1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
296 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 * support secure renegotiation.
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
363 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
367 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
368 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
373 * callback indicates firther work to be done
375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
386 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
388 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
395 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
400 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
401 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
413 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
416 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
421 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
422 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
423 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
426 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
428 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
429 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
433 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
434 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
436 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
439 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
445 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
451 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
452 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
455 * clear this, it may get reset by
456 * send_server_key_exchange
458 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
461 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
462 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
463 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
464 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
465 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
470 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
474 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
477 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
478 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
481 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
483 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
484 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
486 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
487 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
492 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
498 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
504 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
507 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
508 * during re-negotiation:
510 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
511 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
513 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
514 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
517 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
519 * ... except when the application insists on
520 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
523 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
525 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
527 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
528 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
529 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
531 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
534 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
535 /* no cert request */
537 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
538 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
539 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
540 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
541 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
546 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
547 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
550 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
551 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
553 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
554 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
562 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
565 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
566 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
573 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
574 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
575 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
576 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
577 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
581 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
582 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
586 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
588 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
593 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
594 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
599 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
603 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
604 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
609 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
610 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
611 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
612 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
614 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
615 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
617 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
618 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
620 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
623 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
624 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
626 if (!s->session->peer)
629 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
630 * digest cached records.
632 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
634 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
637 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
638 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
639 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
646 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
650 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
651 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
652 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
655 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
656 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
657 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
661 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
662 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
665 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
674 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
676 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
685 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
686 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
687 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
691 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
692 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
694 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
695 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
697 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
702 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
704 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
706 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
707 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
708 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
710 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
711 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
712 * the client's Finished message is read.
714 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
715 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
717 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
721 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
725 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
726 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
728 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
729 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
730 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
731 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
732 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
733 * the client's Finished message is read.
735 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
736 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
737 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
738 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
742 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
744 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
745 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
748 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
752 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
753 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
754 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
755 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
758 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
763 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
764 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
767 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
773 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
774 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
776 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
777 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
779 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
783 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
785 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
789 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
792 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
793 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
796 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
802 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
803 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
804 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
805 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
806 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
808 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
810 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
813 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
815 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
816 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
818 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
819 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
821 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
824 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
829 /* clean a few things up */
830 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
832 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
835 /* remove buffering on output */
836 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
840 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
845 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
847 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
849 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
852 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
867 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
869 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
873 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
874 new_state = s->state;
876 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
877 s->state = new_state;
883 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
887 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
891 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
894 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
895 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
896 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
899 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
900 return ssl_do_write(s);
903 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
905 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
906 unsigned int cookie_len;
909 unsigned char *p, *d;
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
913 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
915 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
917 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
921 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
922 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
923 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
924 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
926 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
927 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
930 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
931 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
932 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
933 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
934 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
939 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
942 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
943 * for session id length
945 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
946 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
952 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
953 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
955 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
958 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
959 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
960 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
962 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
963 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
965 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
968 s->version = s->client_version;
970 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
975 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
976 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
979 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
980 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
982 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
984 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
985 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
989 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
991 if (cookie_length == 0)
995 /* load the client random */
996 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
997 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
999 /* get the session-id */
1002 if (p + j > d + n) {
1003 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1010 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1011 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1012 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1013 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1014 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1015 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1016 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1017 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1018 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1019 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1022 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1023 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1026 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1028 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1030 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1031 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1032 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1033 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1034 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1036 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1043 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1050 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1052 if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1053 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1057 cookie_len = *(p++);
1059 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1060 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1066 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1067 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1068 * does not cause an overflow.
1070 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1072 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1077 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1078 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1079 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1081 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1082 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1084 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1086 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1089 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1091 /* default verification */
1092 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1093 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1094 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1098 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1103 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1104 /* Select version to use */
1105 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1106 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1107 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1108 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1109 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1111 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1112 s->version = s->client_version;
1113 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1115 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1116 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1117 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1118 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1121 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1122 s->version = s->client_version;
1123 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1126 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1130 if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1131 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1138 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1143 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1144 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1145 /* not enough data */
1146 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1150 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1155 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1158 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1161 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1162 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1164 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1165 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1167 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1168 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1176 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1180 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1181 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1183 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1184 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1185 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1186 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1187 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1189 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1190 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1191 s->session->cipher = c;
1198 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1201 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1203 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1210 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1211 /* not enough data */
1212 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1219 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1227 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1232 /* TLS extensions */
1233 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1234 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1241 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1242 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1243 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1244 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1248 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1249 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1254 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1255 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1257 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1258 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1259 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1261 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1263 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1264 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1268 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1270 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1275 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1276 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1281 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1284 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1286 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1287 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1289 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1290 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1296 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1297 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1298 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1300 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1302 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1303 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1304 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1305 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1306 /* Can't disable compression */
1307 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1309 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1312 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1313 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1314 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1315 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1316 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1320 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1322 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1325 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1326 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1327 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1331 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1333 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1338 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1339 /* See if we have a match */
1340 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1342 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1343 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1344 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1346 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1356 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1362 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1363 * using compression.
