1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
356 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
357 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
359 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
416 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s, &skip);
417 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
425 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
426 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
427 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
428 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
429 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
430 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
432 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
433 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
435 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
436 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
438 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
443 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
455 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
456 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
457 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
459 /* clear this, it may get reset by
460 * send_server_key_exchange */
461 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
463 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
464 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
466 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
467 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
468 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
469 * be able to handle this) */
470 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
472 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
475 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
476 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
478 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
480 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
481 * message only if the cipher suite is either
482 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
483 * server certificate contains the server's
484 * public key for key exchange.
486 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
487 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
488 * hint if provided */
489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
490 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
493 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
494 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
496 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
497 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
498 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
499 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
500 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
501 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
507 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
508 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
513 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
517 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
518 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
519 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
520 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
521 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
522 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
523 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
524 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
525 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
526 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
527 * and in RFC 2246): */
528 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
529 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
530 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
531 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
532 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
533 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
534 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
535 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
536 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
538 /* no cert request */
540 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
541 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
542 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
543 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
548 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
549 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
550 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
551 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
552 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
554 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
555 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
562 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
563 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
564 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
565 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
566 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
572 /* This code originally checked to see if
573 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
574 * and then flushed. This caused problems
575 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
576 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
577 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
578 * still exist. So instead we just flush
582 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
583 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
588 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
590 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
594 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
595 ret=tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(s);
596 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
597 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
598 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
603 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
604 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
605 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
609 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
612 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
615 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
617 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
618 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
625 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
626 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
627 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
632 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
633 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
634 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
635 * message is not sent.
636 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
637 * the client uses its key from the certificate
640 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
641 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
643 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
644 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
646 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
650 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
652 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
654 if (!s->session->peer)
656 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
657 * at this point and digest cached records.
659 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
664 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
665 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
673 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
676 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
677 * a client cert, it can be verified
678 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
679 * should be generalized. But it is next step
681 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
682 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
684 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
685 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
689 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
690 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
704 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
705 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
706 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
708 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
709 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
711 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
712 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
714 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
719 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
720 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
721 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
722 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
723 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
725 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
729 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
730 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
731 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
732 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
733 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
737 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
738 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
741 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
746 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
748 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
749 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
750 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
754 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
755 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
756 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
757 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
758 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
764 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
767 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
768 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
769 { ret= -1; goto end; }
771 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
772 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
774 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
775 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
778 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
779 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
787 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
788 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
789 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
790 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
791 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
792 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
793 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
794 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
797 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
798 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
800 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
801 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
803 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
807 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
812 /* clean a few things up */
813 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
815 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
818 /* remove buffering on output */
819 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
823 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
828 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
830 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
832 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
834 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
848 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
852 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
857 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
861 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
868 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
872 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
876 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
879 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
881 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
882 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
885 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
886 return ssl_do_write(s);
889 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
894 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
895 * so permit appropriate message length */
896 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
902 if (!ok) return((int)n);
903 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
905 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA)
910 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
912 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
914 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
919 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
920 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
922 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
924 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
925 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
929 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
931 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
932 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
935 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
941 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
943 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
944 unsigned int cookie_len;
949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
953 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
955 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C)
958 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
959 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
960 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
961 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
964 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
967 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
970 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
971 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
972 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
973 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
974 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
977 if (!ok) return((int)n);
979 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
981 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
982 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
983 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
986 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
987 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
988 : (s->client_version < s->version))
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
991 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
992 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
994 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
995 s->version = s->client_version;
997 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1001 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
1002 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1003 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1005 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1007 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1009 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1010 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1012 if (cookie_length == 0)
1016 /* load the client random */
1017 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1018 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1020 /* get the session-id */
1024 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1025 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1026 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1027 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1028 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1030 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1031 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1032 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1033 * setting will be ignored.
1035 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1037 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1042 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1044 { /* previous session */
1051 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1061 cookie_len = *(p++);
1064 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1065 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1066 * does not cause an overflow.
1068 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1071 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1076 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1077 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1080 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1082 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1084 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1087 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1089 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1092 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1094 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1095 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1097 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1099 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1102 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1107 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1109 /* Select version to use */
1110 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1111 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1113 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1114 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1116 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1119 s->version = s->client_version;
1120 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1123 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1124 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1126 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1127 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1132 s->version = s->client_version;
1133 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1136 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1141 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1143 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1144 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1150 /* not enough data */
1151 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1155 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1162 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1163 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1166 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1169 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1171 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1173 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1175 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1176 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1184 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1185 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1188 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1190 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1191 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1192 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1193 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1194 * enabled, though. */
1195 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1196 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1198 s->session->cipher = c;
1205 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1206 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1207 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1217 /* not enough data */
1218 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1227 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1234 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1241 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1243 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1250 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1251 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1252 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1253 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1256 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1257 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1263 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1265 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1267 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1268 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1269 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1272 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1273 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1277 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1278 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1279 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1281 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1286 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1289 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1291 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1292 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1294 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1295 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1300 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1301 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1302 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1303 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1305 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1306 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1308 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1309 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1310 /* Can't disable compression */
1311 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1316 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1317 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1319 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1320 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1322 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1326 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1331 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1332 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1334 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1339 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1346 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1347 { /* See if we have a match */
1348 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1350 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1351 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1353 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1366 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1371 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1372 * using compression.
