2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/x509.h>
136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
137 #include <openssl/dh.h>
139 #include <openssl/bn.h>
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
141 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
143 #include <openssl/md5.h>
145 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
151 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
171 int new_state,state,skip=0;
173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
182 /* init things to blank */
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
217 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
265 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
283 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
286 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
291 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
292 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
293 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
296 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
298 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
302 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
303 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
304 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
305 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
307 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
308 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
312 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
316 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
317 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
318 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
320 /* clear this, it may get reset by
321 * send_server_key_exchange */
322 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
325 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
327 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
328 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
329 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
330 * be able to handle this) */
331 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
333 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
336 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
337 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
339 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
340 * message only if the cipher suite is either
341 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
342 * server certificate contains the server's
343 * public key for key exchange.
345 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
347 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
349 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
350 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
351 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
357 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
363 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
367 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
368 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
369 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
370 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
371 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
372 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
373 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
374 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
375 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
376 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
377 * and in RFC 2246): */
378 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
379 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
380 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
381 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
382 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
383 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
385 /* no cert request */
387 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
388 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
392 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
393 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
394 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
395 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
399 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
405 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
406 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
407 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
408 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
409 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
410 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
415 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
416 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
419 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
420 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
421 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
422 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
425 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
428 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
429 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
430 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
431 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
437 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
439 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
440 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
443 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
447 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
448 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
449 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
454 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
455 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
456 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
457 * message is not sent.
459 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
464 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
467 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
468 * a client cert, it can be verified
470 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
471 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
472 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
473 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
474 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
475 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
479 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
480 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
482 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
483 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
484 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
486 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
490 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
491 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
492 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
493 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
494 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
498 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
505 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
506 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
507 { ret= -1; goto end; }
509 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
510 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
512 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
513 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
516 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
517 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
525 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
526 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
527 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
528 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
529 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
530 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
531 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
532 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
534 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
536 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
541 /* clean a few things up */
542 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
544 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
547 /* remove buffering on output */
548 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
552 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
554 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
555 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
559 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
561 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
563 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
565 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
579 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
583 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
588 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
592 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
599 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
603 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
607 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
611 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
613 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
614 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
619 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
620 /* number of bytes to write */
625 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
626 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
629 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
634 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
635 * so permit appropriate message length */
636 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
642 if (!ok) return((int)n);
643 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
644 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
646 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
647 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
648 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
649 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
651 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
653 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
654 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
662 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
664 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
665 unsigned int cookie_len;
668 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
673 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
675 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
676 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
677 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
678 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
681 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
684 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
686 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
687 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
688 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
689 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
690 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
693 if (!ok) return((int)n);
694 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
696 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
697 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
698 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
701 if (s->client_version < s->version)
703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
704 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
706 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
707 s->version = s->client_version;
709 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
713 /* load the client random */
714 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
717 /* get the session-id */
721 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
722 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
723 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
724 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
725 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
726 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
727 * an earlier library version)
729 if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
731 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
736 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
738 { /* previous session */
745 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
752 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
757 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
758 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
760 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
761 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
763 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
770 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
771 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
772 * does not cause an overflow.
774 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
777 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
782 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
783 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
786 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
788 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
790 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
793 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
795 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
798 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
800 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
801 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
803 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
805 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
814 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
816 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
817 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
823 /* not enough data */
824 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
828 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
835 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
836 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
839 id=s->session->cipher->id;
842 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
844 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
846 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
848 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
849 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
859 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
861 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
862 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
866 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
867 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
868 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
879 /* not enough data */
880 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
887 if (p[j] == 0) break;
894 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
901 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
903 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
905 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLS_EXT);
910 if (ssl_check_tlsext(s,1) <= 0) {
911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLS_EXT);
916 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
917 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
918 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
919 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
921 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
922 { /* See if we have a match */
925 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
928 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
941 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
947 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
952 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
953 s->session->compress_meth=0;
955 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
957 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
958 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
959 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
962 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
967 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
972 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
976 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
980 /* Session-id reuse */
981 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
982 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
986 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
988 sk=s->session->ciphers;
989 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
991 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
992 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
994 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
998 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1000 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1002 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1006 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1009 /* we now have the following setup.
1011 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1012 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1013 * compression - basically ignored right now
1014 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1015 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1016 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1017 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1024 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1027 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1031 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1034 unsigned char *p,*d;
1036 unsigned long l,Time;
1038 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1040 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1041 p=s->s3->server_random;
1042 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1044 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1046 /* Do the message type and length last */
1049 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1050 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1053 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1054 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1056 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1057 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1058 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1059 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1060 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1061 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1062 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1064 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1065 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1067 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1068 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1074 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1077 /* put the cipher */
1078 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1081 /* put the compression method */
1082 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1085 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1088 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1091 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1101 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1104 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1105 /* number of bytes to write */
1110 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1111 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1114 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1118 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1120 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1123 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1128 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1129 /* number of bytes to write */
1134 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1135 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1138 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1144 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1151 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1152 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1155 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1158 unsigned char *p,*d;
1168 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1169 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1171 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1176 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1179 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1182 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1184 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1185 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1186 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1189 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1198 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1204 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1209 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1212 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1213 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1214 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1215 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1218 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1223 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1230 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1237 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1238 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1239 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1241 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1250 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1251 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1252 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1253 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1265 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1266 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1268 const EC_GROUP *group;
1270 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1271 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1273 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1274 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1275 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1279 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1284 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1286 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1291 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1297 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1304 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1305 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1306 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1307 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1309 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1316 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1317 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1318 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1324 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1325 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1331 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1332 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1333 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1336 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1343 /* Encode the public key.
