1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
271 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
273 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
274 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
278 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
286 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
292 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
293 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
295 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
297 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
299 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
301 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
302 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
304 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
312 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
316 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
317 * support secure renegotiation.
319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
320 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
326 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
341 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
342 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
345 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
349 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
357 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
361 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
362 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
365 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
367 * callback indicates firther work to be done
369 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
372 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
373 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
375 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
376 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
378 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
380 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
388 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
392 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
393 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
394 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
399 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
400 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
402 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
415 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
416 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
419 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
421 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
422 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
426 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
427 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
429 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
432 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
443 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
444 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
445 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
448 * clear this, it may get reset by
449 * send_server_key_exchange
451 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
454 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
455 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
456 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
457 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
458 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
463 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
467 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
470 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
471 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
473 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
474 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
476 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
477 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
478 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
479 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
480 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
491 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
495 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
496 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
497 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
498 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
500 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
501 * during re-negotiation:
503 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
504 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
506 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
507 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
510 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
512 * ... except when the application insists on
513 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
516 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
518 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
520 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
521 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
522 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
524 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
527 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
528 /* no cert request */
530 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
531 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
532 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
533 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
537 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
540 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
541 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
543 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
544 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
550 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
552 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
555 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
556 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
563 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
564 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
565 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
566 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
567 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
571 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
572 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
576 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
578 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
581 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
582 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
583 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
584 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
589 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
594 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
599 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
600 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
601 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
602 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
604 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
605 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
607 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
608 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
610 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
613 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
614 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
616 if (!s->session->peer)
619 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
620 * digest cached records.
622 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
626 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
627 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
633 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
637 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
638 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
639 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
642 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
643 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
645 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
646 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
649 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
658 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
668 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
669 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
671 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
672 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
673 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
674 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
676 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
677 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
678 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
679 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
683 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
684 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
686 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
687 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
689 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
694 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
696 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
698 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
699 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
700 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
701 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
702 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
703 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
704 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
705 * the client's Finished message is read.
707 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
708 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
710 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
714 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
718 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
719 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
721 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
722 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
723 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
724 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
725 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
726 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
727 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
728 * the client's Finished message is read.
730 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
731 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
732 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
733 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
737 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
739 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
740 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
743 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
749 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
750 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
753 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
759 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
762 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
768 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
769 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
771 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
772 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
777 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
779 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
783 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
786 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
787 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
795 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
796 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
797 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
798 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
799 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
801 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
803 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
806 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
808 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
809 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
811 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
812 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
814 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
817 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
822 /* clean a few things up */
823 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
825 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
828 /* remove buffering on output */
829 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
833 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
838 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
840 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
842 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
845 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
859 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
861 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
865 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
866 new_state = s->state;
868 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
869 s->state = new_state;
875 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
879 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
883 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
886 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
887 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
888 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
891 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
892 return ssl_do_write(s);
895 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
897 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
898 unsigned int cookie_len;
901 unsigned char *p, *d;
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
905 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
907 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
909 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
913 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
914 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
915 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
916 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
918 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
919 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
922 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
923 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
924 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
925 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
926 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
931 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
934 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
935 * for session id length
937 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
938 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
944 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
945 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
947 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
950 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
951 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
952 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
954 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
955 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
957 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
960 s->version = s->client_version;
962 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
967 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
968 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
971 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
972 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
974 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
976 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
977 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
981 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
983 if (cookie_length == 0)
987 /* load the client random */
988 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
989 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
991 /* get the session-id */
995 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1002 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1003 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1004 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1005 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1006 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1007 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1008 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1009 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1010 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1011 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1014 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1015 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1018 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1020 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1022 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1023 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1024 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1025 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1026 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1028 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1035 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1042 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1044 if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1045 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1049 cookie_len = *(p++);
1051 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1052 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1058 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1059 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1060 * does not cause an overflow.
