1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
194 int new_state,state,skip=0;
196 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
205 /* init things to blank */
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
231 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
233 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
240 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
242 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
274 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
275 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
277 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
278 * client that doesn't support secure
281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
282 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
288 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
289 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
290 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
291 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
299 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
300 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
301 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
302 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
305 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
308 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
314 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
317 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
318 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
321 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
327 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
328 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
332 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
333 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
335 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
342 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
348 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
349 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
350 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
351 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
352 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
354 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
355 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
357 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
358 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
365 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
372 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
378 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
379 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
381 /* clear this, it may get reset by
382 * send_server_key_exchange */
383 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
385 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
386 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
388 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
389 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
390 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
391 * be able to handle this) */
392 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
394 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
397 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
398 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
400 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
402 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
403 * message only if the cipher suite is either
404 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
405 * server certificate contains the server's
406 * public key for key exchange.
408 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
409 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
410 * hint if provided */
411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
412 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
414 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
415 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
416 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
417 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
418 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
419 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
425 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
426 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
431 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
435 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
436 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
437 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
438 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
439 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
440 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
441 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
442 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
443 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
444 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
445 * and in RFC 2246): */
446 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
447 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
448 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
449 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
450 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
451 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
452 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
453 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
454 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
456 /* no cert request */
458 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
459 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
463 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
464 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
465 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
466 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
467 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
469 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
470 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
476 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
477 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
478 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
479 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
480 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
481 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
485 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
486 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
487 /* This originally and incorrectly called BIO_CTRL_INFO
488 * The reason why this is wrong is mentioned in PR#1949.
489 * Unfortunately, as suggested in that bug some
490 * versions of Apache unconditionally return 0
491 * for BIO_CTRL_WPENDING meaning we don't correctly
492 * flush data and some operations, like renegotiation,
493 * don't work. Other software may also be affected so
494 * call BIO_CTRL_INFO to retain compatibility with
495 * previous behaviour and BIO_CTRL_WPENDING if we
496 * get zero to address the PR#1949 case.
499 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
501 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_WPENDING,0,NULL);
504 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
505 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
506 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
507 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
510 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
513 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
514 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
515 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
516 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
520 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
522 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
524 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
525 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
528 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
532 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
533 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
534 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
539 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
540 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
541 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
542 * message is not sent.
543 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
544 * the client uses its key from the certificate
547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
555 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
558 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
559 * a client cert, it can be verified
560 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
561 * should be generalized. But it is next step
563 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
564 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
566 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
567 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
571 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
572 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
583 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
584 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
586 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
587 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
588 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
590 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
594 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
595 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
596 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
597 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
598 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
600 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
601 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
609 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
614 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
615 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
616 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
617 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
618 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
622 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
623 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
624 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
625 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
626 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
632 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
633 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
635 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
636 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
637 { ret= -1; goto end; }
639 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
640 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
642 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
643 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
646 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
647 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
655 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
656 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
657 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
658 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
659 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
660 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
661 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
662 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
664 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
666 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
671 /* clean a few things up */
672 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
674 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
677 /* remove buffering on output */
678 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
682 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
684 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
685 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
689 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
691 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
693 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
695 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
709 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
713 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
718 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
722 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
729 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
733 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
737 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
741 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
743 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
744 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
749 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
750 /* number of bytes to write */
755 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
756 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
759 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
764 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
765 * so permit appropriate message length */
766 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
772 if (!ok) return((int)n);
773 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
774 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
776 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
777 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
778 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
779 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
781 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
783 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
784 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
792 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
794 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
795 unsigned int cookie_len;
798 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
803 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
805 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
806 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
807 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
808 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
811 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
813 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
816 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
817 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
818 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
819 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
820 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
823 if (!ok) return((int)n);
825 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
827 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
828 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
829 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
832 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
833 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
836 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
838 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
839 s->version = s->client_version;
841 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
845 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
846 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
847 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
849 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
851 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
853 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
854 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
856 if (cookie_length == 0)
860 /* load the client random */
861 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
864 /* get the session-id */
868 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
869 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
870 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
871 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
872 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
873 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
874 * an earlier library version)
876 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
878 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
883 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
885 { /* previous session */
892 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
899 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
905 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
906 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
907 * does not cause an overflow.
909 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
912 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
917 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
918 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
921 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
923 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
925 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
928 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
930 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
933 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
935 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
936 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
938 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
940 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
951 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
953 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
954 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
960 /* not enough data */
961 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
965 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
972 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
973 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
976 id=s->session->cipher->id;
979 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
981 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
983 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
985 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
986 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
994 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
996 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
997 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
998 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
999 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1000 * enabled, though. */
1001 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1002 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1004 s->session->cipher = c;
1010 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1011 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1012 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1022 /* not enough data */
1023 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1030 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1037 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1044 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1046 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1048 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1053 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1058 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1059 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1060 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1061 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1065 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1066 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1068 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1070 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1075 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1077 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1079 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1080 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1081 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1084 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1085 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1089 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1090 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1091 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1093 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1098 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1101 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1103 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1104 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1106 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1107 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1112 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1113 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1114 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1115 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1117 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1118 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1120 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1121 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1122 /* Can't disable compression */
1123 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1125 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1129 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1130 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1132 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1133 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1135 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1139 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1141 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1145 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1146 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1148 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1153 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1160 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1161 { /* See if we have a match */
1162 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1164 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1165 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1167 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1180 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1185 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1186 * using compression.
1188 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1190 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1196 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1201 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1202 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1204 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1206 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1207 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1208 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1209 if (ciphers == NULL)
1211 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1216 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1217 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1221 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1225 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1229 /* Session-id reuse */
1230 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1231 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1232 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1233 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1235 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1237 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1238 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1240 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1241 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1243 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1247 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1248 else if (ec != NULL)
1249 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1251 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1255 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1258 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1261 /* we now have the following setup.
1263 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1264 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1265 * compression - basically ignored right now
1266 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1267 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1268 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1269 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1276 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1279 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1283 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1286 unsigned char *p,*d;
1289 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1293 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1295 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1296 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1297 p=s->s3->server_random;
1298 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1299 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1301 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1304 /* Do the message type and length last */
1307 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1308 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1311 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1312 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1314 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1315 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1316 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1317 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1318 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1319 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1320 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1322 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1323 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1324 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1325 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1326 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1329 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1331 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1333 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1334 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1340 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1343 /* put the cipher */
1344 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1347 /* put the compression method */
1348 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1351 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1354 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1357 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1362 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1371 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1374 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1375 /* number of bytes to write */
1380 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1381 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1384 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1388 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1390 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1393 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1399 /* number of bytes to write */
1404 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1405 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1408 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1414 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1421 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1422 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1425 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1428 unsigned char *p,*d;
1438 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1439 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1441 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1446 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1449 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1452 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1454 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1455 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1456 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1459 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1468 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1474 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1479 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1482 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1483 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1484 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1485 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1488 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1493 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1500 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1507 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1508 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1509 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1511 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1520 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1521 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1522 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1523 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1536 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1538 const EC_GROUP *group;
1540 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1541 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1543 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1544 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1545 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1549 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1554 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1556 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1561 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1567 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1574 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1575 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1576 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1577 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1579 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1586 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1587 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1588 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1594 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1595 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1601 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1602 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1603 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1606 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1613 /* Encode the public key.
1614 * First check the size of encoding and
1615 * allocate memory accordingly.
1617 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1618 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1619 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1622 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1623 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1624 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1625 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1632 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1633 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1634 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1635 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1637 if (encodedlen == 0)
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1643 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1645 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1646 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1647 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1648 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1653 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1654 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1662 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1664 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1666 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1667 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1670 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1672 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1676 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1678 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1682 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1683 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1685 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1688 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1691 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1699 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1704 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1707 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1715 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1717 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1718 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1719 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1720 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1721 * the actual encoded point itself
1723 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1731 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1732 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1734 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1740 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1742 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1743 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1744 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1745 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1752 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1753 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1755 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1759 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1761 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1762 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1763 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1764 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1765 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1766 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1767 (unsigned int *)&i);
1771 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1772 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1782 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1783 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1786 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1787 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1788 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1789 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1790 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1791 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1801 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1802 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1804 /* let's do ECDSA */
1805 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1806 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1807 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1808 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1809 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1810 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1821 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1822 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1828 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1831 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1837 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1838 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1839 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1841 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1844 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1845 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1847 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1851 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1853 unsigned char *p,*d;
1855 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1859 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1863 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1865 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1867 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1876 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1880 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1882 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1883 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1884 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1889 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1890 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1893 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1900 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1901 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1907 /* else no CA names */
1908 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1911 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1912 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1915 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1920 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1921 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1924 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1931 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1934 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1935 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1940 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1944 unsigned long alg_k;
1946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1948 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1956 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1959 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1960 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1961 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1962 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1965 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1966 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1967 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1968 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1972 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1973 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1975 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1978 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
1980 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1981 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1983 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1984 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1985 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1986 * be sent already */
1989 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1997 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1998 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1999 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2000 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2002 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2009 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2010 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2015 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2027 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2031 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2033 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2034 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2037 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2039 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2040 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2041 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2042 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2043 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2045 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2046 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2047 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2049 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2050 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2052 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2053 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2054 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2055 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2056 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2057 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2058 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2064 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2065 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2066 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2068 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2069 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2070 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2071 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2075 s->session->master_key_length=
2076 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2077 s->session->master_key,
2079 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2084 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2089 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2101 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2103 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2109 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2111 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2116 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2119 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2126 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2134 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2139 s->session->master_key_length=
2140 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2141 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2142 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2147 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2149 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2150 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2151 krb5_data authenticator;
2153 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2154 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2155 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2156 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2157 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2158 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2160 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2161 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2163 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2165 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2168 enc_ticket.length = i;
2170 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2173 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2177 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2178 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2181 authenticator.length = i;
2183 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2186 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2190 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2191 p+=authenticator.length;
2195 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2198 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2201 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2204 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2208 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2209 enc_pms.length + 6))
2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2212 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2216 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2220 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2221 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2223 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2224 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2230 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2231 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2233 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2234 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2237 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2238 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2240 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2241 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2247 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2254 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2255 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2257 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2261 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2263 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2266 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2269 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2270 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2273 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2276 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2279 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2282 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2285 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2289 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2292 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2295 if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2297 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2298 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2299 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2300 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2301 * the protocol version.
2302 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2303 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2305 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2306 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2309 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2314 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2316 s->session->master_key_length=
2317 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2318 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2320 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2322 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2323 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2325 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2326 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2331 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2332 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2333 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2334 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2338 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2341 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2346 const EC_GROUP *group;
2347 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2349 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2350 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2353 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2357 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2358 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2360 /* use the certificate */
2361 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2365 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2366 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2368 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2371 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2372 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2374 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2375 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2382 /* Let's get client's public key */
2383 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2386 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2392 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2394 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2396 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2400 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2402 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2404 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2405 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2406 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2407 * never executed. When that support is
2408 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2409 * received in the certificate is
2410 * authorized for key agreement.
2411 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2412 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2415 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2417 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2421 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2422 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2428 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2432 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2433 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2435 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2442 /* Get encoded point length */
2445 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2446 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2452 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2453 * currently, so set it to the start
2455 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2458 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2459 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2460 if (field_size <= 0)
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2466 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2474 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2475 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2476 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2477 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2478 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2479 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2481 /* Compute the master secret */
2482 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2483 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2485 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2491 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2493 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2494 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2495 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2497 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2499 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2505 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2508 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2511 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2514 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2517 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2521 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2522 * string for the callback */
2523 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2524 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2525 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2526 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2527 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2529 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2535 else if (psk_len == 0)
2537 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2539 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2540 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2544 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2545 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2547 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2549 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2553 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2554 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2555 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2556 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2559 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2563 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2564 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2565 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2566 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2567 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2570 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2574 s->session->master_key_length=
2575 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2576 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2579 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2585 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2588 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2589 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL;
2590 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2591 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2593 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2594 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL);
2595 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2596 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2597 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2598 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2599 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2600 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2601 if (client_pub_pkey)
2603 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2606 /* Decrypt session key */
2607 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2617 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2627 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2633 /* Generate master secret */
2634 s->session->master_key_length=
2635 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2636 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2637 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2638 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2643 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2644 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2652 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2654 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2660 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2661 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2665 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2666 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2667 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2668 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2669 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2674 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2676 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2683 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2684 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2685 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2690 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2692 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2694 peer=s->session->peer;
2695 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2696 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2704 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2706 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2707 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2709 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2720 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2724 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2727 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2731 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2734 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2738 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2739 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2740 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2741 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2742 * signature without length field */
2743 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2744 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2755 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2759 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2760 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2763 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2768 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2770 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2771 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2775 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2781 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2789 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2791 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2792 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2793 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2797 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2805 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2807 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2808 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2809 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2813 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2815 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2821 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2822 { unsigned char signature[64];
2824 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2825 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2827 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2829 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2830 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2832 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2833 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2836 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2838 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2845 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2854 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2857 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2861 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2863 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2865 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2866 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2868 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2870 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2877 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2879 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2881 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2882 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2885 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2888 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2889 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2892 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2895 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2899 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2901 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2905 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2907 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2916 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2920 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2923 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2925 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2931 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2939 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2943 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2952 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2954 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2955 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2957 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2961 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2962 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2963 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2966 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2972 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2975 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2981 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2982 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2983 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2984 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2986 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2987 * when we arrive here. */
2988 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2990 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2991 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2997 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2998 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2999 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3000 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3001 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3009 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3012 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3013 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3017 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3022 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3024 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3027 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3028 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3029 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3036 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3037 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3042 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3043 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3046 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3048 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3050 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3055 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3056 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3057 unsigned char key_name[16];
3059 /* get session encoding length */
3060 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3061 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3066 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3067 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3068 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3069 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3070 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3071 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3073 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3074 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3075 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3077 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
3081 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3083 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3085 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3086 /* Skip message length for now */
3088 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3089 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3090 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3091 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3094 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3096 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3105 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3106 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3107 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3108 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3109 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3110 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3112 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3113 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3115 /* Output key name */
3117 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3120 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3121 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3122 /* Encrypt session data */
3123 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3125 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3127 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3129 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3130 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3131 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3134 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3136 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3137 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3138 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3140 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3142 /* number of bytes to write */
3144 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3149 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3150 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3153 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3155 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3158 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3159 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3160 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3163 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3166 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3169 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3170 /* message length */
3171 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3173 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3174 /* length of OCSP response */
3175 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3176 /* actual response */
3177 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3178 /* number of bytes to write */
3179 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3180 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3184 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3185 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));