1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
356 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
357 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
359 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
416 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s, &skip);
417 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
425 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
426 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
427 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
428 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
429 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
430 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
432 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
433 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
435 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
436 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
438 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
443 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
455 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
456 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
457 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
459 /* clear this, it may get reset by
460 * send_server_key_exchange */
461 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
463 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
464 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
466 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
467 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
468 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
469 * be able to handle this) */
470 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
472 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
475 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
476 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
478 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
480 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
481 * message only if the cipher suite is either
482 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
483 * server certificate contains the server's
484 * public key for key exchange.
486 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
487 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
488 * hint if provided */
489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
490 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
493 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
494 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
496 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
497 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
498 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
499 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
500 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
501 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
507 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
508 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
513 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
517 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
518 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
519 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
520 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
521 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
522 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
523 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
524 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
525 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
526 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
527 * and in RFC 2246): */
528 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
529 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
530 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
531 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
532 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
533 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
534 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
535 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
536 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
538 /* no cert request */
540 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
541 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
542 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
543 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
548 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
549 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
550 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
551 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
552 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
554 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
555 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
562 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
563 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
564 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
565 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
566 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
572 /* This code originally checked to see if
573 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
574 * and then flushed. This caused problems
575 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
576 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
577 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
578 * still exist. So instead we just flush
582 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
583 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
588 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
590 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
594 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
595 ret=tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(s);
596 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
597 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
598 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
603 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
604 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
605 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
609 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
612 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
615 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
617 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
618 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
625 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
626 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
627 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
632 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
633 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
634 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
635 * message is not sent.
636 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
637 * the client uses its key from the certificate
640 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
641 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
643 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
644 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
646 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
650 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
652 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
654 if (!s->session->peer)
656 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
657 * at this point and digest cached records.
659 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
664 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
665 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
673 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
676 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
677 * a client cert, it can be verified
678 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
679 * should be generalized. But it is next step
681 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
682 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
684 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
685 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
689 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
690 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
704 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
705 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
706 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
707 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
709 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
710 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
712 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
713 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
715 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
720 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
721 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
722 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
723 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
724 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
726 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
730 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
731 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
732 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
733 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
734 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
735 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
739 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
740 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
743 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
749 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
750 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
751 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
752 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
756 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
758 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
759 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
760 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
766 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
767 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
769 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
770 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
771 { ret= -1; goto end; }
773 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
774 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
776 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
777 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
780 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
781 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
789 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
790 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
791 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
792 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
793 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
794 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
795 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
796 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
799 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
800 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
802 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
804 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
805 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
808 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
812 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
817 /* clean a few things up */
818 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
820 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
823 /* remove buffering on output */
824 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
828 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
833 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
835 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
837 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
839 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
853 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
857 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
862 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
866 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
873 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
877 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
881 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
884 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
886 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
887 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
890 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
891 return ssl_do_write(s);
894 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
899 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
900 * so permit appropriate message length */
901 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
907 if (!ok) return((int)n);
908 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
910 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA)
913 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
915 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
917 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
922 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
923 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
925 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
927 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
928 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
932 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
934 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
935 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
938 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
944 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
946 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
947 unsigned int cookie_len;
952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
956 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
958 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
961 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
962 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
963 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
964 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
967 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
970 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
973 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
974 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
975 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
976 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
977 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
980 if (!ok) return((int)n);
982 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
984 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
985 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
986 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
989 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
990 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
991 : (s->client_version < s->version))
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
994 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
995 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
997 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
998 s->version = s->client_version;
1000 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1004 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
1005 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1006 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1008 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1010 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1012 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1013 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1015 if (cookie_length == 0)
1019 /* load the client random */
1020 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1021 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1023 /* get the session-id */
1027 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1028 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1029 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1030 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1031 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1033 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1034 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1035 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1036 * setting will be ignored.
1038 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1040 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1045 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1047 { /* previous session */
1054 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1064 cookie_len = *(p++);
1067 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1068 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1069 * does not cause an overflow.
1071 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1074 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1079 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1080 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1083 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1085 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1087 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1090 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1092 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1095 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1097 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1098 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1100 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1102 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1105 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1110 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1112 /* Select version to use */
1113 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1114 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1116 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1117 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1119 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1122 s->version = s->client_version;
1123 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1126 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1127 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1129 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1130 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1135 s->version = s->client_version;
1136 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1139 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1144 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1146 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1147 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1153 /* not enough data */
1154 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1158 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1165 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1166 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1169 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1172 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1174 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1176 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1178 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1179 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1187 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1188 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1191 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1193 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1194 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1195 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1196 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1197 * enabled, though. */
1198 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1199 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1201 s->session->cipher = c;
1208 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1209 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1210 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1220 /* not enough data */
1221 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1230 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1237 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1244 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1246 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1253 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1254 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1255 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1256 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1259 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1260 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1266 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1268 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1270 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1271 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1272 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1275 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1276 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1280 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1281 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1282 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1284 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1289 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1292 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1294 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1295 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1297 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1298 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1303 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1304 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1305 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1306 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1308 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1309 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1311 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1312 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1313 /* Can't disable compression */
1314 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1319 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1320 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1322 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1323 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1325 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1329 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1334 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1335 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1337 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1342 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1349 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1350 { /* See if we have a match */
1351 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1353 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1354 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1356 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1369 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1374 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1375 * using compression.
