1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
301 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
303 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
304 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
306 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
308 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
310 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
312 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
313 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
315 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
316 * client that doesn't support secure
319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
320 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
326 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
327 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
328 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
329 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
333 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
337 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
338 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
339 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
340 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
343 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
350 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
355 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
409 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
411 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
412 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
413 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
414 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
415 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
417 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
418 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
420 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
423 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
428 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
442 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
444 /* clear this, it may get reset by
445 * send_server_key_exchange */
446 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
448 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
449 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
451 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
452 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
453 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
454 * be able to handle this) */
455 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
460 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
461 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
463 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
465 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
466 * message only if the cipher suite is either
467 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
468 * server certificate contains the server's
469 * public key for key exchange.
471 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
472 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
473 * hint if provided */
474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
478 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
479 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
481 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
482 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
483 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
484 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
485 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
486 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
492 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
493 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
498 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
504 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
506 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
507 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
508 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
509 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
510 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
511 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
512 * and in RFC 2246): */
513 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
514 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
515 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
516 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
517 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
518 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
519 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
520 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
521 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
523 /* no cert request */
525 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
526 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
527 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
528 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
533 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
534 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
535 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
536 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
537 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
539 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
540 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
546 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
548 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
549 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
550 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
551 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
555 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
557 /* This code originally checked to see if
558 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
559 * and then flushed. This caused problems
560 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
561 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
562 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
563 * still exist. So instead we just flush
567 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
568 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
573 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
575 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
580 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
581 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
585 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
587 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
589 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
590 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
593 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
597 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
598 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
599 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
604 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
605 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
606 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
607 * message is not sent.
608 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
609 * the client uses its key from the certificate
612 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
613 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
615 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
616 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
618 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
622 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
626 if (!s->session->peer)
628 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
629 * at this point and digest cached records.
631 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
636 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
637 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
645 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
648 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
649 * a client cert, it can be verified
650 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
651 * should be generalized. But it is next step
653 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
654 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
656 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
657 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
661 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
662 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
673 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
674 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
676 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
677 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
678 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
680 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
681 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
683 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
684 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
686 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
691 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
692 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
694 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
695 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
697 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
703 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
704 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
705 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
709 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
710 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
713 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
718 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
719 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
720 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
721 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
722 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
726 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
727 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
728 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
729 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
730 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
736 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
737 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
739 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
740 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
741 { ret= -1; goto end; }
743 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
744 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
746 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
747 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
750 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
751 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
759 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
760 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
761 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
762 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
763 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
764 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
765 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
766 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
769 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
770 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
772 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
773 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
775 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
779 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
784 /* clean a few things up */
785 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
787 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
790 /* remove buffering on output */
791 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
795 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
800 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
802 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
804 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
806 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
820 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
824 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
829 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
833 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
840 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
844 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
848 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
852 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
854 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
855 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
860 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
861 /* number of bytes to write */
866 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
867 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
870 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
875 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
876 * so permit appropriate message length */
877 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
883 if (!ok) return((int)n);
884 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
885 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
887 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
889 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
894 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
895 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
897 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
899 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
900 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
904 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
906 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
907 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
910 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
916 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
918 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
919 unsigned int cookie_len;
922 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
927 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
929 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
930 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
931 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
932 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
935 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
938 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
941 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
942 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
943 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
944 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
945 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
948 if (!ok) return((int)n);
950 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
952 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
953 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
954 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
957 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
958 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
961 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
963 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
964 s->version = s->client_version;
966 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
970 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
971 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
972 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
974 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
976 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
978 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
979 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
981 if (cookie_length == 0)
985 /* load the client random */
986 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
989 /* get the session-id */
993 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
994 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
995 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
996 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
997 * won't even compile against older library versions).
999 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1000 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1001 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1002 * setting will be ignored.
1004 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1006 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1011 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1013 { /* previous session */
1020 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1027 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1030 cookie_len = *(p++);
1033 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1034 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1035 * does not cause an overflow.
