1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
356 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
357 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
359 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
405 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
409 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
411 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
412 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
413 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
414 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
416 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
417 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
419 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
420 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
422 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
427 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
434 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
439 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
441 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
443 /* clear this, it may get reset by
444 * send_server_key_exchange */
445 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
447 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
448 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
450 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
451 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
452 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
453 * be able to handle this) */
454 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
456 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
459 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
460 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
462 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
464 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
465 * message only if the cipher suite is either
466 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
467 * server certificate contains the server's
468 * public key for key exchange.
470 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
471 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
472 * hint if provided */
473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
474 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
477 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
478 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
481 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
483 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
484 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
491 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
492 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
497 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
503 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
504 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
505 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
506 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
507 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
508 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
509 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
510 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
511 * and in RFC 2246): */
512 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
513 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
514 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
515 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
516 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
517 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
518 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
519 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
520 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
521 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
522 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
524 /* no cert request */
526 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
527 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
528 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
529 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
534 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
535 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
536 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
537 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
538 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
540 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
541 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
549 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
550 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
551 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
552 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
556 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
558 /* This code originally checked to see if
559 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
560 * and then flushed. This caused problems
561 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
562 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
563 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
564 * still exist. So instead we just flush
568 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
569 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
574 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
576 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
580 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
581 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
582 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
586 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
588 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
590 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
591 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
594 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
598 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
600 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
605 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
606 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
607 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
608 * message is not sent.
609 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
610 * the client uses its key from the certificate
613 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
614 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
616 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
617 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
619 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
623 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
625 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
627 if (!s->session->peer)
629 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
630 * at this point and digest cached records.
632 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
637 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
638 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
646 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
649 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
650 * a client cert, it can be verified
651 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
652 * should be generalized. But it is next step
654 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
655 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
657 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
658 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
662 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
663 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
674 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
675 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
677 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
678 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
679 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
680 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
682 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
683 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
685 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
686 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
688 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
693 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
696 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
697 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
699 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
704 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
705 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
706 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
707 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
708 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
712 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
713 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
716 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
721 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
722 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
723 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
724 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
725 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
729 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
730 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
731 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
732 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
733 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
739 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
740 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
742 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
743 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
744 { ret= -1; goto end; }
746 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
747 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
749 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
750 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
753 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
754 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
763 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
764 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
765 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
766 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
767 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
768 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
769 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
772 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
773 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
775 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
777 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
778 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
781 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
785 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
790 /* clean a few things up */
791 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
793 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
796 /* remove buffering on output */
797 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
801 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
806 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
808 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
810 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
812 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
826 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
830 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
835 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
839 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
846 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
850 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
854 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
857 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
859 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
860 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
863 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
864 return ssl_do_write(s);
867 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
872 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
873 * so permit appropriate message length */
874 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
880 if (!ok) return((int)n);
881 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
882 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
884 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
886 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
891 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
892 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
894 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
896 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
897 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
901 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
903 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
904 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
907 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
913 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
915 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
916 unsigned int cookie_len;
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
925 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
927 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
930 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
931 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
932 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
933 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
936 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
939 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
942 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
943 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
944 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
945 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
946 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
949 if (!ok) return((int)n);
951 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
953 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
954 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
955 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
958 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
959 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
960 : (s->client_version < s->version))
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
963 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
964 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
966 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
967 s->version = s->client_version;
969 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
973 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
974 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
975 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
977 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
979 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
981 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
982 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
984 if (cookie_length == 0)
988 /* load the client random */
989 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
992 /* get the session-id */
996 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
997 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
998 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
999 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1000 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1002 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1003 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1004 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1005 * setting will be ignored.
1007 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1009 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1014 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1016 { /* previous session */
1023 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1033 cookie_len = *(p++);
1036 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1037 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1038 * does not cause an overflow.
