1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
156 #include "ssl_locl.h"
157 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
175 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
177 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
178 return(SSLv3_server_method());
183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
184 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s,int *al)
186 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
188 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
190 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
191 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
193 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
195 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
196 we do so if There is no srp login name */
198 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
202 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
209 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
211 ssl_undefined_function,
212 ssl3_get_server_method)
214 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
217 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
218 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
220 int new_state,state,skip=0;
222 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
226 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
228 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
229 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
231 /* init things to blank */
233 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
242 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
243 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
244 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
246 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
248 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
259 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
261 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
265 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
266 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
269 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
271 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
276 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
278 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
280 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
285 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
293 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
300 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
301 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
305 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
306 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
310 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
311 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
312 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
314 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
315 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
317 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
318 * client that doesn't support secure
321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
322 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
328 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
329 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
330 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
331 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
336 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
339 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
340 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
341 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
342 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
345 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
356 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
358 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
359 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
364 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
366 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
367 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
370 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
372 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
373 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
374 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
375 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
377 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
385 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
391 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
392 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
396 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
399 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
406 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
411 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
412 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
413 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
414 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
415 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
416 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
418 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
419 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
421 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
422 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
424 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
429 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
436 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
442 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
443 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
445 /* clear this, it may get reset by
446 * send_server_key_exchange */
447 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
449 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
450 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
452 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
453 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
454 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
455 * be able to handle this) */
456 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
458 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
461 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
462 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
464 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
466 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
467 * message only if the cipher suite is either
468 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
469 * server certificate contains the server's
470 * public key for key exchange.
472 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
473 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
474 * hint if provided */
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
476 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
479 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
480 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
482 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
483 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
484 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
485 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
486 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
487 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
493 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
494 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
499 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
504 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
505 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
506 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
507 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
508 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
509 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
510 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
511 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
512 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
513 * and in RFC 2246): */
514 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
515 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
516 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
517 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
518 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
519 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
520 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
521 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
522 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
524 /* no cert request */
526 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
527 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
528 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
529 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
534 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
535 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
536 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
537 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
538 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
540 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
541 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
549 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
550 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
551 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
552 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
556 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
558 /* This code originally checked to see if
559 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
560 * and then flushed. This caused problems
561 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
562 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
563 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
564 * still exist. So instead we just flush
568 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
569 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
574 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
576 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
580 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
581 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
582 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
586 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
588 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
590 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
591 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
594 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
598 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
600 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
605 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
606 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
607 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
608 * message is not sent.
609 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
610 * the client uses its key from the certificate
613 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
614 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
616 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
617 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
619 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
623 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
625 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
627 if (!s->session->peer)
629 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
630 * at this point and digest cached records.
632 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
637 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
638 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
646 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
649 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
650 * a client cert, it can be verified
651 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
652 * should be generalized. But it is next step
654 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
655 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
657 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
658 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
662 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
663 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
674 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
675 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
677 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
678 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
679 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
681 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
682 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
684 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
685 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
687 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
692 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
695 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
696 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
698 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
704 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
705 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
706 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
710 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
711 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
714 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
719 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
720 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
721 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
722 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
723 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
727 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
728 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
729 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
730 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
731 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
737 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
738 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
740 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
741 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
742 { ret= -1; goto end; }
744 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
745 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
747 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
748 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
751 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
752 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
760 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
762 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
763 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
764 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
765 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
766 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
767 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
770 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
771 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
773 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
774 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
776 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
780 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
785 /* clean a few things up */
786 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
788 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
791 /* remove buffering on output */
792 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
796 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
801 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
803 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
805 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
807 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
821 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
825 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
830 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
834 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
841 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
845 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
849 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
853 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
855 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
856 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
861 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
862 /* number of bytes to write */
867 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
868 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
871 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
876 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
877 * so permit appropriate message length */
878 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
884 if (!ok) return((int)n);
885 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
886 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
888 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
890 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
895 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
896 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
898 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
900 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
901 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
905 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
907 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
908 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
911 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
917 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
919 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
920 unsigned int cookie_len;
923 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
928 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
930 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
931 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
932 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
933 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
936 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
939 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
942 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
943 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
944 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
945 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
946 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
949 if (!ok) return((int)n);
951 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
953 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
954 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
955 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
958 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
959 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
962 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
964 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
965 s->version = s->client_version;
967 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
971 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
972 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
973 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
975 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
977 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
979 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
980 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
982 if (cookie_length == 0)
986 /* load the client random */
987 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
990 /* get the session-id */
994 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
995 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
996 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
997 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
998 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1000 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1001 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1002 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1003 * setting will be ignored.
