1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */
196 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
200 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
207 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl_undefined_function,
210 ssl3_get_server_method)
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int new_state,state,skip=0;
220 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
241 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
242 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
246 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
257 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
259 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
263 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
264 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
267 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
269 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
274 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
276 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
278 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
283 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
291 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
301 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
302 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
304 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
306 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
307 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
308 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
310 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
311 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
313 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
314 * client that doesn't support secure
317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
318 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
324 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
325 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
326 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
327 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
331 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
332 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
335 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
336 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
337 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
338 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
341 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
344 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
348 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
349 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
350 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
353 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
355 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
356 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
361 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
363 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
364 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
367 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
369 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
370 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
371 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
372 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
374 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
381 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
385 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
386 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
387 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
388 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
392 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
393 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
395 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
399 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
406 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
407 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
408 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
409 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
410 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
411 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
412 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
414 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
415 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
417 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
418 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
420 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
425 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
432 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
437 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
438 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
439 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
441 /* clear this, it may get reset by
442 * send_server_key_exchange */
443 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
445 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
446 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
448 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
449 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
450 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
451 * be able to handle this) */
452 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
454 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
457 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
458 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
460 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
462 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
463 * message only if the cipher suite is either
464 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
465 * server certificate contains the server's
466 * public key for key exchange.
468 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
469 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
470 * hint if provided */
471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
472 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
475 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
476 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
478 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
479 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
480 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
481 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
482 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
483 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
489 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
490 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
495 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
499 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
500 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
501 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
502 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
503 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
504 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
505 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
506 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
507 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
508 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
509 * and in RFC 2246): */
510 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
511 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
512 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
513 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
514 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
515 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
516 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
517 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
518 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
520 /* no cert request */
522 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
523 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
524 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
525 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
530 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
531 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
532 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
533 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
536 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
537 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
543 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
544 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
545 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
546 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
547 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
548 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
552 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
554 /* This code originally checked to see if
555 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
556 * and then flushed. This caused problems
557 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
558 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
559 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
560 * still exist. So instead we just flush
564 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
565 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
570 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
572 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
575 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
576 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
577 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
578 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
582 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
584 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
586 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
587 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
590 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
594 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
595 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
596 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
601 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
602 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
603 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
604 * message is not sent.
605 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
606 * the client uses its key from the certificate
609 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
610 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
612 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
613 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
619 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
623 if (!s->session->peer)
625 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
626 * at this point and digest cached records.
628 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
633 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
634 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
642 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
645 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
646 * a client cert, it can be verified
647 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
648 * should be generalized. But it is next step
650 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
651 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
653 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
654 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
658 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
659 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
670 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
671 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
673 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
674 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
675 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
677 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
678 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
680 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
681 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
683 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
688 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
689 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
690 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
691 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
692 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
694 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
698 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
699 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
700 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
701 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
702 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
706 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
707 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
710 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
715 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
716 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
717 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
718 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
719 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
723 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
724 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
725 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
726 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
727 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
733 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
734 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
736 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
737 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
738 { ret= -1; goto end; }
740 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
741 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
743 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
744 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
747 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
748 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
756 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
758 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
759 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
760 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
761 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
762 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
763 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
766 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
767 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
769 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
770 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
772 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
776 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
781 /* clean a few things up */
782 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
784 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
787 /* remove buffering on output */
788 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
792 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
797 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
799 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
801 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
803 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
817 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
821 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
826 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
830 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
837 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
841 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
845 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
849 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
851 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
852 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
857 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
858 /* number of bytes to write */
863 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
864 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
867 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
872 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
873 * so permit appropriate message length */
874 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
880 if (!ok) return((int)n);
881 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
882 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
884 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
885 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
887 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
889 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
890 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
894 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
896 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
897 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
905 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
907 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
908 unsigned int cookie_len;
911 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
916 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
918 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
919 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
920 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
921 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
924 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
927 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
930 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
931 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
932 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
933 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
934 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
937 if (!ok) return((int)n);
939 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
941 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
942 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
943 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
946 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
947 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
950 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
952 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
953 s->version = s->client_version;
955 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
959 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
960 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
961 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
963 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
965 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
967 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
968 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
970 if (cookie_length == 0)
974 /* load the client random */
975 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
978 /* get the session-id */
982 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
983 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
984 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
985 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
986 * won't even compile against older library versions).
