1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
355 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
356 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
358 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
362 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
364 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
365 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
368 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
370 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
371 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
372 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
373 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
375 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
383 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
387 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
389 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
390 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
394 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
395 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
401 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
405 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
415 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s, &skip);
416 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
418 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
425 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
426 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
427 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
428 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
429 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
431 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
432 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
434 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
437 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
442 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
449 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
454 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
455 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
456 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
458 /* clear this, it may get reset by
459 * send_server_key_exchange */
460 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
462 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
463 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
465 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
466 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
467 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
468 * be able to handle this) */
469 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
471 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
474 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
475 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
477 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
479 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
480 * message only if the cipher suite is either
481 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
482 * server certificate contains the server's
483 * public key for key exchange.
485 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
486 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
487 * hint if provided */
488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
489 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
492 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
493 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
495 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
496 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
497 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
498 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
499 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
500 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
506 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
507 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
512 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
516 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
517 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
518 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
519 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
520 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
521 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
522 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
523 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
524 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
525 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
526 * and in RFC 2246): */
527 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
528 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
529 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
530 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
531 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
532 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
533 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
534 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
535 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
537 /* no cert request */
539 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
540 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
541 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
542 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
547 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
548 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
549 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
550 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
551 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
553 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
554 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
562 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
563 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
564 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
565 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
571 /* This code originally checked to see if
572 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
573 * and then flushed. This caused problems
574 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
575 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
576 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
577 * still exist. So instead we just flush
581 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
582 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
587 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
589 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
594 ret=tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(s);
595 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
596 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
597 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
601 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
603 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
604 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
608 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
611 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
614 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
616 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
617 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
620 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
624 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
625 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
626 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
631 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
632 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
633 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
634 * message is not sent.
635 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
636 * the client uses its key from the certificate
639 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
640 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
642 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
643 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
645 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
649 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
651 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
653 if (!s->session->peer)
655 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
656 * at this point and digest cached records.
658 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
663 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
664 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
672 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
675 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
676 * a client cert, it can be verified
677 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
678 * should be generalized. But it is next step
680 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
681 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
683 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
684 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
688 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
689 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
700 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
703 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
704 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
705 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
707 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
708 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
710 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
711 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
713 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
718 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
719 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
720 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
721 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
722 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
724 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
728 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
729 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
730 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
731 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
732 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
736 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
737 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
740 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
745 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
746 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
747 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
748 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
749 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
753 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
754 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
755 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
756 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
757 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
763 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
764 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
766 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
767 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
768 { ret= -1; goto end; }
770 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
771 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
773 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
774 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
777 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
778 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
786 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
787 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
788 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
789 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
790 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
791 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
792 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
793 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
796 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
797 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
799 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
800 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
802 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
806 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
811 /* clean a few things up */
812 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
814 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
817 /* remove buffering on output */
818 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
822 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
827 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
829 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
831 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
833 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
847 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
851 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
856 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
860 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
867 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
871 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
875 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
878 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
880 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
881 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
884 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
885 return ssl_do_write(s);
888 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
893 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
894 * so permit appropriate message length */
895 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
901 if (!ok) return((int)n);
902 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
904 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA)
907 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
909 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
911 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
916 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
917 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
919 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
921 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
922 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
926 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
928 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
929 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
932 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
938 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
940 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
941 unsigned int cookie_len;
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
950 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
952 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C)
955 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
956 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
957 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
958 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
961 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
964 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
967 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
968 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
969 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
970 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
971 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
974 if (!ok) return((int)n);
976 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
978 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
979 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
980 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
983 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
984 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
985 : (s->client_version < s->version))
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
988 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
989 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
991 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
992 s->version = s->client_version;
994 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
998 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
999 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1000 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1002 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1004 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1006 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1007 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1009 if (cookie_length == 0)
1013 /* load the client random */
1014 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1015 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1017 /* get the session-id */
1021 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1022 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1023 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1024 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1025 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1027 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1028 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1029 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1030 * setting will be ignored.
1032 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1034 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1039 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1041 { /* previous session */
1048 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1058 cookie_len = *(p++);
1061 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1062 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1063 * does not cause an overflow.
