2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
296 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
314 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
316 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
320 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
321 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
322 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
324 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
326 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
327 * support secure renegotiation.
329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
330 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
331 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
333 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
337 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
340 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
341 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
345 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
349 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
352 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
353 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
356 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
358 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
363 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
364 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
368 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
369 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
372 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
376 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
377 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
380 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
382 * callback indicates firther work to be done
384 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
387 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
388 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
390 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
391 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
393 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
396 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
403 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
407 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
408 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
409 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
414 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
417 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
421 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
424 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
428 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
429 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
430 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
431 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
434 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
436 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
437 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
441 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
442 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
444 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
447 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
453 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
458 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
459 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
460 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
463 * clear this, it may get reset by
464 * send_server_key_exchange
466 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
469 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
470 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
471 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
472 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
473 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
478 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
485 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
486 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
488 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
489 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
490 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
491 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
492 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
493 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
494 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
495 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
500 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
506 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
510 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
511 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
512 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
513 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
515 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
516 * during re-negotiation:
518 (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0 &&
519 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
521 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
522 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
525 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
527 * ... except when the application insists on
528 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
531 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
533 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
535 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
536 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
537 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
539 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
542 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
543 /* no cert request */
545 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
546 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
547 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
548 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
549 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
554 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
555 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
558 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
559 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
561 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
562 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
570 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
573 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
574 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
578 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
581 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
582 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
583 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
584 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
585 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
589 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
590 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
594 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
596 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
601 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
602 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
607 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
610 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
611 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
612 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
617 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
618 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
619 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
620 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
622 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
623 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
625 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
626 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
628 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
631 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
632 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
634 if (!s->session->peer)
637 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
638 * digest cached records.
640 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
642 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
645 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
646 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
647 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
654 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
658 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
659 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
660 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
663 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
664 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
665 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
669 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
670 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
673 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
682 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
684 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
695 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
699 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
700 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
702 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
703 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
705 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
710 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
711 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
712 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
714 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
715 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
716 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
718 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
719 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
720 * the client's Finished message is read.
722 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
723 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
725 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
729 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
733 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
734 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
736 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
737 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
738 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
739 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
740 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
741 * the client's Finished message is read.
743 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
744 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
745 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
746 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
750 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
752 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
753 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
756 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
763 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
766 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
771 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
772 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
775 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
782 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
784 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
785 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
787 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
791 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
793 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
797 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
800 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
801 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
804 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
810 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
811 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
812 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
813 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
814 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
816 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
818 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
821 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
823 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
824 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
826 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
827 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
829 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
832 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
837 /* clean a few things up */
838 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
840 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
843 /* remove buffering on output */
844 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
848 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
853 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
855 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
857 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
860 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
875 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
877 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
881 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
882 new_state = s->state;
884 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
885 s->state = new_state;
891 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
895 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
899 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
902 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
903 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
904 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
907 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
908 return ssl_do_write(s);
911 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
913 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
914 unsigned int cookie_len;
917 unsigned char *p, *d;
919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
921 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
923 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
925 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
929 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
930 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
931 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
932 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
934 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
935 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
938 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
939 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
940 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
941 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
942 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
947 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
950 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
951 * for session id length
953 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
954 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
960 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
961 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
963 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
966 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
967 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
968 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
970 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
971 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
973 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
976 s->version = s->client_version;
978 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
983 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
984 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
987 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
988 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
990 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
992 if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1
993 >= (unsigned int)((d + n) - p)) {
994 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
998 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1000 if (cookie_length == 0)
1004 /* load the client random */
1005 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1006 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1008 /* get the session-id */
1011 if ((d + n) - p < j) {
1012 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1017 if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
1018 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1025 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1026 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1027 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1028 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1029 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1030 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1031 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1032 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1033 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1034 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1037 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1038 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1041 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1043 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1045 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1046 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1047 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1048 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1049 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1051 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1058 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1065 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1067 if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
1068 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1072 cookie_len = *(p++);
1074 if ((unsigned int)((d + n ) - p) < cookie_len) {
1075 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1081 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1082 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1083 * does not cause an overflow.