1037 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1040 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1045 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1046 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1049 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1051 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1053 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1056 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1058 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1061 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1063 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1064 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1066 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1068 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1079 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1081 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1082 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1088 /* not enough data */
1089 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1093 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1100 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1101 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1104 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1107 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1109 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1111 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1113 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1114 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1122 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1123 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1126 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1128 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1129 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1130 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1131 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1132 * enabled, though. */
1133 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1134 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1136 s->session->cipher = c;
1143 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1144 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1145 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1155 /* not enough data */
1156 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1163 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1170 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1177 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1179 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1181 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1186 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1191 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1192 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1193 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1194 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1197 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1198 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s,1,pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1200 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1205 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1207 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1209 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1210 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1211 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1214 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1215 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1219 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1220 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1221 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1223 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1228 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1231 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1233 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1234 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1236 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1237 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1242 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1243 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1244 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1245 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1247 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1248 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1250 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1251 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1252 /* Can't disable compression */
1253 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1255 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1259 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1260 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1262 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1263 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1265 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1269 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1271 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1275 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1276 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1278 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1283 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1290 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1291 { /* See if we have a match */
1292 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1294 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1295 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1297 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1310 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1315 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1316 * using compression.
1318 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1320 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1326 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1331 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1332 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1334 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1336 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1337 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1338 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1339 if (ciphers == NULL)
1341 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1346 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1347 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1351 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1355 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1359 /* Session-id reuse */
1360 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1361 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1362 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1363 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1365 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1367 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1368 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1370 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1371 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1373 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1377 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1378 else if (ec != NULL)
1379 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1381 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1385 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1388 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1390 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1392 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1397 /* we now have the following setup.
1399 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1400 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1401 * compression - basically ignored right now
1402 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1403 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1404 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1405 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1408 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1409 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1411 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1422 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1425 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1429 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1432 unsigned char *p,*d;
1435 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1439 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1441 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1442 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1443 p=s->s3->server_random;
1444 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1445 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1447 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1450 /* Do the message type and length last */
1453 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1454 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1457 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1458 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1460 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1461 * back in the server hello:
1462 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1463 * we send back the old session ID.
1464 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1465 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1466 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1467 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1469 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1470 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1471 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1472 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1475 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1477 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1479 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1480 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1486 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1489 /* put the cipher */
1490 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1493 /* put the compression method */
1494 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1497 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1500 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1503 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1508 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1517 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1520 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1521 /* number of bytes to write */
1526 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1527 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1530 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1534 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1536 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1539 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1544 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1545 /* number of bytes to write */
1550 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1551 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1554 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1560 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1567 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1568 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1571 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1574 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1575 unsigned char *p,*d;
1585 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1586 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1588 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1593 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1596 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1599 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1601 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1602 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1603 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1606 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1615 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1621 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1626 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1629 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1630 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1631 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1632 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1635 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1640 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1646 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1653 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1654 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1655 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1657 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1666 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1667 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1668 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1669 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1682 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1684 const EC_GROUP *group;
1686 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1687 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1689 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1690 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1691 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1695 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1700 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1706 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1712 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1718 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1719 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1720 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1721 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1723 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1730 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1731 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1732 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1738 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1739 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1745 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1746 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1747 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1750 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1757 /* Encode the public key.
1758 * First check the size of encoding and
1759 * allocate memory accordingly.
