 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1285 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1287 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1288 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1294 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1295 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1296 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1298 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1300 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1301 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1302 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1303 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1304 /* Can't disable compression */
1305 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1307 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1310 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1311 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1312 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1313 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1314 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1318 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1320 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1323 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1324 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1325 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1329 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1331 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1336 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1337 /* See if we have a match */
1338 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1340 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1341 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1342 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1344 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1354 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1360 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1361 * using compression.
1363 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1370 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1374 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1375 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1377 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1379 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1380 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1381 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1382 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1383 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1388 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1392 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1394 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1395 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1397 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1402 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1405 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1407 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1410 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1414 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1416 /* Session-id reuse */
1417 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1418 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1419 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1420 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1422 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1423 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1424 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1425 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1426 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1428 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1432 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1433 else if (ec != NULL)
1434 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1436 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1439 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1442 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1443 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1448 * we now have the following setup.
1450 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1451 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1452 * compression - basically ignored right now
1453 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1454 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1455 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1456 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1459 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1460 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1461 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1467 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
1470 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1472 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1475 if (ciphers != NULL)
1476 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1480 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1483 unsigned char *p, *d;
1488 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1489 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1490 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1491 p = s->s3->server_random;
1492 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1493 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1497 /* Do the message type and length last */
1498 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1500 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1501 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1504 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1505 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1508 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1509 * back in the server hello:
1510 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1511 * we send back the old session ID.
1512 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1513 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1514 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1515 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1517 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1518 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1519 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1520 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1523 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1525 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1527 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1528 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1530 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1534 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1537 /* put the cipher */
1538 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1541 /* put the compression method */
1542 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1545 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1548 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1551 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1553 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1557 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1559 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1561 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1567 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1568 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1571 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1572 return ssl_do_write(s);
1575 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1578 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1579 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1580 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1583 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1584 return ssl_do_write(s);
1587 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1593 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1597 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1600 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1601 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1604 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1607 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1608 unsigned char *p, *d;
1618 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1619 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1620 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1625 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1628 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1629 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1630 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1631 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1632 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1634 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1637 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1639 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1643 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1646 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1648 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1653 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1657 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1659 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1660 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1661 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1663 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1666 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1668 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1672 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1674 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1678 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1684 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1685 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1686 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1687 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1692 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1693 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1694 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1705 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1706 const EC_GROUP *group;
1708 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1709 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1710 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1711 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1712 if (nid != NID_undef)
1713 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1714 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1715 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1716 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1718 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1719 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1721 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1722 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1724 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1728 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1734 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1735 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1739 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1741 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1746 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1747 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1748 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1749 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1750 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1757 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1758 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1759 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1764 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1765 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1767 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1772 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1773 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1777 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1780 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1785 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1786 * allocate memory accordingly.
1788 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1789 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1790 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1793 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1794 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1795 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1796 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1798 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1802 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1803 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1804 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1805 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1807 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1812 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1816 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1817 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1818 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1824 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1825 * can set these to NULLs
1832 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1834 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1836 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1838 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1840 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1842 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1843 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1844 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1845 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1847 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1850 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1851 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1852 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1853 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1857 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1859 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1862 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1863 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1865 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1872 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1873 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1874 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1876 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1879 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1885 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1889 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1891 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1893 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1904 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1906 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1907 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1908 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1909 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1911 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1919 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1920 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1921 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1922 encodedPoint = NULL;
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1928 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1929 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1930 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1931 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1932 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1933 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1940 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1941 * points to the space at the end.