988 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
989 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
990 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
991 * setting will be ignored.
993 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
995 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1000 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1002 { /* previous session */
1009 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1016 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1019 cookie_len = *(p++);
1022 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1023 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1024 * does not cause an overflow.
1026 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1029 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1034 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1035 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1038 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1040 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1042 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1045 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1047 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1050 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1052 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1053 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1055 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1057 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1068 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1070 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1071 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1077 /* not enough data */
1078 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1082 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1089 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1090 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1093 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1096 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1098 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1100 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1102 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1103 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1111 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1112 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1115 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1117 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1118 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1119 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1120 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1121 * enabled, though. */
1122 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1123 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1125 s->session->cipher = c;
1132 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1133 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1134 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1144 /* not enough data */
1145 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1152 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1159 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1166 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1168 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1170 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1175 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1180 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1181 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1182 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1183 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1187 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1188 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1190 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1192 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1197 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1199 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1201 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1202 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1203 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1206 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1207 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1211 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1212 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1213 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1215 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1220 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1223 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1225 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1226 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1228 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1229 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1234 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1235 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1236 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1237 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1239 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1240 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1242 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1243 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1244 /* Can't disable compression */
1245 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1247 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1251 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1252 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1254 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1255 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1257 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1261 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1263 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1267 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1268 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1270 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1275 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1282 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1283 { /* See if we have a match */
1284 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1286 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1287 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1289 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1302 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1307 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1308 * using compression.
1310 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1312 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1318 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1323 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1324 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1326 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1328 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1329 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1330 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1331 if (ciphers == NULL)
1333 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1338 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1339 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1343 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1347 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1351 /* Session-id reuse */
1352 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1353 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1354 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1355 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1357 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1359 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1360 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1362 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1363 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1365 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1369 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1370 else if (ec != NULL)
1371 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1373 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1377 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1380 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1382 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1386 /* we now have the following setup.
1388 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1389 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1390 * compression - basically ignored right now
1391 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1392 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1393 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1394 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1401 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1404 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1408 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1411 unsigned char *p,*d;
1414 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1418 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1420 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1421 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1422 p=s->s3->server_random;
1423 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1424 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1426 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1429 /* Do the message type and length last */
1432 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1433 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1436 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1437 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1439 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1440 * back in the server hello:
1441 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1442 * we send back the old session ID.
1443 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1444 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1445 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1446 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1448 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1449 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1450 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1451 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1454 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1456 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1458 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1459 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1465 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1468 /* put the cipher */
1469 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1472 /* put the compression method */
1473 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1476 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1479 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1482 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1487 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1496 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1499 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1500 /* number of bytes to write */
1505 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1506 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1509 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1513 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1515 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1518 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1523 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1524 /* number of bytes to write */
1529 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1530 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1533 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1539 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1546 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1547 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1550 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1553 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1554 unsigned char *p,*d;
1564 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1565 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1567 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1572 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1575 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1578 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1580 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1581 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1582 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1585 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1594 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1600 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1605 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1608 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1609 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1610 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1611 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1614 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1619 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1625 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1632 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1633 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1634 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1636 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1645 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1646 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1647 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1648 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1661 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1663 const EC_GROUP *group;
1665 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1666 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1668 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1669 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1670 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1674 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1679 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1685 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1691 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1697 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1698 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1699 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1700 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1702 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1709 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1710 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1711 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1717 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1718 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1724 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1725 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1726 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1729 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1736 /* Encode the public key.
1737 * First check the size of encoding and
1738 * allocate memory accordingly.