1365 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1372 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1376 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1377 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1379 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1381 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1382 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1383 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1384 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1385 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1390 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1394 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1396 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1397 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1399 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1404 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1407 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1409 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1412 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1416 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1418 /* Session-id reuse */
1419 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1420 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1421 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1422 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1424 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1425 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1426 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1427 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1428 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1430 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1434 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1435 else if (ec != NULL)
1436 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1438 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1441 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1444 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1445 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1450 * we now have the following setup.
1452 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1453 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1454 * compression - basically ignored right now
1455 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1456 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1457 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1458 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1461 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1462 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1463 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1473 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1475 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1478 if (ciphers != NULL)
1479 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1480 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1483 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1486 unsigned char *p, *d;
1491 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1492 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1493 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1494 p = s->s3->server_random;
1495 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1496 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1500 /* Do the message type and length last */
1501 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1503 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1504 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1507 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1508 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1511 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1512 * back in the server hello:
1513 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1514 * we send back the old session ID.
1515 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1516 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1517 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1518 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1520 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1521 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1522 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1523 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1526 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1528 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1530 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1531 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1533 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1537 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1540 /* put the cipher */
1541 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1544 /* put the compression method */
1545 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1548 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1551 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1554 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1556 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1560 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1562 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1570 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1571 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1574 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1575 return ssl_do_write(s);
1578 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1581 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1582 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1583 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1586 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1587 return ssl_do_write(s);
1590 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1596 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1600 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1603 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1604 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1607 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1610 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1611 unsigned char *p, *d;
1621 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1622 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1623 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1628 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1631 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1632 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1633 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1634 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1635 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1637 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1640 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1642 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1646 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1649 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1651 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1656 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1660 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1662 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1663 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1664 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1666 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1669 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1671 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1675 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1677 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1681 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1687 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1688 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1689 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1690 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1695 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1696 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1697 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1708 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1709 const EC_GROUP *group;
1711 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1712 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1713 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1714 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1715 if (nid != NID_undef)
1716 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1717 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1718 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1719 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1721 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1722 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1724 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1725 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1727 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1731 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1733 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1737 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1738 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1742 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1744 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1749 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1750 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1751 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1752 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1753 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1760 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1761 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1762 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1767 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1768 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1770 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1775 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1776 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1780 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1783 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1788 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1789 * allocate memory accordingly.
1791 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1792 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1793 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1796 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1797 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1798 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1799 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1801 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1805 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1806 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1807 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1808 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1810 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1815 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1819 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1820 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1821 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1827 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1828 * can set these to NULLs
1835 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1837 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1839 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1841 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1843 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1845 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1846 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1847 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1848 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1850 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1853 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1854 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1855 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1856 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1860 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1862 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1865 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1866 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1868 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1875 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1876 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1877 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1879 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1882 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1888 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1892 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1894 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1896 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1907 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1909 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1910 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1911 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1912 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1914 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1922 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1923 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1924 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1925 encodedPoint = NULL;
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1931 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1932 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1933 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1934 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1935 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1936 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1943 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1944 * points to the space at the end.
