1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
175 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
177 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
178 return(SSLv3_server_method());
183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
184 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
186 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
188 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
190 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
191 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
193 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
195 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
196 we do so if There is no srp login name */
198 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
202 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
209 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
211 ssl_undefined_function,
212 ssl3_get_server_method)
214 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
217 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
218 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
220 int new_state,state,skip=0;
222 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
226 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
228 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
229 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
231 /* init things to blank */
233 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
242 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
243 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
244 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
246 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
248 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
259 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
261 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
265 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
266 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
269 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
271 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
276 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
278 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
280 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
285 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
293 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
300 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
301 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
305 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
306 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
310 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
311 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
312 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
314 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
315 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
317 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
318 * client that doesn't support secure
321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
322 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
328 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
329 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
330 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
331 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
336 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
339 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
340 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
341 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
342 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
345 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
360 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
361 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
364 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
366 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
367 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
370 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
372 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
373 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
374 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
375 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
377 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
385 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
391 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
392 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
396 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
399 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
411 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
412 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
413 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
414 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
415 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
417 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
418 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
420 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
423 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
428 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
442 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
444 /* clear this, it may get reset by
445 * send_server_key_exchange */
446 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
448 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
449 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
451 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
452 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
453 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
454 * be able to handle this) */
455 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
460 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
461 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
463 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
465 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
466 * message only if the cipher suite is either
467 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
468 * server certificate contains the server's
469 * public key for key exchange.
471 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
472 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
473 * hint if provided */
474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
478 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
479 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
481 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
482 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
483 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
484 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
485 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
486 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
492 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
493 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
498 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
504 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
506 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
507 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
508 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
509 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
510 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
511 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
512 * and in RFC 2246): */
513 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
514 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
515 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
516 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
517 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
518 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
519 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
520 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
521 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
522 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
523 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
525 /* no cert request */
527 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
528 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
529 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
530 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
535 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
536 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
537 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
538 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
539 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
541 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
542 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
549 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
550 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
551 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
552 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
553 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
557 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
559 /* This code originally checked to see if
560 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
561 * and then flushed. This caused problems
562 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
563 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
564 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
565 * still exist. So instead we just flush
569 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
570 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
575 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
577 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
580 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
581 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
582 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
583 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
587 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
589 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
591 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
592 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
595 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
601 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
606 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
607 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
608 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
609 * message is not sent.
610 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
611 * the client uses its key from the certificate
614 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
617 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
618 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
620 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
624 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
626 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
628 if (!s->session->peer)
630 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
631 * at this point and digest cached records.
633 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
638 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
639 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
647 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
650 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
651 * a client cert, it can be verified
652 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
653 * should be generalized. But it is next step
655 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
656 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
658 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
659 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
663 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
664 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
675 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
676 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
678 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
679 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
680 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
681 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
683 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
684 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
686 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
687 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
689 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
694 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
696 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
697 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
698 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
700 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
704 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
705 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
706 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
707 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
708 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
709 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
713 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
714 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
717 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
722 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
723 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
724 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
725 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
726 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
730 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
731 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
732 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
733 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
734 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
740 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
741 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
743 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
744 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
745 { ret= -1; goto end; }
747 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
748 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
750 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
751 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
754 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
755 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
763 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
764 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
765 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
766 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
767 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
768 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
769 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
770 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
773 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
774 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
776 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
778 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
779 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
782 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
786 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
791 /* clean a few things up */
792 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
794 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
797 /* remove buffering on output */
798 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
802 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
807 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
809 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
811 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
813 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
827 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
831 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
836 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
840 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
847 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
851 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
855 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
858 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
860 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
861 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
864 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
865 return ssl_do_write(s);
868 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
873 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
874 * so permit appropriate message length */
875 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
881 if (!ok) return((int)n);
882 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
883 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
885 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
887 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
892 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
893 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
895 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
897 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
898 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
902 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
904 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
905 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
908 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
914 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
916 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
917 unsigned int cookie_len;
922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
926 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
928 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
931 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
932 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
933 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
934 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
937 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
940 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
943 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
944 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
945 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
946 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
947 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
950 if (!ok) return((int)n);
952 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
954 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
955 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
956 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
959 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
960 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
961 : (s->client_version < s->version))
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
964 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
965 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
967 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
968 s->version = s->client_version;
970 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
974 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
975 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
976 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
978 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
980 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
982 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
983 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
985 if (cookie_length == 0)
989 /* load the client random */
990 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
993 /* get the session-id */
997 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
998 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
999 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1000 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1001 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1003 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1004 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1005 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1006 * setting will be ignored.
