1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return(SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function,
187 ssl3_get_server_method)
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
193 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
195 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
197 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
198 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
200 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
202 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
203 we do so if There is no srp login name */
205 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
209 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
222 int new_state,state,skip=0;
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
279 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0,
282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
286 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
288 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
290 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
295 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
304 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
311 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
312 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
313 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
314 /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
315 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
317 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
319 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
320 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
322 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
324 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
325 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
326 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
328 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
329 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
331 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
332 * client that doesn't support secure
335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
336 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
342 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
343 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
344 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
345 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
349 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
350 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
353 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
354 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
355 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
356 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
359 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
362 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
366 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
368 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
370 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
371 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
373 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
374 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
377 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
379 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
380 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
383 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
385 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
386 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
387 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
388 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
390 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
403 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
404 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
405 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
409 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
410 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
412 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
416 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
419 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
425 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
426 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
427 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
428 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
430 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
431 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
433 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
434 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
436 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
441 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
448 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
453 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
454 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
455 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
457 /* clear this, it may get reset by
458 * send_server_key_exchange */
459 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
461 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
462 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
464 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
465 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
466 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
467 * be able to handle this) */
468 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
470 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
473 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
474 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
476 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
478 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
479 * message only if the cipher suite is either
480 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
481 * server certificate contains the server's
482 * public key for key exchange.
484 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
485 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
486 * hint if provided */
487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
488 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
491 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
492 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
494 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
495 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
496 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
497 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
498 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
499 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
505 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
506 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
511 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
515 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
516 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
517 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
518 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
519 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
520 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
521 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
522 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
523 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
524 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
525 * and in RFC 2246): */
526 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
527 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
528 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
529 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
530 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
531 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
532 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
533 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
534 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
535 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
536 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
538 /* no cert request */
540 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
541 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
542 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
543 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
548 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
549 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
550 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
551 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
552 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
554 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
555 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
562 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
563 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
564 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
565 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
566 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
572 /* This code originally checked to see if
573 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
574 * and then flushed. This caused problems
575 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
576 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
577 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
578 * still exist. So instead we just flush
582 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
583 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
588 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
590 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
594 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
595 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
596 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
600 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
602 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
604 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
605 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
608 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
612 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
613 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
614 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
619 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
620 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
621 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
622 * message is not sent.
623 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
624 * the client uses its key from the certificate
627 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
628 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
630 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
631 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
633 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
637 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
639 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
641 if (!s->session->peer)
643 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
644 * at this point and digest cached records.
646 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
651 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
652 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
660 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
663 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
664 * a client cert, it can be verified
665 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
666 * should be generalized. But it is next step
668 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
669 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
671 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
672 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
676 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
677 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
688 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
689 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
691 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
692 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
693 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
694 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
696 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
697 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
698 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
699 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
700 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
702 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
703 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
705 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
706 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
708 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
713 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
715 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
717 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
718 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
719 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
720 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
721 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
722 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
723 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
724 * the client's Finished message is read.
726 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
727 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
729 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
730 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
732 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
736 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
737 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
739 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
740 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
741 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
742 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
743 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
744 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
745 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
746 * the client's Finished message is read.
748 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
749 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
750 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
751 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
752 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
756 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
757 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
760 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
766 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
767 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
768 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
769 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
773 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
774 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
775 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
776 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
777 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
783 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
784 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
786 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
787 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
788 { ret= -1; goto end; }
790 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
791 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
793 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
794 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
797 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
798 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
806 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
807 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
808 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
809 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
810 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
811 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
812 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
813 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
816 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
817 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
819 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
821 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
824 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
828 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
833 /* clean a few things up */
834 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
836 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
839 /* remove buffering on output */
840 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
844 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
849 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
851 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
853 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
855 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
869 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
873 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
878 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
882 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
889 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
893 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
897 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
900 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
902 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
903 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
906 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
907 return ssl_do_write(s);
910 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
915 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
916 * so permit appropriate message length */
917 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
923 if (!ok) return((int)n);
924 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
925 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
927 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
929 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
934 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
935 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
937 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
939 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
940 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
944 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
946 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
947 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
950 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
956 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
958 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
959 unsigned int cookie_len;
964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
968 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
970 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
973 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
974 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
975 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
976 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
979 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
982 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
985 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
986 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
987 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
988 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
989 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
992 if (!ok) return((int)n);
994 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
996 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
997 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
998 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
1001 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
1002 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1003 : (s->client_version < s->version))
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1006 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
1007 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
1009 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1010 s->version = s->client_version;
1012 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1016 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
1017 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1018 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1020 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1022 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1024 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1025 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1027 if (cookie_length == 0)
1031 /* load the client random */
1032 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1033 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1035 /* get the session-id */
1039 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1040 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1041 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1042 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1043 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1045 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1046 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1047 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1048 * setting will be ignored.