1740 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1741 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1742 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1745 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1746 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1747 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1748 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1755 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1756 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1757 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1758 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1760 if (encodedlen == 0)
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1766 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1768 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1769 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1770 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1771 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1776 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1777 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1785 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1787 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1789 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1790 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1793 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1795 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1797 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1798 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1799 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1800 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1813 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1817 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1819 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1821 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1828 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1829 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1831 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1834 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1837 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1845 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1850 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1853 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1856 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1869 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1871 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1872 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1873 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1874 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1875 * the actual encoded point itself
1877 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1885 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1886 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1888 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1889 encodedPoint = NULL;
1894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1895 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1897 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1898 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1899 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1900 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1907 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1908 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1910 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1911 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1915 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1917 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1918 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1919 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1920 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1921 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1922 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1923 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1924 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1925 (unsigned int *)&i);
1929 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1930 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1942 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1944 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1946 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1948 /* Should never happen */
1949 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1956 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1959 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1960 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1961 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1962 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1963 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1964 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1971 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1976 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1977 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1983 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1986 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1992 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1993 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1994 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1996 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1999 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2000 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2002 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2006 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2008 unsigned char *p,*d;
2010 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2014 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2018 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2020 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2022 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2027 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2029 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2039 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2043 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2045 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2046 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2047 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2052 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2053 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2056 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2063 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2064 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2070 /* else no CA names */
2071 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2074 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2075 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2078 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2083 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2084 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2087 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2094 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2097 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2098 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2103 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2107 unsigned long alg_k;
2109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2111 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2119 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2122 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2123 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2124 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2125 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2128 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2129 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2130 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2131 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2135 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2136 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2138 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2141 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2143 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2144 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2146 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2147 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2148 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2149 * be sent already */
2152 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2160 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2161 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2162 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2163 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2165 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2172 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2173 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2178 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2190 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2194 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2196 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2197 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2200 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2202 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2203 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2204 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2205 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2206 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2208 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2209 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2210 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2212 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2213 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2215 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2216 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2217 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2218 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2219 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2220 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2221 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2227 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2228 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2229 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2231 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2232 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2233 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2234 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2238 s->session->master_key_length=
2239 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2240 s->session->master_key,
2242 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2247 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2252 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2264 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2266 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2272 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2274 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2279 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2282 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2289 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2298 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2303 s->session->master_key_length=
2304 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2305 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2306 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2311 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2313 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2314 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2315 krb5_data authenticator;
2317 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2318 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2319 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2320 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2321 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2322 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2324 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2325 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2327 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2329 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2332 enc_ticket.length = i;
2334 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2337 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2341 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2342 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2345 authenticator.length = i;
2347 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2350 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2354 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2355 p+=authenticator.length;
2359 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2362 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2365 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2368 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2372 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2373 enc_pms.length + 6))
2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2376 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2380 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2384 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2385 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2387 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2388 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2394 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2395 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2397 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2398 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2401 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2402 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2404 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2405 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2411 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2418 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2419 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2421 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2425 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2427 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2430 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2433 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2434 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2437 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2440 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2443 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2446 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2449 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2453 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2456 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2459 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2461 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2462 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2463 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2464 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2465 * the protocol version.
2466 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2467 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2469 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2472 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2477 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2479 s->session->master_key_length=
2480 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2481 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2483 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2485 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2486 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2488 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2489 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2494 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2495 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2496 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2497 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2501 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2504 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2509 const EC_GROUP *group;
2510 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2512 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2513 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2516 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2520 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2521 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2523 /* use the certificate */
2524 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2528 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2529 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2531 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2534 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2535 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2537 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2538 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2545 /* Let's get client's public key */
2546 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2549 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2555 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2557 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2559 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2563 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2565 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2567 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2568 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2569 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2570 * never executed. When that support is
2571 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2572 * received in the certificate is
2573 * authorized for key agreement.