1062 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1064 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1069 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1070 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1071 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1073 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1074 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1076 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1078 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1081 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1083 /* default verification */
1084 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1085 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1086 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1090 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1095 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1096 /* Select version to use */
1097 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1098 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1099 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1100 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1101 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1103 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1104 s->version = s->client_version;
1105 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1107 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1108 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1109 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1110 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1113 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1114 s->version = s->client_version;
1115 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1118 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1122 if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1123 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1128 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
1129 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1130 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1135 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1136 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1137 /* not enough data */
1138 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1142 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers))
1148 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1149 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) {
1151 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1154 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1155 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1157 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1158 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1160 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1161 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1169 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1173 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1174 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1176 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1177 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1178 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1179 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1180 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1182 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1183 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1184 s->session->cipher = c;
1191 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1194 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1196 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1203 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1204 /* not enough data */
1205 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1212 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1220 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1225 /* TLS extensions */
1226 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1227 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1234 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1235 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1236 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1237 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1241 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1242 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1247 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1248 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1250 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1251 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1252 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1254 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1256 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1257 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1261 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1263 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1268 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1269 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1274 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1277 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1279 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1280 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1282 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1283 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1289 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1290 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1291 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1293 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1295 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1296 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1297 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1298 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1299 /* Can't disable compression */
1300 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1302 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1305 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1306 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1307 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1308 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1309 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1313 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1315 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1318 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1319 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1320 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1324 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1326 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1331 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1332 /* See if we have a match */
1333 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1335 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1336 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1337 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1339 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1349 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1355 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1356 * using compression.
1358 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1365 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1369 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1370 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1372 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1374 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1375 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1376 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1377 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1378 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1383 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1387 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1389 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1390 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1392 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1397 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1400 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1402 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1405 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1409 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1411 /* Session-id reuse */
1412 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1413 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1414 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1415 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1417 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1418 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1419 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1420 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1421 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1423 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1427 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1428 else if (ec != NULL)
1429 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1431 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1434 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1437 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1438 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1443 * we now have the following setup.
1445 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1446 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1447 * compression - basically ignored right now
1448 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1449 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1450 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1451 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1454 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1455 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1456 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1466 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1469 if (ciphers != NULL)
1470 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1471 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1474 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1477 unsigned char *p, *d;
1482 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1483 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1484 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1485 p = s->s3->server_random;
1486 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1489 /* Do the message type and length last */
1490 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1492 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1493 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1496 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1497 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1500 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1501 * back in the server hello:
1502 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1503 * we send back the old session ID.
1504 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1505 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1506 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1507 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1509 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1510 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1511 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1512 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1515 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1517 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1519 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1520 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1525 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1528 /* put the cipher */
1529 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1532 /* put the compression method */
1533 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1536 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1539 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1542 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1547 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1549 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1556 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1557 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1560 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1561 return ssl_do_write(s);
1564 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1567 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1568 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1569 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1572 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1573 return ssl_do_write(s);
1576 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1582 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1586 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1589 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1590 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1593 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1596 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1597 unsigned char *p, *d;
1607 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1608 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1609 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1614 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1617 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1618 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1619 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1620 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1621 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1623 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1626 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1628 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1632 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1635 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1637 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1642 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1646 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1648 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1649 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1650 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1652 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1655 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1657 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1661 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1663 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1667 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1673 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1674 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1675 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1676 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1681 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1682 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1683 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1694 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1695 const EC_GROUP *group;
1697 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1698 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1699 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1700 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1701 if (nid != NID_undef)
1702 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1703 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1704 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1705 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1707 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1708 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1710 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1711 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1713 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1717 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1719 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1723 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1724 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1728 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1730 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1735 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1736 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1737 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1738 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1739 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1746 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1747 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1748 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1753 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1754 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1756 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1761 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1762 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1766 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1769 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1774 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1775 * allocate memory accordingly.
1777 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1778 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1779 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1782 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1783 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1784 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1785 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1787 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1791 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1792 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1793 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1794 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1796 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1801 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1805 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1806 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1807 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1813 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1814 * can set these to NULLs
1821 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1823 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1825 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1827 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1829 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1831 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1832 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1833 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1834 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1836 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1839 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1840 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1841 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1842 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1846 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1848 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1851 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1852 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1854 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1861 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1862 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1863 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1865 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1868 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1874 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1878 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1880 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1882 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1893 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1895 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1896 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1897 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1898 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1900 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1908 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1909 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1910 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1911 encodedPoint = NULL;
1916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1917 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1918 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1919 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1920 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1921 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1922 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1929 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1930 * points to the space at the end.