1008 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1010 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1015 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1017 { /* previous session */
1024 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1034 cookie_len = *(p++);
1037 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1038 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1039 * does not cause an overflow.
1041 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1044 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1049 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1050 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1053 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1055 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1057 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1060 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1062 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1065 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1067 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1068 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1070 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1072 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1075 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1080 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1082 /* Select version to use */
1083 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1084 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1086 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1087 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1089 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1092 s->version = s->client_version;
1093 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1096 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1097 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1099 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1100 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1105 s->version = s->client_version;
1106 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1109 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1114 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1116 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1117 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1123 /* not enough data */
1124 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1128 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1135 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1136 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1139 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1142 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1144 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1146 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1148 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1149 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1157 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1158 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1161 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1163 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1164 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1165 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1166 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1167 * enabled, though. */
1168 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1169 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1171 s->session->cipher = c;
1178 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1179 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1180 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1190 /* not enough data */
1191 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1200 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1207 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1214 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1216 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1223 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1224 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1225 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1226 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1229 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1230 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1236 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1238 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1240 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1241 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1242 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1245 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1246 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1250 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1251 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1252 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1254 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1259 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1262 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1264 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1265 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1267 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1268 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1273 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1274 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1275 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1276 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1278 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1279 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1281 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1282 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1283 /* Can't disable compression */
1284 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1289 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1290 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1292 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1293 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1295 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1299 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1304 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1305 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1307 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1312 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1319 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1320 { /* See if we have a match */
1321 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1323 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1324 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1326 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1339 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1344 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1345 * using compression.
1347 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1354 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1359 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1360 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1362 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1364 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1365 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1366 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1367 if (ciphers == NULL)
1369 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1374 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1376 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1378 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1381 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1387 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1390 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1392 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1393 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1397 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1401 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1405 /* Session-id reuse */
1406 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1407 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1408 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1409 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1411 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1413 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1414 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1416 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1417 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1419 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1423 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1424 else if (ec != NULL)
1425 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1427 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1431 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1434 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1436 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1440 /* we now have the following setup.
1442 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1443 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1444 * compression - basically ignored right now
1445 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1446 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1447 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1448 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1451 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1452 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1454 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1461 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1465 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1468 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1469 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1472 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1475 unsigned char *p,*d;
1480 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1482 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1483 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1484 p=s->s3->server_random;
1485 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1488 /* Do the message type and length last */
1489 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1491 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1492 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1495 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1496 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1498 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1499 * back in the server hello:
1500 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1501 * we send back the old session ID.
1502 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1503 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1504 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1505 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1507 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1508 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1509 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1510 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1513 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1515 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1517 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1518 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1527 /* put the cipher */
1528 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1531 /* put the compression method */
1532 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1535 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1538 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1541 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1546 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1548 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1556 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1559 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1560 return ssl_do_write(s);
1563 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1566 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1568 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1569 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1572 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1573 return ssl_do_write(s);
1576 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1582 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1589 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1590 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1593 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1596 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1597 unsigned char *p,*d;
1607 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1608 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1610 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1615 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1618 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1621 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1623 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1624 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1625 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1628 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1637 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1643 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1648 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1651 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1652 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1653 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1654 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1657 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1662 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1668 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1675 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1676 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1677 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1679 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1688 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1689 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1690 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1691 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1704 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1706 const EC_GROUP *group;
1708 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1709 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1711 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1712 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1713 if (nid != NID_undef)
1714 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1716 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1718 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1719 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1720 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1724 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1729 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1735 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1741 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1743 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1749 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1750 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1751 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1752 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1754 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1761 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1762 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1763 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1769 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1770 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1776 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1777 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1778 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1781 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1788 /* Encode the public key.
1789 * First check the size of encoding and
1790 * allocate memory accordingly.