1005 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1007 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1012 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1014 { /* previous session */
1021 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1028 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1031 cookie_len = *(p++);
1034 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1035 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1036 * does not cause an overflow.
1038 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1041 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1046 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1047 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1050 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1052 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1054 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1057 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1059 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1062 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1064 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1065 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1067 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1069 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1080 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1082 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1083 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1089 /* not enough data */
1090 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1094 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1101 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1102 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1105 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1108 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1110 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1112 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1114 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1115 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1123 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1124 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1127 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1129 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1130 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1131 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1132 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1133 * enabled, though. */
1134 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1135 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1137 s->session->cipher = c;
1144 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1145 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1146 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1156 /* not enough data */
1157 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1164 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1171 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1178 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1180 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1187 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1188 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1189 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1190 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1194 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1195 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1197 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1203 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1205 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1207 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1208 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1209 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1212 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1213 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1217 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1218 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1219 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1221 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1226 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1229 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1231 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1232 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1234 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1235 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1240 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1241 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1242 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1243 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1245 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1246 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1248 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1249 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1250 /* Can't disable compression */
1251 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1256 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1257 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1259 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1260 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1262 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1266 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1271 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1272 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1274 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1279 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1286 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1287 { /* See if we have a match */
1288 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1290 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1291 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1293 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1306 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1311 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1312 * using compression.
1314 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1321 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1326 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1327 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1329 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1331 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1332 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1333 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1334 if (ciphers == NULL)
1336 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1341 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1342 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1346 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1350 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1351 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1352 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1353 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1354 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0));
1355 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1356 /* do not send a session ticket */
1357 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1361 /* Session-id reuse */
1362 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1363 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1364 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1365 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1367 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1369 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1370 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1372 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1373 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1375 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1379 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1380 else if (ec != NULL)
1381 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1383 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1387 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1390 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1392 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1396 /* we now have the following setup.
1398 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1399 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1400 * compression - basically ignored right now
1401 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1402 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1403 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1404 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1411 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1414 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1418 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1421 unsigned char *p,*d;
1424 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1428 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1430 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1431 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1432 p=s->s3->server_random;
1433 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1434 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1436 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1439 /* Do the message type and length last */
1442 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1443 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1446 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1447 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1449 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1450 * back in the server hello:
1451 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1452 * we send back the old session ID.
1453 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1454 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1455 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1456 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1458 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1459 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1460 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1461 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1464 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1465 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1467 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1469 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1470 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1476 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1479 /* put the cipher */
1480 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1483 /* put the compression method */
1484 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1487 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1490 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1493 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1498 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1507 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1510 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1511 /* number of bytes to write */
1516 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1517 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1520 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1524 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1526 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1529 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1535 /* number of bytes to write */
1540 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1541 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1544 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1550 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1557 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1558 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1561 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1564 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1565 unsigned char *p,*d;
1575 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1576 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1578 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1583 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1586 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1589 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1591 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1592 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1593 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1596 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1605 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1611 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1616 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1619 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1620 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1621 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1622 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1625 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1630 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1636 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1643 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1644 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1645 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1647 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1656 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1657 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1658 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1659 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1672 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1674 const EC_GROUP *group;
1676 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1677 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1679 /* Get NID of first shared curve */
1680 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, 0);
1681 if (nid != NID_undef)
1682 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1684 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1686 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1687 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1688 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1692 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1697 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1703 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1709 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1711 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1717 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1718 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1719 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1720 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1722 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1729 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1730 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1731 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1737 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1738 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1744 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1745 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1746 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1749 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1756 /* Encode the public key.
1757 * First check the size of encoding and
1758 * allocate memory accordingly.