1932 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1933 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1936 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1937 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1938 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1939 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1940 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1941 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1943 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1945 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1946 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1950 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1951 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1960 /* send signature algorithm */
1961 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1962 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1963 /* Should never happen */
1964 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1966 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1972 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1974 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1975 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1977 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1979 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1980 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1981 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1987 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1990 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1991 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1993 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1998 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2001 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2002 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2003 return ssl_do_write(s);
2005 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2008 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2009 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2010 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2012 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2016 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2018 unsigned char *p, *d;
2019 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2020 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2024 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2027 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2029 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2031 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2036 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2037 const unsigned char *psigs;
2038 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2040 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2049 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2052 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2053 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2054 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2055 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2056 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2061 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2062 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2064 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2069 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2078 /* else no CA names */
2079 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2082 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2084 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2085 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2086 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2090 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2092 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2100 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2103 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2104 return ssl_do_write(s);
2109 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2113 unsigned long alg_k;
2115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2117 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2121 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2125 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2128 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2129 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2130 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2131 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2134 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2135 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2136 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2137 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2141 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2143 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2146 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2147 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2149 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2152 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2153 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2154 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2155 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2157 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2160 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2162 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2167 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2168 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2169 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2170 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2172 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2175 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2178 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2179 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2182 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2183 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2185 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2194 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2195 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2196 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2197 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2198 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2200 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2201 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2203 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2208 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2209 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2210 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2211 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2212 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2216 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2218 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2219 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2222 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2226 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2227 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2230 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2233 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2234 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2235 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2236 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2237 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2238 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2241 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2243 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2246 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2247 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2248 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2249 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2250 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2251 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2254 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2255 unsigned char workaround_good;
2257 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2259 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2260 version_good |= workaround_good;
2264 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2265 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2267 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2270 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2271 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2272 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2273 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2275 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2276 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2277 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2280 s->session->master_key_length =
2281 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2283 session->master_key,
2286 (rand_premaster_secret));
2287 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2291 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2293 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2297 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2298 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2300 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2305 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2306 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2308 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2315 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2316 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2317 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2318 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2320 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2321 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2322 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2323 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2325 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2328 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2329 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2330 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2332 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2335 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2338 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2339 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2341 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2342 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2344 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2345 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2347 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2350 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2351 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2353 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2359 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2367 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2368 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2374 s->session->master_key_length =
2375 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2377 session->master_key,
2379 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2385 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2386 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2387 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2388 krb5_data authenticator;
2390 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2391 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2392 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2393 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2394 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2396 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2397 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2399 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2402 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2405 enc_ticket.length = i;
2407 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2409 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2413 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2414 p += enc_ticket.length;
2417 authenticator.length = i;
2419 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2421 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2425 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2426 p += authenticator.length;
2430 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2431 p += enc_pms.length;
2434 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2436 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2442 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2443 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2445 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2449 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2452 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2453 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2455 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2456 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2462 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2463 * return authtime == 0.
2465 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2466 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2468 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2469 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2471 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2472 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2477 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2482 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2483 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2485 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2489 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2491 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2493 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2496 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2497 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2500 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2503 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2505 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2508 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2510 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2514 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2516 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2519 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2520 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2522 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2523 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2524 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2525 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2526 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2527 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2528 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2531 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2533 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2538 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2540 s->session->master_key_length =
2541 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2543 session->master_key,
2546 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2547 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2548 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2549 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2550 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2555 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2556 * but it caused problems for apache.
2557 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2558 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2561 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2564 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2568 const EC_GROUP *group;
2569 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2571 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2572 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2577 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2578 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2579 /* use the certificate */
2580 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2583 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2584 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2586 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2589 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2590 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2592 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2593 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2598 /* Let's get client's public key */
2599 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2605 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2607 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2608 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2610 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2613 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2614 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2616 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2617 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2618 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2619 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2620 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2621 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2623 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2625 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2629 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2630 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2635 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2638 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2639 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2641 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2643 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2647 /* Get encoded point length */
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2654 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2659 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2662 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2665 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2666 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2667 if (field_size <= 0) {
2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2671 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2678 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2679 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2680 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2681 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2682 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2683 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2685 /* Compute the master secret */
2686 s->session->master_key_length =
2687 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2689 session->master_key,
2692 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2697 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2698 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2699 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2700 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2702 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2704 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2711 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2713 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2716 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2718 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2723 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2725 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2726 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2727 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2729 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2730 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2732 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2735 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2737 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2740 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2741 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2745 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2746 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2748 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2750 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2754 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2755 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2756 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2757 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2762 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2763 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2764 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2765 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2766 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2771 s->session->master_key_length =
2772 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2774 session->master_key,
2779 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2785 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2790 if (param_len > n) {
2791 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2793 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2796 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2800 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2801 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2802 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2804 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2807 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2808 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2809 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2810 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2815 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2816 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2817 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2824 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2825 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2827 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2828 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2829 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2830 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2831 unsigned long alg_a;
2835 /* Get our certificate private key */
2836 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2837 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2838 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2839 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2840 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2842 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2843 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2845 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2846 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2847 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2848 * client certificate for authorization only.