1050 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1052 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1057 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1059 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1061 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1062 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1063 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1064 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1065 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1067 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
1068 { /* previous session */
1075 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1085 cookie_len = *(p++);
1088 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1089 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1090 * does not cause an overflow.
1092 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1095 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1100 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1101 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1104 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1106 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1108 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1111 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1113 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1116 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1118 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1119 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1121 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1123 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1126 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1131 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1133 /* Select version to use */
1134 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1135 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1137 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1138 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1140 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1143 s->version = s->client_version;
1144 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1147 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1148 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1150 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1151 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1156 s->version = s->client_version;
1157 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1160 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1165 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1167 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1168 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1174 /* not enough data */
1175 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1179 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1186 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1187 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1190 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1193 fprintf(stderr,"client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1195 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1197 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1199 fprintf(stderr,"client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1200 i,sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers),
1201 SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1209 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1210 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1213 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1215 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1216 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1217 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1218 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1219 * enabled, though. */
1220 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1221 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1223 s->session->cipher = c;
1230 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1231 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1232 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1242 /* not enough data */
1243 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1252 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1259 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1266 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1268 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1275 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1276 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1277 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1278 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1281 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1282 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1288 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1290 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1292 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1293 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1294 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1297 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1298 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1302 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1303 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1304 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1306 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1311 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1314 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1316 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1317 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1319 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1320 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1325 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1326 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1327 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1328 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1330 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1331 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1333 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1334 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1335 /* Can't disable compression */
1336 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s))
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1341 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1342 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1344 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1345 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1347 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1351 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1356 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1357 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1359 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1364 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1371 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1372 { /* See if we have a match */
1373 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1375 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1376 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1378 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1391 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1396 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1397 * using compression.
1399 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1406 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1411 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1412 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1414 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1416 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1417 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1418 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1419 if (ciphers == NULL)
1421 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1426 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s))
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1431 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1433 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1435 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1438 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1444 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1447 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1449 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1450 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1454 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1458 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1459 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1460 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1461 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1462 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1463 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1464 /* do not send a session ticket */
1465 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1469 /* Session-id reuse */
1470 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1471 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1472 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1473 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1475 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1477 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1478 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1480 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1481 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1483 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1487 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1488 else if (ec != NULL)
1489 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1491 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1495 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1498 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1500 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1504 /* we now have the following setup.
1506 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1507 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1508 * compression - basically ignored right now
1509 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1510 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1511 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1512 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1515 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1516 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1518 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1525 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1529 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1532 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1533 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1536 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1539 unsigned char *p,*d;
1544 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1546 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1547 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1548 p=s->s3->server_random;
1549 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1552 /* Do the message type and length last */
1553 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1555 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1556 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1559 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1560 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1562 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1563 * back in the server hello:
1564 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1565 * we send back the old session ID.
1566 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1567 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1568 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1569 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1571 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1572 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1573 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1574 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1577 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1578 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1580 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1582 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1583 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1589 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1592 /* put the cipher */
1593 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1596 /* put the compression method */
1597 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1600 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1603 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1606 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1611 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1613 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1620 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1624 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1625 return ssl_do_write(s);
1628 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1631 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1633 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1634 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1637 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1638 return ssl_do_write(s);
1641 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1647 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1654 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1655 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1658 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1661 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1662 unsigned char *p,*d;
1672 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1673 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1675 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1680 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1683 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1686 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1688 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1689 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1690 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1693 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1702 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1708 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1713 if (type & SSL_kDHE)
1715 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1717 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1720 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1727 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1728 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1729 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1730 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1733 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1737 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1738 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp))
1740 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1744 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1750 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1752 else if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1759 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1760 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1761 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1763 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1772 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1773 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1774 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1775 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1788 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1790 const EC_GROUP *group;
1792 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1793 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1795 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1796 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1797 if (nid != NID_undef)
1798 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1800 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1802 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1803 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1804 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1808 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1813 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1819 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1825 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1827 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1833 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1834 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1835 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1836 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1838 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1845 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1846 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1847 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1853 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1854 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1860 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1861 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1862 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1865 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1872 /* Encode the public key.
1873 * First check the size of encoding and
1874 * allocate memory accordingly.