1760 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1761 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1762 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1765 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1766 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1767 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1768 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1775 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1776 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1777 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1778 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1780 if (encodedlen == 0)
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1786 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1788 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1789 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1790 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1791 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1796 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1797 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1805 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1807 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1809 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1810 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1813 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1815 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1817 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1818 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1819 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1820 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1833 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1837 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1839 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1841 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1848 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1849 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1851 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1854 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1857 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1865 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1870 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1873 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1876 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1889 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1891 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1892 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1893 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1894 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1895 * the actual encoded point itself
1897 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1905 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1906 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1908 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1909 encodedPoint = NULL;
1914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1915 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1917 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1918 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1919 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1920 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1927 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1928 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1930 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1931 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1935 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1937 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1938 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1939 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1940 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1941 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1942 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1943 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1944 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1945 (unsigned int *)&i);
1949 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1950 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1962 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1964 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1966 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1968 /* Should never happen */
1969 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1976 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1979 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1980 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1981 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1982 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1983 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1984 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1991 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1996 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1997 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2003 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2006 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2012 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2013 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2014 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2016 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2019 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2020 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2022 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2026 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2028 unsigned char *p,*d;
2030 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2034 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2038 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2040 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2042 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2047 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2049 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2059 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2063 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2065 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2066 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2067 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2072 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2073 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2076 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2083 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2084 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2090 /* else no CA names */
2091 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2094 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2095 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2098 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2103 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2104 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2107 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2114 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2117 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2118 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2123 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2127 unsigned long alg_k;
2129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2131 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2135 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2139 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2142 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2143 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2144 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2145 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2148 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2149 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2150 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2151 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2155 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2156 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2158 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2161 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2163 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2164 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2166 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2167 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2168 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2169 * be sent already */
2172 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2180 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2181 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2182 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2183 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2185 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2192 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2193 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2198 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2210 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2214 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2216 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2217 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2220 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2222 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2223 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2224 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2225 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2226 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2228 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2229 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2230 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2232 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2233 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2235 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2236 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2237 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2238 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2239 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2240 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2241 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2247 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2248 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2249 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2251 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2252 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2253 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2254 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2258 s->session->master_key_length=
2259 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2260 s->session->master_key,
2262 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2267 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2270 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2277 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2288 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2289 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2290 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2291 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2294 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2295 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2296 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2297 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2299 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2303 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2305 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2307 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2312 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2316 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2317 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2320 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2321 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2323 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2325 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2329 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2330 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2333 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2340 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2349 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2356 s->session->master_key_length=
2357 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2358 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2359 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2366 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2368 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2369 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2370 krb5_data authenticator;
2372 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2373 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2374 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2375 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2376 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2377 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2379 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2380 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2382 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2384 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2387 enc_ticket.length = i;
2389 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2392 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2396 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2397 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2400 authenticator.length = i;
2402 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2405 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2409 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2410 p+=authenticator.length;
2414 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2417 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2420 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2423 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2427 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2428 enc_pms.length + 6))
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2431 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2435 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2439 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2440 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2442 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2443 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2449 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2450 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2452 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2453 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2456 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2457 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2459 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2460 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2466 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2473 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2474 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2476 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2480 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2482 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2485 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2488 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2489 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2492 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2495 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2498 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2501 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2504 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2508 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2511 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2514 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2516 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2517 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2518 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2519 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2520 * the protocol version.
2521 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2522 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2524 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2527 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2532 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2534 s->session->master_key_length=
2535 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2536 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2538 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2540 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2541 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2543 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2544 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2549 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2550 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2551 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2552 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2556 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2559 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2564 const EC_GROUP *group;
2565 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2567 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2568 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2571 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2575 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2576 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2578 /* use the certificate */
2579 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2583 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2584 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2586 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2589 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2590 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2592 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2593 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2600 /* Let's get client's public key */
2601 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2604 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2610 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2612 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2614 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2618 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2620 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2622 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2623 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2624 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2625 * never executed. When that support is
2626 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2627 * received in the certificate is
2628 * authorized for key agreement.