1040 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1043 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1048 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1049 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1052 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1054 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1056 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1059 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1061 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1064 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1066 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1067 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1069 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1071 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1074 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1079 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1081 /* Select version to use */
1082 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1083 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1085 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1086 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1088 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1091 s->version = s->client_version;
1092 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1095 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1096 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1098 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1099 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1104 s->version = s->client_version;
1105 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1108 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1113 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1115 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1116 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1122 /* not enough data */
1123 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1127 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1134 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1135 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1138 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1141 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1143 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1145 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1147 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1148 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1156 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1157 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1160 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1162 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1163 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1164 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1165 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1166 * enabled, though. */
1167 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1168 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1170 s->session->cipher = c;
1177 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1178 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1179 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1189 /* not enough data */
1190 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1199 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1206 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1213 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1215 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1222 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1223 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1224 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1225 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1228 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1229 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1235 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1237 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1239 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1240 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1241 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1244 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1245 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1249 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1250 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1251 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1253 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1258 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1261 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1263 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1264 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1266 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1267 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1272 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1273 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1274 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1275 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1277 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1278 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1280 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1281 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1282 /* Can't disable compression */
1283 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1288 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1289 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1291 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1292 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1294 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1298 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1303 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1304 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1306 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1311 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1318 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1319 { /* See if we have a match */
1320 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1322 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1323 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1325 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1338 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1343 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1344 * using compression.
1346 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1353 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1358 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1359 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1361 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1363 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1364 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1365 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1366 if (ciphers == NULL)
1368 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1373 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1375 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1377 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1380 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1386 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1389 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1391 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1392 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1396 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1400 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1404 /* Session-id reuse */
1405 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1406 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1407 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1408 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1410 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1412 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1413 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1415 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1416 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1418 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1422 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1423 else if (ec != NULL)
1424 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1426 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1430 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1433 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1435 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1439 /* we now have the following setup.
1441 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1442 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1443 * compression - basically ignored right now
1444 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1445 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1446 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1447 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1450 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1451 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1453 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1460 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1464 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1467 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1468 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1471 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1474 unsigned char *p,*d;
1479 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1481 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1482 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1483 p=s->s3->server_random;
1484 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1487 /* Do the message type and length last */
1488 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1490 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1491 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1494 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1495 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1497 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1498 * back in the server hello:
1499 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1500 * we send back the old session ID.
1501 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1502 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1503 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1504 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1506 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1507 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1508 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1509 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1512 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1514 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1516 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1517 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1523 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1526 /* put the cipher */
1527 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1530 /* put the compression method */
1531 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1534 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1537 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1540 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1545 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1547 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1554 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1555 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1558 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1559 return ssl_do_write(s);
1562 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1565 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1567 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1568 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1571 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1572 return ssl_do_write(s);
1575 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1581 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1588 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1589 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1592 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1595 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1596 unsigned char *p,*d;
1606 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1607 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1609 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1614 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1617 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1620 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1622 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1623 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1624 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1627 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1636 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1642 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1647 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1650 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1651 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1652 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1653 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1656 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1661 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1667 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1674 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1675 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1676 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1678 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1687 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1688 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1689 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1690 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1703 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1705 const EC_GROUP *group;
1707 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1708 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1710 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1711 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1712 if (nid != NID_undef)
1713 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1715 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1717 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1718 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1719 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1723 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1728 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1734 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1740 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1742 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1748 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1749 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1750 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1751 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1753 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1760 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1761 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1762 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1768 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1769 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1775 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1776 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1777 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1780 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1787 /* Encode the public key.
1788 * First check the size of encoding and
1789 * allocate memory accordingly.