1377 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1384 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1389 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1390 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1392 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1394 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1395 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1396 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1397 if (ciphers == NULL)
1399 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1404 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1406 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1408 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1411 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1417 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1420 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1422 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1423 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1427 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1431 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1435 /* Session-id reuse */
1436 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1437 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1438 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1439 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1441 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1443 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1444 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1446 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1447 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1449 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1453 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1454 else if (ec != NULL)
1455 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1457 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1461 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1464 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1466 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1470 /* we now have the following setup.
1472 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1473 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1474 * compression - basically ignored right now
1475 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1476 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1477 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1478 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1481 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1482 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1484 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1491 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1495 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1498 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1499 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1502 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1505 unsigned char *p,*d;
1510 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1512 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1513 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1514 p=s->s3->server_random;
1515 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1518 /* Do the message type and length last */
1519 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1521 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1522 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1525 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1526 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1528 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1529 * back in the server hello:
1530 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1531 * we send back the old session ID.
1532 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1533 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1534 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1535 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1537 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1538 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1539 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1540 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1543 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1545 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1547 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1548 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1554 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1557 /* put the cipher */
1558 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1561 /* put the compression method */
1562 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1565 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1568 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1571 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1576 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1578 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1585 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1586 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1589 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1590 return ssl_do_write(s);
1593 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1596 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1598 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1599 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1602 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1603 return ssl_do_write(s);
1606 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1612 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1619 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1620 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1623 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1626 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1627 unsigned char *p,*d;
1637 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1638 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1640 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1645 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1648 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1651 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1653 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1654 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1655 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1658 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1667 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1673 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1678 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1681 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1682 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1683 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1684 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1687 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1692 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1698 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1705 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1706 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1707 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1709 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1718 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1719 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1720 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1721 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1734 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1736 const EC_GROUP *group;
1738 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1739 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1741 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1742 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1743 if (nid != NID_undef)
1744 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1746 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1748 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1749 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1750 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1754 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1759 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1765 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1771 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1773 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1779 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1780 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1781 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1782 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1784 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1791 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1792 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1793 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1799 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1800 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1806 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1807 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1808 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1811 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1818 /* Encode the public key.
1819 * First check the size of encoding and
1820 * allocate memory accordingly.
1822 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1823 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1824 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1827 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1828 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1829 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1830 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1837 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1838 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1839 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1840 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1842 if (encodedlen == 0)
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1848 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1850 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1851 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1852 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1853 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1858 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1859 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1867 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1869 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1871 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1872 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1875 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1877 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1879 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1880 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1881 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1882 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1895 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1899 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1901 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1903 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1910 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1911 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1913 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1916 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1919 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1927 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1932 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1934 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1937 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1950 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1952 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1953 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1954 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1955 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1956 * the actual encoded point itself
1958 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1966 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1967 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1969 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1970 encodedPoint = NULL;
1975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1976 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1978 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1979 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1980 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1981 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1988 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1989 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1991 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1995 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1997 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1998 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1999 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
2000 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2001 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2002 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2003 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2004 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
2005 (unsigned int *)&i);
2009 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2010 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2022 /* send signature algorithm */
2023 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2025 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2027 /* Should never happen */
2028 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2035 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2038 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2039 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2040 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2041 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2042 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2043 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2050 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2055 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2056 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2062 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2065 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2066 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2067 return ssl_do_write(s);
2069 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2072 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2073 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2075 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2079 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2081 unsigned char *p,*d;
2083 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2087 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2091 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2093 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2095 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2100 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2102 const unsigned char *psigs;
2103 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2105 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2114 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2118 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2120 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2121 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2122 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2127 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2128 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2131 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2138 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2139 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2145 /* else no CA names */
2146 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2149 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2151 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2152 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2154 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2159 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2161 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2169 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2172 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2173 return ssl_do_write(s);
2178 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2182 unsigned long alg_k;
2184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2186 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2190 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2194 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2197 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2198 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2199 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2200 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2203 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2204 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2205 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2206 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2210 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2211 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2213 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2216 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2218 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2219 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2221 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2222 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2223 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2224 * be sent already */
