1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
194 int new_state,state,skip=0;
196 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
205 /* init things to blank */
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
231 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
233 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
240 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
242 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
276 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
277 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
278 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
283 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
284 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
287 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
288 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
289 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
293 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
300 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
301 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
302 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
305 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
306 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
314 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
315 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
316 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
320 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
321 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
323 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
327 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
336 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
337 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
338 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
339 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
340 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
342 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
343 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
345 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
346 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
348 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
353 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
365 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
366 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
367 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
369 /* clear this, it may get reset by
370 * send_server_key_exchange */
371 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
373 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
374 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
376 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
377 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
378 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
379 * be able to handle this) */
380 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
382 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
385 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
386 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
388 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
390 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
391 * message only if the cipher suite is either
392 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
393 * server certificate contains the server's
394 * public key for key exchange.
396 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
397 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
398 * hint if provided */
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
400 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
402 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
403 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
404 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
405 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
406 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
407 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
413 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
414 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
425 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
426 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
427 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
428 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
429 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
430 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
431 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
432 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
433 * and in RFC 2246): */
434 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
435 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
436 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
437 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
438 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
439 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
440 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
441 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
442 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
444 /* no cert request */
446 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
447 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
451 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
452 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
453 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
454 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
455 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
457 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
458 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
464 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
465 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
466 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
467 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
468 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
469 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
473 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
474 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
475 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
478 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
479 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
480 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
481 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
484 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
487 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
488 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
489 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
490 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
494 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
496 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
498 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
499 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
502 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
506 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
507 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
508 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
513 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
514 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
515 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
516 * message is not sent.
518 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
525 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
528 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
529 * a client cert, it can be verified
530 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
531 * should be generalized. But it is next step
533 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
534 ssl3_digest_cached_records(s);
535 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
536 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
538 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
539 offset+=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
544 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
545 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
547 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
548 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
549 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
551 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
555 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
556 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
557 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
558 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
559 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
561 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
562 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
570 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
575 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
576 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
577 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
578 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
579 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
583 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
584 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
585 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
586 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
587 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
593 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
594 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
596 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
597 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
598 { ret= -1; goto end; }
600 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
601 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
603 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
604 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
607 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
608 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
616 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
617 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
618 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
619 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
620 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
621 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
622 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
623 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
625 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
627 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
632 /* clean a few things up */
633 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
635 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
638 /* remove buffering on output */
639 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
643 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
645 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
646 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
650 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
652 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
654 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
656 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
670 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
674 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
679 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
683 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
690 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
694 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
698 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
702 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
704 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
705 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
710 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
711 /* number of bytes to write */
716 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
717 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
720 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
725 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
726 * so permit appropriate message length */
727 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
733 if (!ok) return((int)n);
734 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
735 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
737 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
738 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
739 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
740 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
742 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
744 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
745 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
753 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
755 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
756 unsigned int cookie_len;
759 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
764 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
766 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
767 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
768 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
769 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
772 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
774 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
777 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
778 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
779 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
780 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
781 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
784 if (!ok) return((int)n);
786 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
788 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
789 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
790 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
793 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
794 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
797 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
799 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
800 s->version = s->client_version;
802 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
806 /* load the client random */
807 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
810 /* get the session-id */
814 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
815 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
816 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
817 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
818 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
819 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
820 * an earlier library version)
822 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
824 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
829 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
831 { /* previous session */
838 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
845 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
850 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
851 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
853 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
854 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
856 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
863 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
864 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
865 * does not cause an overflow.
867 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
870 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
875 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
876 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
879 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
881 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
883 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
886 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
888 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
891 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
893 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
894 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
896 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
898 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
907 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
909 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
910 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
916 /* not enough data */
917 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
921 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
928 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
929 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
932 id=s->session->cipher->id;
935 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
937 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
939 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
941 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
942 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
952 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
954 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
955 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
959 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
960 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
961 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
972 /* not enough data */
973 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
980 if (p[j] == 0) break;
987 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
994 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
996 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
998 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1003 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1009 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1010 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1011 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1012 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1014 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1015 { /* See if we have a match */
1016 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1018 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1019 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1021 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1034 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1040 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1045 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1046 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1048 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1050 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1051 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1052 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1053 if (ciphers == NULL)
1055 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1060 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1061 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1065 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1069 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1070 ssl3_digest_cached_records(s);
1074 /* Session-id reuse */
1075 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1076 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1077 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1078 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1080 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1082 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1083 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1085 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1086 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1088 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1092 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1093 else if (ec != NULL)
1094 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1096 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1100 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1101 /* Clear cached handshake records */
1102 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
1103 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
1106 /* we now have the following setup.