1761 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1762 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1763 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1766 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1767 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1768 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1769 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1776 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1777 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1778 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1779 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1781 if (encodedlen == 0)
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1787 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1789 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1790 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1791 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1792 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1797 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1798 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1806 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1808 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1810 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1811 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1814 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1816 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1818 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1819 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1820 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1821 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1834 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1838 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1840 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1842 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1849 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1850 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1852 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1855 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1858 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1866 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1871 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1874 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1877 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1890 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1892 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1893 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1894 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1895 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1896 * the actual encoded point itself
1898 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1906 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1907 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1909 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1910 encodedPoint = NULL;
1915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1916 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1918 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1919 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1920 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1921 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1928 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1929 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1931 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1932 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1936 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1938 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1939 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1940 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1941 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1942 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1943 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1944 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1945 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1946 (unsigned int *)&i);
1950 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1951 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1963 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1965 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1967 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1969 /* Should never happen */
1970 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1977 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1980 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1981 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1982 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1983 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1984 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1985 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1992 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1997 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1998 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2004 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2007 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2013 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2014 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2015 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2017 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2020 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2021 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2023 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2027 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2029 unsigned char *p,*d;
2031 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2035 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2039 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2041 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2043 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2048 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2050 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2060 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2064 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2066 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2067 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2068 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2073 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2074 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2077 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2084 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2085 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2091 /* else no CA names */
2092 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2095 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2096 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2099 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2104 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2105 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2108 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2115 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2118 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2119 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2124 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2128 unsigned long alg_k;
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2132 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2140 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2143 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2144 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2145 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2146 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2149 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2150 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2151 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2152 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2156 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2157 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2159 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2162 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2164 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2165 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2167 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2168 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2169 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2170 * be sent already */
2173 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2181 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2182 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2183 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2184 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2186 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2193 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2194 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2199 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2211 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2215 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2217 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2218 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2221 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2223 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2224 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2225 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2226 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2227 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2229 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2230 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2231 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2233 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2234 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2236 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2237 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2238 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2239 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2240 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2241 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2242 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2248 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2249 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2250 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2252 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2253 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2254 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2255 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2259 s->session->master_key_length=
2260 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2261 s->session->master_key,
2263 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2268 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2273 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2285 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2287 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2293 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2295 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2300 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2303 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2310 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2319 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2324 s->session->master_key_length=
2325 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2326 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2327 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2332 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2334 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2335 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2336 krb5_data authenticator;
2338 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2339 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2340 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2341 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2342 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2343 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2345 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2346 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2348 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2350 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2353 enc_ticket.length = i;
2355 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2358 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2362 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2363 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2366 authenticator.length = i;
2368 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2371 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2375 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2376 p+=authenticator.length;
2380 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2383 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2386 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2389 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2393 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2394 enc_pms.length + 6))
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2397 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2401 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2405 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2406 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2408 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2409 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2415 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2416 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2418 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2419 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2422 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2423 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2425 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2426 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2432 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2439 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2440 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2442 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2446 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2448 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2451 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2454 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2455 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2458 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2461 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2464 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2467 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2470 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2474 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2477 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2480 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2482 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2483 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2484 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2485 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2486 * the protocol version.
2487 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2488 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2490 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2493 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2498 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2500 s->session->master_key_length=
2501 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2502 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2504 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2506 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2507 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2509 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2510 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2515 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2516 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2517 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2518 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2522 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2525 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2530 const EC_GROUP *group;
2531 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2533 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2534 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2537 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2541 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2542 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2544 /* use the certificate */
2545 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2549 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2550 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2552 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2555 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2556 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2558 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2559 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2566 /* Let's get client's public key */
2567 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2570 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2576 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2578 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2580 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2584 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2586 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2588 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2589 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2590 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2591 * never executed. When that support is
2592 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2593 * received in the certificate is
2594 * authorized for key agreement.