2227 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2235 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2236 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2237 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2238 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2240 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2247 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2248 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2253 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2265 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2269 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2271 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2272 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2275 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2277 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2278 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2279 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2280 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2281 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2283 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2284 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2285 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2287 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2288 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2290 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2291 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2292 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2293 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2294 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2295 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2296 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2302 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2303 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2304 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2306 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2307 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2308 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2309 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2313 s->session->master_key_length=
2314 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2315 s->session->master_key,
2317 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2322 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2325 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2332 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2343 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2344 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2345 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2346 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2349 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2350 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2351 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2352 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2354 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2358 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2360 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2362 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2367 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2371 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2372 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2375 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2376 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2378 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2380 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2384 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2385 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2388 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2395 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2404 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2411 s->session->master_key_length=
2412 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2413 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2414 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2421 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2423 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2424 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2425 krb5_data authenticator;
2427 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2428 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2429 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2430 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2431 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2432 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2434 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2435 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2437 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2439 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2442 enc_ticket.length = i;
2444 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2447 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2451 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2452 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2455 authenticator.length = i;
2457 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2460 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2464 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2465 p+=authenticator.length;
2469 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2472 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2475 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2478 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2482 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2483 enc_pms.length + 6))
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2486 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2490 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2494 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2495 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2497 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2498 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2504 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2505 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2507 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2508 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2511 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2512 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2514 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2515 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2521 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2528 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2529 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2531 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2535 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2537 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2540 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2543 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2544 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2547 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2550 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2553 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2556 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2559 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2563 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2566 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2569 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2571 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2572 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2573 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2574 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2575 * the protocol version.
2576 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2577 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2579 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2582 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2587 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2589 s->session->master_key_length=
2590 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2591 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2593 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2595 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2596 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2598 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2599 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2604 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2605 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2606 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2607 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2611 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2614 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2619 const EC_GROUP *group;
2620 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2622 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2623 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2626 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2630 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2631 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2633 /* use the certificate */
2634 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2638 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2639 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2641 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2644 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2645 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2647 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2648 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2655 /* Let's get client's public key */
2656 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2659 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2665 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2667 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2669 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2673 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2675 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2677 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2678 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2679 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2680 * never executed. When that support is
2681 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2682 * received in the certificate is
2683 * authorized for key agreement.
2684 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2685 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2688 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2690 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2694 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2695 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2701 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2705 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2706 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2708 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2711 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2715 /* Get encoded point length */
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2724 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2725 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2731 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2732 * currently, so set it to the start
2734 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2737 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2738 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2739 if (field_size <= 0)
2741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2745 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2753 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2754 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2755 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2756 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2757 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2758 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2760 /* Compute the master secret */
2761 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2762 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2764 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2770 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2772 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2773 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2774 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2776 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2778 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2784 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2787 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2790 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2793 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2796 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2800 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2801 * string for the callback */
2802 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2803 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2804 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2805 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2806 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2808 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2811 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2814 else if (psk_len == 0)
2816 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2818 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2819 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2823 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2824 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2826 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2828 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2832 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2833 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2834 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2835 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2838 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2842 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2843 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2844 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2845 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2846 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2849 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2853 s->session->master_key_length=
2854 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2855 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2858 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2865 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2873 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2877 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2882 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2883 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2884 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2885 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2888 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2892 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2901 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2902 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2905 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2906 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2907 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2908 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2909 unsigned long alg_a;
2913 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2914 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2915 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2916 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2917 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2918 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2920 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2921 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2922 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2923 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2924 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2925 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2926 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2927 if (client_pub_pkey)
2929 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2932 /* Decrypt session key */
2933 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2934 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2935 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2942 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2948 /* Generate master secret */
2949 s->session->master_key_length=
2950 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2951 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2952 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2953 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2958 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2959 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2967 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2969 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2975 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2976 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2980 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2981 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2982 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2983 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2984 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2989 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2991 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2997 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2999 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3001 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3002 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3003 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3005 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
3008 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3010 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3012 peer=s->session->peer;