1946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1947 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1950 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1951 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1952 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1953 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1954 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1955 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1957 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1959 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1960 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1964 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1965 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1974 /* send signature algorithm */
1975 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1976 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1977 /* Should never happen */
1978 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1980 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1986 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1988 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1989 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1991 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1993 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1994 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1995 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2001 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2004 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2005 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2007 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2012 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2015 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2016 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2017 return ssl_do_write(s);
2019 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2022 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2023 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2024 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2026 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2027 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2031 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2033 unsigned char *p, *d;
2034 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2035 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2039 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2042 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2044 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2046 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2051 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2052 const unsigned char *psigs;
2053 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2055 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2064 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2067 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2068 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2069 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2070 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2071 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2076 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2077 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2079 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2084 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2093 /* else no CA names */
2094 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2097 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2099 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2100 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2101 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2105 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2107 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2115 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2118 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2119 return ssl_do_write(s);
2121 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2125 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2129 unsigned long alg_k;
2131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2133 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2137 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2141 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2144 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2145 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2146 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2147 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2150 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2151 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2152 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2153 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2157 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2159 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2162 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2163 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2165 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2168 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2169 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2170 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2171 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2173 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2176 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2178 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2183 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2184 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2185 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2186 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2188 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2191 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2194 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2195 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2198 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2199 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2201 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2210 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2211 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2212 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2213 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2214 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2216 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2217 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2219 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2224 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2225 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2226 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2227 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2228 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2232 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2234 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2235 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2238 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2242 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2243 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2246 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2249 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2250 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2251 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2252 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2253 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2254 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2257 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2259 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2262 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2263 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2264 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2265 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2266 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2267 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2270 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2271 unsigned char workaround_good;
2273 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2275 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2276 version_good |= workaround_good;
2280 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2281 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2283 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2286 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2287 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2288 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2289 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2291 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2292 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2293 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2296 s->session->master_key_length =
2297 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2299 session->master_key,
2302 (rand_premaster_secret));
2303 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2307 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2309 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2313 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2314 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2316 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2321 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2322 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2324 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2331 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2332 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2333 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2334 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2336 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2337 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2338 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2339 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2341 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2344 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2345 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2346 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2348 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2351 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2354 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2355 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2357 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2358 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2360 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2361 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2363 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2366 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2367 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2369 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2375 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2383 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2384 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2390 s->session->master_key_length =
2391 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2393 session->master_key,
2395 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2401 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2402 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2403 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2404 krb5_data authenticator;
2406 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2407 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2408 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2409 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2410 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2412 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2413 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2415 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2418 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2421 enc_ticket.length = i;
2423 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2425 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2429 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2430 p += enc_ticket.length;
2433 authenticator.length = i;
2435 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2437 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2441 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2442 p += authenticator.length;
2446 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2447 p += enc_pms.length;
2450 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2452 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2454 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2458 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2459 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2461 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2465 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2468 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2469 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2471 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2472 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2478 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2479 * return authtime == 0.
2481 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2482 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2484 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2485 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2487 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2488 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2493 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2498 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2499 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2501 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2505 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2507 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2509 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2512 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2513 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2516 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2519 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2521 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2524 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2526 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2530 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2535 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2536 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2538 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2539 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2540 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2541 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2542 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2543 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2544 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2547 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2549 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2554 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2556 s->session->master_key_length =
2557 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2559 session->master_key,
2562 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2563 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2564 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2565 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2566 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2571 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2572 * but it caused problems for apache.
2573 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2574 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2577 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2580 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2584 const EC_GROUP *group;
2585 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2587 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2588 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2593 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2594 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2595 /* use the certificate */
2596 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2599 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2600 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2602 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2605 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2606 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2608 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2609 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2614 /* Let's get client's public key */
2615 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2621 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2623 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2624 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2626 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2629 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2630 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2632 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2633 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2634 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2635 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2636 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2637 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2639 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2641 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2645 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2646 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2651 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2654 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2655 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2657 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2659 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2663 /* Get encoded point length */
2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2670 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2675 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2678 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2681 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2682 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2683 if (field_size <= 0) {
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2687 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2694 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2695 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2696 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2697 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2698 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2699 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2701 /* Compute the master secret */
2702 s->session->master_key_length =
2703 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2705 session->master_key,
2708 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2713 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2714 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2715 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2716 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2718 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2720 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2727 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2729 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2732 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2734 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2739 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2741 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2742 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2743 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2745 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2746 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2748 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2751 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2753 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2756 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2757 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2761 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2762 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2764 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2766 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2770 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2771 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2772 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2773 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2778 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2779 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2780 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2781 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2782 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2787 s->session->master_key_length =
2788 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2790 session->master_key,
2795 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2801 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2806 if (param_len > n) {
2807 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2809 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2812 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2816 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2817 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2818 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2820 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2823 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2824 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2825 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2826 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2831 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2832 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2833 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2840 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2841 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2843 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2844 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2845 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2846 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2847 unsigned long alg_a;
2851 /* Get our certificate private key */
2852 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2853 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2854 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2855 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2856 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2858 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2859 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2861 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2862 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2863 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2864 * client certificate for authorization only.
