2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
136 #include <openssl/x509.h>
137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
138 #include <openssl/dh.h>
140 #include <openssl/bn.h>
141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
142 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
144 #include <openssl/md5.h>
146 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
151 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
170 int new_state,state,skip=0;
172 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
176 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
178 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
179 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
181 /* init things to blank */
183 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
197 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
199 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
203 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
204 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
207 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
209 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
214 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
216 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
218 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
223 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
231 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
239 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
241 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
242 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
244 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
246 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
247 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
248 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
250 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
251 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
253 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
254 * client that doesn't support secure
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
258 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
264 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
265 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
266 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
271 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
272 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
275 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
276 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
277 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
278 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
281 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
284 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
288 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
289 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
290 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
293 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
294 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
296 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
300 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
301 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
302 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
303 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
307 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
308 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
314 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
317 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
321 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
322 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
323 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
324 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
325 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
327 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
328 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
330 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
331 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
333 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
338 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
345 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
350 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
351 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
352 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
354 /* clear this, it may get reset by
355 * send_server_key_exchange */
356 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
359 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
361 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
362 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
363 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
364 * be able to handle this) */
365 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
367 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
370 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
371 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
373 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
374 * message only if the cipher suite is either
375 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
376 * server certificate contains the server's
377 * public key for key exchange.
379 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
381 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
383 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
384 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
385 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
391 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
392 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
401 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
403 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
404 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
405 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
406 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
407 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
408 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
409 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
410 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
411 * and in RFC 2246): */
412 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
413 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
414 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
415 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
416 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
417 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
419 /* no cert request */
421 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
422 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
426 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
427 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
428 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
429 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
430 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
432 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
433 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
439 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
441 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
442 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
443 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
444 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
448 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
450 /* This code originally checked to see if
451 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
452 * and then flushed. This caused problems
453 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
454 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
455 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
456 * still exist. So instead we just flush
460 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
461 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
466 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
468 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
471 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
472 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
473 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
474 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
478 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
480 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
482 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
483 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
486 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
490 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
491 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
492 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
497 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
498 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
499 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
500 * message is not sent.
502 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
507 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
510 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
511 * a client cert, it can be verified
513 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
514 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
515 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
516 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
517 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
518 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
522 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
523 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
525 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
526 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
527 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
529 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
533 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
534 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
535 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
536 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
537 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
541 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
545 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
550 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
552 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
553 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
554 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
558 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
560 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
561 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
562 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
571 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
572 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
573 { ret= -1; goto end; }
575 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
576 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
578 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
579 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
582 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
583 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
591 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
592 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
593 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
594 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
595 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
596 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
597 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
598 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
600 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
602 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
607 /* clean a few things up */
608 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
610 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
613 /* remove buffering on output */
614 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
618 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
620 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
621 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
625 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
627 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
629 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
631 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
645 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
649 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
654 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
658 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
665 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
669 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
673 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
677 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
679 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
680 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
685 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
686 /* number of bytes to write */
691 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
692 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
695 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
700 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
701 * so permit appropriate message length */
702 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
708 if (!ok) return((int)n);
709 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
710 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
712 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
713 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
714 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
715 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
717 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
719 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
720 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
728 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
730 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
731 unsigned int cookie_len;
734 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
739 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
741 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
742 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
743 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
744 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
747 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
749 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
752 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
753 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
754 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
755 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
756 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
759 if (!ok) return((int)n);
761 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
763 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
764 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
765 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
768 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
769 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
772 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
774 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
775 s->version = s->client_version;
777 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
781 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
782 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
783 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
785 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
787 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
789 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
790 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
792 if (cookie_length == 0)
796 /* load the client random */
797 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
800 /* get the session-id */
804 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
805 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
806 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
807 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
808 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
809 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
810 * an earlier library version)
812 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
814 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
819 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
821 { /* previous session */
828 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
835 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
841 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
842 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
843 * does not cause an overflow.