3013 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3014 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3022 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3024 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3025 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3027 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3038 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3042 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3045 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3049 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3052 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3056 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3057 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3058 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3059 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3060 * signature without length field */
3061 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3062 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3068 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3070 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3073 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3078 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3082 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3092 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3096 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3097 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3100 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3104 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3108 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3112 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3116 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3119 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3120 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3123 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3127 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3129 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3136 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3138 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3139 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3143 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3149 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3157 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3159 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3160 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3161 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3165 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3173 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3175 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3176 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3177 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3181 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3183 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3189 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3190 { unsigned char signature[64];
3192 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3193 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3195 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3197 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3198 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3200 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3201 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3204 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3206 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3213 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3222 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3225 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3227 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3228 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3229 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3231 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3232 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3236 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3238 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3240 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3241 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3243 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3245 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3252 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3254 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3256 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3257 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3260 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3263 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3264 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3267 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3270 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3274 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3276 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3280 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3282 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3291 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3295 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3298 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3300 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3306 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3314 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3318 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3327 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3329 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3330 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3332 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3336 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3337 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3338 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3341 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3344 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3345 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3347 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3353 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3356 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3362 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3363 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3364 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3365 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3367 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3368 * when we arrive here. */
3369 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3371 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3372 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3378 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3379 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3380 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3381 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3382 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3390 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3393 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3394 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3398 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3402 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3404 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3407 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3408 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3409 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3416 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3417 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3420 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3421 return ssl_do_write(s);
3424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3425 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3426 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3428 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3430 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3431 const unsigned char *const_p;
3432 int len, slen_full, slen;
3437 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3438 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3439 unsigned char key_name[16];
3441 /* get session encoding length */
3442 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3443 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3446 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3448 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3452 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3454 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3456 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3462 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3464 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3465 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3471 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3472 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3474 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3475 * follows handshake_header_length +
3476 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3477 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3478 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3479 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3481 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3482 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3483 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3485 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3486 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3487 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3488 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3489 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3492 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3494 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3503 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3504 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3505 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3506 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3507 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3508 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3511 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3512 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3513 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3514 * as their sessions. */
3515 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3517 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3519 /* Output key name */
3521 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3524 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3525 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3526 /* Encrypt session data */
3527 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3529 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3531 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3533 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3534 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3535 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3538 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3540 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3541 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3542 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3543 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3545 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3549 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3550 return ssl_do_write(s);
3553 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3555 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3558 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3559 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3560 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3563 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3566 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3569 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3570 /* message length */
3571 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3573 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3574 /* length of OCSP response */
3575 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3576 /* actual response */
3577 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3578 /* number of bytes to write */
3579 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3580 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3584 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3585 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3588 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3589 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3590 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3591 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3594 int proto_len, padding_len;
3596 const unsigned char *p;
3598 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3599 * extension in their ClientHello */
3600 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3606 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3607 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3608 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3610 514, /* See the payload format below */
3616 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3617 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3618 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3619 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3626 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3628 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3630 /* The payload looks like:
3632 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3633 * uint8 padding_len;
3634 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3637 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3639 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3640 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3643 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3644 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3649 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3650 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3656 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s, int *skip)
3659 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count)
3661 unsigned char *p = NULL;
3662 unsigned char *size_loc = NULL;
3663 srv_supp_data_record *record = NULL;
3667 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3669 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
3670 unsigned short outlen = 0;
3672 record = &s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i];
3674 /* NULL callback or -1 omits supp data entry */
3677 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->supp_data_type,
3678 &out, &outlen, &al, record->arg);
3679 if (cb_retval == -1)
3680 continue; /* skip this supp data entry */
3683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3686 if (outlen == 0 || TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data < outlen + 4 + length)
3688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3691 /* write supp data entry...
3692 * if first entry, write handshake message type
3693 * jump back to write length at end */
3696 /* 1 byte message type + 3 bytes for
3698 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, 4))
3700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3703 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3704 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3705 /* hold on to length field to update later */
3707 /* skip over handshake length field (3
3708 * bytes) and supp_data length field
3713 /* 2 byte supp data type + 2 byte length + outlen */
3714 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, outlen + 4))
3716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3719 s2n(record->supp_data_type, p);
3721 memcpy(p, out, outlen);
3722 /* update length to supp data type (2 bytes) +
3723 * supp data length (2 bytes) + supp data */
3724 length += (outlen + 4);
3729 /* write handshake length */
3730 l2n3(length - 4, size_loc);
3731 /* supp_data length */
3732 l2n3(length - 7, size_loc);
3733 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3734 s->init_num = length;
3737 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3741 /* no supp data message sent */
3747 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3751 int tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3757 const unsigned char *p, *d;
3758 unsigned short supp_data_entry_type = 0;
3759 unsigned short supp_data_entry_len = 0;
3760 unsigned long supp_data_len = 0;
3763 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3764 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A,
3765 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B,
3766 SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,
3767 /* use default limit */
3768 TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data,
3771 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3773 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3776 /* The message cannot be empty */
3779 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3783 n2l3(p, supp_data_len);
3784 while (p<d+supp_data_len)
3786 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_type);
3787 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_len);
3788 /* if there is a callback for this supp data type, send it */
3789 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3791 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].supp_data_type == supp_data_entry_type && s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2)
3793 cb_retval = s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2(s, supp_data_entry_type, p, supp_data_entry_len, &al, s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].arg);
3796 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3801 p+=supp_data_entry_len;
3805 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);