1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
194 int new_state,state,skip=0;
196 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
205 /* init things to blank */
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
231 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
233 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
240 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
242 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
276 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
277 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
278 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
283 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
284 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
287 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
288 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
289 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
293 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
300 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
301 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
302 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
305 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
306 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
314 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
315 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
316 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
320 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
321 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
323 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
327 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
336 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
337 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
338 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
339 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
340 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
342 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
343 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
345 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
346 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
348 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
353 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
365 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
366 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
367 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
369 /* clear this, it may get reset by
370 * send_server_key_exchange */
371 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
373 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
374 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
376 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
377 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
378 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
379 * be able to handle this) */
380 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
382 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
385 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
386 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
388 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
390 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
391 * message only if the cipher suite is either
392 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
393 * server certificate contains the server's
394 * public key for key exchange.
396 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
397 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
398 * hint if provided */
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
400 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
402 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
403 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
404 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
405 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
406 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
407 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
413 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
414 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
425 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
426 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
427 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
428 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
429 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
430 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
431 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
432 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
433 * and in RFC 2246): */
434 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
435 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
436 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
437 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
438 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
439 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
440 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
441 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
442 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
444 /* no cert request */
446 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
447 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
451 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
452 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
453 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
454 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
455 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
457 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
458 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
464 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
465 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
466 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
467 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
468 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
469 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
473 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
474 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
475 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
478 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
479 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
480 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
481 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
484 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
487 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
488 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
489 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
490 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
494 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
496 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
498 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
499 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
502 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
506 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
507 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
508 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
513 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
514 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
515 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
516 * message is not sent.
518 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
526 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
529 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
530 * a client cert, it can be verified
531 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
532 * should be generalized. But it is next step
534 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
535 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
537 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
538 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
542 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
543 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
554 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
555 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
557 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
558 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
559 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
561 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
565 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
566 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
567 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
568 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
569 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
571 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
572 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
580 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
585 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
586 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
587 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
588 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
589 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
593 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
594 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
595 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
596 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
597 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
603 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
604 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
606 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
607 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
608 { ret= -1; goto end; }
610 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
611 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
613 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
614 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
617 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
618 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
626 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
627 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
628 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
629 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
630 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
631 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
632 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
633 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
635 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
637 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
642 /* clean a few things up */
643 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
645 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
648 /* remove buffering on output */
649 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
653 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
655 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
656 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
660 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
662 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
664 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
666 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
680 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
684 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
689 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
693 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
700 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
704 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
708 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
712 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
714 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
715 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
720 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
721 /* number of bytes to write */
726 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
727 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
730 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
735 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
736 * so permit appropriate message length */
737 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
743 if (!ok) return((int)n);
744 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
745 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
747 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
748 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
749 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
750 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
752 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
754 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
755 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
763 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
765 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
766 unsigned int cookie_len;
769 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
774 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
776 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
777 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
778 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
779 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
782 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
784 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
787 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
788 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
789 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
790 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
791 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
794 if (!ok) return((int)n);
796 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
798 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
799 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
800 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
803 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
804 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
807 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
809 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
810 s->version = s->client_version;
812 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
816 /* load the client random */
817 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
820 /* get the session-id */
824 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
825 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
826 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
827 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
828 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
829 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
830 * an earlier library version)
832 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
834 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
839 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
841 { /* previous session */
848 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
855 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
860 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
861 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
863 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
864 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
866 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
873 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
874 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
875 * does not cause an overflow.
877 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
880 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
885 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
886 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
889 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
891 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
893 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
896 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
898 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
901 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
903 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
904 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
906 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
908 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
917 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
919 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
920 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
926 /* not enough data */
927 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
931 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
938 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
939 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
942 id=s->session->cipher->id;
945 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
947 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
949 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
951 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
952 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
960 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
962 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
963 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
964 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
965 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
966 * enabled, though. */
967 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
968 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
970 s->session->cipher = c;
976 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
977 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
978 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
988 /* not enough data */
989 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
996 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1003 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1010 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1012 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1014 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1019 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1024 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1025 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1026 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1027 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1031 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1032 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1034 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1036 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1041 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1043 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1045 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1046 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1047 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1050 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1051 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1055 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1056 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1057 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1059 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1064 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1067 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1069 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1070 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1072 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1073 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1078 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1079 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1080 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1081 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1082 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1083 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1084 { /* See if we have a match */
1085 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1087 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1088 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1090 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1103 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1109 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1114 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1115 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1117 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1119 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1120 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1121 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1122 if (ciphers == NULL)
1124 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1129 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1130 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1134 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1138 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1142 /* Session-id reuse */
1143 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1144 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1145 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1146 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1148 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1150 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1151 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1153 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1154 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1156 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1160 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1161 else if (ec != NULL)
1162 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1164 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1168 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1171 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1174 /* we now have the following setup.
