1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
155 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
156 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
157 #include <openssl/rand.h>
158 #include <openssl/objects.h>
159 #include <openssl/evp.h>
160 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
161 #include <openssl/x509.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
163 # include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #include <openssl/bn.h>
166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
167 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return (SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
187 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
189 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
191 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
193 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
194 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
195 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
197 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
201 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
203 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
210 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
213 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
214 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
216 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
218 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
222 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
223 cb = s->info_callback;
224 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
227 /* init things to blank */
229 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
232 if (s->cert == NULL) {
233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
238 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
239 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
242 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
243 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
252 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
254 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
258 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
259 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
263 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
265 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
270 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
275 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
278 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
282 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
290 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
296 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
313 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
314 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
315 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
316 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
318 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
320 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
321 * support secure renegotiation.
323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
324 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
325 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
330 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
333 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
334 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
338 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
339 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
342 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
345 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
346 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
349 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
352 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
353 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
356 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
357 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
360 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
364 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
365 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
368 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
370 * callback indicates firther work to be done
372 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
375 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
376 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
378 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
379 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
381 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
383 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
391 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
396 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
397 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
402 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
403 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
405 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
417 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
418 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
419 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
422 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
424 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
425 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
429 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
430 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
432 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
441 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
446 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
447 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
448 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
451 * clear this, it may get reset by
452 * send_server_key_exchange
454 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
457 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
458 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
459 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
460 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
461 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
466 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
470 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
473 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
474 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
476 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
477 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
478 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
479 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
480 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
481 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
482 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
483 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
488 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
494 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
498 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
499 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
500 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
501 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
503 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
504 * during re-negotiation:
506 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
507 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
509 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
510 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
513 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
515 * ... except when the application insists on
516 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
519 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
521 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
523 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
524 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
525 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
527 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
530 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
531 /* no cert request */
533 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
534 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
535 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
536 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
539 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
540 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
543 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
549 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
550 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
553 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
554 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
558 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
561 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
562 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
563 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
564 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
565 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
569 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
570 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
574 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
576 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
580 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
581 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
582 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
587 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
592 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
597 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
598 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
599 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
600 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
602 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
603 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
605 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
606 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
608 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
611 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
612 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
614 if (!s->session->peer)
616 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
621 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
622 * extms we've done this already.
624 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
625 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
626 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
633 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
637 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
638 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
639 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
642 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
643 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
645 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
646 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
649 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
658 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
668 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
669 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
671 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
672 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
673 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
674 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
676 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
677 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
678 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
679 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
683 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
684 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
686 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
687 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
689 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
694 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
696 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
698 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
699 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
700 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
701 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
702 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
703 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
704 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
705 * the client's Finished message is read.
707 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
708 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
710 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
714 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
718 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
719 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
721 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
722 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
723 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
724 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
725 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
726 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
727 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
728 * the client's Finished message is read.
730 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
731 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
732 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
733 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
737 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
739 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
740 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
743 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
749 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
750 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
753 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
759 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
762 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
768 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
769 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
771 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
772 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
777 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
779 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
783 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
786 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
787 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
795 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
796 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
797 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
798 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
799 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
801 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
803 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
806 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
808 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
809 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
811 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
812 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
814 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
817 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
822 /* clean a few things up */
823 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
825 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
828 /* remove buffering on output */
829 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
833 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
838 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
840 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
842 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
845 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
859 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
861 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
865 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
866 new_state = s->state;
868 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
869 s->state = new_state;
875 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
879 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
883 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
886 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
887 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
888 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
891 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
892 return ssl_do_write(s);
895 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
897 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
898 unsigned int cookie_len;
901 unsigned char *p, *d;
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
905 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
907 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
909 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
913 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
914 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
915 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
916 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
918 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
919 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
922 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
923 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
924 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
925 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
926 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
931 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
934 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
935 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
937 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
940 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
941 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
942 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
944 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
945 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
947 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
950 s->version = s->client_version;
952 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
957 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
958 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
961 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
962 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
964 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
965 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
967 if (cookie_length == 0)
971 /* load the client random */
972 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
973 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
975 /* get the session-id */
980 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
981 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
982 * ignore resumption requests with flag
983 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
984 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
985 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
986 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
987 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
988 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
989 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
992 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
993 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
996 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
998 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1000 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1001 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1002 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1003 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1004 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1006 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1013 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1020 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1022 cookie_len = *(p++);
1025 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1026 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1027 * does not cause an overflow.