1065 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1068 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1073 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1074 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1077 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1079 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1081 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1084 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1086 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1089 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1091 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1092 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1094 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1096 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1099 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1104 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1106 /* Select version to use */
1107 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1108 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1110 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1111 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1113 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1116 s->version = s->client_version;
1117 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1120 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1121 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1123 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1124 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1129 s->version = s->client_version;
1130 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1133 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1138 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1140 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1141 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1147 /* not enough data */
1148 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1152 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1159 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1160 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1163 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1166 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1168 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1170 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1172 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1173 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1181 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1182 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1185 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1187 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1188 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1189 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1190 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1191 * enabled, though. */
1192 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1193 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1195 s->session->cipher = c;
1202 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1203 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1204 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1214 /* not enough data */
1215 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1224 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1231 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1238 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1240 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1247 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1248 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1249 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1250 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1253 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1254 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1260 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1262 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1264 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1265 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1266 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1269 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1270 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1274 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1275 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1276 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1278 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1283 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1286 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1288 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1289 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1291 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1292 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1297 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1298 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1299 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1300 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1302 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1303 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1305 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1306 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1307 /* Can't disable compression */
1308 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1313 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1314 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1316 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1317 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1319 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1323 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1328 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1329 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1331 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1336 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1343 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1344 { /* See if we have a match */
1345 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1347 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1348 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1350 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1363 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1368 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1369 * using compression.
1371 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1378 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1383 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1384 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1386 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1388 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1389 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1390 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1391 if (ciphers == NULL)
1393 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1398 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1400 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1402 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1405 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1411 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1414 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1416 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1417 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1421 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1425 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1426 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1427 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1428 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1429 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1430 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1431 /* do not send a session ticket */
1432 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1436 /* Session-id reuse */
1437 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1438 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1439 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1440 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1442 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1444 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1445 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1447 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1448 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1450 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1454 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1455 else if (ec != NULL)
1456 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1458 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1462 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1465 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1467 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1471 /* we now have the following setup.
1473 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1474 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1475 * compression - basically ignored right now
1476 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1477 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1478 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1479 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1482 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1483 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1485 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1492 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1496 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1499 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1500 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1503 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1506 unsigned char *p,*d;
1511 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1513 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1514 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1515 p=s->s3->server_random;
1516 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1519 /* Do the message type and length last */
1520 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1522 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1523 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1526 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1527 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1529 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1530 * back in the server hello:
1531 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1532 * we send back the old session ID.
1533 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1534 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1535 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1536 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1538 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1539 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1540 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1541 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1544 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1545 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1547 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1549 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1550 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1556 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1559 /* put the cipher */
1560 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1563 /* put the compression method */
1564 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1567 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1570 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1573 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1578 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1580 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1587 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1588 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1591 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1592 return ssl_do_write(s);
1595 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1598 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1600 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1601 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1604 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1605 return ssl_do_write(s);
1608 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1614 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1621 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1622 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1625 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1628 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1629 unsigned char *p,*d;
1639 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1640 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1642 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1647 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1650 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1653 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1655 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1656 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1657 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1660 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1669 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1675 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1680 if (type & SSL_kDHE)
1683 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1684 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1685 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1686 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1689 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1694 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1700 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1707 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1708 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1709 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1711 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1720 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1721 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1722 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1723 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1736 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1738 const EC_GROUP *group;
1740 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1741 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1743 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1744 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1745 if (nid != NID_undef)
1746 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1748 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1750 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1751 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1752 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1756 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1761 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1767 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1773 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1775 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1781 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1782 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1783 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1784 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1786 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1793 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1794 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1795 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1801 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1802 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1808 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1809 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1810 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1813 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1820 /* Encode the public key.
1821 * First check the size of encoding and
1822 * allocate memory accordingly.