1374 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1381 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1386 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1387 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1389 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1391 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1392 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1393 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1394 if (ciphers == NULL)
1396 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1401 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1403 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1405 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1408 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1414 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1417 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1419 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1420 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1424 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1428 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1432 /* Session-id reuse */
1433 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1434 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1435 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1436 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1438 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1440 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1441 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1443 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1444 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1446 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1450 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1451 else if (ec != NULL)
1452 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1454 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1458 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1461 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1463 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1467 /* we now have the following setup.
1469 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1470 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1471 * compression - basically ignored right now
1472 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1473 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1474 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1475 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1478 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1479 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1481 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1488 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1492 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1495 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1496 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1499 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1502 unsigned char *p,*d;
1507 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1509 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1510 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1511 p=s->s3->server_random;
1512 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1515 /* Do the message type and length last */
1516 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1518 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1519 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1522 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1523 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1525 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1526 * back in the server hello:
1527 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1528 * we send back the old session ID.
1529 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1530 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1531 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1532 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1534 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1535 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1536 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1537 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1540 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1542 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1544 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1545 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1551 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1554 /* put the cipher */
1555 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1558 /* put the compression method */
1559 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1562 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1565 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1568 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1573 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1575 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1582 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1583 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1586 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1587 return ssl_do_write(s);
1590 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1593 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1595 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1596 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1599 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1600 return ssl_do_write(s);
1603 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1609 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1616 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1617 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1620 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1623 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1624 unsigned char *p,*d;
1634 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1635 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1637 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1642 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1645 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1648 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1650 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1651 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1652 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1655 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1664 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1670 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1675 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1678 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1679 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1680 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1681 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1684 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1689 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1695 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1702 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1703 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1704 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1706 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1715 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1716 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1717 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1718 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1731 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1733 const EC_GROUP *group;
1735 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1736 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1738 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1739 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1740 if (nid != NID_undef)
1741 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1743 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1745 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1746 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1747 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1751 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1756 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1762 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1768 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1770 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1776 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1777 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1778 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1779 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1781 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1788 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1789 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1790 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1796 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1797 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1803 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1804 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1805 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1808 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1815 /* Encode the public key.
1816 * First check the size of encoding and
1817 * allocate memory accordingly.
1819 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1820 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1821 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1824 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1825 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1826 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1827 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1834 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1835 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1836 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1837 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1839 if (encodedlen == 0)
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1845 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1847 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1848 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1849 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1850 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1855 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1856 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1864 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1865 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1866 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1868 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1869 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1872 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1874 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1876 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1877 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1878 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1879 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1892 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1896 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1898 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1900 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1907 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1908 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1910 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1913 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1916 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1924 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1929 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1931 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1934 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1947 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1949 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1950 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1951 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1952 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1953 * the actual encoded point itself
1955 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1963 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1964 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1966 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1967 encodedPoint = NULL;
1972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1973 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1975 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1976 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1977 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1978 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1985 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1986 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1988 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1992 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1994 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1995 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1996 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1997 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1998 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1999 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2000 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2001 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
2002 (unsigned int *)&i);
2006 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2007 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2019 /* send signature algorithm */
2020 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2022 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2024 /* Should never happen */
2025 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2032 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2035 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2036 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2037 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2038 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2039 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2040 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2047 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2052 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2053 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2059 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2062 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2063 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2064 return ssl_do_write(s);
2066 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2069 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2070 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2072 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2076 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2078 unsigned char *p,*d;
2080 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2084 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2088 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2090 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2092 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2097 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2099 const unsigned char *psigs;
2100 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2102 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2111 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2115 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2117 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2118 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2119 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2124 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2125 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2128 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2135 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2136 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2142 /* else no CA names */
2143 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2146 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2148 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2149 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2151 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2153 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2161 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2164 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2165 return ssl_do_write(s);
2170 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2174 unsigned long alg_k;
2176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2178 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2182 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2186 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2189 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2190 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2191 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2192 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2195 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2196 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2197 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2198 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2202 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2203 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2205 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2208 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2210 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2211 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2213 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2214 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2215 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2216 * be sent already */