1029 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1031 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1036 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1037 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1038 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1040 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1041 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1043 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1045 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1048 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1050 /* default verification */
1051 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1052 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1053 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1057 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1062 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1063 /* Select version to use */
1064 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1065 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1066 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1067 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1068 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1070 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1071 s->version = s->client_version;
1072 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1074 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1075 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1076 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1077 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1080 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1081 s->version = s->client_version;
1082 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1085 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1090 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
1091 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1092 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1096 if ((p + i) >= (d + n)) {
1097 /* not enough data */
1098 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1102 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers))
1108 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1109 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) {
1111 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1114 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1115 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1117 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1118 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1120 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1121 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1129 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1133 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1134 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1136 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1137 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1138 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1139 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1140 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1142 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1143 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1144 s->session->cipher = c;
1151 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1154 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1156 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1163 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1164 /* not enough data */
1165 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1172 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1180 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1185 /* TLS extensions */
1186 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1187 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1194 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1195 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1196 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1197 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1201 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1202 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1207 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1208 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1210 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1211 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1212 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1214 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1216 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1217 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1221 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1223 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1228 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1229 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1234 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1237 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1239 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1240 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1242 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1243 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1249 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1250 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1251 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1253 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1255 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1256 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1257 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1258 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1259 /* Can't disable compression */
1260 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1262 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1265 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1266 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1267 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1268 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1269 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1273 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1275 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1278 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1279 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1280 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1284 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1286 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1291 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1292 /* See if we have a match */
1293 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1295 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1296 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1297 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1299 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1309 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1315 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1316 * using compression.
1318 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1325 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1329 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1330 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1332 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1334 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1335 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1336 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1337 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1338 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1343 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1347 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1349 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1350 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1352 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1357 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1360 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1362 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1365 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1369 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1370 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1371 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1372 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1373 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1375 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1376 /* do not send a session ticket */
1377 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1379 /* Session-id reuse */
1380 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1383 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1384 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1389 * we now have the following setup.
1391 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1392 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1393 * compression - basically ignored right now
1394 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1395 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1396 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1397 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1400 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1401 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1402 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1412 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1415 if (ciphers != NULL)
1416 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1417 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1420 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1423 unsigned char *p, *d;
1428 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1429 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1430 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1431 p = s->s3->server_random;
1432 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1435 /* Do the message type and length last */
1436 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1438 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1439 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1442 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1443 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1446 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1447 * back in the server hello:
1448 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1449 * we send back the old session ID.
1450 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1451 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1452 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1453 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1455 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1456 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1457 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1458 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1461 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1462 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1464 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1466 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1467 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1472 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1475 /* put the cipher */
1476 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1479 /* put the compression method */
1480 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1483 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1486 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1489 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1494 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1496 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1503 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1504 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1507 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1508 return ssl_do_write(s);
1511 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1514 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1515 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1516 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1519 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1520 return ssl_do_write(s);
1523 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1529 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1533 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1536 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1537 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1540 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1543 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1544 unsigned char *p, *d;
1554 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1555 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1556 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1561 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1564 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1565 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1566 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1567 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1568 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1570 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1573 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1575 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1579 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1582 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1584 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1589 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1593 if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
1594 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1595 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1597 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1599 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1604 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1605 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1606 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1608 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1611 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1613 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1616 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1617 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
1618 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1620 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1623 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1625 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1629 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1631 else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1637 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1638 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1639 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1640 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1645 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1646 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1647 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1658 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1659 const EC_GROUP *group;
1661 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1662 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1663 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1664 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1665 if (nid != NID_undef)
1666 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1667 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1668 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1669 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1671 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1672 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1674 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1675 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1677 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1681 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1683 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1687 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1688 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1692 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1694 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1699 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1700 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1701 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1702 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1703 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1710 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1711 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1712 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1717 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1718 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1720 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1725 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1726 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1730 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1733 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1738 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1739 * allocate memory accordingly.
1741 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1742 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1743 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1746 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1747 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1748 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1749 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1751 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1755 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1756 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1757 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1758 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1760 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1765 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1769 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1770 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1771 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1777 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1778 * can set these to NULLs
1785 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1787 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1789 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1791 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1793 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1795 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1796 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1797 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1798 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1800 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1803 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1804 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1805 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1806 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1810 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1812 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1815 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1816 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1818 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1825 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1826 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1827 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1829 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1832 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1838 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1842 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1844 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1846 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1857 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1859 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1860 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1861 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1862 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1864 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1872 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1873 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1874 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1875 encodedPoint = NULL;
1880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1881 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1882 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1883 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1884 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1885 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1886 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1893 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1894 * points to the space at the end.