1344 * First check the size of encoding and
1345 * allocate memory accordingly.
1347 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1348 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1349 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1352 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1353 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1354 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1355 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1362 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1363 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1364 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1365 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1367 if (encodedlen == 0)
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1373 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1375 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1376 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1377 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1378 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1383 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1384 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1392 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1394 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1398 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1400 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1404 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1406 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1409 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1412 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1420 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1425 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1428 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1436 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1438 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1439 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1440 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1441 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1442 * the actual encoded point itself
1444 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1452 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1453 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1455 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1463 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1464 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1466 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1470 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1472 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1473 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1474 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1475 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1476 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1477 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1478 (unsigned int *)&i);
1482 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1483 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1493 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1494 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1497 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1498 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1499 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1500 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1501 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1502 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1512 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1513 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1515 /* let's do ECDSA */
1516 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1517 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1518 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1519 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1520 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1521 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1532 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1533 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1539 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1542 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1548 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1549 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1550 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1552 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1555 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1556 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1558 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1562 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1564 unsigned char *p,*d;
1566 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1570 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1574 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1576 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1578 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1587 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1591 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1593 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1594 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1595 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1600 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1601 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1604 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1611 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1612 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1618 /* else no CA names */
1619 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1622 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1623 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1626 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1631 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1632 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1635 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1642 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1645 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1646 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1651 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1659 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1667 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1670 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1671 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1672 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1673 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1676 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1677 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1678 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1679 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1683 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1684 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1686 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1691 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1692 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1694 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1695 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1696 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1697 * be sent already */
1700 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1708 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1709 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1710 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1711 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1713 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1721 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1726 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1738 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1742 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1744 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1745 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1748 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1750 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1751 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1752 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1753 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1754 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1756 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1757 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1758 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1760 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1761 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1763 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1764 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1765 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1766 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1767 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1768 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1769 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1775 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1776 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1777 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1779 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1780 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1781 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1782 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1786 s->session->master_key_length=
1787 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1788 s->session->master_key,
1790 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1795 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1800 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1812 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1814 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1820 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1822 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1827 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1830 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1837 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1845 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1850 s->session->master_key_length=
1851 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1852 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1853 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1860 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1861 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1862 krb5_data authenticator;
1864 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1865 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1866 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1867 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1868 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1869 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1871 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1872 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1874 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1876 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1879 enc_ticket.length = i;
1881 if (n < enc_ticket.length + 6)
1883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1884 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1888 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1889 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1892 authenticator.length = i;
1894 if (n < enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)
1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1897 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1901 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1902 p+=authenticator.length;
1906 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1909 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1912 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1915 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1919 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1920 enc_pms.length + 6))
1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1923 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1927 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
1931 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1932 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1934 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1935 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1941 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1942 ** but will return authtime == 0.
1944 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
1945 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
1948 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1949 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1951 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1952 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1958 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
1960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
1965 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
1966 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1968 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
1972 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
1974 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
1976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1977 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1980 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
1981 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1984 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1987 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1990 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1993 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
1995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1996 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2000 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2003 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2006 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2008 s->session->master_key_length=
2009 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2010 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2012 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2014 int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2015 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2017 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2018 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2023 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2024 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2025 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2026 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2030 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2032 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2033 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2038 const EC_GROUP *group;
2039 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2041 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2042 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2045 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2049 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2052 /* use the certificate */
2053 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2057 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2058 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2060 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2063 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2064 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2066 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2067 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2074 /* Let's get client's public key */
2075 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2078 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2084 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2088 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2092 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2094 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2096 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2097 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2098 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2099 * never executed. When that support is
2100 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2101 * received in the certificate is
2102 * authorized for key agreement.
2103 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2104 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2107 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2109 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2113 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2114 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2120 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2124 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2125 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2127 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2130 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2134 /* Get encoded point length */
2137 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2138 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2144 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2145 * currently, so set it to the start
2147 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2150 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2151 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2152 if (field_size <= 0)
2154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2158 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2166 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2167 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2168 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2169 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2170 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2172 /* Compute the master secret */
2173 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2174 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2176 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2182 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2184 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2190 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2191 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2195 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2196 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2197 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2198 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2199 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2204 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2206 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2213 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2214 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2215 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2220 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2222 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2224 peer=s->session->peer;
2225 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2226 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2234 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2236 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2237 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2239 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2250 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2254 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2257 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2261 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2264 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2268 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2269 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2275 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2279 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2280 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2283 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2288 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2290 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2291 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2295 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2301 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2308 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2309 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2311 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2312 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2313 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2317 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2325 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2327 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2328 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2329 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2333 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2335 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2343 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2352 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2355 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2359 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2361 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2363 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2364 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2366 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2368 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2375 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2377 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2379 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2380 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2383 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2386 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2387 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2390 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2393 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2397 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2399 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2403 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2405 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2414 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2418 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2421 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2423 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2429 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2437 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2441 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2450 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2452 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2453 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2455 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2459 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2460 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2461 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2464 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2470 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2473 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2479 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2480 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2481 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2482 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2484 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2485 * when we arrive here. */
2486 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2488 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2489 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2495 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2496 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2497 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2498 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2499 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2507 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2510 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2511 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2515 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2520 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2522 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2524 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2525 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2526 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2527 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2533 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2539 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2540 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2545 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2546 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2548 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2549 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2551 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2553 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2555 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2557 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2559 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2561 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2563 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2565 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2567 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2569 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2571 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2573 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2575 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2577 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2579 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2581 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2583 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2585 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2587 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2589 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2591 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2593 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2595 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2597 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2599 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */