1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
194 int new_state,state,skip=0;
196 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
205 /* init things to blank */
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
231 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
233 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
240 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
242 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
276 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
277 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
278 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
283 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
284 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
287 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
288 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
289 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
293 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
300 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
301 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
302 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
305 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
306 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
314 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
315 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
316 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
320 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
321 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
323 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
327 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
336 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
337 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
338 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
339 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
340 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
342 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
343 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
345 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
346 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
348 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
353 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
365 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
366 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
367 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
369 /* clear this, it may get reset by
370 * send_server_key_exchange */
371 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
373 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
374 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
376 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
377 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
378 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
379 * be able to handle this) */
380 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
382 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
385 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
386 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
388 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
390 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
391 * message only if the cipher suite is either
392 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
393 * server certificate contains the server's
394 * public key for key exchange.
396 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
397 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
398 * hint if provided */
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
400 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
402 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
403 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
404 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
405 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
406 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
407 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
413 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
414 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
425 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
426 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
427 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
428 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
429 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
430 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
431 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
432 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
433 * and in RFC 2246): */
434 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
435 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
436 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
437 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
438 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
439 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
440 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
441 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
442 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
444 /* no cert request */
446 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
447 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
451 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
452 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
453 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
454 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
455 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
457 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
458 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
464 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
465 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
466 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
467 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
468 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
469 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
473 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
474 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
475 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_WPENDING,0,NULL);
478 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
479 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
480 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
481 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
484 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
487 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
488 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
489 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
490 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
494 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
496 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
498 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
499 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
502 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
506 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
507 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
508 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
513 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
514 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
515 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
516 * message is not sent.
517 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
518 * the client uses its key from the certificate
521 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
529 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
532 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
533 * a client cert, it can be verified
534 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
535 * should be generalized. But it is next step
537 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
538 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
540 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
541 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
545 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
546 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
557 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
558 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
560 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
561 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
562 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
564 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
568 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
569 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
570 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
571 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
572 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
573 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
574 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
575 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
583 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
588 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
589 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
590 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
591 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
592 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
596 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
597 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
598 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
599 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
600 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
606 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
607 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
609 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
610 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
611 { ret= -1; goto end; }
613 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
614 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
616 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
617 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
620 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
621 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
629 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
630 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
631 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
632 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
633 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
634 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
635 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
636 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
638 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
640 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
645 /* clean a few things up */
646 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
648 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
651 /* remove buffering on output */
652 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
656 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
658 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
659 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
663 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
665 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
667 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
669 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
683 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
687 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
692 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
696 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
703 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
707 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
711 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
715 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
717 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
718 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
723 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
724 /* number of bytes to write */
729 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
730 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
733 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
738 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
739 * so permit appropriate message length */
740 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
746 if (!ok) return((int)n);
747 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
748 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
750 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
751 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
752 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
753 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
755 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
757 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
758 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
766 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
768 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
769 unsigned int cookie_len;
772 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
777 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
779 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
780 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
781 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
782 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
785 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
787 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
790 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
791 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
792 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
793 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
794 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
797 if (!ok) return((int)n);
799 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
801 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
802 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
803 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
806 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
807 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
810 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
812 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
813 s->version = s->client_version;
815 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
819 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
820 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
821 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
823 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
825 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
827 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
828 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
830 if (cookie_length == 0)
834 /* load the client random */
835 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
838 /* get the session-id */
842 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
843 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
844 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
845 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
846 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
847 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
848 * an earlier library version)
850 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
852 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
857 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
859 { /* previous session */
866 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
873 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
879 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
880 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
881 * does not cause an overflow.
883 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
886 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
891 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
892 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
895 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
897 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
899 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
902 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
904 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
907 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
909 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
910 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
912 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
914 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
925 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
927 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
928 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
934 /* not enough data */
935 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
939 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
946 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
947 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
950 id=s->session->cipher->id;
953 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
955 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
957 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
959 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
960 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
968 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
970 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
971 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
972 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
973 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
974 * enabled, though. */
975 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
976 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
978 s->session->cipher = c;
984 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
985 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
986 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
996 /* not enough data */
997 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1004 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1011 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1018 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1020 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1022 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1027 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1032 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1033 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1034 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1035 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1039 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1040 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1042 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1044 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1049 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1051 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1053 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1054 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1055 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1058 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1059 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1063 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1064 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1065 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1067 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1072 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1075 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1077 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1078 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1080 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1081 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1086 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1087 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1088 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1089 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1091 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1092 { /* See if we have a match */
1093 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1095 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1096 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1098 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1111 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1117 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1122 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1123 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1125 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1127 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1128 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1129 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1130 if (ciphers == NULL)
1132 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1137 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1138 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1142 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1146 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1150 /* Session-id reuse */
1151 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1152 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1153 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1154 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1156 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1158 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1159 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1161 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1162 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1164 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1168 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1169 else if (ec != NULL)
1170 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1172 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1176 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1179 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1182 /* we now have the following setup.
1184 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1185 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1186 * compression - basically ignored right now
1187 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1188 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1189 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1190 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1197 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1200 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1204 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1207 unsigned char *p,*d;
1210 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1214 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1216 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1217 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1218 p=s->s3->server_random;
1219 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1220 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1222 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1225 /* Do the message type and length last */
1228 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1229 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1232 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1233 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1235 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1236 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1237 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1238 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1239 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1240 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1241 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1243 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1244 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1245 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1246 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1247 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1250 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1252 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1254 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1255 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1264 /* put the cipher */
1265 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1268 /* put the compression method */
1269 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1272 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1275 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1278 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1283 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1292 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1295 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1296 /* number of bytes to write */
1301 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1302 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1305 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1309 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1311 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1314 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1319 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1320 /* number of bytes to write */
1325 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1326 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1329 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1335 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1342 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1343 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1346 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1349 unsigned char *p,*d;
1359 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1360 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1362 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1367 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1370 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1373 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1375 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1376 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1377 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1380 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1389 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1395 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1400 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1403 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1404 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1405 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1406 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1409 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1414 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1421 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1428 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1429 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1430 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1432 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1441 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1442 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1443 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1444 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1457 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1459 const EC_GROUP *group;
1461 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1462 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1464 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1465 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1466 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1470 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1475 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1477 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1482 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1488 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1495 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1496 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1497 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1498 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1500 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1507 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1508 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1509 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1515 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1516 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1522 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1523 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1524 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1527 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1534 /* Encode the public key.
1535 * First check the size of encoding and
1536 * allocate memory accordingly.
1538 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1539 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1540 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1543 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1544 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1545 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1546 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1553 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1554 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1555 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1556 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1558 if (encodedlen == 0)
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1564 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1566 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1567 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1568 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1569 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1574 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1575 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1583 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1585 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1587 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1588 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1591 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1593 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1597 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1599 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1603 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1604 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1606 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1609 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1612 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1620 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1625 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1628 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1636 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1638 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1639 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1640 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1641 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1642 * the actual encoded point itself
1644 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1652 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1653 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1655 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1661 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1663 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1664 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1665 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1666 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1673 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1674 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1676 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1680 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1682 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1683 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1684 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1685 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1686 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1687 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1688 (unsigned int *)&i);
1692 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1693 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1703 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1704 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1707 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1708 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1709 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1710 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1711 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1712 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1722 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1723 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1725 /* let's do ECDSA */
1726 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1727 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1728 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1729 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1730 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1731 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1742 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1743 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1749 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1752 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1758 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1759 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1760 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1762 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1765 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1766 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1768 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1772 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1774 unsigned char *p,*d;
1776 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1780 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1784 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1786 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1788 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1797 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1801 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1803 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1804 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1805 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1810 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1811 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1814 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1821 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1822 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1828 /* else no CA names */
1829 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1832 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1833 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1836 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1841 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1842 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1845 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1852 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1855 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1856 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1861 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1865 unsigned long alg_k;
1867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1869 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1877 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1880 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1881 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1882 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1883 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1886 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1887 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1888 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1889 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1893 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1894 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1896 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1899 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
1901 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1902 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1904 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1905 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1906 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1907 * be sent already */
1910 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1918 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1919 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1920 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1921 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1923 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1930 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
1931 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1936 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1948 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1952 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1954 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1955 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1958 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1960 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1961 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1962 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1963 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1964 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1966 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1967 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1968 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1970 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1971 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1973 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1974 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1975 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1976 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1977 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1978 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1979 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1985 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1986 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1987 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1989 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1990 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1991 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1992 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1996 s->session->master_key_length=
1997 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1998 s->session->master_key,
2000 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2005 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2010 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2022 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2024 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2030 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2032 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2037 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2040 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2047 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2055 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2060 s->session->master_key_length=
2061 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2062 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2063 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2068 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2070 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2071 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2072 krb5_data authenticator;
2074 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2075 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2076 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2077 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2078 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2079 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2081 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2082 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2084 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2086 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2089 enc_ticket.length = i;
2091 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2094 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2098 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2099 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2102 authenticator.length = i;
2104 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2107 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2111 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2112 p+=authenticator.length;
2116 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2119 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2122 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2125 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2129 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2130 enc_pms.length + 6))
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2133 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2137 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2141 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2142 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2144 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2145 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2151 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2152 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2154 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2155 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2158 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2159 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2161 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2162 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2168 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2175 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2176 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2178 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2182 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2184 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2187 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2190 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2191 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2194 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2197 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2200 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2203 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2206 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2210 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2213 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2216 if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2218 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2219 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2220 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2221 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2222 * the protocol version.
2223 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2224 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2226 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2227 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2230 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2235 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2237 s->session->master_key_length=
2238 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2239 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2241 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2243 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2244 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2246 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2247 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2252 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2253 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2254 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2255 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2259 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2262 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2267 const EC_GROUP *group;
2268 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2270 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2271 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2274 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2278 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2279 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2281 /* use the certificate */
2282 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2286 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2287 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2289 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2292 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2293 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2295 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2296 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2303 /* Let's get client's public key */
2304 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2307 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2313 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2315 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2317 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2321 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2323 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2325 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2326 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2327 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2328 * never executed. When that support is
2329 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2330 * received in the certificate is
2331 * authorized for key agreement.
2332 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2333 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2336 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2338 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2342 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2343 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2349 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2353 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2354 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2356 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2359 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2363 /* Get encoded point length */
2366 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2367 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2373 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2374 * currently, so set it to the start
2376 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2379 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2380 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2381 if (field_size <= 0)
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2387 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2395 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2396 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2397 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2398 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2399 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2400 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2402 /* Compute the master secret */
2403 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2404 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2406 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2412 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2414 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2415 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2416 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2418 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2420 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2426 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2429 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2432 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2435 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2442 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2443 * string for the callback */
2444 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2445 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2446 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2447 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2448 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2450 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2453 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2456 else if (psk_len == 0)
2458 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2460 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2461 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2465 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2466 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2468 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2470 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2474 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2475 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2476 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2477 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2480 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2484 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2485 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2486 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2487 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2488 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2491 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2495 s->session->master_key_length=
2496 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2497 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2500 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2506 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2509 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2510 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL;
2511 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2512 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2514 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2515 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL);
2516 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2517 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2518 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2519 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2520 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2521 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2522 if (client_pub_pkey)
2524 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2527 /* Decrypt session key */
2528 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2538 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2548 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2554 /* Generate master secret */
2555 s->session->master_key_length=
2556 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2557 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2558 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2559 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2564 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2565 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2573 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2575 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2581 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2582 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2586 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2587 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2588 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2589 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2590 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2595 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2597 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2604 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2605 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2606 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2611 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2613 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2615 peer=s->session->peer;
2616 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2617 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2625 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2627 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2628 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2630 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2641 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2645 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2648 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2652 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2655 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2659 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2660 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2661 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2662 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2663 * signature without length field */
2664 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2665 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2676 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2680 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2681 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2684 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2689 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2691 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2692 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2696 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2702 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2710 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2712 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2713 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2714 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2718 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2726 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2728 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2729 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2730 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2734 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2736 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2742 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2743 { unsigned char signature[64];
2745 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2746 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2748 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2750 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2751 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2753 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2754 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2757 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2759 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2766 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2775 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2778 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2782 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2784 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2786 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2787 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2789 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2791 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2798 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2800 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2802 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2803 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2806 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2809 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2810 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2813 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2816 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2820 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2822 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2826 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2828 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2837 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2841 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2844 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2846 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2852 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2860 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2864 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2873 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2875 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2876 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2878 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2882 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2883 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2884 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2887 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2893 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2896 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2902 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2903 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2904 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2905 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2907 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2908 * when we arrive here. */
2909 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2911 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2912 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2918 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2919 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2920 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2921 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2922 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2930 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2933 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2934 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2938 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2943 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2945 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2948 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2949 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
2950 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
2952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2957 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2958 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2963 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2964 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2967 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2969 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2971 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2976 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2977 unsigned char key_name[16];
2979 /* get session encoding length */
2980 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2981 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2986 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2987 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2988 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2989 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2990 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2991 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2993 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2994 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2995 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2997 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
3001 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3003 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3005 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3006 /* Skip message length for now */
3008 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3009 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3010 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3011 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3014 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3016 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3025 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3026 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3027 s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3028 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3029 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3030 memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3032 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3033 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3035 /* Output key name */
3037 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3040 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3041 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3042 /* Encrypt session data */
3043 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3045 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3047 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3049 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3050 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3051 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3054 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3056 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3057 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3058 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3060 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3062 /* number of bytes to write */
3064 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3069 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3070 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3073 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3075 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3078 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3079 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3080 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3083 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3086 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3089 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3090 /* message length */
3091 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3093 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3094 /* length of OCSP response */
3095 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3096 /* actual response */
3097 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3098 /* number of bytes to write */
3099 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3100 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3104 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3105 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));