1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
155 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
156 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
157 #include <openssl/rand.h>
158 #include <openssl/objects.h>
159 #include <openssl/evp.h>
160 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
161 #include <openssl/x509.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
163 # include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #include <openssl/bn.h>
166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
167 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return (SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
187 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
189 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
191 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
193 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
194 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
195 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
197 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
201 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
203 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
210 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
213 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
214 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
216 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
218 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
222 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
223 cb = s->info_callback;
224 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
227 /* init things to blank */
229 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
236 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
237 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
240 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
241 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
250 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
252 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
256 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
257 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
263 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
265 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
269 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
274 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
276 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
277 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
279 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
282 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
285 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
291 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
293 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
298 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
301 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
303 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
305 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
307 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
308 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
310 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
312 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
316 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
317 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
318 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
319 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
321 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
323 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
324 * support secure renegotiation.
326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
327 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
328 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
330 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
334 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
337 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
338 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
342 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
343 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
346 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
349 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
350 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
353 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
356 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
357 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
361 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
362 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
364 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
368 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
369 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
372 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
374 * callback indicates firther work to be done
376 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
379 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
380 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
382 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
383 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
385 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
387 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
389 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
396 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
400 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
401 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
402 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
407 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
410 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
414 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
417 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
421 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
422 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
423 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
424 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
427 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
429 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
430 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
434 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
437 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
440 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
446 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
451 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
452 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
453 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
456 * clear this, it may get reset by
457 * send_server_key_exchange
459 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
462 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
463 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
464 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
465 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
466 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
471 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
478 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
479 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
481 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
482 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
483 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
484 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
485 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
486 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
487 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
488 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
493 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
499 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
504 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
505 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
506 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
508 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
509 * during re-negotiation:
511 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
512 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
514 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
515 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
518 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
520 * ... except when the application insists on
521 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
524 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
526 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
528 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
529 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
530 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
532 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
535 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
536 /* no cert request */
538 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
539 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
540 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
541 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
542 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
547 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
548 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
551 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
556 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
557 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
558 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
561 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
562 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
566 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
569 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
570 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
571 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
572 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
573 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
577 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
578 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
582 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
584 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
587 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
588 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
589 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
590 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
595 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
598 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
600 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
605 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
606 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
607 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
608 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
610 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
611 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
613 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
614 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
616 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
619 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
620 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
622 if (!s->session->peer)
624 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
626 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
630 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
631 * extms we've done this already.
633 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
634 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
635 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
636 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
644 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
648 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
649 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
650 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
653 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
654 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
655 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
659 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
660 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
663 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
672 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
674 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
683 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
684 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
686 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
687 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
688 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
689 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
691 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
692 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
693 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
694 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
698 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
699 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
701 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
702 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
704 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
709 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
710 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
711 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
713 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
714 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
715 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
716 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
717 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
718 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
719 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
720 * the client's Finished message is read.
722 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
723 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
725 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
729 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
733 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
734 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
736 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
737 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
738 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
739 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
740 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
741 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
742 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
743 * the client's Finished message is read.
745 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
746 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
747 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
748 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
752 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
754 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
755 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
758 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
763 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
764 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
765 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
768 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
772 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
773 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
774 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
777 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
783 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
784 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
786 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
787 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
789 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
793 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
795 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
799 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
802 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
803 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
806 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
812 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
813 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
814 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
815 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
816 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
818 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
820 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
823 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
825 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
826 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
828 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
829 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
831 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
834 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
839 /* clean a few things up */
840 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
842 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
845 /* remove buffering on output */
846 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
850 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
855 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
857 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
859 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
862 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
877 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
879 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
883 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
884 new_state = s->state;
886 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
887 s->state = new_state;
893 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
897 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
901 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
904 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
905 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
909 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
912 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
913 return ssl_do_write(s);
916 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
918 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
919 unsigned int cookie_len;
922 unsigned char *p, *d;
924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
926 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
928 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
930 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
934 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
935 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
936 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
937 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
939 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
940 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
943 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
944 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
945 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
946 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
947 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
952 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
955 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
956 * for session id length
958 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
959 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
965 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
966 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
968 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
971 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
972 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
973 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
975 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
976 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
978 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
981 s->version = s->client_version;
983 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
988 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
989 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
992 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
993 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
995 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
997 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
998 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1002 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1004 if (cookie_length == 0)
1008 /* load the client random */
1009 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1010 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1012 /* get the session-id */
1015 if (p + j > d + n) {
1016 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1023 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1024 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1025 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1026 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1027 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1028 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1029 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1030 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1031 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1032 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1035 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1036 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1039 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1041 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1043 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1044 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1045 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1046 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1047 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1049 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1056 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1063 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1065 if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1066 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1070 cookie_len = *(p++);
1072 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1073 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1079 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1080 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1081 * does not cause an overflow.