2219 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2227 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2228 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2229 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2230 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2232 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2239 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2240 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2245 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2257 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2261 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2263 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2264 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2267 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2269 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2270 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2271 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2272 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2273 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2275 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2276 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2277 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2279 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2280 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2282 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2283 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2284 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2285 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2286 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2287 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2288 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2294 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2295 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2296 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2298 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2299 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2300 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2301 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2305 s->session->master_key_length=
2306 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2307 s->session->master_key,
2309 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2314 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2317 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2324 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2335 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2336 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2337 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2338 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2341 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2342 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2343 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2344 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2346 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2350 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2352 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2354 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2359 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2363 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2364 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2367 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2368 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2370 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2372 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2376 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2377 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2380 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2387 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2396 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2403 s->session->master_key_length=
2404 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2405 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2406 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2413 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2415 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2416 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2417 krb5_data authenticator;
2419 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2420 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2421 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2422 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2423 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2424 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2426 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2427 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2429 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2431 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2434 enc_ticket.length = i;
2436 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2439 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2443 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2444 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2447 authenticator.length = i;
2449 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2452 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2456 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2457 p+=authenticator.length;
2461 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2464 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2467 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2470 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2474 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2475 enc_pms.length + 6))
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2478 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2482 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2486 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2487 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2489 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2490 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2496 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2497 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2499 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2500 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2503 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2504 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2506 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2507 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2513 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2520 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2521 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2523 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2527 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2529 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2535 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2536 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2539 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2542 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2545 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2548 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2551 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2555 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2558 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2561 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2563 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2564 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2565 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2566 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2567 * the protocol version.
2568 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2569 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2571 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2574 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2579 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2581 s->session->master_key_length=
2582 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2583 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2585 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2587 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2588 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2590 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2591 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2596 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2597 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2598 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2599 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2603 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2606 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2611 const EC_GROUP *group;
2612 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2614 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2615 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2618 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2622 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2623 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2625 /* use the certificate */
2626 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2630 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2631 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2633 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2636 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2637 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2639 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2640 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2647 /* Let's get client's public key */
2648 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2651 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2657 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2659 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2661 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2665 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2667 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2669 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2670 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2671 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2672 * never executed. When that support is
2673 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2674 * received in the certificate is
2675 * authorized for key agreement.
2676 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2677 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2680 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2682 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2686 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2687 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2693 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2697 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2698 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2700 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2703 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2707 /* Get encoded point length */
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2716 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2717 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2723 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2724 * currently, so set it to the start
2726 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2729 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2730 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2731 if (field_size <= 0)
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2737 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2745 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2746 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2747 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2748 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2749 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2750 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2752 /* Compute the master secret */
2753 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2754 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2756 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2762 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2764 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2765 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2766 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2768 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2770 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2776 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2779 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2782 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2785 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2788 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2792 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2793 * string for the callback */
2794 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2795 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2796 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2797 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2798 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2800 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2803 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2806 else if (psk_len == 0)
2808 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2810 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2811 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2815 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2816 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2818 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2820 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2824 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2825 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2826 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2827 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2830 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2834 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2835 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2836 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2837 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2838 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2841 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2845 s->session->master_key_length=
2846 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2847 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2850 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2857 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2865 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2869 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2874 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2875 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2876 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2877 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2880 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2884 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2893 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2894 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2897 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2898 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2899 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2900 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2901 unsigned long alg_a;
2903 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2904 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2905 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2906 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2907 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2908 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2910 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2911 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2912 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2913 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2914 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2915 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2916 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2917 if (client_pub_pkey)
2919 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2922 /* Decrypt session key */
2923 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2933 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2943 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2949 /* Generate master secret */
2950 s->session->master_key_length=
2951 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2952 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2953 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2954 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2959 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2960 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2968 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2970 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2976 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2977 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2981 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2982 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2983 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2984 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2985 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2990 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2992 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2998 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3000 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3002 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3003 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3004 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3006 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
3009 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3011 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3013 peer=s->session->peer;