2850 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2851 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2852 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2855 /* Decrypt session key */
2857 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2858 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2859 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2861 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2866 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2867 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2869 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2872 /* Generate master secret */
2873 s->session->master_key_length =
2874 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2876 session->master_key,
2877 premaster_secret, 32);
2878 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2879 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2880 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2885 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2886 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2892 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2899 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2900 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2904 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2905 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2906 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2907 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2908 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2913 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2915 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2917 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2921 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2923 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2925 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2926 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2927 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2928 -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2933 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2934 peer = s->session->peer;
2935 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2936 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2942 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2943 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2945 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2955 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2959 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2961 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2962 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2966 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2968 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2972 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2973 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2974 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2976 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2979 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2980 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
2983 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2984 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
2986 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2988 } else if (rv == 0) {
2989 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2993 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3002 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3006 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3007 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3009 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3013 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3016 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3017 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3019 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3023 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3026 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3027 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3029 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3033 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3034 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3040 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3041 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3042 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3045 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3050 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3057 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3058 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3059 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3060 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3063 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3070 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3071 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3072 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3073 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3076 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3082 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3083 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3084 unsigned char signature[64];
3086 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3087 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3089 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3091 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3092 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3094 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3096 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3098 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3104 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3111 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3114 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3115 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3116 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3117 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3119 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3120 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3124 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3126 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3128 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3129 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3131 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3133 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3136 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3141 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3142 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3143 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3145 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3146 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3150 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3152 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3154 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3155 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3158 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3162 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3163 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3167 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3169 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3175 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3176 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3180 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3182 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3183 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3185 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3190 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3196 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3198 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3201 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3209 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3210 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3211 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3212 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3214 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3217 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3218 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3219 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3221 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3222 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3225 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3226 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3227 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3231 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3233 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3235 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3240 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3241 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3242 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3243 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3246 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3249 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3250 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3251 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3256 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3257 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3258 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3260 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3261 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3269 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3275 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3279 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3283 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3284 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3286 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3287 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3288 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3290 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3295 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3299 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3302 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3303 return ssl_do_write(s);
3306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3307 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3308 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3310 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3314 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3315 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3316 const unsigned char *const_p;
3317 int len, slen_full, slen;
3320 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3321 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3322 unsigned char key_name[16];
3324 /* get session encoding length */
3325 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3327 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3330 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00)
3332 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3336 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3337 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3340 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3344 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3347 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3350 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3352 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3353 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3354 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3358 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3359 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3362 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3365 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3366 * follows handshake_header_length +
3367 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3368 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3369 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3370 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3372 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3373 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3374 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3377 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3379 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3380 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3382 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3383 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3387 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3389 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3390 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3392 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3393 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3395 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3399 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3400 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3401 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3403 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3405 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3407 /* Output key name */
3409 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3412 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3413 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3414 /* Encrypt session data */
3415 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3418 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3422 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3424 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3427 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3428 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3431 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3433 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3434 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3435 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3437 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3442 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3443 return ssl_do_write(s);
3447 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3448 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3452 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3454 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3457 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3458 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3459 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3462 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3465 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3468 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3469 /* message length */
3470 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3472 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3473 /* length of OCSP response */
3474 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3475 /* actual response */
3476 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3477 /* number of bytes to write */
3478 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3479 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3483 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3484 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3487 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3489 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3490 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3492 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3495 int proto_len, padding_len;
3497 const unsigned char *p;
3500 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3501 * extension in their ClientHello
3503 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3505 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3509 /* See the payload format below */
3510 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3511 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3512 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3513 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3519 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3520 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3521 * ssl3_get_finished).
3523 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3529 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3531 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3534 * The payload looks like:
3536 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3537 * uint8 padding_len;
3538 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3541 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3543 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3544 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3547 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3548 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3552 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3553 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;