845 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
848 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
853 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
854 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
857 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
859 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
861 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
864 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
866 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
869 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
871 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
872 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
874 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
876 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
887 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
889 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
890 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
896 /* not enough data */
897 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
901 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
908 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
909 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
912 id=s->session->cipher->id;
915 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
917 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
919 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
921 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
922 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
930 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
932 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
933 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
934 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
935 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
936 * enabled, though. */
937 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
938 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
940 s->session->cipher = c;
946 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
947 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
948 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
958 /* not enough data */
959 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
966 if (p[j] == 0) break;
973 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
980 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
982 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
984 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
989 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
994 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
995 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
996 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
997 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
999 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
1000 { /* See if we have a match */
1001 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1003 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1004 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1006 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1019 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1025 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
1026 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
1027 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
1028 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
1029 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1033 /* wrong number of bytes,
1034 * there could be more to follow */
1035 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1042 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1047 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1048 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1050 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1052 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1053 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1054 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1055 if (ciphers == NULL)
1057 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1062 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1063 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1067 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1071 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1075 /* Session-id reuse */
1076 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1077 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1078 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1079 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1081 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1083 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1084 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1086 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1087 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1089 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1093 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1094 else if (ec != NULL)
1095 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1097 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1101 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1104 /* we now have the following setup.
1106 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1107 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1108 * compression - basically ignored right now
1109 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1110 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1111 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1112 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1119 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1122 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1126 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1129 unsigned char *p,*d;
1131 unsigned long l,Time;
1133 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1135 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1136 p=s->s3->server_random;
1137 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1139 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1141 /* Do the message type and length last */
1144 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1145 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1148 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1149 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1151 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1152 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1153 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1154 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1155 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1156 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1157 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1159 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1160 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1161 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1162 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1163 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1166 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1168 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1170 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1171 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1177 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1180 /* put the cipher */
1181 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1184 /* put the compression method */
1185 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1188 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1191 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1194 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1203 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1206 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1207 /* number of bytes to write */
1212 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1213 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1216 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1220 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1222 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1225 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1230 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1231 /* number of bytes to write */
1236 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1237 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1240 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1246 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1253 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1254 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1257 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1260 unsigned char *p,*d;
1270 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1271 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1273 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1278 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1281 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1284 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1286 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1287 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1288 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1291 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1300 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1306 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1311 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1314 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1315 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1316 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1317 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1320 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1325 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1332 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1339 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1340 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1341 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1343 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1352 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1353 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1354 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1355 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1368 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1370 const EC_GROUP *group;
1372 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1373 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1375 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1376 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1377 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1381 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1386 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1388 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1393 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1399 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1406 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1407 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1408 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1409 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1411 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1418 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1419 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1420 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1426 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1427 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1433 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1434 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1435 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1438 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1445 /* Encode the public key.
1446 * First check the size of encoding and
1447 * allocate memory accordingly.
1449 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1450 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1451 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1454 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1455 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1456 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1457 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1464 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1465 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1466 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1467 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1469 if (encodedlen == 0)
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1475 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1477 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1478 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1479 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1480 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1485 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1486 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1494 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1496 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1500 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1502 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1506 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1508 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1511 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1514 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1522 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1527 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1530 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1538 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1540 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1541 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1542 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1543 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1544 * the actual encoded point itself
1546 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1554 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1555 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1557 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1565 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1566 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1568 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1572 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1574 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1575 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1576 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1577 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1578 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1579 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1580 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1581 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1582 (unsigned int *)&i);
1586 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1587 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1597 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1598 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1601 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1602 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1603 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1604 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1605 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1606 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1616 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1617 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1619 /* let's do ECDSA */
1620 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1621 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1622 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1623 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1624 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1625 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1636 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1637 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1643 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1646 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1652 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1653 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1654 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1656 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1659 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1660 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1662 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1666 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1668 unsigned char *p,*d;
1670 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1674 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1678 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1680 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1682 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1691 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1695 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1697 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1698 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1699 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1704 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1705 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1708 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1715 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1716 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1722 /* else no CA names */
1723 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1726 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1727 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1730 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1735 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1736 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1739 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1746 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1749 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1750 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1755 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1763 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1771 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1774 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1775 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1776 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1777 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1780 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1781 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1782 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1783 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1787 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1788 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1790 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1792 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1795 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1796 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1798 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1799 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1800 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1801 * be sent already */
1804 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1812 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1813 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1814 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1815 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1817 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1824 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1825 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
1826 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1831 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1843 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1847 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1849 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1850 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1853 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1855 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1856 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1857 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1858 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1859 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1861 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1862 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1863 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1865 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1866 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1868 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1869 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1870 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1871 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1872 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1873 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1874 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1880 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1881 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1882 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1884 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1885 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1886 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1887 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1891 s->session->master_key_length=
1892 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1893 s->session->master_key,
1895 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1900 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1905 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1917 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1919 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1925 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1927 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1932 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1935 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1942 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1950 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1955 s->session->master_key_length=
1956 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1957 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1958 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1965 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1966 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1967 krb5_data authenticator;
1969 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1970 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1971 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1972 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1973 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1974 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1976 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1977 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1979 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1981 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1984 enc_ticket.length = i;
1986 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1989 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1993 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1994 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1997 authenticator.length = i;
1999 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2002 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2006 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2007 p+=authenticator.length;
2011 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2014 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2017 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2020 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2024 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2025 enc_pms.length + 6))
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2028 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2032 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2036 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2037 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2039 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2040 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2046 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2047 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2049 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2050 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2053 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2054 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2056 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2057 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2063 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2070 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2071 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2073 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2077 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2079 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2082 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2085 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2086 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2089 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2092 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2095 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2098 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2101 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2105 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2108 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2111 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2113 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2114 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2115 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2116 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2117 * the protocol version.