1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1944 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1947 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1948 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1949 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1950 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
1951 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5
1954 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1955 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1956 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1957 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1958 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1959 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
1960 (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) {
1961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1963 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1969 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1970 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1979 /* send signature algorithm */
1980 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1981 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1982 /* Should never happen */
1983 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1985 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1991 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1993 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1994 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1995 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1996 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1997 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1998 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1999 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2000 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2002 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2007 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2010 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2011 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2013 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2018 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2021 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2022 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2023 return ssl_do_write(s);
2025 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2028 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2029 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2030 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2032 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2033 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2037 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2039 unsigned char *p, *d;
2040 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2041 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2045 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2048 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2050 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2052 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2057 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2058 const unsigned char *psigs;
2059 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2061 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2070 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2073 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2074 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2075 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2076 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2077 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2082 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2083 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2085 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2090 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2099 /* else no CA names */
2100 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2103 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2105 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2106 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2107 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2111 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2113 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2121 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2124 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2125 return ssl_do_write(s);
2127 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2131 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2135 unsigned long alg_k;
2137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2139 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2143 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2147 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2150 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2151 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2152 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2153 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2156 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2157 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2158 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2159 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2163 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2165 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2168 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2169 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2171 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2174 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2175 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2176 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2177 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2179 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2182 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2184 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2189 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2190 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2191 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2192 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2194 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2197 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2200 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2201 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2204 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2205 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2207 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2216 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2217 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2218 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2219 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2220 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2222 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2223 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2225 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2230 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2231 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2232 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2233 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2234 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2238 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2240 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2241 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2244 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2248 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2249 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2252 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2255 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2256 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2257 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2258 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2259 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2260 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2263 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2265 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2268 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2269 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2270 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2271 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2272 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2273 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2276 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2277 unsigned char workaround_good;
2279 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2281 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2282 version_good |= workaround_good;
2286 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2287 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2289 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2292 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2293 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2294 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2295 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2297 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2298 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2299 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2302 s->session->master_key_length =
2303 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2305 session->master_key,
2308 (rand_premaster_secret));
2309 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2313 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2315 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2319 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2320 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2322 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2327 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2328 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2330 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2337 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2338 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2339 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2340 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2342 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2343 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2344 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2345 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2347 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2350 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2351 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2352 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2354 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2357 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2360 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2361 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2363 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2364 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2366 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2367 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2369 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2372 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2373 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2375 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2381 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2389 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2390 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2396 s->session->master_key_length =
2397 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2399 session->master_key,
2401 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2407 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2408 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2409 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2410 krb5_data authenticator;
2412 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2413 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2414 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2415 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2416 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2418 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2419 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2422 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2425 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2428 enc_ticket.length = i;
2430 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2432 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2436 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2437 p += enc_ticket.length;
2440 authenticator.length = i;
2442 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2444 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2448 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2449 p += authenticator.length;
2453 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2454 p += enc_pms.length;
2457 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2459 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2461 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2465 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2466 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2468 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2472 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2475 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2476 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2478 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2479 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2485 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2486 * return authtime == 0.
2488 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2489 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2491 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2492 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2494 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2495 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2500 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2505 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2506 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2508 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2512 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2514 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2516 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2519 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2520 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2523 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2527 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2529 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2533 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2535 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2540 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2542 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2546 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2547 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2549 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2550 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2551 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2552 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2553 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2554 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2555 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2558 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2560 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2566 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2568 s->session->master_key_length =
2569 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2571 session->master_key,
2574 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2575 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2576 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2577 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2578 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2583 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2584 * but it caused problems for apache.
2585 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2586 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2590 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
2594 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2597 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2601 const EC_GROUP *group;
2602 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2604 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2605 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2610 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2611 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2612 /* use the certificate */
2613 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2616 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2617 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2619 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2622 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2623 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2625 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2626 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2631 /* Let's get client's public key */
2632 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2638 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2640 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2641 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2643 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2646 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2647 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2649 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2650 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2651 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2652 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2653 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2654 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2656 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2658 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2662 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2663 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2668 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2671 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2672 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2674 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2676 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2680 /* Get encoded point length */
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2687 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2692 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2695 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2698 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2699 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2700 if (field_size <= 0) {
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2704 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2711 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2712 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2713 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2714 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2715 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2716 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2718 /* Compute the master secret */
2719 s->session->master_key_length =
2720 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2722 session->master_key,
2725 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2730 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2731 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2732 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2733 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2735 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2737 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2744 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2746 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2749 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2751 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2756 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2758 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2759 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2760 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2762 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2763 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2765 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2768 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2770 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2773 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2774 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2778 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2779 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2781 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2783 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2787 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2788 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2789 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
2790 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2795 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2796 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2797 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2798 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2799 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2804 s->session->master_key_length =
2805 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2807 session->master_key,
2812 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2818 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2823 if (param_len > n) {
2824 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2826 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2829 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2833 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2834 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2835 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2837 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2840 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2841 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2842 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2843 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2848 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2849 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2850 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2857 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2858 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2860 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2861 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2862 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2863 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2864 unsigned long alg_a;
2868 /* Get our certificate private key */
2869 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2870 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2871 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2872 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2873 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2875 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2876 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2877 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2881 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2886 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2887 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2888 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2889 * client certificate for authorization only.