1085 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1087 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1092 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1093 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1094 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1096 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1097 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1099 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1101 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1104 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1106 /* default verification */
1107 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1108 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1109 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1117 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1118 /* Select version to use */
1119 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1120 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1121 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1122 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1123 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1125 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1126 s->version = s->client_version;
1127 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1129 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1130 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1131 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1132 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1135 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1136 s->version = s->client_version;
1137 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1140 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1144 if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
1145 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1152 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1157 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1158 if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
1159 /* not enough data */
1160 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1164 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1169 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1172 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1175 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1176 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1178 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1179 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1181 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1182 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1190 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1194 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1195 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1197 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1198 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1199 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1200 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1201 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1203 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1204 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1205 s->session->cipher = c;
1212 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1215 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1217 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1224 if ((d + n) - p < i) {
1225 /* not enough data */
1226 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1233 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1241 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1246 /* TLS extensions */
1247 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1248 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) {
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1255 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1256 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1257 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1258 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1262 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1263 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1268 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1269 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1271 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1272 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1273 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1275 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1277 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1278 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1282 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1284 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1289 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1290 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1295 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1298 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1300 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1301 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1303 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1304 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1310 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1311 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1312 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1314 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1316 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1317 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1318 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1319 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1320 /* Can't disable compression */
1321 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1323 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1326 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1327 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1328 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1329 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1330 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1334 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1336 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1339 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1340 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1341 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1345 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1347 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1352 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1353 /* See if we have a match */
1354 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1356 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1357 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1358 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1360 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1370 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1376 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1377 * using compression.
1379 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1386 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1390 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1391 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1393 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1395 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1396 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1397 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1398 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1399 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1404 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1408 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1410 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1411 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1413 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1418 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1421 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1423 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1426 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1430 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1432 /* Session-id reuse */
1433 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1434 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1435 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1436 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1438 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1439 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1440 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1441 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1442 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1444 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1448 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1449 else if (ec != NULL)
1450 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1452 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1455 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1458 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1459 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1464 * we now have the following setup.
1466 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1467 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1468 * compression - basically ignored right now
1469 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1470 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1471 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1472 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1475 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1476 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1477 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1483 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
1486 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1488 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1491 if (ciphers != NULL)
1492 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1496 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1499 unsigned char *p, *d;
1504 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1505 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1506 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1507 p = s->s3->server_random;
1508 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1509 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1513 /* Do the message type and length last */
1514 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1516 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1517 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1520 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1521 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1524 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1525 * back in the server hello:
1526 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1527 * we send back the old session ID.
1528 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1529 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1530 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1531 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1533 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1534 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1535 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1536 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1539 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1541 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1543 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1544 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1546 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1550 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1553 /* put the cipher */
1554 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1557 /* put the compression method */
1558 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1561 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1564 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1567 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1569 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1573 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1575 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1577 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1583 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1584 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1587 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1588 return ssl_do_write(s);
1591 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1594 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1595 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1596 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1599 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1600 return ssl_do_write(s);
1603 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1609 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1613 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1616 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1619 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1620 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1623 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1626 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1627 unsigned char *p, *d;
1637 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1638 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1639 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1644 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1647 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1648 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1649 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1650 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1651 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1653 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1656 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1658 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1662 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1665 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1667 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1672 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1676 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1678 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1679 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1680 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1682 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1685 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1687 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1691 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1693 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1697 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1703 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1713 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1714 const EC_GROUP *group;
1716 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1717 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1718 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1719 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1720 if (nid != NID_undef)
1721 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1722 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1723 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1724 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1726 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1727 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1729 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1730 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1732 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1736 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1738 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1742 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1743 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1747 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1749 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1754 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1755 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1756 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1757 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1758 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1765 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1766 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1767 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1772 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1773 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1775 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1780 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1781 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1785 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1788 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1793 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1794 * allocate memory accordingly.
1796 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1797 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1798 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1801 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1802 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1803 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1804 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1806 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1810 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1811 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1812 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1813 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1815 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1820 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1824 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1825 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1826 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1832 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1833 * can set these to NULLs
1840 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1842 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1844 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1846 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1848 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1850 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1851 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1852 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1853 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1855 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1858 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1859 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1860 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1861 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1865 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1867 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1870 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1871 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1873 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1879 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1880 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1881 * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here
1883 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kEDH)))
1890 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1891 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1892 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1894 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1897 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1898 /* Allow space for signature algorithm */
1899 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1901 /* Allow space for signature length */
1908 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1912 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1914 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1916 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1923 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1924 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1927 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kEDH))) {
1929 for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) {
1940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1941 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1943 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1944 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1945 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1946 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1948 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1956 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1957 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1958 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1959 encodedPoint = NULL;
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1965 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1966 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1967 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1968 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1969 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1970 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1977 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1978 * points to the space at the end.