1176 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1177 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1178 * compression - basically ignored right now
1179 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1180 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1181 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1182 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1189 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1192 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1196 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1199 unsigned char *p,*d;
1202 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1206 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1208 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1209 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1210 p=s->s3->server_random;
1211 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1212 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1214 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1217 /* Do the message type and length last */
1220 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1221 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1224 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1225 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1227 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1228 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1229 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1230 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1231 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1232 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1233 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1235 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1236 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1237 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1238 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1239 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1242 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1244 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1246 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1247 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1256 /* put the cipher */
1257 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1260 /* put the compression method */
1261 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1264 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1267 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1270 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1275 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1284 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1287 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1288 /* number of bytes to write */
1293 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1294 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1297 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1301 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1303 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1306 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1311 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1312 /* number of bytes to write */
1317 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1318 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1321 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1327 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1334 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1335 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1338 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1341 unsigned char *p,*d;
1351 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1352 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1354 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1359 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1362 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1365 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1367 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1368 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1369 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1372 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1381 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1387 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1392 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1395 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1396 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1397 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1398 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1401 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1406 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1413 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1420 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1421 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1422 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1424 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1433 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1434 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1435 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1436 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1449 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1451 const EC_GROUP *group;
1453 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1454 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1456 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1457 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1458 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1462 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1467 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1469 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1474 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1480 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1487 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1488 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1489 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1490 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1492 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1499 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1500 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1501 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1507 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1508 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1514 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1515 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1516 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1519 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1526 /* Encode the public key.
1527 * First check the size of encoding and
1528 * allocate memory accordingly.
1530 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1531 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1532 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1535 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1536 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1537 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1538 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1545 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1546 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1547 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1548 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1550 if (encodedlen == 0)
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1556 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1558 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1559 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1560 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1561 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1566 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1567 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1575 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1577 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1579 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1580 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1583 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1585 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1589 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1591 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1595 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1596 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1598 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1601 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1604 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1612 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1617 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1620 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1628 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1630 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1631 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1632 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1633 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1634 * the actual encoded point itself
1636 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1644 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1645 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1647 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1653 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1655 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1656 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1657 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1658 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1665 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1666 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1668 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1672 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1674 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1675 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1676 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1677 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1678 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1679 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1680 (unsigned int *)&i);
1684 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1685 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1695 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1696 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1699 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1700 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1701 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1702 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1703 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1704 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1714 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1715 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1717 /* let's do ECDSA */
1718 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1719 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1720 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1721 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1722 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1723 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1734 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1735 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1741 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1744 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1750 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1751 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1752 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1754 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1757 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1758 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1760 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1764 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1766 unsigned char *p,*d;
1768 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1772 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1776 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1778 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1780 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1789 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1793 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1795 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1796 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1797 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1802 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1803 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1806 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1813 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1814 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1820 /* else no CA names */
1821 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1824 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1825 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1828 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1833 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1834 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1837 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1844 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1847 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1848 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1853 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1857 unsigned long alg_k;
1859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1861 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1869 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1872 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1873 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1874 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1875 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1878 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1879 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1880 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1881 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1885 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1886 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1888 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1891 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
1893 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1894 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1896 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1897 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1898 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1899 * be sent already */
1902 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1910 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1911 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1912 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1913 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1915 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1922 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
1923 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1928 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1940 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1944 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1946 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1947 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1950 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1952 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1953 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1954 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1955 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1956 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1958 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1959 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1960 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1962 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1963 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1965 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1966 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1967 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1968 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1969 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1970 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1971 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1977 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1978 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1979 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1981 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1982 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1983 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1984 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1988 s->session->master_key_length=
1989 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1990 s->session->master_key,
1992 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1997 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2002 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2014 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2016 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2022 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2024 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2029 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2032 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2039 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2047 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2052 s->session->master_key_length=
2053 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2054 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2055 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2060 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2062 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2063 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2064 krb5_data authenticator;
2066 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2067 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2068 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2069 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2070 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2071 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2073 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2074 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2076 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2078 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2081 enc_ticket.length = i;
2083 if (n < enc_ticket.length + 6)
2085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2086 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2090 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2091 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2094 authenticator.length = i;
2096 if (n < enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2099 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2103 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2104 p+=authenticator.length;
2108 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2111 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2114 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2117 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2121 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2122 enc_pms.length + 6))
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2125 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2129 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2133 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2134 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2136 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2137 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2143 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2144 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2146 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2147 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2150 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2151 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2153 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2154 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2160 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2167 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2168 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2170 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2174 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2176 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2179 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2182 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2183 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2186 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2189 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2192 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2195 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2198 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2202 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2205 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2208 if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2210 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2211 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2212 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2213 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2214 * the protocol version.