1108 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1109 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1110 * compression - basically ignored right now
1111 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1112 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1113 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1114 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1121 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1124 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1128 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1131 unsigned char *p,*d;
1133 unsigned long l,Time;
1135 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1137 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1138 p=s->s3->server_random;
1139 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1141 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1143 /* Do the message type and length last */
1146 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1147 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1150 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1151 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1153 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1154 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1155 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1156 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1157 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1158 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1159 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1161 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1162 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1163 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1164 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1165 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1168 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1170 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1172 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1173 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1179 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1182 /* put the cipher */
1183 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1186 /* put the compression method */
1187 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1190 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1193 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1196 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1201 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1210 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1213 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1214 /* number of bytes to write */
1219 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1220 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1223 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1227 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1229 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1232 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1237 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1238 /* number of bytes to write */
1243 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1244 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1247 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1253 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1260 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1261 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1264 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1267 unsigned char *p,*d;
1277 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1278 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1280 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1285 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1288 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1291 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1293 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1294 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1295 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1298 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1307 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1313 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1318 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1321 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1322 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1323 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1324 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1327 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1332 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1339 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1346 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1347 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1348 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1350 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1359 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1360 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1361 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1362 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1375 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1377 const EC_GROUP *group;
1379 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1380 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1382 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1383 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1384 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1388 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1393 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1395 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1406 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1413 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1414 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1415 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1416 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1418 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1425 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1426 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1427 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1433 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1434 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1440 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1441 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1442 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1445 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1452 /* Encode the public key.
1453 * First check the size of encoding and
1454 * allocate memory accordingly.
1456 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1457 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1458 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1461 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1462 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1463 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1464 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1471 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1472 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1473 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1474 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1476 if (encodedlen == 0)
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1482 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1484 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1485 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1486 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1487 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1492 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1493 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1501 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1503 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1505 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1506 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1509 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1511 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1515 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1517 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1521 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1522 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1524 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1527 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1530 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1538 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1543 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1546 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1554 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1556 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1557 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1558 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1559 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1560 * the actual encoded point itself
1562 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1570 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1571 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1573 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1579 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1581 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1582 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1583 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1584 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1591 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1592 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1594 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1598 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1600 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1601 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1602 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1603 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1604 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1605 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1606 (unsigned int *)&i);
1610 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1611 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1621 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1622 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1625 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1626 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1627 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1628 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1629 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1630 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1640 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1641 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1643 /* let's do ECDSA */
1644 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1645 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1646 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1647 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1648 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1649 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1660 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1661 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1667 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1670 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1676 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1677 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1678 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1680 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1683 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1684 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1686 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1690 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1692 unsigned char *p,*d;
1694 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1698 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1702 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1704 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1706 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1715 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1719 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1721 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1722 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1723 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1728 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1729 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1732 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1739 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1740 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1746 /* else no CA names */
1747 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1750 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1751 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1754 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1759 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1760 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1763 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1770 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1773 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1774 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1779 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1783 unsigned long alg_k;
1785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1787 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1795 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1798 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1799 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1800 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1801 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1804 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1805 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1806 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1807 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1811 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1812 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1814 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1817 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
1819 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1820 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1822 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1823 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1824 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1825 * be sent already */
1828 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1836 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1837 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1838 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1839 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1841 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1848 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
1849 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1854 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1866 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1870 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1872 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1873 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1876 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1878 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1879 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1880 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1881 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1882 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1884 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1885 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1886 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1888 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1889 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1891 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1892 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1893 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1894 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1895 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1896 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1897 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1903 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1904 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1905 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1907 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1908 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1909 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1910 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1914 s->session->master_key_length=
1915 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1916 s->session->master_key,
1918 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1923 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1928 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1940 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1942 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1948 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1950 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1955 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1958 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1965 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1973 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1978 s->session->master_key_length=
1979 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1980 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1981 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1986 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
1988 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1989 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1990 krb5_data authenticator;
1992 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1993 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1994 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1995 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1996 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1997 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1999 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2000 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2002 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2004 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2007 enc_ticket.length = i;
2009 if (n < enc_ticket.length + 6)
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2012 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2016 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2017 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2020 authenticator.length = i;
2022 if (n < enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)
2024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2025 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2029 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2030 p+=authenticator.length;
2034 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2037 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2040 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2043 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2047 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2048 enc_pms.length + 6))
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2051 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2055 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2059 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2060 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2062 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2063 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2069 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2070 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2072 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2073 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2076 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2077 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2079 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2080 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2086 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2093 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2094 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2096 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2100 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2102 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2105 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2108 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2109 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2112 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2115 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2118 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2121 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2124 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2128 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2131 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2134 if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2136 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2137 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2138 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2139 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2140 * the protocol version.