1824 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1825 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1826 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1829 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1830 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1831 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1832 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1839 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1840 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1841 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1842 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1844 if (encodedlen == 0)
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1850 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1852 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1853 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1854 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1855 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1860 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1861 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1869 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1871 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1873 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1874 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1877 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1879 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1881 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1882 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1883 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1884 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1897 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1901 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1903 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1905 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1912 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1913 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1915 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1918 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1921 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1929 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1934 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1936 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1939 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1952 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1954 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1955 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1956 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1957 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1958 * the actual encoded point itself
1960 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1968 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1969 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1971 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1972 encodedPoint = NULL;
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1978 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1980 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1981 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1982 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1983 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1990 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1991 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1993 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1997 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1999 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2000 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2001 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
2002 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2003 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2004 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2005 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2006 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
2007 (unsigned int *)&i);
2011 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2012 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2024 /* send signature algorithm */
2025 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2027 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2029 /* Should never happen */
2030 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2037 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2040 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2041 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2042 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2043 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2044 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2045 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2052 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2057 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2058 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2064 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2067 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2068 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2069 return ssl_do_write(s);
2071 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2074 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2075 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2077 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2081 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2083 unsigned char *p,*d;
2085 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2089 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2093 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2095 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2097 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2102 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2104 const unsigned char *psigs;
2105 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2107 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2116 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2120 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2122 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2123 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2124 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2129 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2130 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2133 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2140 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2141 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2147 /* else no CA names */
2148 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2151 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2153 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2154 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2156 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2158 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2166 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2169 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2170 return ssl_do_write(s);
2175 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2179 unsigned long alg_k;
2181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2183 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2187 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2191 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2194 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2195 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2196 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2197 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2200 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2201 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2202 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2203 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2207 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2208 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2210 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2213 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2215 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2216 int decrypt_len, decrypt_good_mask;
2217 unsigned char version_good;
2219 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2220 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2222 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2223 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2224 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2225 * be sent already */
2228 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2236 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2237 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2238 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2239 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2241 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2248 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2249 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2254 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2266 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2267 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2268 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2269 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2270 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2271 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2273 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2274 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2275 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2277 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2280 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2281 * decrypt_good_mask will be zero if so and non-zero otherwise. */
2282 decrypt_good_mask = decrypt_len ^ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2284 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2285 * then version_good will be zero. The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa
2286 * extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2287 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2288 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2289 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2290 * decryption error. */
2291 version_good = p[0] ^ (s->client_version>>8);
2292 version_good |= p[1] ^ (s->client_version&0xff);
2294 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2295 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2296 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2297 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2298 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2299 * support the requested protocol version. If
2300 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2301 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2303 unsigned char workaround_mask = version_good;
2304 unsigned char workaround;
2306 /* workaround_mask will be 0xff if version_good is
2307 * non-zero (i.e. the version match failed). Otherwise
2309 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 4;
2310 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 2;
2311 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 1;
2312 workaround_mask = ~((workaround_mask & 1) - 1);
2314 workaround = p[0] ^ (s->version>>8);
2315 workaround |= p[1] ^ (s->version&0xff);
2317 /* If workaround_mask is 0xff (i.e. there was a version
2318 * mismatch) then we copy the value of workaround over
2320 version_good = (workaround & workaround_mask) |
2321 (version_good & ~workaround_mask);
2324 /* If any bits in version_good are set then they'll poision
2325 * decrypt_good_mask and cause rand_premaster_secret to be
2327 decrypt_good_mask |= version_good;
2329 /* decrypt_good_mask will be zero iff decrypt_len ==
2330 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed. We
2331 * fold the bottom 32 bits of it with an OR so that the LSB
2332 * will be zero iff everything is good. This assumes that we'll
2333 * never decrypt a value > 2**31 bytes, which seems safe. */
2334 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 16;
2335 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 8;
2336 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 4;
2337 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 2;
2338 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 1;
2339 /* Now select only the LSB and subtract one. If decrypt_len ==
2340 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed then
2341 * decrypt_good_mask will be all ones. Otherwise it'll be all
2343 decrypt_good_mask &= 1;
2344 decrypt_good_mask--;
2346 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2347 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2348 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2350 p[i] = (p[i] & decrypt_good_mask) |
2351 (rand_premaster_secret[i] & ~decrypt_good_mask);
2354 s->session->master_key_length=
2355 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2356 s->session->master_key,
2358 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2363 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2366 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2373 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2384 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2385 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2386 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2387 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2390 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2391 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2392 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2393 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2395 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2399 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2401 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2403 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2408 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2412 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2413 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2416 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2417 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2419 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2421 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2425 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2426 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2429 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2436 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2445 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2452 s->session->master_key_length=
2453 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2454 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2455 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2462 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2464 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2465 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2466 krb5_data authenticator;
2468 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2469 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2470 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2471 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2472 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2473 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2475 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2476 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2478 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2480 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2483 enc_ticket.length = i;
2485 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2488 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2492 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2493 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2496 authenticator.length = i;
2498 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2501 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2505 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2506 p+=authenticator.length;
2510 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2513 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2516 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2519 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2523 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2524 enc_pms.length + 6))
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2527 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2531 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2535 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2536 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2538 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2539 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2545 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2546 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2548 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2549 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2552 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2553 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2555 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2556 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2562 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2569 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2570 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2572 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2576 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2578 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2581 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2584 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2585 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2588 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2591 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2594 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2597 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2600 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2604 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2607 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2610 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2612 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2613 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2614 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2615 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2616 * the protocol version.