1791 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1792 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1793 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1796 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1797 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1798 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1799 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1806 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1807 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1808 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1809 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1811 if (encodedlen == 0)
1813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1817 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1819 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1820 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1821 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1822 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1827 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1828 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1836 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1838 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1840 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1841 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1844 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1846 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1848 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1849 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1850 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1851 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1864 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1868 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1870 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1872 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1879 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1880 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1882 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1885 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1888 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1896 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1901 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1903 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1906 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1919 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1921 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1922 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1923 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1924 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1925 * the actual encoded point itself
1927 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1935 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1936 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1938 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1939 encodedPoint = NULL;
1944 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1945 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1947 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1948 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1949 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1950 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1957 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1958 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1960 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1964 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1966 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1967 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1968 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1969 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1970 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1971 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1972 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1973 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1974 (unsigned int *)&i);
1978 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1979 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1991 /* send signature algorithm */
1992 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1994 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1996 /* Should never happen */
1997 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2004 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2007 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2008 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2009 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2010 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2011 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2012 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2019 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2024 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2025 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2031 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2034 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2035 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2036 return ssl_do_write(s);
2038 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2041 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2042 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2044 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2048 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2050 unsigned char *p,*d;
2052 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2056 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2060 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2062 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2064 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2069 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2071 const unsigned char *psigs;
2072 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2074 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2083 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2087 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2089 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2090 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2091 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2096 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2097 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2100 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2107 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2108 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2114 /* else no CA names */
2115 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2118 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2120 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2121 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2123 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2128 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2130 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2138 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2141 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2142 return ssl_do_write(s);
2147 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2151 unsigned long alg_k;
2153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2155 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2159 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2163 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2166 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2167 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2168 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2169 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2172 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2173 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2174 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2175 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2179 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2180 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2182 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2185 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2187 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2188 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2190 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2191 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2192 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2193 * be sent already */
2196 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2204 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2205 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2206 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2207 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2209 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2216 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2217 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2222 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2234 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2238 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2240 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2241 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2244 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2246 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2247 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2248 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2249 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2250 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2252 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2253 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2254 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2256 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2257 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2259 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2260 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2261 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2262 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2263 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2264 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2265 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2271 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2272 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2273 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2275 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2276 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2277 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2278 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2282 s->session->master_key_length=
2283 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2284 s->session->master_key,
2286 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2291 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2294 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2301 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2312 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2313 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2314 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2315 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2318 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2319 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2320 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2321 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2323 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2327 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2329 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2331 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2336 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2340 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2341 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2344 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2345 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2347 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2349 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2353 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2354 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2357 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2364 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2373 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2380 s->session->master_key_length=
2381 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2382 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2383 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2390 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2392 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2393 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2394 krb5_data authenticator;
2396 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2397 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2398 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2399 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2400 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2401 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2403 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2404 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2406 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2408 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2411 enc_ticket.length = i;
2413 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2416 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2420 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2421 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2424 authenticator.length = i;
2426 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2429 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2433 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2434 p+=authenticator.length;
2438 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2441 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2444 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2447 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2451 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2452 enc_pms.length + 6))
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2455 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2459 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2463 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2464 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2466 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2467 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2473 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2474 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2476 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2477 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2480 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2481 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2483 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2484 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2490 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2497 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2498 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2500 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2504 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2506 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2509 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2512 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2513 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2516 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2519 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2522 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2525 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2528 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2532 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2535 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2538 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2540 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2541 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2542 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2543 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2544 * the protocol version.
2545 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2546 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2548 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2551 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2556 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2558 s->session->master_key_length=
2559 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2560 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2562 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2564 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2565 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2567 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2568 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2573 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2574 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2575 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2576 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2580 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2583 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2588 const EC_GROUP *group;
2589 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2591 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2592 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2595 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2599 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2600 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2602 /* use the certificate */
2603 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2607 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2608 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2610 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2613 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2614 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2616 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2617 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2624 /* Let's get client's public key */
2625 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2628 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2634 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2636 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2638 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2642 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2644 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2646 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2647 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2648 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2649 * never executed. When that support is
2650 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2651 * received in the certificate is
2652 * authorized for key agreement.