1980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1981 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1984 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1985 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1986 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1987 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
1988 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5
1991 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1992 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1993 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1994 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1995 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1996 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
1997 (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) {
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2000 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2006 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2007 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
2016 /* send signature algorithm */
2017 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2018 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2019 /* Should never happen */
2020 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2022 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2028 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2030 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
2031 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2032 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2033 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2034 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2035 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
2036 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2037 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
2038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2039 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2044 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2047 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2048 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2050 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2055 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2058 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2059 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2060 return ssl_do_write(s);
2062 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2065 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2066 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2067 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2069 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2070 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2074 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2076 unsigned char *p, *d;
2077 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2078 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2082 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2085 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2087 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2089 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2094 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2095 const unsigned char *psigs;
2096 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2098 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2107 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2110 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2111 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2112 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2113 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2114 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2119 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2120 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2122 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2127 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2136 /* else no CA names */
2137 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2140 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2142 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2143 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2144 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2148 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2150 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2158 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2161 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2162 return ssl_do_write(s);
2164 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2168 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2172 unsigned long alg_k;
2174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2176 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2180 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2184 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2187 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2188 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2189 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2190 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2193 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2194 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2195 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2196 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2200 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2202 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2205 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2206 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2208 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2211 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2212 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2213 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2214 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2216 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2219 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2221 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2226 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2227 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2228 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2229 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2231 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2234 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2237 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2238 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2241 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2242 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2244 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2253 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2254 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2255 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2256 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2257 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2259 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2260 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2262 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2267 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2268 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2269 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2270 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2271 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2274 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2275 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2278 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2282 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2283 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2286 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2289 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2290 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2291 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2292 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2293 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2294 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2297 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2299 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2302 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2303 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2304 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2305 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2306 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2307 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2310 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2311 unsigned char workaround_good;
2313 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2315 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2316 version_good |= workaround_good;
2320 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2321 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2323 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2326 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2327 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2328 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2329 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2331 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2332 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2333 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2336 s->session->master_key_length =
2337 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2339 session->master_key,
2342 (rand_premaster_secret));
2343 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2347 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2349 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2353 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2354 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2356 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2361 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2362 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2364 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2365 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2372 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2373 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2374 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2375 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2377 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2378 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2379 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2380 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2382 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2385 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2386 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2387 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2389 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2392 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2395 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2396 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2398 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2399 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2401 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2402 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2404 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2407 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2408 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2410 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2416 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2419 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2425 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2426 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2432 s->session->master_key_length =
2433 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2435 session->master_key,
2437 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2443 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2444 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2445 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2446 krb5_data authenticator;
2448 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2449 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2450 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2451 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2452 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2454 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2455 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2458 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2461 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2464 enc_ticket.length = i;
2466 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2468 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2472 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2473 p += enc_ticket.length;
2476 authenticator.length = i;
2478 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2480 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2484 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2485 p += authenticator.length;
2489 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2490 p += enc_pms.length;
2493 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2495 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2497 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2501 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2502 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2504 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2508 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2511 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2512 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2514 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2515 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2521 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2522 * return authtime == 0.
2524 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2525 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2527 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2528 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2530 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2531 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2536 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2541 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2542 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2544 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2548 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2550 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2552 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2555 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2556 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2559 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2563 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2565 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2569 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2571 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2576 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2578 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2582 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2583 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2585 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2586 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2587 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2588 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2589 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2590 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2591 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2594 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2596 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2602 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2604 s->session->master_key_length =
2605 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2607 session->master_key,
2610 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2611 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2612 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2613 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2614 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2619 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2620 * but it caused problems for apache.
2621 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2622 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2626 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
2630 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2633 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2637 const EC_GROUP *group;
2638 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2640 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2641 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2646 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2647 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2648 /* use the certificate */
2649 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2652 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2653 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2655 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2658 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2659 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2661 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2662 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2667 /* Let's get client's public key */
2668 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2674 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2676 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2677 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2679 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2682 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2683 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2685 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2686 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2687 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2688 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2689 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2690 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2692 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2694 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2698 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2699 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2704 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2707 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2708 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2710 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2712 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2716 /* Get encoded point length */
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2721 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2724 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2726 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2730 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2733 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2736 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2737 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2738 if (field_size <= 0) {
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2742 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2749 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2750 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2751 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2752 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2753 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2754 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2756 /* Compute the master secret */
2757 s->session->master_key_length =
2758 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2760 session->master_key,
2763 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2768 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2769 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2770 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2771 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2773 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2775 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2782 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2784 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2787 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2789 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2794 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2796 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2797 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2798 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2800 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2801 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2803 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2806 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2808 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2811 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2812 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2816 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2817 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2819 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2821 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2825 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2826 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2827 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
2828 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2833 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2834 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2835 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2836 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2837 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2842 s->session->master_key_length =
2843 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2845 session->master_key,
2850 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2856 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2861 if (param_len > n) {
2862 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2864 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2867 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2871 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2872 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2873 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2875 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2878 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2879 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2880 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2881 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2886 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2887 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2888 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2895 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2896 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2898 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2899 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2900 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2901 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2902 unsigned long alg_a;
2906 /* Get our certificate private key */
2907 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2908 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2909 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2910 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2911 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2913 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2914 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2915 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2919 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2924 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2925 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2926 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2927 * client certificate for authorization only.
