1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
194 int new_state,state,skip=0;
196 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
205 /* init things to blank */
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
231 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
233 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
240 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
242 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
274 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
275 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
277 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
278 * client that doesn't support secure
281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
282 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
288 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
289 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
290 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
291 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
299 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
300 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
301 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
302 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
305 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
308 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
314 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
317 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
318 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
321 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
327 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
328 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
332 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
333 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
335 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
342 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
348 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
349 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
350 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
351 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
352 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
354 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
355 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
357 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
358 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
365 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
372 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
378 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
379 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
381 /* clear this, it may get reset by
382 * send_server_key_exchange */
383 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
385 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
386 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
388 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
389 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
390 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
391 * be able to handle this) */
392 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
394 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
397 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
398 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
400 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
402 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
403 * message only if the cipher suite is either
404 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
405 * server certificate contains the server's
406 * public key for key exchange.
408 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
409 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
410 * hint if provided */
411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
412 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
414 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
415 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
416 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
417 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
418 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
419 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
425 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
426 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
431 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
435 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
436 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
437 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
438 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
439 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
440 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
441 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
442 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
443 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
444 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
445 * and in RFC 2246): */
446 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
447 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
448 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
449 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
450 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
451 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
452 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
453 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
454 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
456 /* no cert request */
458 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
459 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
463 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
464 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
465 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
466 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
467 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
469 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
470 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
476 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
477 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
478 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
479 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
480 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
481 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
485 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
486 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
487 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_WPENDING,0,NULL);
490 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
491 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
492 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
493 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
496 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
499 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
500 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
501 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
502 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
506 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
508 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
510 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
511 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
514 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
518 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
519 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
520 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
525 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
526 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
527 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
528 * message is not sent.
529 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
530 * the client uses its key from the certificate
533 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
541 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
544 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
545 * a client cert, it can be verified
546 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
547 * should be generalized. But it is next step
549 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
550 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
552 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
553 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
557 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
558 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
569 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
570 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
572 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
573 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
574 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
576 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
580 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
581 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
582 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
583 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
584 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
586 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
587 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
595 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
600 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
601 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
602 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
603 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
604 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
608 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
609 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
610 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
611 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
612 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
618 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
619 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
621 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
622 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
623 { ret= -1; goto end; }
625 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
626 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
628 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
629 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
632 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
633 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
641 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
642 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
643 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
644 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
645 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
646 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
647 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
648 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
650 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
652 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
657 /* clean a few things up */
658 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
660 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
663 /* remove buffering on output */
664 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
668 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
670 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
671 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
675 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
677 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
679 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
681 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
695 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
699 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
704 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
708 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
715 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
719 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
723 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
727 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
729 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
730 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
735 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
736 /* number of bytes to write */
741 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
742 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
745 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
750 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
751 * so permit appropriate message length */
752 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
758 if (!ok) return((int)n);
759 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
760 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
762 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
763 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
764 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
765 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
767 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
769 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
770 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
778 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
780 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
781 unsigned int cookie_len;
784 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
789 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
791 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
792 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
793 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
794 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
797 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
799 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
802 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
803 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
804 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
805 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
806 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
809 if (!ok) return((int)n);
811 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
813 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
814 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
815 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
818 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
819 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
822 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
824 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
825 s->version = s->client_version;
827 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
831 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
832 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
833 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
835 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
837 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
839 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
840 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
842 if (cookie_length == 0)
846 /* load the client random */
847 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
850 /* get the session-id */
854 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
855 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
856 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
857 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
858 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
859 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
860 * an earlier library version)
862 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
864 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
869 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
871 { /* previous session */
878 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
885 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
891 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
892 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
893 * does not cause an overflow.
895 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
898 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
903 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
904 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
907 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
909 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
911 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
914 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
916 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
919 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
921 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
922 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
924 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
926 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
937 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
939 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
940 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
946 /* not enough data */
947 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
951 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
958 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
959 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
962 id=s->session->cipher->id;
965 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
967 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
969 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
971 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
972 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
980 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
982 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
983 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
984 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
985 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
986 * enabled, though. */
987 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
988 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
990 s->session->cipher = c;
996 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
997 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
998 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1008 /* not enough data */
1009 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1016 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1023 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1030 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1032 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1034 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1039 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1044 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1045 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1046 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1047 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1051 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1052 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1054 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1056 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1061 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1063 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1065 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1066 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1067 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1070 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1071 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1075 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1076 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1077 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1079 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1084 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1087 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1089 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1090 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1092 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1093 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1098 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1099 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1100 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1101 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1103 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1104 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1106 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1107 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1108 /* Can't disable compression */
1109 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1111 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1115 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1116 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1118 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1119 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1121 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1125 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1127 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1131 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1132 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1134 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1139 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1146 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1147 { /* See if we have a match */
1148 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1150 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1151 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1153 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1166 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1171 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1172 * using compression.