1083 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1085 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1090 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1091 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1092 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1094 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1095 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1097 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1099 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1102 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1104 /* default verification */
1105 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1106 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1107 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1111 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1116 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1117 /* Select version to use */
1118 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1119 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1120 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1121 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1122 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1124 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1125 s->version = s->client_version;
1126 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1128 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1129 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1130 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1131 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1134 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1135 s->version = s->client_version;
1136 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1139 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1143 if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1144 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1151 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1156 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1157 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1158 /* not enough data */
1159 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1163 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1168 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1171 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1174 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1175 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1177 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1178 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1180 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1181 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1189 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1193 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1194 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1196 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1197 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1198 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1199 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1200 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1202 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1203 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1204 s->session->cipher = c;
1211 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1214 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1216 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1223 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1224 /* not enough data */
1225 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1232 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1240 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1245 /* TLS extensions */
1246 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1247 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1254 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1255 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1256 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1257 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1261 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1262 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1267 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1268 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1270 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1271 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1272 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1274 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1276 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1277 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1281 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1283 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1288 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1289 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1294 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1295 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1296 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1297 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1298 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1304 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1305 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1306 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1308 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1310 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1311 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1312 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1313 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1314 /* Can't disable compression */
1315 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1317 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1320 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1321 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1322 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1323 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1324 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1328 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1330 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1333 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1334 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1335 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1339 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1341 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1346 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1347 /* See if we have a match */
1348 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1350 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1351 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1352 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1354 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1364 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1370 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1371 * using compression.
1373 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1380 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1384 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1385 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1387 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1389 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1390 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1391 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1392 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1397 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1401 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1403 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1404 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1406 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1411 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1414 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1416 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1419 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1423 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1424 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1425 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1426 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1427 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1429 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1430 /* do not send a session ticket */
1431 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1433 /* Session-id reuse */
1434 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1437 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1438 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1443 * we now have the following setup.
1445 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1446 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1447 * compression - basically ignored right now
1448 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1449 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1450 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1451 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1454 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1455 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1456 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1466 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1468 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1471 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1472 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1475 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1478 unsigned char *p, *d;
1483 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1484 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1485 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1486 p = s->s3->server_random;
1487 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1488 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1492 /* Do the message type and length last */
1493 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1495 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1496 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1499 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1500 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1503 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1504 * back in the server hello:
1505 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1506 * we send back the old session ID.
1507 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1508 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1509 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1510 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1512 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1513 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1514 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1515 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1518 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1519 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1521 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1523 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1524 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1526 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1530 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1533 /* put the cipher */
1534 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1537 /* put the compression method */
1538 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1541 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1544 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1547 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1549 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1553 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1555 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1557 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1563 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1567 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1570 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1571 return ssl_do_write(s);
1574 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1577 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1578 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1582 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1585 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1586 return ssl_do_write(s);
1589 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1595 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1599 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1602 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1603 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1606 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1609 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1610 unsigned char *p, *d;
1620 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1621 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1622 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1627 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1629 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1630 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1631 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1632 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1633 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1634 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1636 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1639 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1641 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1645 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1648 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1650 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1655 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1659 if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
1660 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1661 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1663 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1665 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1671 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1672 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1674 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1677 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1679 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1682 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1683 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
1684 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1686 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1689 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1691 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1695 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1697 else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1703 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1704 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1705 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1706 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1711 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1712 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1713 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1724 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1725 const EC_GROUP *group;
1727 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1728 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1729 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1730 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1731 if (nid != NID_undef)
1732 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1733 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1734 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1735 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1737 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1738 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1740 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1741 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1743 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1747 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1749 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1753 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1754 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1758 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1760 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1765 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1766 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1767 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1768 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1769 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1776 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1777 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1778 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1783 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1784 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1786 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1791 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1792 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1796 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1799 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1804 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1805 * allocate memory accordingly.
1807 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1808 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1809 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1812 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1813 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1814 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1815 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1817 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1821 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1822 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1823 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1824 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1826 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1831 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1835 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1836 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1837 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1843 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1844 * can set these to NULLs
1851 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1853 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1855 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1857 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1859 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1861 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1862 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1863 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1864 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1866 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1869 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1870 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1871 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1872 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1876 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1878 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1881 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1882 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1884 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1891 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1892 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1893 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1895 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1898 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1904 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1908 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1910 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1912 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1923 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1925 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1926 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1927 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1928 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1930 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1938 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1939 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1940 encodedPoint = NULL;
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1946 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1947 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1948 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1949 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1950 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1951 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1958 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1959 * points to the space at the end.