2866 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2867 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2868 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2871 /* Decrypt session key */
2873 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2874 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2875 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2877 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2882 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2883 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2885 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2888 /* Generate master secret */
2889 s->session->master_key_length =
2890 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2892 session->master_key,
2893 premaster_secret, 32);
2894 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2895 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2896 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2901 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2902 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2908 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2915 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2916 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2920 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2921 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2922 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2923 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2924 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2926 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2930 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2932 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2934 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2938 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2940 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2943 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2944 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2945 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2946 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2947 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2948 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2950 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2955 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2956 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2957 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2958 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2959 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2964 peer = s->session->peer;
2965 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2966 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2968 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2970 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2971 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2975 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2976 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2977 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2979 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2982 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2983 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
2986 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2987 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
2989 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2991 } else if (rv == 0) {
2992 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2996 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3005 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3009 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3010 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3012 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3016 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3019 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3020 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3022 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3026 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3029 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3030 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3032 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3036 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3037 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3043 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3044 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3045 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3048 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3053 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3060 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3061 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3062 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3063 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3066 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3073 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3074 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3075 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3076 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3079 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3085 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3086 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3087 unsigned char signature[64];
3089 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3090 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3092 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3094 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3095 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3097 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3099 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3101 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3107 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3114 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3115 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3118 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3119 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3120 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3121 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3123 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3124 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3128 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3130 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3132 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3133 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3135 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3137 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3140 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3145 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3146 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3147 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3149 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3150 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3154 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3156 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3158 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3159 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3162 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3166 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3167 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3171 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3173 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3179 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3180 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3184 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3186 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3187 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3189 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3194 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3200 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3202 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3205 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3213 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3214 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3215 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3216 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3218 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3221 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3222 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3223 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3225 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3226 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3229 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3230 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3231 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3235 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3237 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3239 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3244 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3245 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3246 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3247 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3250 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3253 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3254 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3255 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3260 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3261 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3262 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3264 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3265 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3273 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3275 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3281 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3285 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3289 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3290 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3292 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3293 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3294 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3296 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3297 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3302 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3304 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3307 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3310 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3311 return ssl_do_write(s);
3314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3315 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3316 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3318 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3322 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3323 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3324 const unsigned char *const_p;
3325 int len, slen_full, slen;
3328 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3329 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3330 unsigned char key_name[16];
3332 /* get session encoding length */
3333 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3335 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3338 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3339 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3342 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3344 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3348 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3349 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3352 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3356 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3359 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3362 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3364 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3365 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3366 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3370 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3371 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3374 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3377 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3378 * follows handshake_header_length +
3379 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3380 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3381 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3382 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3384 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3385 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3386 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3389 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3391 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3392 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3394 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3395 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3399 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3401 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3402 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3404 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3405 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3407 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3411 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3412 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3413 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3415 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3417 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3419 /* Output key name */
3421 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3424 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3425 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3426 /* Encrypt session data */
3427 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3430 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3434 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3436 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3439 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3440 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3443 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3445 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3446 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3447 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3449 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3450 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3454 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3455 return ssl_do_write(s);
3459 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3460 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3461 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3465 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3467 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3470 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3471 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3472 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3475 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3476 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3480 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3483 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3484 /* message length */
3485 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3487 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3488 /* length of OCSP response */
3489 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3490 /* actual response */
3491 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3492 /* number of bytes to write */
3493 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3494 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3498 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3499 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3502 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3504 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3505 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3507 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3510 int proto_len, padding_len;
3512 const unsigned char *p;
3515 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3516 * extension in their ClientHello
3518 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3520 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3521 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3525 /* See the payload format below */
3526 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3527 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3528 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3529 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3535 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3536 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3537 * ssl3_get_finished).
3539 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3541 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3546 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3547 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3550 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3553 * The payload looks like:
3555 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3556 * uint8 padding_len;
3557 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3560 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3561 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3564 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3565 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3566 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3570 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3571 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3573 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3576 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3577 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;