1174 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1176 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1182 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1187 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1188 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1190 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1192 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1193 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1194 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1195 if (ciphers == NULL)
1197 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1202 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1203 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1207 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1211 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1215 /* Session-id reuse */
1216 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1217 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1218 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1219 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1221 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1223 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1224 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1226 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1227 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1229 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1233 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1234 else if (ec != NULL)
1235 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1237 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1241 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1244 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1247 /* we now have the following setup.
1249 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1250 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1251 * compression - basically ignored right now
1252 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1253 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1254 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1255 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1262 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1265 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1269 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1272 unsigned char *p,*d;
1275 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1279 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1281 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1282 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1283 p=s->s3->server_random;
1284 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1285 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1287 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1290 /* Do the message type and length last */
1293 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1294 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1297 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1298 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1300 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1301 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1302 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1303 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1304 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1305 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1306 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1308 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1309 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1310 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1311 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1312 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1315 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1317 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1319 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1320 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1329 /* put the cipher */
1330 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1333 /* put the compression method */
1334 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1337 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1340 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1343 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1348 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1357 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1361 /* number of bytes to write */
1366 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1367 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1370 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1374 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1376 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1379 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1385 /* number of bytes to write */
1390 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1391 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1394 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1400 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1407 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1408 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1411 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1414 unsigned char *p,*d;
1424 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1425 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1427 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1432 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1435 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1438 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1440 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1441 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1442 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1445 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1454 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1460 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1465 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1468 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1469 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1470 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1471 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1474 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1479 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1486 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1493 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1494 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1495 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1497 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1506 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1507 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1508 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1509 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1522 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1524 const EC_GROUP *group;
1526 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1527 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1529 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1530 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1531 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1535 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1540 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1542 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1547 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1553 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1560 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1561 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1562 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1563 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1565 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1572 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1573 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1574 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1580 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1581 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1587 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1588 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1589 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1592 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1599 /* Encode the public key.
1600 * First check the size of encoding and
1601 * allocate memory accordingly.
1603 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1604 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1605 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1608 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1609 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1610 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1611 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1618 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1619 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1620 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1621 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1623 if (encodedlen == 0)
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1629 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1631 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1632 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1633 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1634 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1639 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1640 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1648 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1650 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1652 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1653 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1656 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1658 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1662 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1664 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1668 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1669 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1671 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1674 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1677 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1685 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1690 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1693 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1701 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1703 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1704 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1705 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1706 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1707 * the actual encoded point itself
1709 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1717 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1718 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1720 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1726 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1728 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1729 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1730 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1731 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1738 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1739 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1741 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1745 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1747 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1748 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1749 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1750 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1751 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1752 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1753 (unsigned int *)&i);
1757 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1758 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1768 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1769 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1772 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1773 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1774 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1775 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1776 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1777 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1787 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1788 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1790 /* let's do ECDSA */
1791 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1792 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1793 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1794 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1795 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1796 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1807 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1808 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1814 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1817 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1823 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1824 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1825 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1827 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1830 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1831 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1833 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1837 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1839 unsigned char *p,*d;
1841 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1845 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1849 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1851 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1853 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1862 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1866 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1868 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1869 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1870 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1875 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1876 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1879 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1886 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1887 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1893 /* else no CA names */
1894 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1897 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1898 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1901 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1906 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1907 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1910 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1917 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1920 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1921 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1926 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1930 unsigned long alg_k;
1932 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1934 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1942 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1944 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1945 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1946 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1947 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1948 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1951 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1952 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1953 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1954 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1958 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1959 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1961 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1964 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
1966 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1967 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1969 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1970 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1971 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1972 * be sent already */
1975 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1983 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1984 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1985 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1986 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1988 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1995 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
1996 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2001 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2013 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2017 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2019 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2020 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2023 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2025 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2026 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2027 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2028 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2029 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2031 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2032 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2033 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2035 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2036 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2038 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2039 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2040 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2041 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2042 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2043 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2044 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2050 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2051 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2052 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2054 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2055 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2056 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2057 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2061 s->session->master_key_length=
2062 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2063 s->session->master_key,
2065 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2070 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2075 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2087 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2089 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2095 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2097 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2102 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2105 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2112 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2120 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2125 s->session->master_key_length=
2126 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2127 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2128 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2133 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2135 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2136 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2137 krb5_data authenticator;
2139 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2140 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2141 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2142 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2143 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2144 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2146 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2147 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2149 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2151 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2154 enc_ticket.length = i;
2156 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2159 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2163 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2164 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2167 authenticator.length = i;
2169 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2172 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2176 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2177 p+=authenticator.length;
2181 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2184 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2187 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2190 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2194 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2195 enc_pms.length + 6))
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2198 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2202 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2206 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2207 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2209 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2210 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2216 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2217 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2219 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2220 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2223 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2224 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2226 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2227 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2233 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2240 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2241 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2243 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2247 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2249 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2252 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2255 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2256 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2259 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2262 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2265 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2268 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2271 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2275 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2278 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2281 if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2283 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2284 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2285 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2286 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2287 * the protocol version.