3014 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3015 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3023 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3025 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3026 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3028 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3039 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3043 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3046 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3050 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3053 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3057 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3058 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3059 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3060 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3061 * signature without length field */
3062 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3063 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3069 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3071 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3074 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3079 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3083 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3093 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3097 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3098 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3101 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3105 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3109 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3113 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3117 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3120 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3121 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3124 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3128 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3130 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3137 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3139 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3140 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3144 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3150 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3158 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3160 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3161 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3162 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3166 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3174 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3176 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3177 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3178 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3182 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3184 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3190 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3191 { unsigned char signature[64];
3193 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3194 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3196 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3198 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3199 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3201 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3202 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3205 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3207 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3214 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3223 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3226 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3228 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3229 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3230 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3232 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3233 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3237 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3239 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3241 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3242 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3244 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3246 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3253 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3255 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3257 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3258 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3261 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3264 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3265 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3268 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3271 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3275 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3277 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3281 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3283 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3292 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3296 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3299 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3301 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3307 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3315 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3319 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3328 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3330 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3331 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3333 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3337 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3338 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3339 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3342 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3345 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3346 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3348 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3354 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3357 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3363 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3364 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3365 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3366 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3368 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3369 * when we arrive here. */
3370 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3372 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3373 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3379 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3380 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3381 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3382 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3383 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3391 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3394 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3395 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3399 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3403 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3405 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3408 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3409 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3410 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3417 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3418 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3421 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3422 return ssl_do_write(s);
3425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3426 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3427 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3429 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3431 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3432 const unsigned char *const_p;
3433 int len, slen_full, slen;
3438 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3439 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3440 unsigned char key_name[16];
3442 /* get session encoding length */
3443 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3444 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3447 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3449 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3453 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3455 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3457 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3463 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3465 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3466 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3472 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3473 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3475 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3476 * follows handshake_header_length +
3477 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3478 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3479 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3480 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3482 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3483 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3484 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3486 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3487 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3488 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3489 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3490 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3493 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3495 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3504 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3505 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3506 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3507 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3508 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3509 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3512 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3513 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3514 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3515 * as their sessions. */
3516 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3518 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3520 /* Output key name */
3522 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3525 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3526 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3527 /* Encrypt session data */
3528 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3530 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3532 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3534 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3535 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3536 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3539 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3541 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3542 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3543 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3544 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3546 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3550 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3551 return ssl_do_write(s);
3554 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3556 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3559 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3560 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3561 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3564 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3567 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3570 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3571 /* message length */
3572 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3574 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3575 /* length of OCSP response */
3576 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3577 /* actual response */
3578 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3579 /* number of bytes to write */
3580 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3581 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3585 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3586 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3589 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3590 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3591 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3592 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3595 int proto_len, padding_len;
3597 const unsigned char *p;
3599 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3600 * extension in their ClientHello */
3601 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3607 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3608 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3609 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3611 514, /* See the payload format below */
3617 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3618 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3619 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3620 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3627 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3629 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3631 /* The payload looks like:
3633 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3634 * uint8 padding_len;
3635 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3638 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3640 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3641 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3644 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3645 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3650 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3651 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3657 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s, int *skip)
3660 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count)
3662 unsigned char *p = NULL;
3663 unsigned char *size_loc = NULL;
3664 srv_supp_data_record *record = NULL;
3668 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3670 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
3671 unsigned short outlen = 0;
3673 record = &s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i];
3675 /* NULL callback or -1 omits supp data entry */
3678 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->supp_data_type,
3679 &out, &outlen, &al, record->arg);
3680 if (cb_retval == -1)
3681 continue; /* skip this supp data entry */
3684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3687 if (outlen == 0 || TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data < outlen + 4 + length)
3689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3692 //write supp data entry...
3693 //if first entry, write handshake message type
3694 //jump back to write length at end
3697 //1 byte message type + 3 bytes for message length
3698 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, 4))
3700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3703 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3704 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3705 //hold on to length field to update later
3707 //skip over handshake length field (3 bytes) and supp_data length field (3 bytes)
3711 //2 byte supp data type + 2 byte length + outlen
3712 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, outlen + 4))
3714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3717 s2n(record->supp_data_type, p);
3719 memcpy(p, out, outlen);
3720 //update length to supp data type (2 bytes) + supp data length (2 bytes) + supp data
3721 length += (outlen + 4);
3726 //write handshake length
3727 l2n3(length - 4, size_loc);
3729 l2n3(length - 7, size_loc);
3730 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3731 s->init_num = length;
3734 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3738 //no supp data message sent
3744 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3748 int tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3754 const unsigned char *p, *d;
3755 unsigned short supp_data_entry_type = 0;
3756 unsigned long supp_data_entry_len = 0;
3757 unsigned long supp_data_len = 0;
3760 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3761 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A,
3762 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B,
3763 SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,
3764 /* use default limit */
3765 TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data,
3768 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3770 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3773 /* The message cannot be empty */
3776 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3777 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3780 n2l3(p, supp_data_len);
3781 while (p<d+supp_data_len)
3783 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_type);
3784 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_len);
3785 //if there is a callback for this supp data type, send it
3786 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3788 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].supp_data_type == supp_data_entry_type && s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2)
3790 cb_retval = s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2(s, supp_data_entry_type, p, supp_data_entry_len, &al, s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].arg);
3793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3798 p+=supp_data_entry_len;
3802 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);