1876 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1877 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1878 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1881 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1882 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1883 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1884 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1891 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1892 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1893 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1894 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1896 if (encodedlen == 0)
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1902 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1904 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1905 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1906 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1907 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1912 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1913 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1921 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1923 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1925 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1926 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1929 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1931 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1933 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1934 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1935 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1936 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1949 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1953 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1955 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1957 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1964 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1965 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1967 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1970 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1973 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1981 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1986 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1988 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1991 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
2003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2004 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
2006 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
2007 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
2008 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2009 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
2010 * the actual encoded point itself
2012 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
2020 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
2021 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
2023 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2024 encodedPoint = NULL;
2029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2030 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
2032 /* copy PSK identity hint */
2033 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
2034 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
2035 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2042 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
2043 * and p points to the space at the end. */
2044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2045 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2049 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
2051 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2052 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2053 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
2054 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2055 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2056 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2057 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2058 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
2059 (unsigned int *)&i);
2063 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2064 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2076 /* send signature algorithm */
2077 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2079 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2081 /* Should never happen */
2082 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2089 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2092 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2093 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2094 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2095 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2096 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2097 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2104 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2109 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2110 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2116 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2119 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2120 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2121 return ssl_do_write(s);
2123 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2126 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2127 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2129 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2133 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2135 unsigned char *p,*d;
2137 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2141 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2145 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2147 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2149 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2154 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2156 const unsigned char *psigs;
2157 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2158 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2159 /* Skip over length for now */
2161 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2162 /* Now fill in length */
2172 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2176 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2178 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2179 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2180 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2185 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2186 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2189 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2196 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2197 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2203 /* else no CA names */
2204 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2207 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2209 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2210 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2212 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2217 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2219 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2227 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2230 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2231 return ssl_do_write(s);
2236 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2240 unsigned long alg_k;
2242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2244 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2248 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2252 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2255 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2256 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2257 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2258 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2261 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2262 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2263 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2264 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2268 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2269 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2271 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2274 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2276 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2278 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2280 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2281 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2283 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2284 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2285 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2286 * be sent already */
2289 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2297 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2298 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2299 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2300 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2302 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2309 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2310 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2315 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2327 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2328 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2329 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2330 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2331 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2332 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2334 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2335 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2336 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2338 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2341 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2342 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2343 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2345 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2346 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2347 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2348 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2349 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2350 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2351 * decryption error. */
2352 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2353 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2355 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2356 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2357 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2358 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2359 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2360 * support the requested protocol version. If
2361 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2362 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2364 unsigned char workaround_good;
2365 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2366 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2367 version_good |= workaround_good;
2370 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2371 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2372 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2374 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2375 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2376 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2378 p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
2379 rand_premaster_secret[i]);
2382 s->session->master_key_length=
2383 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2384 s->session->master_key,
2386 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2391 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2394 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2401 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2412 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2413 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2414 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2415 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2418 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2419 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2420 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2421 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2423 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2427 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2429 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2431 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2436 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2440 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2441 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2444 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2445 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2447 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2449 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2453 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2454 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2457 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2464 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2473 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2480 s->session->master_key_length=
2481 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2482 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2483 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2490 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2492 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2493 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2494 krb5_data authenticator;
2496 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2497 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2498 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2499 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2500 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2501 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2503 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2504 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2506 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2508 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2511 enc_ticket.length = i;
2513 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2516 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2520 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2521 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2524 authenticator.length = i;
2526 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2529 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2533 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2534 p+=authenticator.length;
2538 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2541 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2544 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2547 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2551 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2552 enc_pms.length + 6))
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2555 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2559 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2563 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2564 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2566 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2567 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2573 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2574 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2576 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2577 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2580 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2581 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2583 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2584 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2590 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2597 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2598 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2600 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2604 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2606 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2609 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2612 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2613 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2616 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2619 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2622 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2625 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2628 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2632 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2635 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2638 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2640 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2641 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2642 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2643 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2644 * the protocol version.
2645 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2646 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2648 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2651 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2656 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2658 s->session->master_key_length=
2659 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2660 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2662 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2664 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2665 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2667 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2668 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2673 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2674 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2675 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2676 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2680 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2683 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2688 const EC_GROUP *group;
2689 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2691 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2692 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2695 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2699 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2700 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2702 /* use the certificate */
2703 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2707 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2708 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2710 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2713 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2714 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2716 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2717 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2724 /* Let's get client's public key */
2725 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2728 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2734 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2736 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
2738 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2742 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2744 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2746 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2747 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2748 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2749 * never executed. When that support is
2750 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2751 * received in the certificate is
2752 * authorized for key agreement.