2617 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2618 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2620 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2623 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2628 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2630 s->session->master_key_length=
2631 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2632 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2634 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2636 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2637 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2639 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2640 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2645 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2646 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2647 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2648 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2652 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2655 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2660 const EC_GROUP *group;
2661 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2663 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2664 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2667 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2671 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2672 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2674 /* use the certificate */
2675 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2679 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2680 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2682 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2685 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2686 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2688 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2689 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2696 /* Let's get client's public key */
2697 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2700 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2706 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2708 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
2710 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2714 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2716 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2718 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2719 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2720 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2721 * never executed. When that support is
2722 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2723 * received in the certificate is
2724 * authorized for key agreement.
2725 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2726 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2729 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2731 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2735 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2736 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2742 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2746 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2747 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2749 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2752 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2756 /* Get encoded point length */
2761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2765 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2766 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2772 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2773 * currently, so set it to the start
2775 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2778 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2779 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2780 if (field_size <= 0)
2782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2786 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2794 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2795 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2796 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2797 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2798 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2799 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2801 /* Compute the master secret */
2802 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2803 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2805 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2811 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2813 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2814 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2815 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2817 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2819 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2825 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2828 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2831 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2834 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2837 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2841 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2842 * string for the callback */
2843 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2844 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2845 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2846 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2847 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2849 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2852 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2855 else if (psk_len == 0)
2857 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2859 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2860 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2864 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2865 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2867 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2869 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2873 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2874 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2875 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2876 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2879 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2883 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2884 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2885 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2886 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2887 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2890 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2894 s->session->master_key_length=
2895 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2896 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2899 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2906 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2914 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2918 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2923 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2924 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2925 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2926 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2929 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2933 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2942 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2943 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2946 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2947 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2948 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2949 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2950 unsigned long alg_a;
2952 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2953 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2954 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2955 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2956 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2957 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2959 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2960 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2961 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2962 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2963 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2964 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2965 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2966 if (client_pub_pkey)
2968 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2971 /* Decrypt session key */
2972 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2982 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2992 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2998 /* Generate master secret */
2999 s->session->master_key_length=
3000 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3001 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
3002 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3003 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3008 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
3009 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3017 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3019 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3025 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3026 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3030 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3031 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3032 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3033 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3034 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3039 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3041 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3047 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3049 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3051 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3052 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3053 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3055 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
3058 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3060 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3062 peer=s->session->peer;
3063 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3064 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3072 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3074 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3075 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3077 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3088 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3092 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3095 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3099 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3102 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3106 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3107 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3108 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3109 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3110 * signature without length field */
3111 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3112 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3118 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3120 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3123 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3128 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3132 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3142 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3146 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3147 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3150 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3154 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3158 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3162 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3166 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3169 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3170 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3173 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3177 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3179 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3186 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3188 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3189 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3193 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3199 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3207 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3209 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3210 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3211 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3215 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3223 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3225 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3226 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3227 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3231 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3233 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3239 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3240 { unsigned char signature[64];