2595 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2596 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2599 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2601 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2605 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2606 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2612 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2616 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2617 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2619 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2622 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2626 /* Get encoded point length */
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2635 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2636 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2642 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2643 * currently, so set it to the start
2645 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2648 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2649 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2650 if (field_size <= 0)
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2656 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2664 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2665 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2666 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2667 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2668 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2669 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2671 /* Compute the master secret */
2672 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2673 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2675 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2681 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2683 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2684 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2685 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2687 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2689 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2695 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2698 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2701 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2704 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2707 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2711 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2712 * string for the callback */
2713 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2714 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2715 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2716 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2717 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2719 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2725 else if (psk_len == 0)
2727 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2729 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2730 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2734 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2735 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2737 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2739 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2743 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2744 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2745 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2746 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2749 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2753 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2754 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2755 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2756 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2757 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2760 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2764 s->session->master_key_length=
2765 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2766 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2769 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2776 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2784 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2788 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2793 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2794 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2795 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2796 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2799 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2803 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2812 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2813 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2816 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2817 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2818 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2819 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2820 unsigned long alg_a;
2822 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2823 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2824 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2825 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2826 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2827 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2829 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2830 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2831 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2832 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2833 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2834 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2835 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2836 if (client_pub_pkey)
2838 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2841 /* Decrypt session key */
2842 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2852 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2862 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2868 /* Generate master secret */
2869 s->session->master_key_length=
2870 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2871 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2872 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2873 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2878 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2879 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2887 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2889 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2895 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2896 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2900 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2901 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2902 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2903 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2904 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2909 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2911 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2917 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2919 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2921 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2922 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2923 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2925 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2928 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2930 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2932 peer=s->session->peer;
2933 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2934 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2942 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2944 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2945 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2947 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2958 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2962 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2965 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2969 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2972 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2976 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2977 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2978 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2979 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2980 * signature without length field */
2981 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2982 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2988 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2990 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2991 /* Should never happen */
2994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2995 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2998 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
2999 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3002 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3005 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3009 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3013 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3023 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3027 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3028 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3031 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3035 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3039 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3043 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3047 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3050 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3051 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3054 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3058 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3060 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3067 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3069 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3070 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3074 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3080 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3088 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3090 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3091 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3092 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3096 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3104 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3106 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3107 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3108 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3112 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3114 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3120 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3121 { unsigned char signature[64];
3123 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3124 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3126 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3128 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3129 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3131 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3132 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3135 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3137 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3144 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3153 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3156 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3158 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3159 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3160 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3162 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3163 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3167 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3169 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3171 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3172 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3174 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3176 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3183 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3185 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3187 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3188 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3191 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3194 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3195 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3198 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3201 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3205 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3207 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3211 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3213 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3222 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3226 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3229 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3231 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3237 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3245 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3249 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3258 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3260 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3261 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3263 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3267 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3268 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3269 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3272 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3275 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3276 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3278 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3284 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3287 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3293 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3294 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3295 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3296 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3298 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3299 * when we arrive here. */
3300 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3302 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3303 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3309 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3310 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3311 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3312 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3313 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3324 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3325 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3329 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3334 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3336 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3339 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3340 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3341 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3348 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3349 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3354 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3355 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3359 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3360 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3362 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3364 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3365 const unsigned char *const_p;
3366 int len, slen_full, slen;
3371 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3372 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3373 unsigned char key_name[16];
3375 /* get session encoding length */
3376 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3377 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3380 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3382 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3386 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3388 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3390 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3396 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3398 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3399 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3405 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3406 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3408 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3409 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3410 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3411 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3412 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3413 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3415 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3416 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3417 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3420 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3422 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3423 /* Skip message length for now */
3425 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3426 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3427 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3428 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3431 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3433 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3442 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3443 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3444 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3445 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3446 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3447 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3450 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3451 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3452 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3453 * as their sessions. */
3454 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3456 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3458 /* Output key name */
3460 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3463 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3464 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3465 /* Encrypt session data */
3466 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3468 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3470 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3472 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3473 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3474 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3477 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3479 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3480 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3481 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3483 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3485 /* number of bytes to write */
3487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3492 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3493 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3496 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3498 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3501 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3502 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3503 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3506 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3509 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3512 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3513 /* message length */
3514 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3516 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3517 /* length of OCSP response */
3518 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3519 /* actual response */
3520 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3521 /* number of bytes to write */
3522 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3523 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3527 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3528 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3531 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3532 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3533 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3534 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3537 int proto_len, padding_len;
3539 const unsigned char *p;
3541 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3542 * extension in their ClientHello */
3543 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3549 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3550 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3551 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3553 514, /* See the payload format below */
3559 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3560 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3561 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3562 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3569 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3571 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3573 /* The payload looks like:
3575 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3576 * uint8 padding_len;
3577 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3580 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3582 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3583 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3586 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3587 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3592 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3593 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;