2929 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2930 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2931 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2934 /* Decrypt session key */
2936 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2937 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2938 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2940 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2945 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2946 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2948 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2951 /* Generate master secret */
2952 s->session->master_key_length =
2953 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2955 session->master_key,
2956 premaster_secret, 32);
2957 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
2958 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2959 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2960 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2965 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2966 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2972 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2979 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2980 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2984 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2985 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2986 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2987 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2988 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2990 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2994 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2996 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2998 int al, ok, ret = 0;
3002 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3004 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3007 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
3008 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
3009 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
3010 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
3011 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
3012 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
3014 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
3019 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3020 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3021 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3022 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
3023 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
3028 peer = s->session->peer;
3029 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3031 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3035 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
3037 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3039 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3040 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3044 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3045 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3046 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3048 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3051 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3052 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
3055 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3056 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3058 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3060 } else if (rv == 0) {
3061 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3065 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3074 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3078 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3079 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3081 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3085 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3088 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3089 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3091 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3095 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3098 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3099 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3101 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3105 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3106 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3112 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3113 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3114 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3117 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3122 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3129 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3130 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3131 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3132 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3135 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3142 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3143 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3144 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3145 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3148 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3154 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3155 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3156 unsigned char signature[64];
3158 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3160 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3164 if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) {
3165 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3166 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3171 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3173 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3174 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3176 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3178 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3180 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3186 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3193 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3194 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3197 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3198 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3199 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3200 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3202 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3203 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3207 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3209 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3211 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3212 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3214 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3216 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3219 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3224 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3225 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3226 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3228 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3229 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3233 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3235 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3237 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3238 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3241 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3245 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3246 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3250 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3252 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3258 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3259 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3263 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3264 if (nc + 3 > llen) {
3265 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3267 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3271 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3272 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3274 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3279 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3285 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3287 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3290 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3298 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3299 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3300 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3301 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3303 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3306 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3307 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3308 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3310 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3311 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3314 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3315 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3316 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3320 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3322 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3324 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3329 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3330 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3331 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3332 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3335 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3338 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3339 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3340 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3345 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3346 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3347 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3349 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3350 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3358 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3360 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3366 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3370 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3374 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3375 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3377 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3378 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3379 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3381 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3382 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3387 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3389 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3392 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3395 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3396 return ssl_do_write(s);
3399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3400 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3401 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3403 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3407 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3408 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3409 const unsigned char *const_p;
3410 int len, slen_full, slen;
3413 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3414 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3415 unsigned char key_name[16];
3417 /* get session encoding length */
3418 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3420 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3423 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3424 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3427 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3429 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3433 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3434 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3437 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3441 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3444 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3447 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3449 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3450 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3451 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3455 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3456 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3459 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3462 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3463 * follows handshake_header_length +
3464 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3465 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3466 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3467 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3469 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3470 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3471 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3474 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3476 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3477 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3479 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3480 /* if 0 is returned, write en empty ticket */
3481 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3485 l2n(0, p); /* timeout */
3486 s2n(0, p); /* length */
3487 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET,
3488 p - ssl_handshake_start(s));
3489 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3491 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3492 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3493 return ssl_do_write(s);
3498 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3500 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3501 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3503 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3504 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3506 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3510 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3511 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3512 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3514 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3516 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3518 /* Output key name */
3520 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3523 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3524 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3525 /* Encrypt session data */
3526 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3529 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3533 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3535 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3538 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3539 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3542 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3544 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3545 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3546 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3548 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3549 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3553 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3554 return ssl_do_write(s);
3558 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3559 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3560 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3564 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3566 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3571 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3572 * follows handshake_header_length +
3573 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3576 msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3577 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen)) {
3578 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3582 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3585 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3586 /* length of OCSP response */
3587 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3588 /* actual response */
3589 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3591 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen);
3594 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3595 return (ssl_do_write(s));
3598 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3600 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3601 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3603 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3606 int proto_len, padding_len;
3608 const unsigned char *p;
3611 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3612 * extension in their ClientHello
3614 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3616 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3617 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3621 /* See the payload format below */
3622 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3623 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3624 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3625 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3631 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3632 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3633 * ssl3_get_finished).
3635 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3637 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3642 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3643 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3646 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3649 * The payload looks like:
3651 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3652 * uint8 padding_len;
3653 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3656 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3657 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3660 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3661 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3662 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3666 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3667 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3669 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3672 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3673 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;