2753 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2754 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2757 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2759 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2763 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2764 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2770 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2774 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2775 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2777 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2780 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2784 /* Get encoded point length */
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2793 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2794 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2800 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2801 * currently, so set it to the start
2803 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2806 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2807 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2808 if (field_size <= 0)
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2814 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2822 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2823 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2824 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2825 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2826 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2827 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2829 /* Compute the master secret */
2830 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2831 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2833 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2839 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2841 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2842 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2843 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2845 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2847 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2853 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2856 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2859 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2862 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2865 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2869 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2870 * string for the callback */
2871 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2872 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2873 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2874 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2875 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2877 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2880 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2883 else if (psk_len == 0)
2885 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2887 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2888 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2892 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2893 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2895 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2897 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2901 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2902 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2903 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2904 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2907 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2911 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2912 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2913 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2914 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2915 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2918 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2922 s->session->master_key_length=
2923 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2924 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2927 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2934 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2942 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2946 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2951 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2952 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2954 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2958 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2959 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2960 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2961 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2964 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2968 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2977 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2978 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2981 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2982 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2983 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2984 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2985 unsigned long alg_a;
2989 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2990 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2991 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2992 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2993 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2994 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2996 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2997 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2998 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2999 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3000 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
3001 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
3002 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3003 if (client_pub_pkey)
3005 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3008 /* Decrypt session key */
3009 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
3010 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
3011 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
3013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3018 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
3021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3024 /* Generate master secret */
3025 s->session->master_key_length=
3026 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3027 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
3028 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3029 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3034 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
3035 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3043 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3045 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3051 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3052 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3055 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3056 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3057 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3058 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3059 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3060 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3065 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3067 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3073 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3075 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3077 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3078 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3079 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3081 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3084 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3086 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3088 peer=s->session->peer;
3089 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3090 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3098 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3100 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3101 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3103 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3114 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3118 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3121 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3125 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3128 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3132 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3133 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3134 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3135 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3136 * signature without length field */
3137 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3138 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3144 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3146 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3149 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3154 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3158 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3168 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3172 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3173 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3176 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3180 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3184 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3188 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3192 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3195 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3196 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3199 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3203 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3205 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3212 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3214 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3215 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3219 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3225 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3233 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3235 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3236 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3237 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3241 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3249 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3251 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3252 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3253 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3257 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3259 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3265 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3266 { unsigned char signature[64];
3268 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3269 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3271 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3273 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3274 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3276 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3277 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3280 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3282 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3289 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3298 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3301 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3303 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3304 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3305 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3307 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3308 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3312 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3314 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3316 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3317 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3319 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3321 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3328 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3330 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3332 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3333 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3336 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3339 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3340 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3343 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3346 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3350 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3352 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3356 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3358 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3367 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3371 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3374 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3376 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3382 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3390 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3394 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3403 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3405 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3406 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3408 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3412 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3413 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3414 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3417 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3420 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3421 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3423 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3430 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3433 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3440 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3443 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3446 al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3448 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3451 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3454 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3455 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3456 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3457 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3459 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3460 * when we arrive here. */
3461 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3463 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3464 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3470 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3471 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3472 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3473 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3474 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3482 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3485 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3486 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3490 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3494 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3496 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3499 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3500 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3501 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3508 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk))
3510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3513 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3516 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3517 return ssl_do_write(s);
3520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3521 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3522 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3524 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3526 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3527 const unsigned char *const_p;
3528 int len, slen_full, slen;
3533 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3534 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3535 unsigned char key_name[16];
3537 /* get session encoding length */
3538 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3539 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3542 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3544 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3548 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3550 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3552 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3558 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3560 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3561 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3567 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3568 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3570 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3571 * follows handshake_header_length +
3572 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3573 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3574 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3575 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3577 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3578 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3579 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3581 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3582 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3583 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3584 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3585 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3588 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3590 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3599 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3600 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3601 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3602 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3603 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3604 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3607 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3608 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3609 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3610 * as their sessions. */
3611 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3613 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3615 /* Output key name */
3617 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3620 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3621 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3622 /* Encrypt session data */
3623 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3625 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3627 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3629 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3630 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3631 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3634 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3636 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3637 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3638 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3639 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3641 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3645 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3646 return ssl_do_write(s);
3649 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3651 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3654 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3655 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3656 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3659 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3662 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3665 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3666 /* message length */
3667 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3669 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3670 /* length of OCSP response */
3671 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3672 /* actual response */
3673 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3674 /* number of bytes to write */
3675 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3676 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3680 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3681 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3684 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3685 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3686 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3687 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3690 int proto_len, padding_len;
3692 const unsigned char *p;
3694 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3695 * extension in their ClientHello */
3696 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3702 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3703 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3704 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3706 514, /* See the payload format below */
3712 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3713 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3714 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3715 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3722 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3724 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3726 /* The payload looks like:
3728 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3729 * uint8 padding_len;
3730 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3733 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3735 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3736 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3739 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3740 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3745 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3746 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;