2653 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2654 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2657 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2659 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2663 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2664 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2670 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2674 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2675 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2677 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2680 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2684 /* Get encoded point length */
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2693 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2694 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2700 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2701 * currently, so set it to the start
2703 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2706 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2707 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2708 if (field_size <= 0)
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2714 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2722 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2723 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2724 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2725 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2726 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2727 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2729 /* Compute the master secret */
2730 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2731 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2733 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2739 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2741 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2742 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2743 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2745 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2747 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2753 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2756 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2759 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2762 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2765 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2769 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2770 * string for the callback */
2771 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2772 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2773 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2774 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2775 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2777 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2780 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2783 else if (psk_len == 0)
2785 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2787 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2788 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2792 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2793 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2795 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2797 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2801 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2802 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2803 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2804 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2807 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2811 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2812 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2813 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2814 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2815 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2818 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2822 s->session->master_key_length=
2823 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2824 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2827 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2834 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2842 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2846 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2851 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2852 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2854 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2858 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2859 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2860 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2861 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2864 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2868 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2877 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2878 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2881 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2882 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2883 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2884 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2885 unsigned long alg_a;
2889 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2890 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2891 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2892 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2893 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2894 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2896 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2897 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2898 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2899 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2900 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2901 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2902 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2903 if (client_pub_pkey)
2905 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2908 /* Decrypt session key */
2909 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2910 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2911 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2918 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2924 /* Generate master secret */
2925 s->session->master_key_length=
2926 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2927 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2928 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2929 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2934 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2935 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2943 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2945 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2951 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2952 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2956 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2957 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2958 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2959 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2960 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2965 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2967 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2973 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2975 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2977 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2978 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2979 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2981 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
2984 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2986 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2988 peer=s->session->peer;
2989 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2990 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2998 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3000 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3001 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3003 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3014 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3018 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3021 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3025 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3028 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3032 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3033 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3034 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3035 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3036 * signature without length field */
3037 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3038 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3044 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3046 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3049 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3054 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3058 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3068 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3072 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3073 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3076 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3080 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3084 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3088 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3092 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3095 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3096 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3099 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3103 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3105 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3112 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3114 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3115 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3119 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3125 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3133 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3135 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3136 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3137 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3141 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3149 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3151 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3152 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3153 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3157 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3159 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3165 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3166 { unsigned char signature[64];
3168 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3169 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3171 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3173 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3174 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3176 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3177 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3180 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3182 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3189 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3198 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3201 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3203 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3204 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3205 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3207 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3208 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3212 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3214 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3216 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3217 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3219 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3221 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3228 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3230 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3232 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3233 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3236 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3239 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3240 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3243 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3246 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3250 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3252 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3256 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3258 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3267 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3271 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3274 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3276 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3282 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3290 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3294 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3303 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3305 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3306 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3308 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3312 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3313 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3314 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3317 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3320 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3321 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3323 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3329 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3332 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3338 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3339 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3340 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3341 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3343 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3344 * when we arrive here. */
3345 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3347 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3348 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3354 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3355 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3356 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3357 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3358 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3366 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3369 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3370 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3374 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3378 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3380 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3383 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3384 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3385 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3392 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3393 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3396 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3397 return ssl_do_write(s);
3400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3401 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3402 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3404 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3406 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3407 const unsigned char *const_p;
3408 int len, slen_full, slen;
3413 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3414 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3415 unsigned char key_name[16];
3417 /* get session encoding length */
3418 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3419 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3422 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3424 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3428 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3430 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3432 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3438 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3440 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3441 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3447 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3448 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3450 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3451 * follows handshake_header_length +
3452 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3453 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3454 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3455 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3457 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3458 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3459 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3461 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3462 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3463 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3464 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3465 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3468 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3470 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3479 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3480 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3481 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3482 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3483 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3484 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3487 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3488 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3489 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3490 * as their sessions. */
3491 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3493 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3495 /* Output key name */
3497 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3500 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3501 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3502 /* Encrypt session data */
3503 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3505 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3507 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3509 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3510 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3511 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3514 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3516 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3517 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3518 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3519 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3521 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3525 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3526 return ssl_do_write(s);
3529 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3531 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3534 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3535 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3536 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3539 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3542 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3545 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3546 /* message length */
3547 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3549 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3550 /* length of OCSP response */
3551 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3552 /* actual response */
3553 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3554 /* number of bytes to write */
3555 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3556 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3560 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3561 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3564 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3565 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3566 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3567 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3570 int proto_len, padding_len;
3572 const unsigned char *p;
3574 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3575 * extension in their ClientHello */
3576 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3582 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3583 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3584 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3586 514, /* See the payload format below */
3592 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3593 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3594 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3595 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3602 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3604 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3606 /* The payload looks like:
3608 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3609 * uint8 padding_len;
3610 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3613 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3615 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3616 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3619 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3620 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3625 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3626 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;