2288 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2289 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2291 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2292 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2295 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2300 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2302 s->session->master_key_length=
2303 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2304 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2306 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2308 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2309 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2311 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2312 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2317 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2318 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2319 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2320 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2324 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2327 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2332 const EC_GROUP *group;
2333 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2335 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2336 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2339 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2343 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2344 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2346 /* use the certificate */
2347 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2351 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2352 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2354 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2357 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2358 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2360 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2361 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2368 /* Let's get client's public key */
2369 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2372 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2378 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2380 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2382 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2386 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2388 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2390 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2391 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2392 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2393 * never executed. When that support is
2394 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2395 * received in the certificate is
2396 * authorized for key agreement.
2397 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2398 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2401 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2403 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2407 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2408 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2414 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2418 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2419 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2421 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2424 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2428 /* Get encoded point length */
2431 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2432 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2439 * currently, so set it to the start
2441 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2444 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2445 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2446 if (field_size <= 0)
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2452 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2460 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2461 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2462 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2463 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2464 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2465 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2467 /* Compute the master secret */
2468 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2469 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2471 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2477 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2479 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2480 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2481 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2483 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2485 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2491 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2494 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2497 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2500 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2503 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2507 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2508 * string for the callback */
2509 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2510 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2511 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2512 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2513 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2515 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2518 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2521 else if (psk_len == 0)
2523 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2525 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2526 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2530 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2531 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2533 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2535 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2539 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2540 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2541 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2542 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2545 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2549 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2550 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2551 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2552 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2553 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2556 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2560 s->session->master_key_length=
2561 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2562 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2565 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2571 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2574 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2575 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL;
2576 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2577 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2579 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2580 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL);
2581 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2582 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2583 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2584 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2585 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2586 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2587 if (client_pub_pkey)
2589 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2592 /* Decrypt session key */
2593 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2603 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2613 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2619 /* Generate master secret */
2620 s->session->master_key_length=
2621 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2622 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2623 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2624 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2629 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2630 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2638 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2640 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2646 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2647 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2651 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2652 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2653 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2654 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2655 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2660 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2662 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2669 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2670 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2671 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2676 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2678 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2680 peer=s->session->peer;
2681 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2682 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2690 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2692 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2693 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2695 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2706 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2710 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2713 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2717 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2720 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2724 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2725 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2726 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2727 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2728 * signature without length field */
2729 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2730 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2741 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2745 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2746 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2749 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2754 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2756 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2757 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2761 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2767 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2775 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2777 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2778 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2779 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2783 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2791 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2793 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2794 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2795 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2799 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2801 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2807 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2808 { unsigned char signature[64];
2810 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2811 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2813 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2815 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2816 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2818 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2819 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2822 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2824 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2831 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2840 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2843 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2847 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2849 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2851 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2852 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2854 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2856 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2863 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2865 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2867 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2868 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2871 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2874 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2875 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2878 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2881 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2885 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2887 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2891 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2893 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2902 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2906 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2909 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2911 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2917 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2925 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2929 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2938 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2940 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2941 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2943 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2947 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2948 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2949 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2952 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2958 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2961 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2967 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2968 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2969 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2970 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2972 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2973 * when we arrive here. */
2974 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2976 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2977 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2983 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2984 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2985 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2986 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2987 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2995 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2998 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2999 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3003 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3008 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3010 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3013 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3014 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3015 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3022 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3023 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3028 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3029 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3032 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3034 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3036 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3041 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3042 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3043 unsigned char key_name[16];
3045 /* get session encoding length */
3046 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3047 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3052 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3053 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3054 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3055 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3056 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3057 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3059 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3060 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3061 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3063 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
3067 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3069 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3071 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3072 /* Skip message length for now */
3074 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3075 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3076 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3077 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3080 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3082 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3091 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3092 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3093 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3094 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3095 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3096 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3098 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3099 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3101 /* Output key name */
3103 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3106 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3107 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3108 /* Encrypt session data */
3109 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3111 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3113 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3115 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3116 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3117 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3120 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3122 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3123 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3124 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3126 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3128 /* number of bytes to write */
3130 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3135 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3136 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3139 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3141 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3144 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3145 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3146 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3149 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3152 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3155 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3156 /* message length */
3157 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3159 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3160 /* length of OCSP response */
3161 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3162 /* actual response */
3163 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3164 /* number of bytes to write */
3165 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3166 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3170 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3171 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));