2629 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2630 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2633 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2635 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2639 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2640 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2646 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2650 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2651 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2653 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2656 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2660 /* Get encoded point length */
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2669 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2670 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2676 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2677 * currently, so set it to the start
2679 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2682 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2683 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2684 if (field_size <= 0)
2686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2690 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2698 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2699 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2700 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2701 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2702 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2703 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2705 /* Compute the master secret */
2706 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2707 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2709 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2715 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2717 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2718 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2719 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2721 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2723 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2729 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2732 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2735 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2738 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2741 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2745 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2746 * string for the callback */
2747 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2748 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2749 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2750 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2751 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2753 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2756 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2759 else if (psk_len == 0)
2761 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2763 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2764 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2768 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2769 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2771 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2773 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2777 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2778 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2779 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2780 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2783 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2787 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2788 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2789 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2790 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2791 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2794 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2798 s->session->master_key_length=
2799 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2800 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2803 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2810 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2818 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2822 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2827 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2828 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2829 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2830 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2833 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2837 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2846 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2847 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2850 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2851 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2852 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2853 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2854 unsigned long alg_a;
2856 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2857 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2858 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2859 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2860 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2861 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2863 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2864 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2865 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2866 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2867 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2868 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2869 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2870 if (client_pub_pkey)
2872 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2875 /* Decrypt session key */
2876 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2886 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2896 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2902 /* Generate master secret */
2903 s->session->master_key_length=
2904 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2905 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2906 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2907 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2912 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2913 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2921 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2923 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2929 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2930 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2934 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2935 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2936 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2937 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2938 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2943 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2945 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2951 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2953 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2955 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2956 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2957 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2959 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2962 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2964 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2966 peer=s->session->peer;
2967 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2968 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2976 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2978 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2979 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2981 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2992 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2996 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2999 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3003 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3006 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3010 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3011 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3012 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3013 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3014 * signature without length field */
3015 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3016 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3022 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3024 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
3025 /* Should never happen */
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3029 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3032 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3033 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3036 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3039 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3043 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3047 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3057 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3061 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3062 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3065 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3069 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3073 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3077 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3081 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3084 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3085 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3088 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3092 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3094 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3101 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3103 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3104 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3108 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3114 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3122 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3124 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3125 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3126 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3130 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3138 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3140 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3141 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3142 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3146 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3148 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3154 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3155 { unsigned char signature[64];
3157 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3158 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3160 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3162 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3163 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3165 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3166 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3169 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3171 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3178 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3187 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3190 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3192 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3193 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3194 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3196 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3197 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3201 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3203 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3205 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3206 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3208 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3210 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3217 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3219 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3221 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3222 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3225 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3228 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3229 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3232 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3235 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3239 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3241 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3245 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3247 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3256 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3260 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3263 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3265 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3271 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3279 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3283 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3292 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3294 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3295 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3297 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3301 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3302 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3303 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3306 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3309 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3310 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3312 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3318 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3321 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3327 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3328 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3329 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3330 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3332 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3333 * when we arrive here. */
3334 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3336 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3337 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3343 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3344 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3345 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3346 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3347 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3355 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3358 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3359 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3363 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3368 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3370 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3373 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3374 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3375 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3382 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3383 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3388 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3389 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3393 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3394 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3396 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3398 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3399 const unsigned char *const_p;
3400 int len, slen_full, slen;
3405 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3406 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3407 unsigned char key_name[16];
3409 /* get session encoding length */
3410 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3411 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3414 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3416 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3420 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3422 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3424 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3430 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3432 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3433 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3439 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3440 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3442 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3443 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3444 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3445 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3446 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3447 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3449 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3450 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3451 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3454 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3456 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3457 /* Skip message length for now */
3459 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3460 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3461 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3462 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3465 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3467 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3476 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3477 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3478 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3479 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3480 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3481 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3484 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3485 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3486 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3487 * as their sessions. */
3488 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3490 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3492 /* Output key name */
3494 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3497 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3498 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3499 /* Encrypt session data */
3500 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3502 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3504 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3506 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3507 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3508 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3511 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3513 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3514 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3515 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3517 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3519 /* number of bytes to write */
3521 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3526 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3527 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3530 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3532 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3535 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3536 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3537 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3540 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3543 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3546 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3547 /* message length */
3548 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3550 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3551 /* length of OCSP response */
3552 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3553 /* actual response */
3554 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3555 /* number of bytes to write */
3556 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3557 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3561 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3562 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3565 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
3566 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3567 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3568 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3571 int proto_len, padding_len;
3573 const unsigned char *p;
3575 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3576 * extension in their ClientHello */
3577 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3583 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3584 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3585 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3587 514, /* See the payload format below */
3593 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3594 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3595 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3596 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3603 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3605 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3607 /* The payload looks like:
3609 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3610 * uint8 padding_len;
3611 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3614 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3616 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3617 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3620 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3621 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3626 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3627 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;