1792 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1793 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1794 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1797 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1798 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1799 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1800 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1807 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1808 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1809 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1810 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1812 if (encodedlen == 0)
1814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1818 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1820 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1821 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1822 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1823 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1828 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1829 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1837 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1839 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1841 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1842 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1845 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1847 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1849 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1850 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1851 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1852 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1865 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1869 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1871 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1873 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1880 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1881 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1883 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1886 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1889 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1897 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1902 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1904 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1907 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1920 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1922 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1923 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1924 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1925 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1926 * the actual encoded point itself
1928 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1936 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1937 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1939 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1940 encodedPoint = NULL;
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1946 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1948 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1949 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1950 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1951 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1958 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1959 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1961 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1965 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1967 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1968 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1969 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1970 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1971 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1972 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1973 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1974 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1975 (unsigned int *)&i);
1979 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1980 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1992 /* send signature algorithm */
1993 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1995 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1997 /* Should never happen */
1998 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2005 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2008 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2009 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2010 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2011 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2012 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2013 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2020 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2025 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2026 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2032 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2035 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2036 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2037 return ssl_do_write(s);
2039 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2042 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2043 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2045 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2049 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2051 unsigned char *p,*d;
2053 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2057 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2061 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2063 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2065 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2070 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2072 const unsigned char *psigs;
2073 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2075 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2084 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2088 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2090 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2091 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2092 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2097 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2098 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2101 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2108 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2109 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2115 /* else no CA names */
2116 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2119 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2121 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2122 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2124 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2129 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2131 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2139 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2142 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2143 return ssl_do_write(s);
2148 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2152 unsigned long alg_k;
2154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2156 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2160 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2167 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2168 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2169 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2170 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2173 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2174 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2175 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2176 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2180 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2181 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2183 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2186 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2188 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2190 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2192 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2193 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2195 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2196 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2197 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2198 * be sent already */
2201 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2209 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2210 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2211 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2212 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2214 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2221 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2222 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2227 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2239 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2240 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2241 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2242 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2243 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2244 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2246 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2247 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2248 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2250 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2253 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2254 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2255 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2257 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2258 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2259 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2260 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2261 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2262 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2263 * decryption error. */
2264 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2265 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2267 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2268 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2269 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2270 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2271 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2272 * support the requested protocol version. If
2273 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2274 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2276 unsigned char workaround_good;
2277 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2278 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2279 version_good |= workaround_good;
2282 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2283 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2284 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2286 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2287 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2288 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2290 p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
2291 rand_premaster_secret[i]);
2294 s->session->master_key_length=
2295 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2296 s->session->master_key,
2298 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2303 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2306 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2313 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2324 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2325 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2326 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2327 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2330 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2331 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2332 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2333 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2335 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2339 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2341 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2343 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2348 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2352 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2353 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2356 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2357 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2359 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2361 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2365 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2366 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2369 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2376 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2385 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2392 s->session->master_key_length=
2393 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2394 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2395 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2402 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2404 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2405 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2406 krb5_data authenticator;
2408 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2409 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2410 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2411 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2412 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2413 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2415 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2416 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2418 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2420 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2423 enc_ticket.length = i;
2425 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2428 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2432 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2433 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2436 authenticator.length = i;
2438 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2441 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2445 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2446 p+=authenticator.length;
2450 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2453 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2456 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2459 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2463 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2464 enc_pms.length + 6))
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2467 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2471 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2475 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2476 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2478 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2479 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2485 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2486 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2488 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2489 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2492 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2493 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2495 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2496 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2502 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2509 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2510 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2512 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2516 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2518 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2521 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2524 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2525 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2528 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2531 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2534 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2537 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2540 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2544 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2547 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2550 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2552 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2553 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2554 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2555 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2556 * the protocol version.
2557 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2558 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2560 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2563 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2568 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2570 s->session->master_key_length=
2571 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2572 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2574 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2576 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2577 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2579 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2580 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2585 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2586 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2587 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2588 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2592 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2595 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2600 const EC_GROUP *group;
2601 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2603 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2604 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2607 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2611 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2612 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2614 /* use the certificate */
2615 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2619 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2620 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2622 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2625 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2626 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2628 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2629 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2636 /* Let's get client's public key */
2637 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2640 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2646 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2648 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2650 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2654 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2656 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2658 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2659 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2660 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2661 * never executed. When that support is
2662 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2663 * received in the certificate is
2664 * authorized for key agreement.