2141 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2142 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2144 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2145 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2148 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2153 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2155 s->session->master_key_length=
2156 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2157 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2159 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2161 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2162 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2164 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2165 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2170 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2171 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2172 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2173 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2177 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2180 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2185 const EC_GROUP *group;
2186 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2188 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2189 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2192 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2196 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2197 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2199 /* use the certificate */
2200 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2204 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2205 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2207 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2210 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2211 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2213 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2214 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2221 /* Let's get client's public key */
2222 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2225 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2231 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2233 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2235 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2239 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2241 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2243 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2244 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2245 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2246 * never executed. When that support is
2247 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2248 * received in the certificate is
2249 * authorized for key agreement.
2250 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2251 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2254 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2256 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2260 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2261 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2267 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2271 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2272 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2274 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2277 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2281 /* Get encoded point length */
2284 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2285 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2291 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2292 * currently, so set it to the start
2294 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2297 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2298 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2299 if (field_size <= 0)
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2305 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2313 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2314 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2315 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2316 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2317 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2319 /* Compute the master secret */
2320 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2321 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2323 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2329 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2331 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2332 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2333 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2335 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2337 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2343 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2346 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2349 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2352 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2355 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2359 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2360 * string for the callback */
2361 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2362 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2363 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2364 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2365 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2367 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2370 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2373 else if (psk_len == 0)
2375 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2377 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2378 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2382 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2383 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2385 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2387 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2391 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2392 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2393 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2394 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2397 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2401 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2402 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2403 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2404 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2405 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2408 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2412 s->session->master_key_length=
2413 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2414 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2417 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2423 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2425 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2426 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2429 /* Get our certificate privatec key*/
2430 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL);
2431 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2432 /* Decrypt session key */
2433 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) || p[1]!=0x81 )
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2438 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,p+3,p[2]) <0)
2441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2444 /* Generate master secret */
2445 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2446 s->session->master_key_length=
2447 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2448 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2453 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2455 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2461 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2462 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2466 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2467 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2468 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2469 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2470 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2475 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2477 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2484 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2485 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2486 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2491 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2493 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2495 peer=s->session->peer;
2496 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2497 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2505 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2507 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2508 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2510 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2521 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2525 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2528 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2532 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2535 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2539 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2540 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2541 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2542 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2543 * signature without length field */
2544 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2545 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2556 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2560 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2561 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2564 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2569 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2571 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2572 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2576 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2582 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2590 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2592 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2593 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2594 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2598 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2606 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2608 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2609 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2610 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2614 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2616 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2622 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2623 { unsigned char signature[64];
2625 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2626 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2628 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2630 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2631 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2633 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2634 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2637 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2639 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2646 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2655 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2658 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2662 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2664 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2666 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2667 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2669 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2671 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2678 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2680 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2682 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2683 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2686 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2689 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2690 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2693 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2696 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2700 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2702 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2706 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2708 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2717 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2721 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2724 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2726 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2732 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2740 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2744 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2753 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2755 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2756 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2758 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2762 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2763 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2764 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2767 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2773 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2776 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2782 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2783 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2784 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2785 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2787 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2788 * when we arrive here. */
2789 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2791 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2792 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2798 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2799 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2800 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2801 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2802 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2810 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2813 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2814 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2818 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2823 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2825 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2828 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2829 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
2830 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2837 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2838 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2843 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2844 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2847 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2849 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2851 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2856 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2857 unsigned char key_name[16];
2859 /* get session encoding length */
2860 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2861 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2866 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2867 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2868 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2869 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2870 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2871 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2873 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2874 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2875 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2877 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2881 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2883 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2885 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2886 /* Skip message length for now */
2888 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2889 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2890 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2891 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2894 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2896 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
2905 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
2906 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2907 s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2908 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2909 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2910 memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2912 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2913 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2915 /* Output key name */
2917 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2920 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2921 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2922 /* Encrypt session data */
2923 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2925 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2927 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2929 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2930 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2931 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2934 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2936 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2937 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
2938 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
2940 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
2942 /* number of bytes to write */
2944 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2949 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2950 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2953 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2955 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
2958 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2959 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2960 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2963 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2966 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2969 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
2970 /* message length */
2971 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
2973 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
2974 /* length of OCSP response */
2975 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2976 /* actual response */
2977 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2978 /* number of bytes to write */
2979 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
2980 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2984 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2985 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));