1896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1897 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1900 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1901 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1902 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1903 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1904 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1905 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1907 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1909 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1910 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1914 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1915 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1924 /* send signature algorithm */
1925 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1926 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1927 /* Should never happen */
1928 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1930 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1936 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1938 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1939 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1941 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1943 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1944 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1945 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
1946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1951 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1954 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1955 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1957 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1962 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
1965 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1966 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1967 return ssl_do_write(s);
1969 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1971 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1972 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
1973 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1974 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1976 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1980 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1982 unsigned char *p, *d;
1983 int i, j, nl, off, n;
1984 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1988 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
1991 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1993 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1995 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2000 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2001 const unsigned char *psigs;
2002 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2003 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2004 /* Skip over length for now */
2006 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2007 /* Now fill in length */
2017 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2020 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2021 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2022 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2023 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2024 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2029 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2031 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2036 /* else no CA names */
2037 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2040 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2042 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2045 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2046 return ssl_do_write(s);
2051 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2055 unsigned long alg_k;
2057 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2059 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2063 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2065 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2067 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2070 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2071 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2072 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2073 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2076 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2077 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2078 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2079 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2083 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2085 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2088 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2089 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2091 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2094 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2095 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2096 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2097 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2099 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2102 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2104 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2109 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2110 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2111 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2112 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2114 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2117 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2120 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2121 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2124 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2125 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2127 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2136 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2137 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2138 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2139 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2140 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2142 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2143 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2145 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2150 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2151 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2152 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2153 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2154 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2158 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2160 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2161 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2164 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2168 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2169 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2172 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2175 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2176 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2177 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2178 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2179 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2180 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2183 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2185 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2188 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2189 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2190 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2191 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2192 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2193 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2196 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2197 unsigned char workaround_good;
2199 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2201 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2202 version_good |= workaround_good;
2206 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2207 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2209 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2212 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2213 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2214 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2215 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2217 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2218 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2219 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2222 s->session->master_key_length =
2223 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2225 session->master_key,
2228 (rand_premaster_secret));
2229 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2233 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2235 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2239 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2240 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2242 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2247 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2248 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2250 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2257 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2258 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2259 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2260 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2262 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2263 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2264 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2265 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2267 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2270 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2271 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2272 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2274 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2277 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2280 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2281 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2283 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2284 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2286 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2287 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2289 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2292 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2293 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2295 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2301 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2309 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2310 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2316 s->session->master_key_length =
2317 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2319 session->master_key,
2321 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2327 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2328 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2329 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2330 krb5_data authenticator;
2332 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2333 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2334 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2335 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2336 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2338 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2339 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2341 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2344 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2347 enc_ticket.length = i;
2349 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2351 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2355 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2356 p += enc_ticket.length;
2359 authenticator.length = i;
2361 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2363 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2367 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2368 p += authenticator.length;
2372 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2373 p += enc_pms.length;
2376 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2378 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2380 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2384 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2385 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2387 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2391 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2394 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2395 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2397 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2398 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2404 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2405 * return authtime == 0.
2407 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2408 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2410 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2411 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2413 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2414 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2419 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2424 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2425 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2427 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2431 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2433 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2435 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2438 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2439 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2442 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2445 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2447 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2450 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2452 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2456 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2458 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2461 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2462 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2464 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2465 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2466 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2467 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2468 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2469 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2470 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2473 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2475 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2480 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2482 s->session->master_key_length =
2483 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2485 session->master_key,
2488 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2489 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2490 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2491 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2492 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2497 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2498 * but it caused problems for apache.
2499 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2500 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2503 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2506 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2510 const EC_GROUP *group;
2511 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2513 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2514 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2519 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2520 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2521 /* use the certificate */
2522 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2525 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2526 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2528 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2531 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2532 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2534 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2535 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2540 /* Let's get client's public key */
2541 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2547 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2549 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
2550 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2552 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2555 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2556 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2558 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2559 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2560 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2561 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2562 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2563 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2565 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2567 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2571 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2572 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2577 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2580 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2581 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2583 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2585 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2589 /* Get encoded point length */
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2596 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2601 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2604 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2607 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2608 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2609 if (field_size <= 0) {
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2613 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2620 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2621 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2622 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2623 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2624 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2625 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2627 /* Compute the master secret */
2628 s->session->master_key_length =
2629 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2631 session->master_key,
2634 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2639 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2640 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2641 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2642 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2644 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2646 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2653 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2655 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2658 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2660 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2665 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2667 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2668 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2669 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2671 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2672 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2674 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2677 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2679 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2682 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2683 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2687 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2688 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2690 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2692 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2696 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2697 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2698 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2699 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2704 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2705 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2706 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2707 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2708 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2713 s->session->master_key_length =
2714 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2716 session->master_key,
2721 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2727 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2732 if (param_len > n) {
2733 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2735 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2738 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2742 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2743 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2744 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2746 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2749 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2750 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2751 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2752 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2757 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2758 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2759 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2766 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2767 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2769 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2770 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2771 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2772 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2773 unsigned long alg_a;
2777 /* Get our certificate private key */
2778 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2779 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2780 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2781 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2782 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2784 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2785 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2787 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2788 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2789 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2790 * client certificate for authorization only.