3242 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3243 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3245 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3247 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3248 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3250 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3251 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3254 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3256 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3263 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3272 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3275 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3277 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3278 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3279 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3281 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3282 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3286 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3288 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3290 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3291 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3293 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3295 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3302 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3304 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3306 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3307 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3310 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3313 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3314 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3317 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3320 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3324 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3326 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3330 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3332 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3341 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3345 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3348 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3350 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3356 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3364 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3368 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3377 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3379 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3380 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3382 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3386 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3387 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3388 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3391 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3394 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3395 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3397 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3403 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3406 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3412 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3413 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3414 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3415 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3417 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3418 * when we arrive here. */
3419 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3421 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3422 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3428 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3429 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3430 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3431 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3432 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3440 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3443 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3444 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3448 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3452 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3454 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3457 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3458 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3459 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3466 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3467 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3470 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3471 return ssl_do_write(s);
3474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3475 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3476 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3478 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3480 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3481 const unsigned char *const_p;
3482 int len, slen_full, slen;
3487 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3488 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3489 unsigned char key_name[16];
3491 /* get session encoding length */
3492 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3493 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3496 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3498 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3502 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3504 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3506 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3512 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3514 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3515 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3521 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3522 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3524 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3525 * follows handshake_header_length +
3526 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3527 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3528 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3529 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3531 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3532 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3533 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3535 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3536 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3537 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3538 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3539 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3542 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3544 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3553 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3554 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3555 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3556 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3557 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3558 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3561 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3562 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3563 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3564 * as their sessions. */
3565 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3567 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3569 /* Output key name */
3571 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3574 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3575 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3576 /* Encrypt session data */
3577 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3579 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3581 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3583 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3584 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3585 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3588 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3590 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3591 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3592 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3593 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3595 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3599 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3600 return ssl_do_write(s);
3603 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3605 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3608 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3609 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3610 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3613 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3616 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3619 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3620 /* message length */
3621 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3623 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3624 /* length of OCSP response */
3625 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3626 /* actual response */
3627 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3628 /* number of bytes to write */
3629 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3630 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3634 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3635 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3638 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3639 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3640 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3641 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3644 int proto_len, padding_len;
3646 const unsigned char *p;
3648 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3649 * extension in their ClientHello */
3650 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3656 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3657 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3658 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3660 514, /* See the payload format below */
3666 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3667 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3668 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3669 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3676 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3678 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3680 /* The payload looks like:
3682 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3683 * uint8 padding_len;
3684 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3687 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3689 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3690 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3693 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3694 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3699 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3700 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3706 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s, int *skip)
3709 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count)
3711 unsigned char *p = NULL;
3712 unsigned char *size_loc = NULL;
3713 srv_supp_data_record *record = NULL;
3717 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3719 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
3720 unsigned short outlen = 0;
3722 record = &s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i];
3724 /* NULL callback or -1 omits supp data entry */
3727 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->supp_data_type,
3728 &out, &outlen, &al, record->arg);
3729 if (cb_retval == -1)
3730 continue; /* skip this supp data entry */
3733 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3736 if (outlen == 0 || TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data < outlen + 4 + length)
3738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3741 /* write supp data entry...
3742 * if first entry, write handshake message type
3743 * jump back to write length at end */
3746 /* 1 byte message type + 3 bytes for
3748 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, 4))
3750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3753 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3754 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3755 /* hold on to length field to update later */
3757 /* skip over handshake length field (3
3758 * bytes) and supp_data length field
3763 /* 2 byte supp data type + 2 byte length + outlen */
3764 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, outlen + 4))
3766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3769 s2n(record->supp_data_type, p);
3771 memcpy(p, out, outlen);
3772 /* update length to supp data type (2 bytes) +
3773 * supp data length (2 bytes) + supp data */
3774 length += (outlen + 4);
3779 /* write handshake length */
3780 l2n3(length - 4, size_loc);
3781 /* supp_data length */
3782 l2n3(length - 7, size_loc);
3783 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3784 s->init_num = length;
3787 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3791 /* no supp data message sent */
3797 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3801 int tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3807 const unsigned char *p, *d;
3808 unsigned short supp_data_entry_type = 0;
3809 unsigned short supp_data_entry_len = 0;
3810 unsigned long supp_data_len = 0;
3813 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3814 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A,
3815 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B,
3816 SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,
3817 /* use default limit */
3818 TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data,
3821 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3823 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3826 /* The message cannot be empty */
3829 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3833 n2l3(p, supp_data_len);
3834 while (p<d+supp_data_len)
3836 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_type);
3837 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_len);
3838 /* if there is a callback for this supp data type, send it */
3839 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3841 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].supp_data_type == supp_data_entry_type && s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2)
3843 cb_retval = s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2(s, supp_data_entry_type, p, supp_data_entry_len, &al, s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].arg);
3846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3851 p+=supp_data_entry_len;
3855 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);