2118 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2119 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2121 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2124 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2129 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2131 s->session->master_key_length=
2132 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2133 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2135 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2137 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2138 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2140 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2141 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2146 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2147 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2148 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2149 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2153 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2156 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2161 const EC_GROUP *group;
2162 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2164 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2165 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2168 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2172 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2175 /* use the certificate */
2176 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2180 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2181 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2183 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2186 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2187 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2189 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2190 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2197 /* Let's get client's public key */
2198 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2201 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2207 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2211 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2215 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2217 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2219 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2220 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2221 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2222 * never executed. When that support is
2223 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2224 * received in the certificate is
2225 * authorized for key agreement.
2226 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2227 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2230 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2232 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2236 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2237 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2243 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2247 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2248 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2250 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2253 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2257 /* Get encoded point length */
2260 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2261 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2267 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2268 * currently, so set it to the start
2270 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2273 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2274 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2275 if (field_size <= 0)
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2281 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2289 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2290 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2291 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2292 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2293 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2295 /* Compute the master secret */
2296 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2297 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2299 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2305 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2307 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2313 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2314 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2318 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2319 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2320 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2321 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2322 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2327 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2329 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2336 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2337 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2338 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2343 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2345 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2347 peer=s->session->peer;
2348 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2349 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2357 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2359 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2360 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2362 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2373 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2377 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2380 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2384 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2387 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2391 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2392 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2398 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2402 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2403 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2406 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2411 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2413 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2414 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2418 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2424 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2432 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2434 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2435 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2436 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2440 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2448 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2450 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2451 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2452 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2456 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2458 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2466 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2475 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2478 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2482 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2484 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2486 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2487 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2489 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2491 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2498 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2500 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2502 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2503 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2506 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2509 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2510 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2513 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2516 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2520 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2522 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2526 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2528 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2537 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2541 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2544 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2546 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2552 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2560 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2564 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2573 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2575 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2576 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2578 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2582 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2583 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2584 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2587 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2593 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2596 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2602 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2603 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2604 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2605 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2607 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2608 * when we arrive here. */
2609 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2611 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2612 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2618 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2619 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2620 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2621 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2622 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2630 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2633 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2634 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2638 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2643 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2645 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2647 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2648 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2649 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2650 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2656 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2657 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2662 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2663 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2668 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2669 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2671 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2672 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2674 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2676 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2678 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2680 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2682 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2684 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2686 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2688 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2690 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2692 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2694 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2696 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2698 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2700 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2702 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2704 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2706 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2708 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2710 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2712 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2714 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2716 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2718 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2720 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2722 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2730 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2732 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2734 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2739 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2740 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2741 unsigned char key_name[16];
2743 /* get session encoding length */
2744 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2745 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2750 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2751 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2752 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2753 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2754 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2755 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2757 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2758 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2759 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2761 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2765 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2767 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2769 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2770 /* Skip message length for now */
2772 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2773 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2774 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2775 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2778 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2780 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
2789 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
2790 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2791 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2792 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2793 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2794 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2796 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2797 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2799 /* Output key name */
2801 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2804 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2805 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2806 /* Encrypt session data */
2807 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2809 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2811 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2813 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2814 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2815 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2818 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2820 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2821 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
2822 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
2824 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
2826 /* number of bytes to write */
2828 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2833 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2834 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2837 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2839 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
2842 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2843 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2844 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2847 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2850 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2853 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
2854 /* message length */
2855 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
2857 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
2858 /* length of OCSP response */
2859 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2860 /* actual response */
2861 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2862 /* number of bytes to write */
2863 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
2864 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2868 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2869 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));