2574 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2575 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2578 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2580 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2584 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2585 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2591 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2595 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2596 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2598 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2601 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2605 /* Get encoded point length */
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2614 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2615 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2621 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2622 * currently, so set it to the start
2624 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2627 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2628 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2629 if (field_size <= 0)
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2635 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2643 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2644 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2645 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2646 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2647 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2648 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2650 /* Compute the master secret */
2651 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2652 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2654 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2660 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2662 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2663 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2664 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2666 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2668 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2674 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2677 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2680 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2683 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2686 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2690 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2691 * string for the callback */
2692 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2693 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2694 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2695 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2696 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2698 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2701 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2704 else if (psk_len == 0)
2706 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2708 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2709 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2713 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2714 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2716 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2718 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2722 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2723 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2724 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2725 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2728 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2732 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2733 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2734 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2735 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2736 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2739 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2743 s->session->master_key_length=
2744 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2745 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2748 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2755 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2763 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2767 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2772 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2773 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2774 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2775 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2778 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2782 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2791 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2792 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2795 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2796 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2797 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2798 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2799 unsigned long alg_a;
2801 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2802 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2803 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2804 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2805 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2806 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2808 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2809 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2810 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2811 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2812 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2813 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2814 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2815 if (client_pub_pkey)
2817 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2820 /* Decrypt session key */
2821 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2831 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2841 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2847 /* Generate master secret */
2848 s->session->master_key_length=
2849 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2850 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2851 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2852 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2857 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2858 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2866 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2868 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2874 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2875 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2879 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2880 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2881 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2882 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2883 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2888 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2890 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2896 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2898 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2900 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2901 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2902 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2907 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2909 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2911 peer=s->session->peer;
2912 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2913 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2921 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2923 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2924 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2926 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2937 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2941 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2944 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2948 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2951 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2955 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2956 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2957 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2958 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2959 * signature without length field */
2960 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2961 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2967 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2969 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2970 /* Should never happen */
2973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2974 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2977 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
2978 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2981 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2984 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
2988 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2992 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3002 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3006 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3007 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3010 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3014 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3018 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3022 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3026 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3029 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3030 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3033 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3037 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3039 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3046 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3048 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3049 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3053 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3059 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3067 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3069 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3070 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3071 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3075 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3082 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3083 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3085 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3086 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3087 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3091 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3093 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3099 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3100 { unsigned char signature[64];
3102 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3103 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3105 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3107 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3108 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3110 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3111 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3114 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3116 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3123 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3132 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3135 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3137 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3138 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3139 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3141 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3142 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3146 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3148 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3150 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3151 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3153 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3155 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3162 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3164 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3166 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3167 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3170 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3173 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3174 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3177 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3180 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3184 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3186 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3190 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3192 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3201 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3205 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3208 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3210 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3216 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3224 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3228 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3237 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3239 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3240 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3242 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3246 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3247 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3248 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3251 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3254 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3255 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3257 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3263 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3266 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3272 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3273 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3274 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3275 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3277 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3278 * when we arrive here. */
3279 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3281 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3282 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3288 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3289 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3290 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3291 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3292 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3300 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3303 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3304 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3308 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3313 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3315 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3318 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3319 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3320 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3327 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3328 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3333 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3334 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3338 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3339 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3341 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3343 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3344 const unsigned char *const_p;
3345 int len, slen_full, slen;
3350 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3351 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3352 unsigned char key_name[16];
3354 /* get session encoding length */
3355 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3356 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3359 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3361 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3365 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3367 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3369 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3375 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3377 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3378 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3384 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3385 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3387 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3388 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3389 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3390 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3391 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3392 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3394 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3395 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3396 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3399 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3401 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3402 /* Skip message length for now */
3404 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3405 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3406 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3407 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3410 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3412 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3421 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3422 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3423 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3424 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3425 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3426 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3429 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3430 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3431 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3432 * as their sessions. */
3433 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3435 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3437 /* Output key name */
3439 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3442 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3443 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3444 /* Encrypt session data */
3445 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3447 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3449 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3451 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3452 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3453 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3456 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3458 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3459 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3460 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3462 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3464 /* number of bytes to write */
3466 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3471 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3472 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3475 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3477 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3480 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3481 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3482 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3485 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3488 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3491 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3492 /* message length */
3493 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3495 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3496 /* length of OCSP response */
3497 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3498 /* actual response */
3499 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3500 /* number of bytes to write */
3501 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3502 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3506 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3507 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3510 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3511 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3512 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3513 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3516 int proto_len, padding_len;
3518 const unsigned char *p;
3520 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3521 * extension in their ClientHello */
3522 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3528 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3529 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3530 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3532 514, /* See the payload format below */
3538 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3539 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3540 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3541 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3548 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3550 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3552 /* The payload looks like:
3554 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3555 * uint8 padding_len;
3556 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3559 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3561 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3562 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3565 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3566 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3571 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3572 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;