2665 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2666 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2669 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2671 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2675 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2676 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2682 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2686 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2687 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2689 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2692 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2696 /* Get encoded point length */
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2705 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2706 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2712 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2713 * currently, so set it to the start
2715 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2718 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2719 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2720 if (field_size <= 0)
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2726 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2734 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2735 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2736 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2737 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2738 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2739 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2741 /* Compute the master secret */
2742 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2743 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2745 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2751 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2753 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2754 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2755 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2757 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2759 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2765 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2768 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2771 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2774 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2777 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2781 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2782 * string for the callback */
2783 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2784 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2785 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2786 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2787 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2789 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2795 else if (psk_len == 0)
2797 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2799 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2800 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2804 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2805 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2807 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2809 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2813 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2814 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2815 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2816 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2819 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2823 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2824 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2825 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2826 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2827 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2830 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2834 s->session->master_key_length=
2835 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2836 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2839 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2846 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2854 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2858 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2863 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2864 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2866 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2870 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2871 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2872 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2873 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2876 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2880 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2889 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2890 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2893 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2894 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2895 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2896 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2897 unsigned long alg_a;
2901 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2902 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2903 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2904 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2905 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2906 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2908 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2909 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2910 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2911 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2912 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2913 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2914 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2915 if (client_pub_pkey)
2917 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2920 /* Decrypt session key */
2921 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2922 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2923 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2930 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2936 /* Generate master secret */
2937 s->session->master_key_length=
2938 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2939 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2940 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2941 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2946 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2947 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2955 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2957 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2963 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2964 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2968 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2969 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2970 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2971 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2972 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2977 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2979 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2985 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2987 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2989 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2990 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2991 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2993 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
2996 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2998 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3000 peer=s->session->peer;
3001 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3002 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3010 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3012 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3013 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3015 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3026 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3030 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3033 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3037 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3040 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3044 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3045 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3046 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3047 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3048 * signature without length field */
3049 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3050 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3056 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3058 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3061 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3066 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3070 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3080 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3084 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3085 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3088 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3092 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3096 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3100 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3104 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3107 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3108 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3111 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3115 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3117 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3124 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3126 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3127 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3131 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3137 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3145 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3147 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3148 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3149 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3153 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3161 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3163 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3164 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3165 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3169 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3171 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3177 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3178 { unsigned char signature[64];
3180 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3181 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3183 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3185 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3186 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3188 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3189 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3192 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3194 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3201 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3210 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3213 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3215 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3216 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3217 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3219 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3220 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3224 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3226 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3228 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3229 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3231 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3233 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3240 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3242 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3244 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3245 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3248 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3251 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3252 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3255 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3258 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3262 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3264 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3268 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3270 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3279 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3283 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3286 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3288 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3294 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3302 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3306 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3315 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3317 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3318 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3320 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3324 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3325 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3326 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3329 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3332 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3333 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3335 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3341 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3344 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3350 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3351 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3352 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3353 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3355 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3356 * when we arrive here. */
3357 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3359 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3360 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3366 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3367 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3368 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3369 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3370 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3378 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3381 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3382 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3386 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3390 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3392 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3395 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3396 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3397 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3404 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3408 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3409 return ssl_do_write(s);
3412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3413 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3414 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3416 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3418 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3419 const unsigned char *const_p;
3420 int len, slen_full, slen;
3425 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3426 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3427 unsigned char key_name[16];
3429 /* get session encoding length */
3430 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3431 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3434 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3436 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3440 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3442 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3444 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3450 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3452 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3453 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3459 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3460 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3462 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3463 * follows handshake_header_length +
3464 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3465 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3466 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3467 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3469 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3470 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3471 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3473 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3474 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3475 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3476 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3477 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3480 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3482 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3491 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3492 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3493 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3494 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3495 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3496 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3499 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3500 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3501 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3502 * as their sessions. */
3503 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3505 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3507 /* Output key name */
3509 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3512 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3513 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3514 /* Encrypt session data */
3515 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3517 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3519 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3521 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3522 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3523 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3526 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3528 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3529 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3530 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3531 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3533 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3537 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3538 return ssl_do_write(s);
3541 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3543 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3546 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3547 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3548 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3551 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3554 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3557 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3558 /* message length */
3559 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3561 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3562 /* length of OCSP response */
3563 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3564 /* actual response */
3565 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3566 /* number of bytes to write */
3567 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3568 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3572 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3573 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3576 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3577 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3578 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3579 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3582 int proto_len, padding_len;
3584 const unsigned char *p;
3586 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3587 * extension in their ClientHello */
3588 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3594 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3595 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3596 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3598 514, /* See the payload format below */
3604 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3605 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3606 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3607 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3614 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3616 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3618 /* The payload looks like:
3620 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3621 * uint8 padding_len;
3622 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3625 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3627 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3628 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3631 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3632 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3637 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3638 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;