2215 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2216 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2218 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2219 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2222 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2227 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2229 s->session->master_key_length=
2230 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2231 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2233 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2235 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2236 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2238 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2239 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2244 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2245 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2246 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2247 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2251 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2254 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2259 const EC_GROUP *group;
2260 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2262 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2263 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2266 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2270 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2271 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2273 /* use the certificate */
2274 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2278 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2279 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2281 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2284 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2285 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2287 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2288 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2295 /* Let's get client's public key */
2296 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2299 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2305 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2307 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2309 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2313 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2315 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2317 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2318 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2319 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2320 * never executed. When that support is
2321 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2322 * received in the certificate is
2323 * authorized for key agreement.
2324 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2325 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2328 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2330 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2334 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2335 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2341 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2345 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2346 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2348 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2351 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2355 /* Get encoded point length */
2358 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2359 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2365 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2366 * currently, so set it to the start
2368 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2371 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2372 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2373 if (field_size <= 0)
2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2379 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2387 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2388 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2389 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2390 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2392 /* Compute the master secret */
2393 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2394 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2396 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2402 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2404 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2405 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2406 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2408 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2410 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2416 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2419 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2422 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2425 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2428 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2432 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2433 * string for the callback */
2434 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2435 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2436 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2437 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2438 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2440 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2443 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2446 else if (psk_len == 0)
2448 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2451 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2455 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2456 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2458 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2460 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2464 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2465 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2466 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2467 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2470 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2474 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2475 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2476 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2477 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2478 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2481 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2485 s->session->master_key_length=
2486 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2487 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2490 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2496 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2498 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2499 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2502 /* Get our certificate privatec key*/
2503 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL);
2504 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2505 /* Decrypt session key */
2506 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) || p[1]!=0x81 )
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2511 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,p+3,p[2]) <0)
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2517 /* Generate master secret */
2518 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2519 s->session->master_key_length=
2520 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2521 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2526 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2528 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2534 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2535 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2539 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2540 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2541 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2542 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2543 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2548 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2550 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2557 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2558 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2559 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2564 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2566 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2568 peer=s->session->peer;
2569 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2570 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2578 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2580 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2581 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2583 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2594 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2598 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2601 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2605 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2608 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2612 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2613 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2614 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2615 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2616 * signature without length field */
2617 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2618 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2629 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2633 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2634 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2637 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2642 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2644 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2645 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2649 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2655 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2663 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2665 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2666 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2667 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2671 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2679 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2681 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2682 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2683 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2687 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2689 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2695 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2696 { unsigned char signature[64];
2698 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2699 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2701 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2703 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2704 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2706 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2707 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2710 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2712 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2719 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2728 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2731 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2735 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2737 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2739 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2740 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2742 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2744 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2751 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2753 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2755 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2756 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2759 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2762 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2763 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2766 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2769 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2773 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2775 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2779 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2781 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2790 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2794 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2797 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2799 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2805 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2813 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2817 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2826 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2828 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2829 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2831 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2835 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2836 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2837 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2840 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2846 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2849 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2855 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2856 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2857 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2858 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2860 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2861 * when we arrive here. */
2862 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2864 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2865 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2871 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2872 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2873 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2874 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2875 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2883 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2886 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2887 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2891 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2896 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2898 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2901 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2902 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
2903 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2910 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2911 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2916 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2917 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2920 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2922 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2924 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2929 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2930 unsigned char key_name[16];
2932 /* get session encoding length */
2933 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2934 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2939 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2940 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2941 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2942 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2943 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2944 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2946 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2947 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2948 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2950 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2954 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2956 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2958 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2959 /* Skip message length for now */
2961 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2962 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2963 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2964 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2967 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2969 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
2978 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
2979 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2980 s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2981 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2982 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2983 memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2985 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2986 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2988 /* Output key name */
2990 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2993 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2994 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2995 /* Encrypt session data */
2996 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2998 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3000 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3002 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3003 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3004 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3007 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3009 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3010 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3011 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3013 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3015 /* number of bytes to write */
3017 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3022 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3023 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3026 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3028 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3031 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3032 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3033 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3036 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3039 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3042 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3043 /* message length */
3044 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3046 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3047 /* length of OCSP response */
3048 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3049 /* actual response */
3050 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3051 /* number of bytes to write */
3052 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3053 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3057 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3058 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));