1961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1962 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1965 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1966 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1967 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1968 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1969 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1970 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1972 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1974 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1975 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1979 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1980 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1989 /* send signature algorithm */
1990 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1991 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1992 /* Should never happen */
1993 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1995 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2001 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2003 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2004 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2006 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2008 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
2009 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2010 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2016 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2019 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2020 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2022 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2027 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2028 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2034 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2035 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2036 return ssl_do_write(s);
2038 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2041 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2042 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2044 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2045 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2049 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2051 unsigned char *p, *d;
2052 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2053 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2057 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2060 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2062 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2064 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2069 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2070 const unsigned char *psigs;
2071 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2072 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2073 /* Skip over length for now */
2075 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2076 /* Now fill in length */
2086 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2089 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2090 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2091 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2092 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2093 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2098 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2100 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2105 /* else no CA names */
2106 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2109 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2114 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2117 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2118 return ssl_do_write(s);
2120 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2124 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2128 unsigned long alg_k;
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2132 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2136 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2140 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2143 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2144 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2145 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2146 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2149 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2150 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2151 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2152 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2156 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2158 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2161 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2162 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2164 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2167 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2168 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2169 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2170 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2172 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2175 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2177 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2182 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2183 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2184 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2185 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2187 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2190 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2193 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2194 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2197 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2198 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2200 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2209 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2210 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2211 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2212 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2213 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2215 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2216 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2218 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2223 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2224 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2225 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2226 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2227 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2230 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2231 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2234 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2238 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2239 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2242 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2245 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2246 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2247 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2248 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2249 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2250 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2253 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2255 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2258 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2259 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2260 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2261 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2262 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2263 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2266 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2267 unsigned char workaround_good;
2269 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2271 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2272 version_good |= workaround_good;
2276 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2277 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2279 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2282 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2283 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2284 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2285 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2287 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2288 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2289 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2292 s->session->master_key_length =
2293 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2295 session->master_key,
2298 (rand_premaster_secret));
2299 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2300 if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2301 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2308 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2310 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2314 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2315 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2317 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2322 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2323 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2325 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2332 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2333 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2334 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2335 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2337 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2338 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2339 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2340 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2342 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2345 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2346 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2347 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2349 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2352 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2355 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2356 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2358 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2359 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2361 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2362 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2364 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2367 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2368 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2370 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2376 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2384 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2385 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2391 s->session->master_key_length =
2392 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2394 session->master_key,
2396 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2397 if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2398 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2407 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2408 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2409 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2410 krb5_data authenticator;
2412 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2413 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2414 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2415 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2416 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2418 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2419 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2421 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2424 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2427 enc_ticket.length = i;
2429 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2431 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2435 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2436 p += enc_ticket.length;
2439 authenticator.length = i;
2441 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2443 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2447 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2448 p += authenticator.length;
2452 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2453 p += enc_pms.length;
2456 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2458 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2460 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2464 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2465 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2467 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2471 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2474 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2475 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2477 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2478 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2484 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2485 * return authtime == 0.
2487 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2488 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2490 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2491 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2493 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2494 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2499 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2504 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2505 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2507 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2511 memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); /* per RFC 1510 */
2513 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2515 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2518 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2519 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2522 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2525 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2527 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2530 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2536 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2538 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2541 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2542 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2544 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2545 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2546 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2547 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2548 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2549 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2550 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2553 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2555 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2560 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2562 s->session->master_key_length =
2563 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2565 session->master_key,
2567 if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2568 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2573 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2574 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2575 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2576 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2577 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2582 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2583 * but it caused problems for apache.
2584 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2585 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2588 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2591 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2595 const EC_GROUP *group;
2596 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2598 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2599 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2604 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2605 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2606 /* use the certificate */
2607 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2610 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2611 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2613 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2616 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2617 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2619 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2620 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2625 /* Let's get client's public key */
2626 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2632 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2634 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
2635 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2637 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2640 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2641 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2643 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2644 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2645 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2646 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2647 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2648 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2650 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2652 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2656 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2657 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2662 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2665 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2666 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2668 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2670 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2674 /* Get encoded point length */
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2681 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2686 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2689 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2692 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2693 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2694 if (field_size <= 0) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2698 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2705 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2706 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2707 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2708 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2709 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2710 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2712 /* Compute the master secret */
2713 s->session->master_key_length =
2714 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2716 session->master_key,
2719 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2720 if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2721 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2729 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2730 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2731 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2732 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2734 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2736 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2743 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2745 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2748 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2750 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2755 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2757 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2758 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2759 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2761 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2762 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2764 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2767 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2769 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2772 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2773 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2777 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2778 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2780 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2782 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2786 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2787 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2788 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2793 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2794 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2795 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2796 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2801 s->session->master_key_length =
2802 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2804 session->master_key,
2807 if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2808 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2814 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2820 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2825 if (param_len > n) {
2826 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2828 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2831 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2835 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2836 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2837 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2839 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2842 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2843 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2844 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2849 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2850 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2851 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2858 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2859 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2861 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2862 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2863 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2864 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2865 unsigned long alg_a;
2869 /* Get our certificate private key */
2870 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2871 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2872 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2873 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2874 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2876 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2877 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2879 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2880 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2881 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2882 * client certificate for authorization only.