2792 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2793 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2794 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2797 /* Decrypt session key */
2799 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2800 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2801 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2803 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2808 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2809 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2811 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2814 /* Generate master secret */
2815 s->session->master_key_length =
2816 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2818 session->master_key,
2819 premaster_secret, 32);
2820 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2821 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2822 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2827 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2828 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2834 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2841 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2842 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2846 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2847 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2848 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2849 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2850 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2855 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2857 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2859 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2863 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2865 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2867 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2868 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2869 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2870 -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2875 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2876 peer = s->session->peer;
2877 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2878 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2884 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2885 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2887 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2897 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2901 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2903 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2904 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2908 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
2909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2910 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2914 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2915 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2916 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2918 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2921 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2922 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
2925 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2926 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
2928 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2930 } else if (rv == 0) {
2931 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2935 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2944 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2948 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2949 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2951 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2955 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2958 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2959 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2961 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2965 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
2968 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
2969 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2971 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2975 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
2976 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2982 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
2983 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2984 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2987 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2992 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2999 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3000 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3001 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3002 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3005 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3012 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3013 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3014 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3015 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3018 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3024 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3025 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3026 unsigned char signature[64];
3028 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3029 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3031 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3033 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3034 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3036 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3038 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3040 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3046 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3053 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3056 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3057 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3058 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3059 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3061 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3062 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3066 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3068 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3070 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3071 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3073 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3075 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3078 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3083 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3084 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3085 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3087 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3088 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3092 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3094 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3096 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3097 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3100 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3104 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3105 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3109 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3111 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3117 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3118 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3122 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3124 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3125 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3127 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3132 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3138 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3140 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3143 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3151 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3152 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3153 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3154 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3156 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3159 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3160 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3161 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3163 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3164 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3167 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3168 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3169 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3174 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3176 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3178 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3183 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3186 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3188 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3190 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3193 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3196 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3197 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3198 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3199 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3202 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3205 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3206 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3207 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3212 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3213 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3214 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3216 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3217 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3225 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3231 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3235 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3239 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3240 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3242 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3243 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3244 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3246 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3251 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3255 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3258 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3259 return ssl_do_write(s);
3262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3263 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3264 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3266 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3270 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3271 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3272 const unsigned char *const_p;
3273 int len, slen_full, slen;
3276 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3277 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3278 unsigned char key_name[16];
3280 /* get session encoding length */
3281 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3283 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3286 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00)
3288 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3292 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3293 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3296 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3300 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3303 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3306 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3308 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3309 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3310 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3314 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3315 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3318 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3321 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3322 * follows handshake_header_length +
3323 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3324 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3325 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3326 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3328 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3329 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3330 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3333 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3335 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3336 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3338 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3339 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3343 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3345 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3346 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3348 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3349 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3351 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3355 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3356 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3357 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3359 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3361 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3363 /* Output key name */
3365 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3368 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3369 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3370 /* Encrypt session data */
3371 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3374 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3378 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3380 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3383 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3384 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3387 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3389 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3390 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3391 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3392 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3394 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3398 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3399 return ssl_do_write(s);
3403 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3404 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3408 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3410 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3413 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3414 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3415 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3418 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3421 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3424 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3425 /* message length */
3426 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3428 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3429 /* length of OCSP response */
3430 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3431 /* actual response */
3432 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3433 /* number of bytes to write */
3434 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3439 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3440 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3443 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3445 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3446 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3448 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3451 int proto_len, padding_len;
3453 const unsigned char *p;
3456 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3457 * extension in their ClientHello
3459 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3461 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3465 /* See the payload format below */
3466 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3467 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3468 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3469 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3475 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3476 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3477 * ssl3_get_finished).
3479 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3485 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3487 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3490 * The payload looks like:
3492 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3493 * uint8 padding_len;
3494 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3497 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3499 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3500 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3503 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3504 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3508 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3509 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;