2891 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2892 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2893 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2896 /* Decrypt session key */
2898 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2899 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2900 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2902 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2907 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2908 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2910 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2913 /* Generate master secret */
2914 s->session->master_key_length =
2915 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2917 session->master_key,
2918 premaster_secret, 32);
2919 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
2920 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2921 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2922 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2927 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2928 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2934 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2941 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2942 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2946 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2947 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2948 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2949 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2950 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2952 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2956 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2958 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2960 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2964 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2966 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2969 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2970 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2971 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2972 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2973 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2974 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2976 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2981 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2982 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2983 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2984 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2985 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2990 peer = s->session->peer;
2991 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2992 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2994 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2996 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2997 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3001 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3002 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3003 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3005 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3008 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3009 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
3012 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3013 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3015 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3017 } else if (rv == 0) {
3018 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3022 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3031 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3035 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3036 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3038 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3042 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3045 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3046 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3048 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3052 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3055 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3056 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3058 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3062 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3063 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3069 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3070 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3071 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3074 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3079 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3086 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3087 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3088 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3089 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3092 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3098 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3099 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3100 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3101 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3102 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3105 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3111 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3112 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3113 unsigned char signature[64];
3115 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3117 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3121 if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) {
3122 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3123 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3128 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3130 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3131 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3133 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3135 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3137 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3143 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3150 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3151 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3154 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3155 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3156 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3157 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3159 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3160 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3164 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3166 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3168 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3169 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3171 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3173 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3176 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3181 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3182 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3183 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3185 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3186 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3190 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3192 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3194 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3195 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3198 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3202 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3203 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3207 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3209 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3215 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3216 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3220 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3222 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3223 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3225 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3230 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3236 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3238 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3241 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3249 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3250 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3251 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3252 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3254 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3257 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3258 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3259 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3261 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3262 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3265 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3266 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3267 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3271 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3273 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3275 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3280 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3281 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3282 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3283 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3286 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3289 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3290 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3291 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3296 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3297 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3298 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3300 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3301 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3309 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3311 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3317 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3321 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3325 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3326 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3328 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3329 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3330 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3332 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3333 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3338 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3340 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3343 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3346 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3347 return ssl_do_write(s);
3350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3351 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3352 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3354 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3358 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3359 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3360 const unsigned char *const_p;
3361 int len, slen_full, slen;
3364 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3365 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3366 unsigned char key_name[16];
3368 /* get session encoding length */
3369 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3371 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3374 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3375 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3378 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3380 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3384 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3385 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3388 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3392 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3395 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3398 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3400 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3401 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3402 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3406 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3407 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3410 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3413 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3414 * follows handshake_header_length +
3415 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3416 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3417 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3418 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3420 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3421 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3422 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3425 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3427 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3428 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3430 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3431 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3435 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3437 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3438 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3440 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3441 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3443 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3447 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3448 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3449 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3451 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3453 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3455 /* Output key name */
3457 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3460 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3461 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3462 /* Encrypt session data */
3463 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3466 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3470 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3472 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3475 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3476 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3479 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3481 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3482 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3483 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3485 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3486 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3490 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3491 return ssl_do_write(s);
3495 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3496 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3497 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3501 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3503 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3506 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3507 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3508 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3511 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3512 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3516 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3519 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3520 /* message length */
3521 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3523 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3524 /* length of OCSP response */
3525 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3526 /* actual response */
3527 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3528 /* number of bytes to write */
3529 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3530 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3534 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3535 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3538 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3540 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3541 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3543 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3546 int proto_len, padding_len;
3548 const unsigned char *p;
3551 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3552 * extension in their ClientHello
3554 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3556 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3557 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3561 /* See the payload format below */
3562 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3563 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3564 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3565 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3571 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3572 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3573 * ssl3_get_finished).
3575 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3577 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3582 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3583 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3586 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3589 * The payload looks like:
3591 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3592 * uint8 padding_len;
3593 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3596 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3597 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3600 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3601 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3602 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3606 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3607 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3609 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3612 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3613 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;