2884 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2885 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2886 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2889 /* Decrypt session key */
2891 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2892 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2893 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2895 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2900 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2901 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2903 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2906 /* Generate master secret */
2907 s->session->master_key_length =
2908 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2910 session->master_key,
2911 premaster_secret, 32);
2912 if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2913 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2917 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2918 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2919 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2924 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2925 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2930 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2937 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2938 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2942 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2943 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2944 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2945 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2947 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2951 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2953 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2955 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2959 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2961 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2963 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2964 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2965 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2966 -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2971 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2972 peer = s->session->peer;
2973 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2974 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2980 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2981 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2983 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2993 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2997 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2999 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3000 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3004 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3006 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3010 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3011 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3012 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3014 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3017 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3018 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
3021 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3022 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3024 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3026 } else if (rv == 0) {
3027 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3031 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3040 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3044 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3045 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3047 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3051 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3054 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3055 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3057 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3061 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3064 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3065 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3067 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3071 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3072 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3078 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3079 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3080 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3083 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3088 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3095 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3096 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3097 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3098 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3101 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3107 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3108 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3109 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3110 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3111 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3114 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3120 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3121 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3122 unsigned char signature[64];
3124 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3125 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3127 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3129 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3130 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3132 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3134 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3136 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3142 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3149 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3150 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3153 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3154 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3155 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3156 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3157 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3161 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3163 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3165 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3166 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3168 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3170 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3173 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3178 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3179 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3180 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3182 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3183 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3187 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3189 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3191 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3192 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3195 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3199 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3200 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3204 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3206 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3212 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3213 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3217 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3219 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3220 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3222 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3227 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3233 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3235 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3238 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3246 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3247 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3248 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3249 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3251 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3254 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3255 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3256 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3258 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3259 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3262 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3263 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3264 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3269 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3271 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3273 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3278 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3281 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3283 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3285 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3288 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3291 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3292 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3293 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3296 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3299 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3300 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3301 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3306 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3307 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3309 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3310 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3317 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3319 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3321 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3325 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3329 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3330 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3332 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3333 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3334 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3336 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3337 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3342 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3344 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3347 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3350 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3351 return ssl_do_write(s);
3354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3355 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3356 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3358 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3362 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3363 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3364 const unsigned char *const_p;
3365 int len, slen_full, slen;
3368 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3369 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3370 unsigned char key_name[16];
3372 /* get session encoding length */
3373 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3375 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3378 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3379 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3382 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3384 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3388 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3389 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3392 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3396 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3399 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3402 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3404 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3405 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3406 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3410 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3411 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3414 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3417 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3418 * follows handshake_header_length +
3419 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3420 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3421 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3422 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3424 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3425 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3426 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3429 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3431 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3432 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3434 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3435 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3439 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3441 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3442 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3444 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3445 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3447 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3451 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3452 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3453 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3455 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3457 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3459 /* Output key name */
3461 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3464 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3465 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3466 /* Encrypt session data */
3467 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3470 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3474 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3476 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3479 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3480 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3483 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3485 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3486 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3487 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3489 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3491 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3495 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3496 return ssl_do_write(s);
3499 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3500 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3501 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3505 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3507 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3510 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3511 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3512 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3515 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3516 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3520 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3523 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3524 /* message length */
3525 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3527 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3528 /* length of OCSP response */
3529 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3530 /* actual response */
3531 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3532 /* number of bytes to write */
3533 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3534 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3538 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3539 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3542 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3544 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3545 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3547 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3550 int proto_len, padding_len;
3552 const unsigned char *p;
3555 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3556 * extension in their ClientHello
3558 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3560 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3561 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3565 /* See the payload format below */
3566 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3567 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3568 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3569 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3575 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3576 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3577 * ssl3_get_finished).
3579 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3581 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3586 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3587 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3590 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3593 * The payload looks like:
3595 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3596 * uint8 padding_len;
3597 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3600 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3601 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3604 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3605 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3606 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3610 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3611 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3613 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3616 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3617 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;